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A Racial Theory of Labour

Racial Capitalism from Colonial Slavery to Postcolonial Migration

Nicholas De Genova

A reconsideration of the crucial historical role of slavery in the consolidation of the global regime of capital accumulation provides a vital source of Marxian critique for our postcolonial present.  The Atlantic slave trade literally transformed African men and women into human commodities.  The reduction of human beings into human commodities, or ‘human capital’ — indeed, into labour and nothing but labour — which was the very essence of modern slavery, served as a necessary predicate for the consolidation and perfecting of what Marx called ‘labour in the abstract,’ and requires us to re-situate enslaved labour as the defining and constitutive limit for how we comprehend labour as such under capitalism.  The production of labour in the abstract, or labour ‘in general,’ depended nonetheless upon concrete productions of sociopolitical difference, particularly the branding of race.  The term ‘Black,’ which was devised to literally and figuratively brand the flesh of enslaved people, was also contrived to signify their particular sociopolitical condition of brutal degradation as the ultimate limit for the subjugation of labour.  Blackness names that limit.  Thus, Blackness is in fact necessary for apprehending labour as such under capitalism.  Marx’s scathing critique of wage labour is always haunted by the long shadow of slavery as its limit figure.  If we comprehend labour to be the antithesis of capital, then to the extent that Blackness names the ultimate condition of labour's subordination and subjection to capital, we need to recognize the tendency forall labour under capital to be pressed toward a sociopolitical condition of Blackness (or approximating Blackness), where Blackness does not name any kind of essential identity but the racialised sociopolitical condition of that subordination/subjection.  Consequently, the labour theory of value — which has always been in fact, more accurately, a value theory of labour — must be complemented with what we might posit to be a racial theory of labour.  Such an ostensibly historical perspective on the foundational role of slavery in the genesis of capitalism is no mere scholastic exercise in the historiography of ‘primitive accumulation,’ however, but rather must be re-purposed toward the ends of elaborating what has remained an as-yet underdeveloped Marxian theory of migrant labour. Extrapolating key insights from Marx’s corpus for the formulation of a racial theory of labour, this essay is ultimately concerned with the ways that slavery supplies capitalism with a defining horizon forall labour, and thus how this insight might instructively serve to comprehend the racialised subordination of migrant labour within our global/ postcolonial sociopolitical order.

 

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

 

The proposition in this essay of a racial theory of labour inevitably seeks to situate labour under capitalism in the broad historical context that would permit for a theory of labour capacious enough to encompass the legacies of enslaved labour in the era of colonial capitalism as inextricable from the contemporary postcolonial regime of global capital accumulation, for which migration – human mobility on a global scale – is a crucial and indispensable feature. While modern slavery and other forms of coerced labour under colonialism were indisputably predicated upon the mass capture and immobilisation of labour in what were, in effect, de facto prison labour camps, such as slave plantations, it is nonetheless also indisputable that such enterprises required the unprecedented mobilisation of human labour on a global scale. The trans-Atlantic slave trade is perhaps the most obvious instantiation of this world historic phenomenon, but colonisation itself similarly entailed a variety of mass-scale human mobilities across the planet, including indentured labour, the transportation of convict labour, settler colonialism, as well as the more heterogeneous dynamics of installing and enforcing colonial rule, administratively and militarily. The present task is not, however, an exercise in historiography, but rather an exercise in theory. Thus, the empirical demonstration or validation of this exercise must, of necessity, be considered beyond the scope of what is feasible within the remit of this short essay. Instead, in the interests of a rethinking of some of the elementary features of Marx’s theorisation of labour under capitalism, this essay will rely upon a method that is principally exegetical. In short, a re-reading of Marx is undertaken here in order to reveal and highlight some of the key components for understanding the racial underpinnings of capitalism that have always been hiding, so to speak, in plain sight.  

From the outset, let it be clear that what is at stake here is a reconsideration of Marx’s theory of labour. When Marx famously initiates his greater project in Volume One of Capital with the proposition that Political Economy ‘has never once asked the question … why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the magniutude of the value of the product,’[i] his solution to that puzzle is – tellingly, if perhaps counter-intuitively for some readers – that capitalism is ‘a social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man.’[ii] That is to say, his purpose is not merely a technical (economistic) investigation into the calculation of economic value, as expressed in wages and the prices of commodities. His emphasis on mastery is emphatically and explicitly political. Building on this crucial but much-neglected (or commonly mis-read) formulation, Diane Elson proposes the concept of ‘a value theory of labour.’ In other words, Elson contends, the labour theory of value has always been in fact, more accurately, a value theory of labour. This reversal of terms serves to underscore that what really mattered for Marx was indeed to producea theory of labour – a theory adequate to the specific ways in which labour is systematically understood and represented under capitalism, as if it were simply a matter of calculating and commensurating quantitatively different but qualitatively homogeneous and interchangeable exercises of labour (in the abstract). Elson explains: ‘My argument is that theobject of Marx’s theory of value was labour. It is not a matter of seeking an explanation of why prices are what they are and finding it in labour. But rather of seeking an understanding of why labour takes the forms it does, and what the political consequences are.’[iii]

Marx was interested in why the substance of labour assumes the particular form that it does under capitalism – a form in which what is predominant is its abstraction as something reducible toquantity. His contention was that this socially and historically specific predominance of abstract labour under capitalism signaled a particular sociopolitical organisation of themastery of human life by production (as its own end), whereby the productive power and creative capacities of human life (refigured and perverted by capital as ‘labour’) is subordinated to a regime of production ‘for the sake of production.’[iv] The crucial role of abstract labour in Marx’s analysis has inadvertently but very regrettably contributed to misreadings that (re-)fetishise and (re-)reify labour as an abstraction, lending apparent credence to reductive notions of the analytical and political primacy of ‘class’ that have frequently been presumed to be fundamentally opposed and inimical to race, relegating race and gender and all other sociopolitical differences to the secondary or derivative status of epiphenomena. The tragedy of such misreadings is that they uncritically recapitulate one of the most egregious and defining premises of capitalist social relations, taking recourse to a notion of labour that is fundamentally abstract, denuded, and disembodied.

Therefore, I will argue in this essay, in a manner that is analogous to Marx’s formulation, that if the mastery of human life – and labour – under capitalism has pervasively assumed the particular form of racial domination, we must similarly demand to understand why. With Marx, we must ask: Why has this content assumed that particular form? And what are the political consequences? This is a matter of deepening our comprehension of the Marxian theory of labour, a theory for which labour is its epistemic object, and sharpening our appreciation of its political ramifications. Such a theory must be adequate to the specific ways in which labour is systematically understood and represented under capitalism as something homogeneous and abstract, yet which in the materiality of lived practice is always embodied, and therefore gendered – and, indeed, racialised. Hence, the necessity ofa racial theory of labour.

Global Capitalism, Racial Capitalism

An elementary predicate of Marx’s analysis of the regime of capital accumulation is its global scope and scale. Indeed, Marx establishes repeatedly that one must understand capital to have been effectively globalfrom its inception. In one of the most forceful articulations of this perspective, in his discussion of ‘the so-called primitive accumulation’ in Volume One ofCapital, Marx declares with a flourish:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterise the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. Hard on their heels follows the commercial war of the European nations, which hasthe globe as its battlefield.[v]

Importantly, Marx’s critique identifies slavery, colonialism, genocide, and warfare as veritable preconditions for the very possibility of capital accumulation. Arguably, this historical analysis, so integral as it truly is for Marx’s understanding of capitalism as such, lends force to the contention that the Marxian critique of capitalism inherently, and of necessity, requires an appreciation that capitalism was always, from the outset, not only global but also racial.

Such a perspective, readily corroborated by Marx’s own analysis, could be taken to command the recognition that what we have come to know as the global regime of capital accumulation is inextricable from a (post)colonial sociopolitical order of white supremacy. Here, then, there is some justifiable grounds for retroactively discerning in the very foundations of the classic Marxian critique of capitalism an incipient conception (albeit insufficiently articulated) of what Cedric Robinson famously designated to be racial capitalism. As Robinson formulates his central argument inBlack Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition:

Racism, I maintain, was not simply a convention for ordering the relations of European to non-European peoples but has its genesis in the ‘internal’ relations of European peoples. As part of the inventory of Western civilisation it would reverberate within and without, transferring its toll from the past to the present. In contradistinction to Marx’s and Engels’s expectations that bourgeois society would rationalize social relations and demystify social consciousness, the obverse occurred. The development, organisation, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force, then, it could be expected that racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism.[vi]

For Robinson, the intrinsically racial character of capitalism in fact derived from a constitutive and already racialised feature of social inequality and hierarchy in the composition and organisation of European social formations themselves. This was plainly not Marx’s perspective. Such historical inquiries and any ensuing disputes notwithstanding, however, it is plain that for Robinson the entrenchment of capitalist social relations on a global scale could only ever be ‘permeated’ by ‘racialism.’ Without allowing ourselves to get detoured by historiographic quibbles over origin stories, capitalist civilisation was inseparable from what Robinson memorably calls ‘the terrible culture of race’:  ‘Race was its epistemology, its ordering principle, its organizing structure, its moral authority, its economy of justice, commerce, and power.’[vii] But could one realistically expect or reasonably conclude otherwise from Marx’s own depiction of ‘the dawn of the era of capitalist production’ as one ‘chiefly’ distinguished by such systemic phenomena as the mass ‘extirpation, enslavement and entombment’ and ‘conquest and plunder’ of indigenous peoples, worldwide, and the notorious ‘commercial hunting of blackskins’? Capitalism, for Marx, was indeed saturated from its inception, not merely ideologically but also materially and practically, with racialism (in Robinson’s phrase):  capitalism has never been other than racial capitalism. 

In light of this historical perspective, what has been insufficiently comprehended, furthermore, is that we are long overdue for a robust renovation of Marxist theory and radical anti-capitalist political practice in light of a more thoroughgoing and comprehensive reevaluation of the central and defining concepts and theoretical categories of Marxian analysis through the critical lens of race. As a contribution to such an endeavor, this essay proposes a reconsideration of the crucial historical role of slavery, especially with respect to advancing a rigorous analysis of labour — and hence, of labour subordination — within the larger configuration of capitalist social relations.  Not simply reducible to a scholastic exercise in the historiography of what Marx characterised as ‘the so-called primitive accumulation’ of capital, and therefore not merely a contribution to a more precise and more supple appreciation of the past, such an endeavor provides a vital source of Marxian critique for apprehending the mobility of labour (and its subordination as ‘migrant’ labour, in particular) within our global postcolonial present, and thus, for formulating any plausible politics that might aspire to a postcapitalist future.

Slavery, Labour, and Blackness

With specific reference to the disfigurement of the nascent struggles by the white working class in the United States because of the coeval existence of slavery, Marx famously proclaimed, ‘Labour in a white skin can never emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin.’[viii] This classic racial watchword of anti-capitalist struggle is no less pertinent today than in Marx’s era. ‘Labour in a white skin cannever emancipate itself,’ Marx notably insisted — never! — wherever whiteness is predicated upon the systemic denigration of Blackness. And where, or when, we may rightly demand, has whiteness evernot been so predicated?

For this, indeed, is the precise historical meaning of whiteness, its significance and salience.[ix] Rather than an immutable, transhistorical, pre-political ‘biological’ essence, racial whiteness is truly ‘a very modern thing,’ as W.E.B. Du Bois memorably put it.[x] Indeed, whiteness is an invention of colonial/racial capitalism, originating in the brutal sociopolitical processes that have come to be known as primitive accumulation.[xi] Referring to this global history of conquest as a material necessity for jump-starting and sustaining the processes of capital accumulation, Marx contends, ‘The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement and murder flowed back to the mother-country and were turned into capital there.’[xii] ‘In fact,’ Marx concludes poignantly, ‘the veiled slavery of the wage labourers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the New World as its pedestal.’[xiii] This formulation’s meaning is unequivocal:  with the phrase ‘needed … as its pedestal,’ Marx plainly contends that slavery was necessary as the base or foundation that materially supported wage labour.[xiv]

Here, it is perhaps helpful to briefly address the substantive historical relationship between slavery and wage labour. To try to address the empirical question of the relative importance of slave labour and wage labour, or their comparative proportions in the production of surplus value during the early history of capitalism, is, in a strict sense, plainly unanswerable. Apart from the sheer paucity of any comprehensive body of data that might plausibly support such an econometric comparison, there is the more fundamental dilemma of truly apprehending capitalism as an effectively global socioeconomic formation, for which any recourse to the fiction of a ‘national’ economy is inherently fallacious and misleading.  ‘The political economy of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Atlantic,’ Walter Johnson argues cogently, ‘[was] a single space, its dimensions defined by flows of people, money, and goods, its nested temporalities set by interlocking (though clearly distinct) labour regimes, cyclical rhythms of cultivation and foreign exchange, and shared standards of calculability and measurement,’[xv] in which slave labour and wage labour were ‘two poles of [a] single Atlantic economy’ characterised by ‘dynamic simultaneity.’[xvi] Similarly advancing a ‘broad conception of totality,’ Dale Tomich argues, slave labour was ‘part of the organisation of social labour on the world scale … a specific form of commodity production that [was] related to other such forms through the world market and international division of labour,’ while it was precisely the world market and division of labour that supplied and sustained the conditions of possibility for the reproduction of slave labour.[xvii]A materialist and historical analysis,’ Johnson clarifies, ‘begins from the premise that in actual historical fact there was no nineteenth-century capitalism without slavery. However else industrial capitalism might have developed in the absence of slave-produced cotton and Southern capital markets, it did not develop that way.’[xviii]

Cotton was indeed ‘the Industrial Revolution’s most essential commodity,’[xix] and cotton produced by enslaved labour in the southern United States became ‘the most widely traded commodity in the world.’[xx] As the world’s primary producer of cotton, the United States occupied ‘a distinctive position in the global economy.’[xxi] In 1860, on the eve of the U.S. Civil War, fully three-quarters of U.S. cotton was being produced for export, providing British industry in particular (the global epicenter of wage labour) no less than 70 percent of this vital raw material.[xxii] Consequently, slavery must be recognised to have been ‘indispensable to the economic development of the United States’ as evidenced by ‘some basic facts:  that slave-grown cotton was the most valuable export made in America, that the capital stored in slaves exceeded the combined value of all the nation’s railroads and factories, that foreign investment underwrote the expansion of plantation lands …that the highest concentration of steam power in the United States was to be found along the Mississippi [River],’ the waterway traversing the heartland of the expanded slave economy, rather than any site in the northeastern region where economic development was driven by industrial capitalism.[xxiii]Exceeding the total number of free migrants who moved to the United States between the time of the Revolution and 1850, and despite British and U.S. abolitions of the slave trade in1808, the fifty years that preceded the Civil War saw more than four million enslaved people forcibly imported into New World slavery’s most intensive zones of production and profit-making, with ‘the total number of enslaved people in the New World [increasing] dramatically, from about five million to about seven million.’[xxiv]  Comparatively, the population engaged in wage labour in the United States during this period remained quite small, especially in agriculture. ‘The wage labour market in the US was perennially plagued by labour shortages.… as late as 1860 there was only one wage labourer for every two farms in the North.’[xxv]Moreover, slavery was indispensable for the dramatic advances in industrial capitalism in Britain, and thus for the very creation of its wage-labour proletariat.[xxvi] ‘Neither Britain nor any other country that followed it down the path of textile-based industrialisation could have accomplished an economic transformation without the millions of acres of cotton fields of the expanding American South.’[xxvii] To substitute the cotton that British industry imported from U.S. slave labour camps with a comparable amount of wool, for instance, ‘Britain in 1830 would have had to devote 23 million acres to sheep pasture—more than the sum total of the island’s agricultural land.’[xxviii] Likewise, as Edward Baptist demonstrates, ‘The total gain in productivity per [enslaved] picker from 1800 to 1860 was almost 400 percent – precisely the same as ‘the increase in the efficiency of [wage] workers who tended spinning machines in Manchester cotton mills’ between 1819 and 1860, when the same figure for workers in weaving mills ‘improved by 600 to 1,000 percent.’ Therefore, Baptist argues, ‘even as textile factories harnessed increasingly complex machinery to more powerful non-human energy sources …[enslaved] cotton pickers produced gains in productivity similar to those of [wage labour in] cotton factories.’[xxix] Driving all of this world historic capitalist expansion, in a fundamental sense, was the feverish ever-rising productivity of slave labour, which was derived from what Baptist depicts as ‘a dynamically evolving technology’ predicated on measurement, forced innovation, and torture[xxx]:  ‘Whips rose and fell. And cotton-picking rates rose inexorably….  The whip made cotton.’[xxxi] ‘The scientific principle of every cotton labour camp [was] a metaphorical whipping-machine:  a technology for controlling and exploiting human beings, calibrating increments of torture to extract both efficient production of pounds of cotton and endless, dynamic improvements to that efficiency.’[xxxii] These continuous increases in the efficiency of slave labour meant ever-lower real prices for cotton, which then increased the surplus value that was reinvested as capital in still more efficient factory machinery, as well as bolstering the astounding profits of both industrial capitalists and slave owners, revenues for governments, and higher wages for the new industrial working class.[xxxiii]

In Marx’s invocation of slavery as the proverbial pedestal for the exploitation of wage labour, he identifies a particular condition for the actual historical genesis of capital, but provides no extended elaboration of the interrelation of slavery and wage labour. Instead, because Marx’s principal aim is to theoretically clarify the capital-wage labour relation, he prioritises the logical development of its form in a manner that, in effect, treats slavery as a kind of externality.[xxxiv] Nonetheless, contemporary historiography abundantly verifies what  Marx already plainly knew:  ‘historically, slavery was a key means of expanding commodity production, creating a world market, and providing the substantive conditions for the development of the capital-wage labour form.’[xxxv]However, as Dale Tomich notes, ‘the historical hierarchy among forms of labour is not, and cannot be, the same as the theoretical hierarchy.’[xxxvi] This conceptual autonomy of slavery and ‘capitalism’ has regrettably led many would-be Marxists astray, treating both terms as ahistorical, static, abstract categories presumed to be fundamentally inimical, and in this way recapitulating some of the elementary conceits of classical bourgeois political economy regarding the presumptively greater productivity and efficiency of wage labour over slave labour, and thus upholding the notion of their irreconcilability.[xxxvii] As James Oakes remarks tellingly, ‘Nowadays, the bourgeois critique of slavery is kept alive primarily by Marxist historians.’[xxxviii] Indeed, whereas for much of history wage labour was ‘perceived as something akin to slavery,’[xxxix] it was precisely one of the paramount ideological achievements of the advancing bourgeois ethos of industrial capitalist society during the early to mid-nineteenth century, particularly in the form of what is known as labour republicanism in the United States, that wage labour came to be pervasively coded as ‘free labour.’ The racialisation of ‘free’ labour as the proper station and comparatively virtuous status of white workers, in contradistinction with African American enslavement as well as the ‘slavish’ condition of myriad other categories of people of color, was utterly crucial and decisive.[xl]

Marx relies extensively on the heuristic utility of contrasts between slave labour and wage labour, precisely to underscore the affinities between the two. Furthermore, he does not shun depictions of ostensibly ‘free’ (waged) labour as a reconstructed form of servitude: ‘The starting-point of the development that gave rise both to the wage-labourer and to the capitalist was the enslavement of the worker.’[xli] The characterisation of wage labour as a ‘veiled’ form of slavery, notably, speaks directly to Marx’s preoccupation with why labour (and its mastery) systematically appears under capitalism in this particular form:  ‘the value and price of labour-power’ come to be expressed in the form of wages, and thus ‘makes the actual relation invisible, and indeed presents to the eye the precise opposite of that relation,’ thereby supplying the basis for ‘all the notions of justice held by both the worker and the capitalist … all capitalism’s illusions of freedom.’[xlii]  Nonetheless, Marx also discerned in the ‘unqualified slavery’ of colonial capitalism the production of commodities for the world market whereby ‘the civilised horrors of over-work are grafted onto the barbaric horrors of slavery.’[xliii] Hence, New World slavery was not only a material and practical prerequisite for that illusory freedom attributed to wage labour, but also a kind of exemplar of the raw unveiled truth of labour under capitalism. Thus, Marx’s analysis would seem to command a deeper interrogation of labour as such by way of a more frank encounter with labour in its proverbial Black ‘skin.’

The ‘trade in men’ (and women, and children), in Du Bois’s account, ‘came in time to be founded on racial caste, and this caste was made the foundation of a new industrial system.’[xliv] As a result, the ‘doctrine of race’ arising from this primitive accumulation to justify and legitimate the subjugation of indigenous, colonised, and enslaved peoples thereafter had to be ‘frantically rationalised in every possible direction.’[xlv] That racial whiteness has, since its inception, been an equivocal and treacherous fabrication, therefore, ought to be fairly evident. Nevertheless, the semblance of objectivity and purity customarily attributed to whiteness — its precisely un-natural yet terrifyingly naturalised social reality — has been forged and exalted only through a bloody history and a system of rule predicated on racial hierarchy in which whiteness has systematically been exclusively guarded as the most privileged status — which is to say, in short, white supremacy. As Du Bois memorably remarked, ‘there was but one unanimity’ among the various rivals for imperial prerogative – ‘the doctrine of the divine right of white people to steal.’[xlvi] Du Bois eloquently if acerbically exposed what he called the ‘religion of whiteness,’[xlvii] for which ‘whiteness is the ownership of the earth forever and ever, Amen!’[xlviii]

White supremacy is a social and political order of domination and subordination that systemically generates and upholds inequalities of wealth, power, and prestige by privileging racialised whiteness over and above all other categories of ‘racial’ identity. Foundational racialised distinctions and meanings, such as ‘white’ or ‘Black,’ were literally invented, imposed, and enforced through various iterations of the global regime of European/colonial supremacy, retroactively. They appear as the transparent and self-evident (‘natural’) names for differences that only came to have significance and gravity because the particular forms of exploitation and domination that created them required and relied upon their naturalisation. Whiteness, like Blackness, is however no mere fact of nature; it is fact of white supremacy.

To adequately adapt Marx’s critique of the racial coordinates of capitalism and the perplexities of labour in one or another racial ‘skin,’ we must conceive of Blackness as more capacious than a mere synonym for African origin or ancestry alone. We need recourse to a conception of Blackness that corresponds to the full range of racialised categories that white supremacy has orchestrated under the sign of negation. In other words, I refer here not to any supposedly ‘objective’ or ‘natural’ sort of (phenotypic, quasi-’biological’) racial Blackness that might be more conventionally attributed to people of African origin or descent in particular, but rather to the pronouncedly heterogeneous spectrum of all those categories of humanity that European settler colonialism and imperialism unrelentingly produced as colonised and enslaved ‘natives,’ and thus as expressly not-’white.’ Indeed, this was never merely a matter of racial ideology alone, but also of the material and practical transfer of plantation management personnel and ‘expertise’ across the colonial world, within and between empires, whereby the practices of racialised labour subordination were inextricable from the racial subjugation and denigration of subject peoples.[xlix] Hence, in the annals of colonial white supremacy, the compendium of heterogeneous terms and epithets devoted to racial Blackness has often been deployed rather promiscuously to name or denigrate a quite variegated array of phenotypically diverse colonised subjects. What has always been paramount, however, is their relegation to a subordinated status denied and expelled from whiteness.

Moreover, we may instructively apprehend ‘Blackness’ not primarily (or not exclusively) as a literal attribute of the ‘skin’ per se, but rather as the preeminent figure of racialised subordination within a global regime of white supremacy. The people of Africa — who were hunted, captured, kidnapped, commodified, trafficked, shackled, deported, tortured, raped, mutilated, and killed, all in order to subject them to a permanent regime of brutally coerced labour — were the only category of humanity in the modern world order, as Achille Mbembe argues, ‘whose skin has been transformed into the form and spirit of merchandise — the living crypt of capital.’[l] Indeed, if the Atlantic slave trade literally transformed African persons into ‘human-objects, human-commodities, human-money,’[li] the term ‘Black’ that was devised to brand their particular flesh nonetheless ‘was invented to signify exclusion, brutalisation, and degradation, to point to a limit constantly conjured and abhorred.’[lii] Consequently, and above all else, Blackness names that limit.

Inasmuch as the objectification of human productive power and creative capacity is precisely what is at stake in Marx’s critique of the capital-labour relation, predicated as it is upon the commodification of the capacity for work (labour-power), the reduction of human beings into ‘human-objects, human-commodities, human-money’ — indeed, ‘human capital’ — which was the very essence of modern slavery, requires us to re-situate enslaved labour as the defining and constitutive limit for how we comprehend labour itself under capitalism.[liii] This, after all, is precisely what Marx describes in his analysis of the struggle over the working day.  From the standpoint of capital, Marx clarifies, even for ostensibly ‘free’ (waged) labour:

The working-day contains the full 24 hours.… Hence it is self-evident that the labourer is nothing other than labour-power for the duration of his whole life, and that therefore all his disposable time is by nature and by right labour-time, to be devoted to the self-valorisation of capital, to be devoted to the self-expansion of capital…. But in its blind measureless drive, its insatiable appetite for surplus labour, capital oversteps not only the moral, but even the merely physical limits of the working-day…. It is not the normal maintenance of the labour-power which determines the limits of the working-day here, but rather the greatest possible daily expenditure of labour-power, no matter how diseased, compulsory and painful it may be, which determines the limits of the workers’ period of rest. Capital asks no questions about the length of life of labour-power. What interests it is purely and simply the maximum of labour-power that can be set in motion in a working day. It attains this objective by shortening the life of labour-power….[liv]

Marx’s scathing critique of wage labour is always haunted by the long shadow of slavery as its limit figure.[lv] Insofar as Blackness is inextricable from the historical experience of modern slavery as a kind of name, indeed a racialised branding, for that historically specific limit of human objectification and commodification, we may begin to recognise that all labour under capitalism may itself be understood to be at leasttendentially encompassed under this racialised sign as the antithesis of capital. This, indeed, is what ensures that labour ‘in a white skin’ – labour identified with racial whiteness, and thus invested in the treacherous material and practical benefits of white supremacy – cannever emancipate itself. Such an investment in whiteness obfuscates what Marx decried as ‘the enslavement of the worker’ to capital, and very reliably renders ‘white’ workers as labour-for-capital. This, furthermore, is why capitalism requires white supremacy and will always sustain the advantages that accrue to those who have come to be racialised as white, which Du Bois famously recognised to be the symbolic and psychological ‘wages’ of whiteness.[lvi] Marx underscores the centuries-long incubation and development of capitalist social relations ‘required before the ‘free’ worker … makes a voluntary agreement, i.e. is compelled by social conditions to sell the whole of his active life, his very capacity for labour, in return for the price of his customary means of subsistence, to sell his birthright for a mess of pottage.’[lvii] This same historical process was substantially concurrent with the genesis of a global (colonial capitalist) regime of white supremacy, which similarly compelled those putatively ‘free’ workers racialised as white to trade their human birthright for the disfigurement of whiteness, and to accommodate themselves to capitals’ mastery over them in exchange for the paltry benefits of their sociopolitical alignment with the master race – a mess of racial pottage.  

If we comprehend labour to be the antithesis of capital, then to the extent that Blackness names the ultimate condition of labour’s subordination and subjection to capital, we need to recognise the tendency for all labour under capital to be pressed toward a sociopolitical condition of Blackness (or approximating Blackness), where Blackness does not name any kind of essential identity but the racialised sociopolitical condition of that subordination/subjection. This may be taken to be a corollary to the proposition that enslavement is the limit figure for all labour under capitalism, and that there is a tendency to press all labour toward that limit. Inasmuch as this dynamic is relational and tendential, and thus signals the larger workings of a system, we have an analytic that can encompass the full range of sociopolitical differences and contradictions (racialised or otherwise) along an unstable and contingent continuum of relative freedom/unfreedom.

While never denying or disregarding the historical specificity of African experiences of white supremacy and the particularity for Africans and all people of African ancestry of being racialised as Black,[lviii] we nonetheless require a more expansive and capacious understanding of Blackness as a sociopolitical category that, likewise, tendentially encompasses the whole spectrum of racialised social identities produced as non-white within our global postcolonial regime of white supremacy. Here, we may recall that in his landmark text,The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois proposes aglobal conceptual framework for apprehending his subject: ‘The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line –– the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.’[lix] In the aftermath of the era of decolonisation that defined the latter half of the twentieth century, the problem of the color line has become widely synonymous with borders. Contemporary postcolonial migration and refugee movements may therefore be recognised as providing crucial sites for what Mbembe has tellingly depicted as ‘the Becoming Black of the world,’[lx] whereby ‘the systematic risks experienced specifically by Black slaves during early capitalism have now become the norm for, or at least the lot of, all of subaltern humanity,’[lxi] in which ‘the term ‘Black’ has been generalised,’[lxii] and there is a ‘tendency to universalize the Black condition.’[lxiii]

Race, Difference, and the Abstraction of Labour

If I am emphasizing race (and specifically, Blackness) as a decisive analytical tool for ultimately unpacking the global question of labour within our postcolonial condition, generally (and for the question of migrant labour, in particular) it is because Blackness is in fact necessary for apprehending labour as such under capitalism. When he proclaimed, ‘Labour in a white skin can never emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin,’ Marx chose his words well. By evoking thebranding of the flesh of enslaved African/American labour, Marx tersely but precisely named the visceral corporeality and sheer cruelty of slavery’s dehumanizing violence, while yet naming a more diffuse process of racialisation whereby Blackness itself could be inferred to be both the result of a kind of sociopolitical branding as well as that very physical process of branding itself. In other words, the production of racial distinctions in the modern capitalist world has itself been a continuous and ever unfinished process of branding. Blackness (and race, more generally) has been an elemental and foundational figure for theoretically interrogating the sociopolitical production ofdifference within our capitalist modernity.

The theoretical stakes of this intervention revolve around what is necessarily a mutually constitutive engagement in my scholarly work with both race and migration; they are not reducible, however, to any ostensibly delimited question of ‘identity.’ In other words, the stakes here are emphatically not to apprehend ‘difference’ as if it were merely an unfortunate or cumbersome, pre-political (quasi-natural) pretext for various properly political tactics of labour subordination and strategies of divide-and-rule, serving to undermine the unity of a presumptively unitary ‘working class.’ Rather, I am proposing that we cannot adequately comprehend Marx’s theory of labour under capitalism, as such, without further pursuing this inquiry into the puzzle of ‘labour in a white skin’ and, concomitantly, labour branded as Black.

Capital can never extract from labour the abstract (eminently social) substance that is ‘value’ except with recourse to the abstraction of labour-power, which however can only be derived from the palpable vital energies of living labour. As an operative, indeed decisive, category of capital accumulation, labour-power (abstract labour) never ceases to pertain to real flesh-and-blood (embodied, and hence, racialised) working people (concrete labour). As Marx explains:

With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also disappears; this in turn entails the disappearance of the different concrete forms of labour. They can no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract.… There is nothing left of them in each case but the same phantom-like objectivity; they are merely congealed quantities of homogenous human labour, i.e. of human labour-power.… As crystals of this social substance, which is common to them all, they are values — commodity values.[lxiv]

Marx affiliated concrete (variegated) labour with the use-value of the distinct products of that labour, and therefore with the whole heterogeneous panoply of positive, determinate, qualitative specificities — in short, with difference as such, and therefore with the historically specific and socially distinctive aspects of human life. In contrast, it was the systemic requirement for abstract labour as a generic form that served to elucidate the historically specific but global character of alienation, exploitation, and fetishism under capitalism.

Notably, Marx discerned these global capitalist socioeconomic processes to be uneven in their development, and therefore, to be most abundantly evidenced in the United States.

Indifference toward specific labours conforms to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference…. Such a state of affairs is at its most developed in the most modern form of existence of bourgeois society — in the United States. Here, then, for the first time, the point of departure of modern economics, namely the abstraction of the category ‘labour,’ ‘labour as such,’ labour pure and simple, becomes true in practice. The simplest abstraction, then, which modern economics places at the head of its discussions, and which expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms of society, nevertheless achieves practical truth as an abstraction only as a category of the most modern society.[lxv]

Remarkably, what for Marx was the epitome of ‘the most modern society,’ or more precisely, ‘the most modern form of existence of bourgeois society’ (as a virtually ‘pure’ form of capitalist society) — the United States — was, we may recall, precisely a social formation that had been materially and practically built upon large-scale plantation slavery, and a sociopolitical order of white supremacy. And it was here, where the branding of labour in the racialised ‘skin’ of Blackness was likewise exceedingly advanced, that there emerged the most pure form of the abstraction of ‘labour’ as such, of labour ‘in general.’

In his account of the formation of capital, Marx establishes an analytical opposition between ‘two very different kinds of commodity owners; on the one hand, the owners of money, means of production, means of subsistence, who are eager to valorise the sum of values they have appropriated by buying the labour-power of others; on the other hand, free workers, the sellers of their own labour-power, and therefore the sellers of labour. Free workers, in the double sense that they neither form part of the means of production themselves, as would be the case with slaves, serfs, etc., nor do they own the means of production.’[lxvi] In this regard, there is an emphatic heuristic contrast drawn between the figures of ‘free workers’ (or ‘free labour’) and ‘slaves.’ It is precisely this figure of ‘free’ labour that serves to underscore the historically specific character of the emergence of labour-power as the commodified objectification of the human capacity to work (labour in the abstract), which distinguishes the ostensibly contractual and purely voluntary transaction that is understood to transpire in the capitalist labour market between owners of the means of production and wage labourers – as if they were the mere sellers of just another commodity like any other. Nonetheless, these putatively ‘free’ workers are scathingly depicted by Marx as those ‘who have nothing to sell except their own skins.’[lxvii] Moreover, Marx explains, referring specifically to the historical dissolution of feudalism, ‘these newly freed men became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And this history, the history of their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.’[lxviii] This indeed is one of the premier formulations by which we understand the concept of (‘the so-called’) primitive accumulation: ‘So-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as ‘primitive’ because it forms the pre-history of capital, and of the mode of production corresponding to capital.’[lxix] Nevertheless, these processes of expropriation and dispossession, we know, just as Marx knew, were — and continue to be — coterminous with the generalisation of the wage-labour relation. Their character as ‘prior’ to capitalism proper is strictly apparent and is presented in this manner by Marx for analytical purposes. In fact, they were not only constitutive, historically, of capital and indeed necessary preconditions for the formation of a regime of capital accumulation, but they have co-existed with the more pure ideal type of capitalist (wage-)labour relations throughout the ongoing history of ‘actually existing’ capitalism, which has never ceased to be written in blood and fire.[lxx] In this respect, centuries of New World slavery cannot be reduced to a mere residual of some putative pre-history of ‘true’ capitalist relations.

The racial branding of labour that Marx identifies in the context of New World slavery was a necessary and truly definitive feature of the brutality required for the subjugation of enslaved African/American labour but also for the elaborate sociopolitical and sociolegal machinations devised to produce the global/colonial fact of Blackness. Importantly, I contend, it was likewise this same branding, this same production of racialised difference, that served as a necessary predicate for the consolidation and perfecting of what Marx called ‘labour in the abstract.’ Labour in the abstract — a figure of labour literally shorn of its humanity and stripped of all qualitative specificities — was possible historically only through the real stripping and degradation of the actual human life of the enslaved and colonised into a form of life that could be classed as virtually sub-human.  And after all, as Gargi Bhattacharyya notes, ‘capitalism cannot function if we all are allowed to become fully human.’[lxxi]

To be rendered as labour in the abstract is to be reduced to labour and nothing but labour. This was the precise project of modern slavery. This of course is not to suggest that such a project was ever successfully fulfilled or completed. Enslaved people were never reduced to a condition so abject as to be shorn of their distinctly human subtlety and suppleness. On the contrary, the irrepressibly human creative powers and potentialities of enslaved African/Americans were not only a veritable font of continuous insubordination and rebellion, but also a foundational source for the very notion of freedom and the unfinished work of emancipation in our modern world.[lxxii] Nor is it to suggest, on the other hand, that enslaved people were the ostensible owners and sellers of that distinctly capitalist commodity that Marx designated as labour-power. However, there never could have emerged this social fiction of labour-power —whereby the capacity to work could be rendered as if it were simply one more commodity for sale in the market — without a pre-history in which the myriad forms of concrete labour became reduced and generalised (that is to say, abstracted) into a figure of labour in the abstract, labour ‘in general.’ For the historically specific emergence and consolidation of this peculiarly modern form of generic ‘labour,’ slavery was constitutive. There was simply no more perfect approximation of the elusive figure of labour in the abstract than the social condition inflicted on enslaved people by modern slavery — that distinctly capitalist sociopolitical regime that worked assiduously and unrelentingly to reduce a whole category of human life to labour and nothing but labour.

The production of labour in the abstract, or labour ‘in general,’ furthermore, depended upon concrete productions of sociopolitical difference, for which acts of physical, corporeal branding were merely a cruel punctuation to the more general branding of race. Once again, I hasten to clarify that this is in no sense an essentialist proposition about ‘race’ as any kind of ‘real’ (pseudo-natural, phenotypic, quasi-biological) category of difference among distinct varieties of human being, but rather an insistence on the eminently social and political reality of race as a defining and organizing principle for the historical production of difference, inequality, and hierarchy within the global labour regime of capitalism.

The homogenised abstraction of labour-power could be generated only under the aegis of the social production of real heterogeneity and inequality, such as that which Du Bois famously called ‘the problem of the color line,’[lxxiii] or analogously, what Partha Chatterjee has designated as ‘the rule of colonial difference.’[lxxiv] In other words, the capital-labour relation — which appears to be merely a matter of narrowly ‘economic’ relations — must always be understood in terms of its actual politics, which is to say, the power struggles at stake in the disputes over the historically specific social production of difference.[lxxv] As Bhattacharyya incisively puts the question, alongside an ‘overarching instrumentalisation of human life, how are some deemed (even) less?’[lxxvi] Capital’s apparent (economic) indifference to, or disregard for, the specificities of the terms of conditions for extracting the maximum surplus value has only ever been sustained in practice through the actual (political) struggles that differentiate living labour toward the very instrumental end of maximizing its subordination and exploitation. Such a politics of difference at work within the genesis of abstract labour has always been inextricable from the real history of racial subjugation, for which slavery remains a primal scene.

Labour Mobility, Migrant ‘Illegality,’ and Branding

In the remainder of this essay, I will re-purpose this ostensibly historical perspective on the foundational role of slavery in the genesis of colonial capitalism toward the ends of elaborating what has remained an as-yet underdeveloped Marxian theory of migrant labour within the contemporary postcolonial condition.[lxxvii] My endeavor is not to identify and denounce the contemporary existence of diverse forms of ‘virtual’ or ‘new slavery,’ nor to subsume a discussion of migrant labour within a comparable exposé of the vicious and coercive features of human trafficking. While there is surely no shortage of truly horrific exploitation and oppression in the world today, including a whole sordid spectrum of forms of outright enslavement, I am reluctant to contribute to the sensationalisation of such spectacles of victimisation, both because they often serve, however inadvertently or unwittingly, to re-stabilise ‘normal’ exploitation as effectively legitimate and proper, and because they tend to conceal or suppress the subjective dimensions, however constrained and contradictory, of those who are thus objectified and subjugated by the cruelty of their exploiters.[lxxviii] Rather, having extrapolated key insights from Marx’s corpus for the formulation of a racial theory of labour, I am concerned with the ways that slavery as a specific system of (colonial capitalist) labour subordination supplies capitalism with a defining horizon for all labour, and thus how this insight might instructively serve to comprehend the racialised subordination of migrant labour within our global/ postcolonial sociopolitical order.  A comprehensive Marxian theory of migration commands a critical attention to theorizing questions of the state, law, nationalism, borders, and citizenship, as well as race (among other social formations of ‘difference’). My focus here will continue to highlight questions of race and labour.

Migration provides a key site for contemplating the mobility of labour ‘as such’ — labour ‘in general,’ or labour in the abstract. Simply put, there could be ‘no capitalism without migration.’[lxxix] Simultaneously, the global mobility of labour is in fact inexorably embroiled in the production of difference, particularly the spatialised difference that is produced by (‘national’) state borders.[lxxx] Indeed, in a world social order that delegates the expressly political tasks of labour’s subordination and coercion to localised (territorially delimited) formations of more or less organised violence (customarily, ‘national’ state formations),[lxxxi] borders and their enforcement become critical sites of labour subordination, mediating the global relation of capital and labour through various interventions that differentiate the mobility of labour according to the juridical categories that govern migration. Thus, if there were no borders, there would be no ‘migration’ as such – only mobility.[lxxxii]

As the veritable source of all value, it is not unreasonable to say that labour-power is the premier commodity in the global circuitry of capitalist exchange. Capital has made and relentlessly re-made the world in its own image, and according to its chaotic requirements — bursting asunder every apparent barrier in the creation of an ever more unobstructed global arena for profit-making and the continuous re-consolidation of a global division of labour.[lxxxiii] Likewise, necessarily and inevitably, there has also been a concomitant escalation in the mobility of labour-power – arguably, above and beyond that of any other commodity (except money capital itself). Whereas other commodities are generally transported in order to be exchanged and consumed, once and for all, capital’s continuous and unrelenting appetite for labour-power requires that living labour must be constantly replenished in order that it may be repeatedly ‘consumed’ anew.[lxxxiv] Thus, the global movement of homogenised, abstract labour is finally embodied in the restless life and death of labour in a rather more ‘concrete’ form -- which is to say, actual migrant working men and women. While Marx restricted his use of the concept of ‘concrete labour’ to refer to the heterogenous variety of specific forms of work that produced distinct products or contributions to the larger labour process, I adapt this distinction between abstract and concrete labour here to insist on the ways in which labour in the abstract is never separable from its embodiment in living labour, replete with all the qualitative differences that may otherwise be assembled under the heading of ‘concrete’ labour. The accelerated mobility of labour-power is similarly inseparable, then, from the migration of actual (corporeal) human beings and all the concomitant differences that accrue to them through the mediation of border regimes and immigration law.

In the mass exodus of the Irish fleeing the potato famine of 1846, for instance, Marx notably recognised what he characterised as ‘a systematic process.’[lxxxv] The Irish exodus entailed ‘a new way of spiriting a poor people thousands of miles away from the scene of its misery.’[lxxxvi] It also served, in effect, as ‘one of the most lucrative branches of [Ireland’s] export trade.’[lxxxvii] By exporting the labour-power of its surplus population while also mobilizing the migrants themselves as a source of remittances, Marx noted, the exodus not only subsidised those left behind but further fueled migration by financing the travel costs of subsequent generations of migrants. From the opposite vantage point of the United States, Marx discerned with respect to Irish labour migration a parallel process of importation — ‘the importation of paupers.’[lxxxviii] As Michael Burawoy classically demonstrated, migrant labour likewise entails a systematic separation of the exploitation of labour-power from the sites (and costs) of its reproduction.[lxxxix] As with the mobility of capital itself, which exudes a pronounced indifference toward the particular forms of the labour process where it invests in favor of a maximisation of surplus value, and is in this sense exceedingly versatile, so also with the human mobility of labour. Migrant labour mobility is a supreme instance of flexibility, commonly compelled to regard the particular content of one or another type of work with relative indifference, and to render up its labour-power wherever and however it may be required.

The inclination that Marx discerned with regard to the mobility of capital to surmount any ‘legal [or other] extra-economic impediments to its freedom of movement’ is yet another aspect of this versatility of migrant labour.[xc] Nevertheless, depicting Ireland’s precisely colonial condition in terms of ‘a government … maintained only by bayonets and by a state of siege sometimes open and sometimes disguised,’[xci] Marx also discerned how the ‘forced immigration of poor Irishmen’ into the industrial cities of England had enabled the capitalist class to cultivate ‘two hostile camps’ defined by the ‘profound antagonism between the Irish proletariat and the English proletariat,’ whereby ‘the average English worker hates the Irish worker … [and] regards him somewhat like thepoor whites of the Southern States of North America regard their black slaves.’[xcii]  The ‘tendency to universalize the Black condition,’[xciii] so provocatively articulated by Mbembe for the contemporary postcolonial subaltern condition on a global scale, was plainly evident already for Marx.  This is so, I am insisting, because slavery was already the inexorable limit figure for all forms of labour under capitalism, and consequently, Blackness always already supplied the racialised cipher for signaling the most extreme manifestations of modern exploitation.

For present purposes, it is likewise crucial to recall that even for those who come to be racialised as Black, we must guard against naturalizing what has always and everywhere been an historically specific sociopolitical process of producing them as ‘Black.’ In this regard, Stuart Hall’s reflections on his experience as a Black migrant are quite poignant: ‘I’d never called myself black ever in my life.... So it was a discovery for me, a rediscovery [in Britain] of the Caribbean in new terms ... and a rediscovery of the black subject.... I didn’t choose that. I had no alternative.’[xciv] In other words, although the centuries-old racialisation of enslaved Africans and their descendants in the New World was indisputably a defining crucible for the global/colonial racial formation of Blackness, it was nonetheless the postcolonial migrant encounter with Europe that was, in Hall’s experience, tantamount to a migration into Blackness, a re-racialisation, a subordination and subjection that was inextricable from the ongoing and unfinished business of (re-)producing racial distinctions and meanings. His migration, and moreover, his migrant condition, required that he be socially and politically inscribed, and thus racially branded — as Black.

The ‘Blackness’ of racially subjugated migrants is therefore always something fundamentally new, to be continuously ‘discovered’ by migrants as they endure and confront the larger social forces working to produce them as racial objects and thereby also as (re-)racialised subjects, and thus compelling them to ‘re-discover’ themselves racially. It is necessary, then, that we recognize the fundamentally racial character of migration within and throughout the world capitalist system,[xcv] while also underscoring the contemporary salience of the figures of migration and refugee movements for destabilizing, de-naturalizing, and de-essentializing yet again the pernicious persistence of encrusted and ossified racial nomenclatures. The persistently racial salience of migration is as indisputable as is the pivotal importance of migration in demonstrating the profoundly unstable and historically mutable character of race as an eminently social construction, implicated always in unresolved sociopolitical struggles over its meanings and lived consequentiality.[xcvi] Thus, it is productive once more to insist on a conception of Blackness that exceeds the constrictions of the more rigid and conventional racial codifications that have been generated and sedimented historically.

The historical production of Blackness (and thereby, also of whiteness) required the literal branding of the flesh of enslaved Africans and their descendants across the Americas.  Furthermore, racialisation itself has operated as a kind of sociopolitical branding. Such sociopolitical processes of branding have always required multifarious and reiterative operations, including of course those of the law, to truly accomplish the task of allocating and resolutely attaching sociopolitical categories of difference to diverse varieties of human persons, and thus searing their racialised designations onto their bodies and identities. Analogously, we may begin to comprehend how other (ostensibly non-racial or race-neutral) forms of sociopolitical categorisation and regimentation, such as ostensibly ‘national’ differences come to operate as effectively racial categories of difference, and how generic figures of ‘foreignness,’ or indeed the durable designation of particular categories of migrants as ‘illegal,’ also bear a compelling resemblance to branding. Without effacing the irreducible historical specificity of Marx’s discussion of modern slavery, it has indeed become increasingly common today, given our global postcolonial condition, that labour ‘in a black skin’ presents itself also in a ‘foreign’ costume.

The putative ‘illegality’ of migrants or so-called ‘asylum-seekers’ (itself a derisive term predicated on suspicion) has become the single most prominent ‘problem’ for immigration and asylum law and policy on a global scale during recent decades. Seldom does public debate consider precisely where and how this ‘illegality’ came into being, however. Nonetheless, migrant and refugee ‘illegality’ always has a history within each particular juridical and border enforcement context. One of the central hypotheses of a critical analysis of what I call the legal production of migrant ‘illegality’[xcvii] has been to recognize that a spectacle of border policing in fact systematically distracts us from discerning how migrant and refugee ‘illegality’ is truly generated elsewhere, through law and policy formulated and promulgated at a great remove from the actual physical/territorial borders of states.[xcviii] Indeed, it is the law that brands particular migrations and categories of migrants as ‘illegal.’ Migrant illegalisation is a process of sociopolitical branding.

Furthermore, the ethnographic study of present-day border policing and immigration enforcement practices confirms that such histories (much like the histories of racialisation) are never finished. Rather than faits accomplis, established once and for all time, these diverse and historically specific productions of migrant and refugee ‘illegality’ must continue to be (re-) produced through border struggles and ongoing practices of (re-)bordering. The concepts of deportability[xcix] and a global deportation regime,[c] furthermore, help to elucidate how illegalised migrants’ and refugees’ susceptibility to deportation — the prospect of deportation, beyond the actual fact of deportation — contributes decisively to the production of migrant precarity in everyday life. In short, it is precisely deportability that plays a distinctly disciplinary role in the production of the conditions of possibility for migrant labour-power to serve as a highly desirable commodity for employers, often converting what Marx called the disposable ‘reserve army’[ci] of labour into an enthusiastically recruited (deportable) labour force of choice.

Capital requires a surplus population to both absorb displaced workers, but also to serve as a pool of potential workers when production expands.[cii] The operation of the reserve army of labour serves to discipline labour at the same time that it meets the requirements of capital accumulation on an expanding scale. ‘The over-work of the employed part of the working class swells the ranks of its reserve, while, conversely, the greater pressure that the reserve by its competition exerts on the employed workers forces them to submit to over-work and subjects them to the dictates of capital.’[ciii] The sociopolitical and legal branding of migrant labour as ‘foreign’ and especially as ‘illegal’ supplies a crucial disciplinary mechanism for managing all labour through a multiplication of the categories of difference that serve to decompose and fragment labour into competing rival factions riven by racialised and other essentialised antagonisms that are naturalised as ‘unpassable boundaries’ and ‘fictions of embodied otherness.’[civ] Alternating mass deportations with a more or less permanent mass importation of illegalised and deportable labour has long ensured that the state’s mediation of migration through diverse tactics of border policing and immigration law enforcement provides capital with an exquisitely flexible, eminently disposable ‘reserve army’ of labour.[cv]

Furthermore, the border-making and border-enforcing activities of immigration enforcement have been increasingly and pervasively relocated to sites within the ‘interior’ of migrant-receiving states, such that illegalised migrants and refugees are made, in effect, to carry borders on their very bodies[cvi] as border enforcement and the prospect of deportation come to permeate the full spectrum of racialised everyday life activities and spaces. The global class politics of human mobility, which routinely transposes a transnational relation of capital and labour into the ostensibly insular ‘national’ politics of ‘immigration’ and border policing, continuously reinvigorates ‘unpassable boundaries’ and thus reinvents and reanimates racialised distinctions. Thus, the global class politics of human mobility (the mobility of labour) ever increasingly instigates the consolidation of what Étienne Balibar (among others) has depicted as ‘a world apartheid,’ which institutes a ‘color bar’ that now no longer merely separates the so-called ‘center’ from ‘periphery,’ or North from South, but effectively runs through all ‘national’ state formations.[cvii] Thus, the branding processes of migrant illegalisation generate open-ended sites not only for border struggles and immigration and refugee politics, taken more narrowly, but also for unforeseen and expansive disputes over race, citizenship, and labour, more generally. As with the racial branding of Blackness that was a constitutive feature of the historical production of enslaved labour, so also does migrant ‘illegality’ today entail a sociolegal branding that is crucial for the creation and maintenance of migration as a reliable, eminently mobile, flexible, and ultimately disposable source of racially subjugated labour-power.

Finally, let us recall once more Marx’s poignant insight: ‘Labour in a white skin can never emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin.’[cviii] Hence, we may begin to recognise how the sociopolitical production of difference, and the branding of diverse categories of labouring humanity into racialised ‘skins,’ has operated as an absolutely central and constitutive feature of labour’s subordination to the requirements and mandates of capital accumulation, and thus the continuous (re-)production of labour-for-capital. Analogously, the sociopolitical and legal mediations of human mobility on a global scale — and thereby, the bordering of labour mobility as ‘migration’ — thus becomes apprehensible as a comparable production of difference that brands various particular categories of labour as ‘foreign,’ if not indeed as ‘illegal.’[cix] If, as Marx and Engels famously proclaim in the closing lines of The Communist Manifesto, the working people ‘of all countries’ have ‘a world to win,’[cx] it may be all the more vital and more relevant than ever to recall another decisive and conceptually more ambitious proposition that precedes that resounding battle cry, and which migration serves continuously to verify:  the working people of the world ‘have no country.’[cxi] Hence, a contemporary corollary to Marx’s axiom would seem to be: Labour in the prison inmate’s uniform of citizenship can never emancipate itself where labour in the migrant’s garb of ‘foreignness’ is branded as ‘illegal.’

 

Acknowledgements

Some of the ideas developed in this essay initially began to take shape in the course of an extended dialogue with Nahum Chandler, to whom I owe a debt of deep gratitude and appreciation. I am also grateful for the enduring inspiration and encouragement of Dave Roediger and Howie Winant. Thanks are also due to Hannah Schling, whose questions pushed me to clarify various points. An earlier version of portions of this essay appeared in my essay “Migration and the Mobility of Labor” in Matt Vidal, Tony Smith, Tomás Rotta, and Paul Prew (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx. New York and London: Oxford University Press (published online: December 2018).

 

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De Genova, Nicholas. 2013. ‘Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality: The Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of Inclusion.’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(7):1180-98.

De Genova, Nicholas. 2016a. ‘The ‘Crisis’ of the European Border Regime: Towards a Marxist Theory of Borders.’ International Socialism 150:33-56; available at: <http://isj.org.uk/the-crisis-of-the-european-border-regime-towards-a-ma…;.

De Genova, Nicholas. 2016b. ‘Toward a Marxian Anthropology? Bare, Abstract, Mobile, Global.’ Dialectical Anthropology 40(2):125-141.

De Genova, Nicholas. 2018. ‘The ‘Migrant Crisis’ as Racial Crisis: Do Black Lives Matter in Europe?’Ethnic and Racial Studies 41(10): 1765-82.

De Genova, Nicholas, Gleda Garelli, and Martina Tazzioli. 2018. The Autonomy of Migration within the Crises.’SAQ: South Atlantic Quarterly 117 (2) [forthcoming, April 2018]

De Genova, Nicholas and Nathalie Peutz, eds. 2010. The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Du Bois, W. E. B. [1903]1982. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Signet/ Penguin.

Du Bois, W. E. B. 1915. The Negro. New York: Holt; Project Gutenberg EBook available at:http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15359/15359-h/15359-h.htm

Du Bois, W.E.B. [1920]1971 ‘The Souls of White Folk.’ Pp. 29-52 in Darkwater: Voices From Within the Veil. New York: AMS Press. Reprinted in Roediger, ed. 1998, pp. 184-99.

Du Bois, W.E.B. 1935. Black Reconstruction: An Essay toward a History of the Part which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

Du Bois, W.E.B. [1939]2014. Black Folk Then and Now: An Essay in the History and Sociology of the Negro Race. New York: Oxford University Press.

Elson, Diane. 1979. ‘The Value Theory of Labour.’ Pp. 115-80 in Diane Elson (ed.), Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism. London: CSE Books.

Federici, Silvia. 2003. Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation. New York: Autonomedia.

Genovese, Eugene D. 1965. The Political Economy of Slavery. New York: Pantheon.

Gilroy, Paul. 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hall, Stuart & Les Back. 2009. ‘At Home and Not at Home: Stuart Hall in Conversation with Les Back.’ Cultural Studies 2(4):658-687.

Harris, Cheryl. 1993. ‘Whiteness as Property.’ Harvard Law Review 106(8):1707-91.

Harvey, David. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Holloway, John. 1994. ‘Global Capital and the National State.’ Capital and Class 52: 23-49.

Johnson, Walter. 2003. ‘Commentary on James Oakes, ‘The Peculiar Fate of the Bourgeois Critique of Slavery’.’ Pp. 48-55 in in Winthrop Jordan, ed. Slavery and the American South. Jackson: University of Mississippi Press.

Johnson, Walter. 2004. ‘The Pedestal and the Veil: Rethinking the Capitalism/ Slavery Question.’ Journal of the Early Republic 24(2): 299-308.

Johnson, Walter. 2013.River of Dark Dreams : Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Khosravi, Shahram. 2010.‘Illegal’ Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Marx, Karl. [1845] 1920. The Poverty of Philosophy. Chicago: Charles Kerr.

Marx, Karl. [1858] 1973. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. New York: Vintage/ Random House.

Marx, Karl. [1867] 1976. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One. New York: Vintage/ Random House.

Marx, Karl. [1870] 1971. ‘From Confidential Communication.’ Pp. 252-55 in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Ireland and the Irish Question. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels [1848] 1967. The Communist Manifesto. New York: Pluto Press.

Mbembe, Achille. 2017. Critique of Black Reason. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.

Mezzadra, Sandro. 2011a. ‘The Gaze of Autonomy: Capitalism, Migration, and Social Struggles.’ Pp. 121-42 in Vicki Squire, ed. The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity. London and New York: Routledge.

Mezzadra, Sandro. 2011b. ‘The Topicality of Prehistory: A New Reading of Marx’s Analysis of ‘So-called Primitive Accumulation.’ Rethinking Marxism 23(3): 302-321.

Midnight Notes Collective. 1990. ‘The New Enclosures.’ Midnight Notes No. 10; available at:www.midnightnotes.org/newenclos.html.

Ngai, Sianne. 2015. ‘Visceral Abstractions.’ GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 21(1):33-63.

Oakes, James. 2003. ‘The Peculiar Fate of the Bourgeois Critique of Slavery.’ Pp. 29-48 in Winthrop Jordan, ed. Slavery and the American South. Jackson: University of Mississippi Press.

Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 1986/2015. Racial Formation in the United States. Third Edition. New York: Routledge.

Robinson, Cedric. 1983/2000. Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Roediger, David R. 1991. The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class. New York: Verso.

Roediger, David R., ed. 1998. Black on White: Black Writers on What It Means to Be White. New York: Schocken Books.

Roediger, David R. and Elizabeth D. Esch. 2012. The Production of Difference: Race and the Management of Labour in U.S. History. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rosenthal, Caitlin. 2018. Accounting for Slavery: Masters and Management. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

Saxton, Alexander. 1990. The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America. New York: Verso.

Sharma, Nandita. 2003. ‘Travel Agency: A Critique of Anti-trafficking Campaigns.’ Refuge 21: 53–65.

Sharma, Nandita. 2020. Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Tomich, Dale W. 2004. Through the Prism of Slavery:Labour, Capital, and World Economy. New York: Rowman & Liittlefield.

Turner, Terence. 2008. ‘Marxian Value Theory: An Anthropological Perspective.’ Anthropological Theory 8(1):43-56.

van der Linden, Marcel. 2010. ‘Re-Constructing the Origins of Modern Labour Management.’ Labour History 51(4): 509-522.

 


[i] Marx 1867/1976, p.173.

[ii] Marx 1867/1976, p.174.

[iii] Elson 1979, p. 123; see also Turner 2008.

[iv] Marx 1867/1976, p.1038.

[v] Marx 1867/1976, p. 915; emphases added.

[vi] Robinson 1983/2000, p. 2.

[vii] Robinson 1983/2000, p. xxxi.

[viii] Marx 1867/1976, p. 414.

[ix] Du Bois 1920/1971. See also:  Allen 1994, and 1997; Cox 1959; Du Bois 1915; Harris 1993; Roediger 1991; Roediger, ed. 1998; Saxton 1990.

[x] Du Bois 1920/1971, p. 30.

[xi] Notably, the term ‘primitive accumulation’ — a phrase that originated in the works of bourgeois political economists, which Marx referenced with derision for its euphemistic and misleading character and depicted more precisely as ‘the so-called primitive accumulation’— has over time reverted to widespread (unproblematised) usage, and has come to serve as a shorthand in Marxist scholarship for the violent processes that Marx exposes in his critique; see Marx 1867/1976, pp. 873-74.

[xii] Marx 1867/ 1976, p.918.

[xiii] Marx 1867/ 1976, p. 925. For an extended reflection on this passage, see Johnson, 2004; while my reading of Marx’s discussion of this juxtaposition of slave labour and wage labour would reject Johnson’s contention (p.301) that Marx ‘evaded’ the question of slavery and purposefully provincialised the analysis of capitalism in a manner that was ‘Anglo-centric in its spatial parameters and teleological in its temporal framing’ (p.302), I concur with his argument against the methodological nationalism or Eurocentrism of many customary Marxist accounts, dedicated to simply and dogmatically upholding the tautological notion that ‘slavery was, like feudalism, ‘pre-capitalist,’ ‘archaic,’ and a ‘conservative’ residuum’ (p.303), and consequently inclined to interpret the pedestal metaphor as a temporal/ historical one rather than as ‘structural (or spatial)’ (p.305).   

[xiv] Less elegantly, in The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx notably proclaimed: ‘without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry’ (Marx, 1845/ 1920, p.121.

[xv] Johnson, 2004, p.304.

[xvi] Johnson, 2004, p.305.

[xvii] Tomich, 2004, p.30.

[xviii] Johnson, 2013, p.254; see also Baptist, 2014, pp.128.

[xix] Baptist, 2016, p.33; see also Beckert, 2014.

[xx] Baptist, 2016, p.53.

[xxi] Beckert and Rockman, 2016, p.5.

[xxii] Ashworth, 1995, p.89.

[xxiii] Beckert and Rockman, 2016, p.1

[xxiv] Baptist, 2016, pp.53-54.

[xxv] Ashworth, 1995, p.84.

[xxvi] Beckert, 2014, p.32, p.198.

[xxvii] Baptist, 2014, pp.128-129.

[xxviii] Baptist, 2014, p. 129.

[xxix] Baptist, 2014, p. 129. There wear analogously dramatic and persistent increases in the productivity of slave plantations for Cuban sugar and Brazilian coffee; Baptist, 2016, p.54-55.

[xxx] Baptist, 2016, p.57.

[xxxi] Baptist, 2016, p.52.

[xxxii] Baptist, 2016, p.57.

[xxxiii] Baptist, 2014, p. 129; see also Beckert, 2014, p.334; pp.621-622.

[xxxiv] Tomich, 2004, p.23.

[xxxv] Tomich, 2004, p.23.

[xxxvi] Tomich, 2004, p.31.

[xxxvii] For a classic example, see Genovese, 1965; see also Ashworth, 1995, for whom the ‘principal thesis’ is that it was ‘increasing difficult, and finally impossible, for slavery and capitalism to coexist’ (p.115). For relevant critiques, see Baptist, 2014; Beckert, 2014; Johnson, 2013, pp. 252-254; Oakes, 2003; Tomich, 2004, pp. 9-13.

[xxxviii] Oakes, 2003, p.47.

[xxxix] Ashworth, 1995, p.114.

[xl] Roediger, 1991.

[xli] Marx 1867/1976, p.875.

[xlii] Marx 1867/1976, p.680.

[xliii] Marx 1867/1976, p. 345.

[xliv] Du Bois 1915, Chapter IX; see also Du Bois 1939/ 2014, p. 97.

[xlv] Du Bois 1939/ 2014, p. 91.

[xlvi] Du Bois 1920/1971, p. 48.

[xlvii] Du Bois 1920/1971, p. 31.

[xlviii] Du Bois 1920/1971, p. 30.

[xlix] Beckert, 2014; van der Linden, 2010; see also Roediger and Esch, 2012; Rosenthal 2018.

[l] Mbembe 2017, p. 6.

[li] Mbembe 2017, p. 2.

[lii] Mbembe 2017, p. 6.

[liii] John Clegg makes a similar point: ‘There is something pristinely capitalist about the total commodification of labour under slavery. Slaves are doubly alienated, for they lack property in both the means of production and in themselves.’ Clegg, 2015, p.302.

[liv] Marx 1867/1976, pp. 375-76.

[lv] Referring to a French slave code, Marx declares:  ‘This subject one must study in detail to see what the bourgeois makes of himself and of the worker when he can model the world according to his own image without any interference.’ Marx, 1867/1976, p.916 n.4.

 

[lvi] Du Bois 1935; see also Roediger 1991.

[lvii] Marx 1867/1976, p.382.

[lviii] Cf. Chandler 2013, and 2014; Gilroy 1993; Mbembe 2017.

[lix] Du Bois 1903/1982, p.15; see also Chandler 2006, and 2010.

[lx] Mbembe 2017, p. 6.

[lxi] Mbembe 2017, p. 4.

[lxii] Mbembe 2017, p. 6.

[lxiii] Mbembe 2017, p. 4.

[lxiv] Marx 1867/1976, p. 128.

[lxv] Marx 1858/1973, pp. 104-05.

[lxvi] Marx 1867/1976, p. 874.

[lxvii] Marx 1867/1976, p. 873.

[lxviii] Marx 1867/1976, p. 875.

[lxix] Marx 1867/1976, pp. 874-75.

[lxx] There has been a robust Marxian debate around the contemporaneity of such violent processes of dispossession; see, e.g. Bonefeld 2001; De Angelis 2001; Federici 2003; Harvey 2003; Mezzadra 2011b; Midnight Notes Collective 1990.

[lxxi] Bhattacharyya 2018, p. x.

[lxxii] Du Bois famously depicted the general aims of the strivings of ‘the American Negro’ in a manner that anticipated that another world was possible: ‘to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture, to escape both death and isolation, to … use his best powers and his latent genius.’ Du Bois 1903/1982, p. 9; see also Chandler 2006, 2010, and 2013.

[lxxiii] Du Bois 1903/1982, pp. 3, 15.

[lxxiv] Chatterjee 1993.

[lxxv] Roediger and Esch 2012.

[lxxvi] Bhattacharyya 2018, p. xi.

[lxxvii] See also De Genova 2012, 2016a, and 2016b.

[lxxviii] Cf. Andrijasevic 2010; Aradau 2008; Chapkis 2003; Sharma 2003; see also De Genova 2013.

[lxxix] Mezzadra  2011a, p. 125.

[lxxx] De Genova 2016a; Ngai, 2015; Sharma 2020.

[lxxxi] Holloway 1994.

[lxxxii] De Genova 2016a.

[lxxxiii] Marx1858/1973, p.524.

[lxxxiv] De Genova 2010, 2012, and 2016b.

[lxxxv] Marx 1867/1976, p. 862.

[lxxxvi] Marx 1867/1976, p. 862.

[lxxxvii] Marx 1867/1976, p. 862.

[lxxxviii] Marx 1867/1976, p. 939.

[lxxxix] Burawoy 1976.

[xc] Marx 1867/1976, p. 1013.

[xci] Marx 1867/1976, p. 863.

[xcii] Marx 1870/ 1971, p. 254; emphases in original.

[xciii] Mbembe 2017, p. 4.

[xciv] Hall and Back 2009, p. 662.

[xcv] De Genova 2018.

[xcvi] Omi and Winant 1986/2015.

[xcvii] De Genova 2002, 2004, and 2005.

[xcviii] De Genova 2002, 2005, and 2013.

[xcix] De Genova 2002, 2005, 2010, and 2013.

[c] De Genova and Peutz 2010.

[ci] Marx 1867/1976, p.784.

[cii] Marx 1867/1976, p. 784.

[ciii] Marx 1867/1976, p. 789.

[civ] Bhattacharyya 2018, p. 2.

[cv] De Genova 2016a.

[cvi] Khosravi 2010, pp. 97-120.

[cvii] Balibar 1993/2002, p. 82; see also Besteman 2020.

[cviii] Marx 1867/1976, p. 414.

[cix] De Genova 2013, and 2018; Sharma 2020.

[cx] Marx and Engels 1848/2008, p. 84.

[cxi] Marx and Engels 1848/2008, p. 61.

Revisiting the Plantation Society

The New World Group and the Critique of Capitalism

Scott Timcke

This paper examines the critique of capitalism provided by the New World Group. Emerging from the West Indian Society for the Study of Social Issues at The University of The West Indies, Mona, the Group was formed in 1963 specifically to address the reformation of social and political forces in the wake of Caribbean territories gaining formal independence from European colonial powers. This reformation was broader than the political-economy, it included psychological and ideological reworkings, all items necessary to evaluate the kinds societies West Indians could strive for. Set within intra-Marxist debates on early capitalist development, this paper focuses on the collaboration and creative tensions between Norman Girvan, George Beckford, and Lloyd Best as they helped one another construct their respective political philosophy, social theory, and economic analysis of the logic of plantation societies, which while incomplete from our vantage, did mostly capture the historical dynamics found in the Caribbean.

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

Introduction

The plantation was a total social and economic unit, supplemented with a system of routine surveillance to support nakedly unapologetic authoritarian governance that greatly shaped the very horizon of development in Caribbean societies, even long after political independence. Combining vertical relations of domination integral to extracting labour with some limited horizontal relations to aid the day-to-day functioning, the plantation fostered anticipatory obedience and instinctual habituation to unspoken imperatives. While eagerly catering towards aggressively extractive market relations this unit actively dismissed viewpoints that countered the supremacy of market forces. The interplay between domination and egalitarianism enabled processes of creolization leading to new cultural forms in speech, like picong and kas kas; new modes of kinship, like extending fictive kin and religious syncretism. But social and economic relations of production remained rooted in extraction. There may have been individual acts of resistance, but the unit’s overseers stymied democratic change the moment resistance became inconvenient.

Well aware of these conditions, West Indian intellectuals in the post-war era sought to explain the economic structures of Caribbean societies by reference to path determinacy set by European colonial formations and the associated sequestering of surpluses. Known as ‘a Theory of Plantation Economy and Society,’ this body of thought was developed by the New World Group comprising George Beckford, Lloyd Best, Norman Girvan, complimented by people like C. Y. Thomas, H. R. Brewster, Joan Robinson, Owen Jefferson, Gordon Lewis and Trevor Monroe among others, and then joined by Kari Polanyi Levitt and Archie Singham from abroad.[1] This interdisciplinary project had many intellectual tributaries and confluences, in addition to a wide delta of applications and interpretations.[2] In the spirit of independence, Girvan writes, the theory sought to “reflect the political aspect of decolonization on the intellectual, economic, social and cultural spheres.”[3] Put differently, one aim of the Group was to decolonize hereto accounts of the ‘general process’ to better comprehend the functional role of race and empire in capital accumulation.[4]

Emerging from the incubator of the West Indian Society for the Study of Social Issues at The University of The West Indies, Mona in Jamaica, the Group was formed in 1963 specifically to address the reformation of social and political forces in the wake of Caribbean territories gaining formal independence from European colonial powers. The year before Jamaica had become independent of British direct rule, with University College (as it was known then) severing its ties in the same year from the University of London to become The University of The West Indies. Led by students and young lecturers, this reformation was broader than the critique of political economy. It included psychological and ideological reworkings, all items necessary to evaluate the kinds of societies West Indians could strive for.

Across the West Indies, Independence also brought pragmatic matters to the fore—the need to produce constitutions, currencies, and passports being some basic examples. Well read and highly educated, members of the New World Group knew that independence would not automatically produce tidy democratic states. Formal decolonization and democratization were conjunctures of vicious contest; the stakes were setting an enduring social trajectory. Even to this day, the mythology of Independence in the West Indies sanitizes how in this decisive political moment there was a quick realignment of interests and deal-making as local factions sought to build constituencies to win power electorally, and otherwise occupy the commanding heights of their societies as British flags were lowered.[5] Along with trade unionists, urban radical social movements and the organized poor,[6] these intellectuals sought to better conceptualize the workings of power in their national, regional, and international contexts. They strove throughout to understand how rule by markets was constituted through historical and material forces.

In the case of members of the New World Group this activity was undertaken inside of key state institutions, like public universities, at least in the 1960s. However as the 1970s unfolded some members, like Best, had been driven from these same institutions. Best responded by forming Tapia in 1968, which ran in Trinidad and Tobago’s 1976 election as a political party.[7] It won 3.81% of the vote.[8] Other members like Girvan stayed in academia longer, but left to do development work, becoming the Secretary General of the Association of Caribbean States. Although there are some exceptions in more radical spaces,[9] arguably it has only really been since the CLR James Centennial Conference in 2001 that the New World Group has received recognition for their theorizing by members of the local establishment. That said, this ‘bump of a revival’ to use Brian Meeks’ turn of phrase has been selective.[10] The Group’s critique of the US and UK ruling classes are permitted; critiques of the local ruling class remain less welcome.

Set within intra-Marxist debates on early accounts of capitalist development, this paper focuses on the collaboration and creative tensions between Girvan, Beckford, and Best as they helped one another construct their respective political philosophy, social theory, and economic analysis of the logic of plantation societies, which while incomplete from our vantage, did mostly capture the historical dynamics found in the Caribbean. As either founders, editors or key contributors, these three figures are notable for their early involvement in the transnational publication, New World, of which 14 issues were published between 1963 and 1972 between Georgetown, Guyana and Mona, Jamaica.[11] University work was a centralizing force keeping Girvan, Beckford, and Best in frequent contact. The by-product of this close collaboration was that all three had multiple ground-breaking academic monographs which draw upon the work of the others. I will elaborate upon these ties in the third part of the paper.

At the same time I also want to be cautious in this essay to not perpetuate the trope of extraordinary figures. Even while the West Indies is comprised of small societies where interpersonal relations are visible and traceable, it would still be an error to reify any person—they could not and did not have the singular influence of which they are credited. It is better to think more about a generational cluster of scholarship advancing lines of critique and the circumstances that enabled or constrained that critique.

Accordingly, in this paper I survey the arguments and analysis offered by the Group as their historical studies intervene in the debates on race, capitalism, and Marxism. Through doing so, I aim to contribute to a non-European and non-American centric approach to the historical study of racism and exploitation. There are several steps involved in making the argument that the Group has much to offer Political Marxism. The first portion of the paper covers the intramural debates in Marxian accounts for capitalist development. I then turn to revisionist inter-war economic historiography of the Black Atlantic, as this was an archive for the Group’s later synthesis of modernity and conceptualization of how the ‘general process’ involves the realization of civic ascriptions and their associated modes of articulation as they dynamically respond to the imposed demands of production and circuits of accumulation. Looking forward, for my claim that the Group can contribute much to Political Marxism to make sense, it is worthwhile revisiting some standard Marxist accounts of capitalist development.

Standard Marxist Accounts of Early Capitalist Development

The transition from feudalism to capitalism has generated a vast historical literature of which the Brenner–Wood exchange on the Low Countries is emblematic of how the role of race has occasionally been overlooked in the analysis of early capitalist development.[12] Robert Brenner attributed the development of capitalist property relations there to declining soil fertility and a resultant resource gradient leading to a division of labor within rural commodity production. Farmers subsequently turned to the market to purchase consumptive goods, which in turn created new instruments and urban development. Still, Ellen Meiksins Wood objected that there are “fundamental differences between commercial and capitalist societies.”[13] While granting that the Low Countries had active markets in land, labour, and capital, and some mechanized manufacturing (most notably in shipbuilding), for Wood this society lacked social reproduction predicated upon market dependence, meaning that it lacked other necessary characteristics of capitalism, like the accumulation imperative or the revolutionary need to overhaul forces of production. But in their back and forth, both Wood and Brenner fail to give attention to the role played by the transfer of surpluses from the East and West Indies, or how enslaved people provided the fiscal security for the commercial ventures undertaken by the VOC.

Lest one suspect that these errors belong to Political Marxism exclusively, similar kinds of oversights also exist in the classic debates on manorialism over where and when primacy between urban or rural sectors emerged during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. To briefly elaborate, Pierre-Philippe Rey argues that the process of converting feudal obligations into money rents was external to capitalism, like the already existing practice of expropriating peasant’s surpluses. Guy Bois notes how basic units of feudal production were agnostic to increasing productivity nor sought profit-orientated investment. Instead, small-scale peasant holdings preferred subsistence routines sufficient to meet levies and satisfy ideologies of self-sufficiency. Lords, on the other hand, were primarily concerned with preserving civic hierarchies. Still, as technology (and its organization) slowly improved over two centuries—like village plow teams becoming more efficient—so lords increasingly appropriated surpluses in the form of money. In time these reconfigurations of manorialism weakened feudal institutions and strengthened commercialism that by the 16th century rural areas had been commodified and many smallholders pauperized. These processes culminated in levies being exceeded by rents, and thus a preference given to the later.[14] But while Pierre-Philippe Rey and Guys Bois offer strong empirical evidence for their respective arguments, in general they discount the role of international trade with the Western Hemisphere in aiding urban development. Moreover, while it is not quite true that plantations were simply manors taken abroad, neither is it entirely false.

Even Perry Anderson’s more expansive conception of “the feudal dynamic” and its contradictions neglects the role of Atlantic imperialism.[15] He writes that the “private sovereignty” of the “parcelized” manor weakened the power of centralized authority due to overlapping jurisdictions. Medieval towns took advantage of the uneven capabilities of the state and intra-feudal rivalries to acquire relative autonomy, in turn making them conducive to nascent urbanization as peasants fled serfdom. These developments were not without revanche as the feudal system sought to seize this wealth generated by these sites of agrarian commerce. Against the backdrop of commodity production and exchange, absolutist states emerged. Justified by the traditions of Roman law which emphasised sovereignty and unconditional private property, absolutist states swept away parcelized sovereignty and feudal rights to land. Violence proliferated as national monarchies consolidated, culminating in an inversion of the feudal system; sovereignty became public and property became private.

As Anderson points out, absolutist states were contradictory war machines. They combined feudal era dispossession of rival economies through military force with modern directed economic investment. To direct war and wealth, a bureaucracy was built to collect taxes which weakened the levy system, while also diminishing peasants’ holdings. To offset their lost feudal standing, aristocrats oversaw this planned predation. Being placed in charge of the military and administrative apparatus well positioned them to engage in rent seeking activities. Nevertheless, warfare and dispossession undermined the development of markets, supply chains and the collection of taxes therefrom. And so, absolutist states sought loans from the commercial-financial complex. Over time, these loans represent the relative power shifts in European classes.

New claims, expropriations, and exploitations stemmed from this re-organization of power, but this power was nevertheless predicated upon a primordial conceptualization of trade as a zero-sum exercise. Provided the bourgeoisie produced weapon systems they were granted considerable autonomy which allowed for capitalist forces and relations of production to expand. The primary beneficiaries of early capitalist expansion were aristocrats and the bourgeoisie, who were integrated in the state; what Pierre-Philippe Rey terms a ‘double mix.’ In their respective ways, these classes used the absolutist state to construct a ‘national interest’ to pursue their prerogatives by managing the enclosure, commodification and conversion of existing goods into private property. The costs of this transition were borne by peasants who became cottagers and journeymen who became wage labourers. To the extent they could, these groups resisted and fought a long war against this transition. While Anderson’s account of the uneven and combined development of Europe well primes us to review the unseen, uneven and combined development occurring concurrently in the Western Hemisphere, the account also illustrates how issues of race, enslavement and imperialism are treated as somewhat peripheral concerns in early capitalist development, framed as effects rather than contributing factors.

Even contemporary analysis of capitalist development under-explores the role of race. For instance, reminiscent of Karl Polanyi’s ‘double movement,’ Wolfgang Streeck recounts the antinomies of European industrialisation. It brought “expulsion from the land, proletarianization, exploitation, repression and cruel discipline” as well as “emancipation from traditional ways of life, new solidarities, trade unions with the capacity to fight for higher wages and better conditions, and the possibility of industrial citizenship and social reform.” The development of co-ordinated, co-operative large-scale production presented new stakes and techniques over the “division of the proceeds” between capital and labour, which also appeared in the organization of factories.[16] With their power to strike, labour gained considerable bargaining power, at least relative to other preceding forms of organized production.

In response, between 1840 and 1920 capitalists seized upon new technologies like telegraphy, rotary power printing, the telephone, punch card processing and the like to improve their means of calculation and communication, while taking steps to safeguard this control through intellectual property regimes. Many of these technologies were enrolled to support Frederick Taylor’s scientific management, a project Caitlin Rosenthal characterizes as adapting and refining techniques practiced in the new world plantation system.[17] What was conceptualised as innovative business practices was simply the use of technology to re-establish control on the labour process. In the post war era, microprocessors simply continued this trajectory by consolidating power and control with capitalists.[18]

To help erode recent concessions and recapture lost dividends, capitalists sought to offset labour power by interpolating workers to their project while begrudgingly commissioning the state to provide welfare programs to quell grievances and unrest. For example, in the wake of the 1968 revolts, European manufacturers cooperated with unions to humanize industrial work to forestall anti-capitalist protests. “Some workers and their representatives gained the right, not just to be informed and consulted,” Streeck writes, “but also to contribute to decisions about work organisation, technology, working hours and training.”[19] Nevertheless these defensive concessionary tactics were coupled with more aggressive investments in transportation and communication technologies. Factories were relocated to towns without a labour tradition while vulnerable migrants were employed, all this in hopes of preventing worker self-organization. In Britain, the latter was accomplished by importing labour “obviously of a selective type.” West Indians migrants “largely [came] to [fill] vacancies created by the upward mobility of British labour and were acting as a replacement population.”[20]

Of interest, Streeck does not mention how “crumbs from the colonial table,” as Walter Rodney described it, were used as loyalty rents for the proletariat to create wedge issues. Neither does Streeck refer to how “capitalists misinformed and mis-educated workers in the metropoles to the point where they became allies in colonial exploitation.”[21] Where race implicitly emerges as a topic is when he discusses how production was outsourced to the Global South, a process that gained traction throughout the 1990s. “The hellish Manchester of early industrialisation still exists, but on the global periphery,” Streeck writes, “too far away for school trips.”[22] But as WEB Du Bois might add, there were never school trips to working plantations.

Given Brenner, Wood, Rey, Bois, Anderson and Streeck’s neglect of the role of race and imperialism in capitalist development it is perhaps more than understandable that scholars like Cedric Robinson have complicated relationships with Marxist historiography. Although hardly the first or last scholar to think about the role of race in capitalism, Robinson provided one quintessential account of the role of racial hierarchy by arguing that “the development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force, then, it could be expected that racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism.”[23] With brevity in mind, he suggests that the reason European and American Marxists make race-relations incidental and contingent whereas class relations are necessity is because Marxism is irrevocably locked to the West’s “racialist architectonic”. Herein “race was its epistemology, its ordering principle, its organizing structure, its moral authority, its economy of justice, commerce and power” because racism “runs deep in the bowels of western thought.”[24] As such, for Robinson there are explanatory limits to Marxian categories on matters of race.

While there is value in critiquing his details, Robinson’s remarks provide a useful prompt for a richer synthetic account of early capitalist development, one which can greatly benefit from the explanatory insight offered by the literature which analyzes the triangular trade in the Black Atlantic. Indeed, the Black Radical tradition is especially good at pressing home the deep connection between (and still reverberating effects of) enslavement in the Western Hemisphere and contemporary capitalism;[25] what Robinson calls the “dialectic of imperialism and liberation.”[26] This connection is racial capitalism, a market-system propped up by states that permits, nay relies upon racial and gendered violence as an ‘extra-economic’ means to force reproduction to occur through the market. From this vantage, the capitalism-slavery debate very much informs the race-class debate, the debate about modern state formation and racial formation are all roughly equivalent attempts to plot the realizations of domination and dominion that emerged during the expansion of markets during modernity.    

The Initial Caribbean Counter-Analysis

The reason I have spent a few pages overviewing the debates on early capitalist development is to show the terrain on which The New World Group struggled. Yet even while their analysis emerges from positions on the margins of this terrain, by no means are they marginal to these discussions. In this respect, the Group inherited much from Caribbeanists like CLR James, WEB Du Bois, and Eric Williams.[27] In providing a “counter-culture of modernity”—to poach a term of art from Paul Gilroy—James, Du Bois and Williams had an ambivalent relationship to the centers of analysis, “sometimes as defenders of the West, sometimes as its sharpest critics.”[28] As such it is instructive to review their interpretation of the histories of, and contradictions in, the global political economy. Doing so allows us to see the subsequent continuities of themes and iteration of topics in the New World Group’s analysis of the role of drainage in uneven and combined development during modernity.

To begin with Williams, he foregrounds the role of mercantile trade wars in the latter half of the 17th century between major European powers as setting in motion a series of nested contests, amongst which were control over the Western Hemisphere and India. Through private interests and royal chartered companies, Britain pivoted from purchasing goods from the Dutch and instead invested in domestic industry and colonial agriculture. Regarding the Caribbean colonies, anticipating development economists like Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson,[29] Williams demonstrates how due to the interplay of the characteristics of specific crops, land markets and labour demands led to different institutional arrangements. For example, sugar production was particularly labour intensive. This meant that planters initially sought to enslave indigenous populations, but when this finite labour pool was depleted due to genocide, then planters drew upon the English poor and convicts through servitude and indentureship. While there are clear differences between white servitude and black enslavement, these contracts were treated as a property relation thereby providing the template for enslavement.[30] Moreover, “the capital accumulated from the one financed the other.”

While the Colonial Board unsuccessfully sought to curtail the abuses of servitude, these legal protections did not encompass West Africans. As the legal space was provided, planters turned to mass enslavement to leverage economies of scale for high rates of profit. This consolidated into triangular trade, wherein slavers from Liverpool purchased slaves in West Africa, sold the enslaved to Caribbean planters, then returned with agricultural goods to Britain. This new labour regime led to rapid social change. As an illustration, in 1645 Barbados had 11’200 small white farmers and 5’680 black slaves. By 1667, there were 745 large plantations and 82’023 slaves. A 500-acre plantation in 1640 cost £400, yet by 1648 the price had increased by 3500%. In 1650, its agriculture was worth £3 million, just under £670 million in contemporary terms, and so became a vital component of the wider British economy. To select but one of his examples, Williams relays how “in 1697 British imports from Barbados were five times the combined imports from the bread colonies; the exports to Barbados were slightly larger.” He adds that “little Barbados, with its 166 square miles, was worth more to British capitalism than New England, New York, and Pennsylvania combined.”[31]

Unable to survive in this market without land to expand into, many whites left the colonies despite incentives to remain, like restrictions of trades and qualified franchises for Colonial Assemblies. A diminishing tax base led Colonial Assemblies to impose high duties on imported slaves to raise revenue, and to which merchants predictably objected. While colonies were contested, in the end “the plantation economy had no room for poor whites,” Williams wrote. “The victims were the Negroes in Africa and the small white farmer.” Intense social inequality of this kind meant that only wealthy planters and the enslaved remained, thereby revealing the general tendency of capitalism. Between 1763 and 1778 London merchants avoided investment in the Liverpool slave trade because they thought it was running at a loss.

Douglas Hall’s assessment of the early 19th West Indian sugar industry was that irrespective of how “well-equipped and well managed” estates might have been (and many were not), planters “lacked the basic permissives of calculability of success or failure in their businesses. They seldom had any realistic idea of how the enterprise stood financially, or what its prospects were.” Hall relays how British Merchants were aware of how financial illiteracy caused debts and mortgages to accumulate interest.[32] Nevertheless “industrial expansion required finance.”[33] And for the bulk of the 18th Century those best positioned to invest capital were big planters and slave traders.[34] Concurrently, their wealth allowed them to exert considerable influence as well as the ability to purchase political office which in turns shaped the governance of triangular trade system. In summary, Williams argues that “the contribution of slavery to the development of British capitalism,” specifically the role of the “slave trade [provided] the capital which financed the Industrial Revolution in England.” The wealth generated by Atlantic trade provided demand for consumptive goods which stoked domestic economic activity. Effectively sugar cultivation in the West Indies provided solutions for the various economic crises in Europe, meaning that the so-called periphery was at the center of European capitalist development. In short, ‘slavery drove growth.’ For Williams, this system only ended when planters’ desires for monopoly threatened profits and expansion in other sectors.

Given that context creates conceptualization, Williams argued that depending on land and labour colonial economic formations divide into two models. The first was “the self-sufficient and diversified economy of small farmers, while the second “has the facilities for the production of staple articles on large scale for an export market,” and can be illustrated by the American and Caribbean colonies respectively.[35] Accordingly, while they write about 18th Century Caribbean agricultural production and 19th Century American industrialism respectively, there is comparative value in comparing and triangulating James’ and Du Bois’ insights into race and capitalism. In doing so they offer good templates to go beyond provincializing accounts by noting the global nature of capitalism.

James’ analysis of 18th century capitalism vividly demonstrates how systematic sexual violation, starvation, racialization and natal alienation were inseparable from the balance of payments in international trade. Against the backdrop of the shifting balance of power in Europe, the wars to capture these spaces generally testify to the value of colonial agricultural production and extraction: few states would bother if it was not ultimately profitable. Similarly, James notes how the possession and repression of the enslaved became central to the ruling ideology of San Domingo. This ideology included latent fear of insurrections by the 500’000 enslaved, or the enslaved being recruited by invading armies.[36] Within this context James provides a social history of mutable identities, one in which politics greatly shapes interests and affiliations. As an example of this refusal to flatten thought, he details the antagonisms between the Governor and the Intendant, given that “the source of its power [was] so many thousands of miles away.” On the eve of the Haitian revolution, the Governor had just over 500 personnel to act as “a counterweight to the power of the planters in the small whites of town and country,” who numbered “about 30’000.” Ideologically opposed to budding absolutism and independently minded, the bureaucracy “frequently encroached on the Intendant’s administration of justice and finance,” but themselves lacked capacity for the reach and enforcement of rule.[37] Building upon these cleavages, James’ language of “small whites” and “big whites” is analytically perceptive. For example, most of the big landowners and rentiers—big whites—lived in Europe and employed white labour—small whites—to safeguard their property.[38]

Neither did James shy away from discussions of how racial hierarchy intersected with differentiated class positions themselves shaped by alliance building, and aspirations of upward social mobility.[39] Small whites were reticent about Mulattos’ rising social status: while Mulattoes’ increasing wealth was resented, small whites courted them lest they “swell the ranks of their enemies.”[40] While big whites sought an alliance with Mulattos to suppress revolts, nevertheless the French Assembly worried that “to give rights to Mulattoes who outnumbered them would be to hand over the colony, military and civil, to these bastard upstarts and their allies of the counter-revolution.”[41] Similarly, the dividends from enslavement were a source of factional contests within European states. For example, James points out how in the wake of their revolution, the French Republic deemed the colonial surpluses vital to consolidate rule, both internally and externally, while creditors, not wanting to lose their investments, went to considerable lengths to protect their property which eventually culminated in the 1802 expedition to put down the revolution. In the end, supposedly the freedom of some required the enslavement of others.

Notwithstanding politics and positions—and he places considerable emphasis on these in his analysis—James’ indictment is systematic, as one of his most famous passages illustrates: “There were good and bad Governors, good and bad Intendants, as there were good and bad slave owners. But this was a matter of pure chance. It was the system that was bad.”[42] This system was not localized, confined to a specific place and specific time, but rather the realization of a dynamic tri-continental economy designed to perpetuate subordination which was maintained by routine acts of extreme violence. James’ analysis illustrated how enslavement was not residue of a by-gone era, some pre-capitalist endeavour that wage-labour surpassed, but rather was emblematic of a mature supra-national capitalist system that could only be escaped through savvy revolutionary action.

Turning to the United States Du Bois discusses how enslavement created a subject of capital and white supremacy which became an immutable category and an indicator in racial formation. “Black labor became the foundation stone not only of the Southern social structure, but of Northern manufacture and commerce, of the English factory system, of European commerce, of buying and selling on a world-wide scale,” Du Bois wrote.[43] The effects of this consolidating racial formation were not confined to the United States, rather “new cities were built on the results of black labor, and a new labor problem, involving all white labor, arose in both Europe and America.”[44] Du Bois’s analysis argues that racial formation was leveraged to extract surpluses that were then transferred across the Atlantic.

In the empire of cotton enslaved people were both labour and capital. As for the later, in the 19th century British merchants made advances to American cotton planters, who in turn used this credit to produce, hoping to use slavery to cover expenses and gain a profit. Likewise, “sugar cultivation” Williams wrote “was a lottery.”[45] The enslaved were the collateral upon which advances in this mode of production depended. In the early part of the Atlantic slave trade black women were disposable, but once colonies settled, as the slave trade was outlawed, so Black women became integral components to reproducing the whole. The system relied upon sexual violation to produce capital. As commodities and capital themselves, through reproduction Black women produced capital for planters. One consequence of this rich analysis of the social relations of production showed the historical interconnection of the global geographies of commodity chains, labour processes, and class and civic ascriptions, and the silences around the peculiar institutions that formed the bedrock of the accumulation of capital. Accordingly, the social history of the white European working class cannot be separated from the entitlements, privileges, wages, and spoils of whiteness, which was used to make demands for political rights and higher social standing.

In summary, the core features of capitalism are racialization and instrumentalization, commodification and securitization, financialization and violence, with cascading effects felt the world over. During the Black Atlantic sphere of circulation, new grammars of difference came to justify and legitimate enslavement, which in turn produced a myriad of class, status, and identity distinctions. This returns us to the work of Robinson. He argued that there were severe limitations to orthodox Marxism and black nationalism. He found in both a common dogma; fictitious essentialism that produced uncritical narratives about the proletariat or Black subjects leading credence to the belief that capturing the commanding heights was sufficient to change patterns of domination. But in assuming that identity gave rise to political consciousness these projects neither had an adequate understanding of domination nor the basis of its institutional implementation. Inter alia simply changing the names and faces of the people in charge would be little genuine democratic emancipation, points that harken back to James’ analysis of the Caribbean. Rather, what was required was a programmatic agenda that channelled the Black revolutionary thought that encountered the raw violence that sustained tri-angular trade.

In their respective ways Williams, James, and Du Bois identified an Atlantic political economy where the movement of people, goods, and surpluses in this sphere of circulation directed the rise of industrialism. This system was spatially differentiated, had a global division of labour as well as several modes of articulation, but nevertheless comprised a single system. Within the proletariat, metropolitan whites received loyalty rents for their affiliation with this system, which included status and other civic ascriptions that were initially plotted against the enslaved and then later colonial subjects. In addition to entitlements, small whites received a (narrow) share of the spoils from the imperial system, calculated to be just enough to divide the proletariat, quell moral dilemmas, and stall class struggles. The dialectic between whiteness and blackness takes place against the backdrop that is the dialectic between metropole and hinterland, between empire and slavery, all mutably co-defined. In short, the legacies of imperial class relations connect capitalist exploitation and racial distinctions. And so there is nothing to gain from giving analytical priority to Europe over Africa, factory over field, white proletarians over the black enslaved. For Williams, James and Du Bois there were no distinction between histories of modern slavery and histories of capitalism, the distinction between them only seeks to propagandize in capitalism’s favour. It was this analysis that brought incredulity from the European intellectuals. “For years,” James wrote, “we seemed, to the official and the learned world, to be at best, political illiterates.”[46]

The Theory of The New World Group

As I suggested in the previous section, pressing against ‘white ignorance’[47] the Caribbean critique of political economy produced a unique social imaginary that offers a credible counter-analysis of modernity. This counter-analysis is at the heart of a Caribbean lineage of imaginative acts of self-invention that seek to find new, and arguably more potential for, just social relations. Doing so was an inter- and multi-disciplinary venture. For example, Girvan noted that the New World Group deliberately courted the views and insights from “historians, poets, literary critics, economists, political scientists, sociologists and journalists,”[48] linking their views with the pursuit of a Caribbean critique of political economy. For Girvan, the Group was a “demonstration of the potential for the development of a unified Caribbean consciousness, and of the feasibility of collaborative efforts that transcend the sterile divisions of discipline, occupation and territory.”[49]

From the main three protagonists, Beckford’s contribution was perhaps the strongest, if also the least known, because his work was essentially the Caribbean counterpart to Marx’s detailing of the social transformations in England between 1750 and 1850 brought by capital. In greater detail than Williams, and with a wider lens than James or Du Bois, in Persistent Poverty Beckford describes a metropolitan economy centred on London and other European ports.[50] Merchants and emerging industrialists provided the working capital for New World planters. Planters worked with colonial land proprietors, where contracted to provide agriculture, and imported enslaved persons to work the field and serve the house. Some of the enslaved escaped to form Maroon communities. In compressed form, Beckford described the Atlantic economy with its various class, race, legal and occupational components as these work within and make institutional frameworks that govern the use and abuse of power. The ultimate end of this project was to externalize costs in the Caribbean and repatriate benefits out of it, stoke racial conflict to redirect local energies, then create a local elite that was both psychological dependent and ideologically affiliated with metropolitan interests.[51] Unable to be fully captured by equations, all these relations and structures factor into the long run determinants of import and export prices.

Although close friends, Best thought that while Beckford did generate a robust and dynamic “theory of income distribution” wherein metropolitan merchants exercised first claim, it was through “a quite gratuitous embrace of the cosmology of historical materialism.”[52] Still, it was this gratuitous embrace that Beckford used to demonstrate how capitalist-directed investments and the rationality of profitability explains the location of particular industries on the world scale, while the falling rate of profit is offset by ever more severe repression of the enslaved (and later apprenticed) workforce. Beckford’s agenda to redress these issues is standard—land and property regime reform, significant redistribution, economic integration—insofar that social scientists generally understand that these actions aid egalitarian goals. One difficulty, Beckford admitted, was the legitimation required for these domestic policy targets, especially when there was much psychological dependency. And so Beckford charted a James-like revolutionary course: “change must begin in the minds of people, relating to the concept they have of themselves.”[53]

For his part Best, along with Levitt, argued that colonial governors had designed domestic economies to ‘simply be’ hinterlands of exploitation revolving around a kernel of enclave mono-crop production. Although these plantations had weak formal linkages to other local industries they nevertheless constituted “a well-defined set of institutions” and “a distinct pattern of economic behaviour.” To wit: “our central hypothesis,” they write, “is that this legacy represents an endowment of mechanisms of economic adjustment that deprive the region of internal dynamic.”[54] At stake in this theorization was the viability of the Sir Arthur Lewis’s model of development, which to simplify for present purposes is a social democratic economic conjecture about the necessity and suitability of foreign capital in facilitating national development strategies. Sir Arthur Lewis proposed that because Caribbean countries had cheap labour, they were well positioned to discard the production of staple goods and instead industrialize if external capital was courted. Capital inflows would subsequently restructure the economy generating, in time, local capital that could be redeployed to produce social goods. Effectively within this ‘dual economy’, surpluses could be concentrated then redirected for national development goals.[55] Best recoiled at this suggestion: blacks were more than a source of cheap labour. “Our fundamental difference with Lewis was not that he saw imperialism and foreign capital as part of the solution while we saw it as the heart of the problem,” Best wrote.[56] Put differently, his work insisted that the Caribbean industrialization projects were a continuation of metropolitan interests restructuring and under-developing the region, with the one major change in the post-independence period being administrative. Colonial officials were replaced by local elites acting as compradors while erstwhile continuing the elite enrichment practices of their forebears.

There is another area where the Group had useful insights, and this was the critique of orthodox post-war development economics.[57] More than his companions, Best was the most willing to appreciate the limitations of the epistemic capabilities of development economics, but also preserve it. Rather than the kind of Leninism Beckford deployed, or the kind of dependency model Girvan gravitated towards, Best thought that advances in method would come when led by Caribbean imagination. The difficulty was that Best’s skills as a political philosopher lagged his skills as an economic historian. His views around ethnicity are a good example of this. Best maintained that Marxists treated race ‘simply as’ a class problem, not a distinct set of prejudices that constitute society in their own right. By contrast he foregrounded ethnicity to such an extent that it became akin to ethnic reductionism wherein “class is merely a special case of ethnicity”[58] To tease this out, Best believed that social bonds precede property relations, that class analysis properly conducted discounts meaningful cultural attachments. The chief difficulty with this conclusion is that it neglects that Marx’s critique of alienation tackles the same ground; that the commodification of labour upends the social bonds that humans wish to freely pursue.

Lastly, Girvan had a much greater interest in demonstrating how multinational extractive industries, whether sugar in Jamaica, bauxite in Guyana, or oil in Trinidad and Tobago did not serve the interests of Caribbean people.[59] Many of these were contemporary empirical studies of firms, sectors, and complexes in the 20th century. Girvan undertook them primarily to show how the development strategies adopted by West Indian governments were unlikely to generate self-sustaining growth with full employment because their economies were structured to be perpetually dependent on metropoles, consistent with the models created by Beckford and Best. Notwithstanding their respective differences, the common theme of the New World Group was economic dependence to metropolitan interests and the work of local collaborators and compradors to legally entrench that dependence. As an alternative Girvan proposed enhancing regional economic integration through a Caribbean Free Trade Association, a point which generated considerable technical debate, and which I will address in the next section.

Given pressing matters of governance, how these political economists conceptualised decolonization as involving both thought and action had a sizable impact in the postcolonial English-speaking Caribbean. Beckford provides a tidy statement of the New World Group’s agenda: “Our aim remains clear: to promote radical change in all aspects of Caribbean life and society so as to release the long-suppressed creative energies of the peoples of the region”.[60] Still the Group insisted that historical analysis had to be the starting point for a development programme capable of producing a synthesis which could temper the warring ethno-political blocs that traversed the region. In doing so the Group challenged the intellectual and disciplinary insularities of economics in the mid-20th century. “Self-consciously adopting the perceived interests of the people,” Michael Witter writes “these scholars waged a long and distinguished struggle against the ideas in economic theory that justified and rationalized the disenfranchisement and exploitation of the working people.”[61] Attentive to history but not beholden to it, altogether their analysis of the path dependency borne from early capitalism sought to better account for the role of race and class in modernity. Equally important, the plantation theory was purposefully antagonistic to modernization theory, which was prescriptive in international development agencies during the period when the Group was active. Contra modernization theory, the Group argued that development was not possible based on a set of ‘prudent’ policy choices because the legacies of colonial policies meant the local economy was built to cater to the imperatives of metropolitan capital above all else. In short, economic configurations had a material history, and in the Caribbean these configurations were resistant, if not wholly antagonistic, to democratic desires.

Although some participants like Lloyd Best were feverishly anti-Marxist, the New World Group’s theorization can best be understood as an intervention in intra-mural Marxian debates through front loading issues of racialization and the class characteristics of a global division of labour. At stake here was to what extent were Marxist explanations of social history capable of grasping the many dimensions of racial oppression.[62] These were not ill-informed critiques. For example, while at Oxford, Best was frequently Stuart Hall’s lunch companion when the later was editing Universities and Left Review.[63] Conversely for Girvan, what deficiencies existed in Marxism were of application, not foundational or methodological.[64]

In this regard the Group had several main contributions to post-war 20th century social thought. Building upon the observation that sugar plantations were different from tobacco plantations, tenant plantations were different from company plantations and so on, they sought to explain how these differences conditioned subsequent political structures. For example, in Appendix II ofPersistent Poverty, Beckford outlines four primary types of plantations: company, tenant, family and state. While they all are characterised by a “high degree of central control and co-ordination” they are distinguished by forms of capital at disposal and the ratio of assets on the books between land, machinery, and the enslaved. For example, the bulk percentage of investment for tenet and family types was in land, while for companies it was in equipment, processing machinery, and enslaved persons. These differences are also expressed in management. Resident family plantations tended to combine ownership and management roles, while tenant farms had supervisors. Company plantations management tended to be on behalf of owners living abroad, and it tended to be more authoritarian and sought to undermine the community in which it was located.[65] These differences explain the specific nature of politics in and over Colonial Assemblies. To simplify for this paper, family and tenet planters sought representation, while state and company plantations undermined those initiatives.

Second, the Group sought to correct for economic and ideological dependence on the West; demonstrating how plantations and multinational corporations were the institutional means keeping Caribbean economies stagnant,[66] while framing any resistance to the retelling of capitalist development from the Caribbean point of view as intellectual institutional racism. In this spirit, the Group was aware of the historical contradiction between liberal universalism and the lived experience of enslavement and colonialism. For example, in the Caribbean, legal codes enforced racial segregation and subordination. It was not rule of law, but rule by law. In this vein, they had extensive discussion about neo-colonialism, that being fiscal rule without occupation in the post-independence era.[67] In short, the legacy of centuries in a colonial condition would not be wiped out merely by a legal instrument conferring constitutional sovereignty.

Accordingly, arguments around reparations are not confined to fiscal concerns. It involves decentering notions of justice that arise from the standpoint of the Northern metropolitan bourgeoises. Taking its place would be approaches that foreground the dialectical relationship between the South and North, seeking to account for native genocide - approaches that also acknowledge the ways in which gendered and racialized social reproduction occurred through stratification and subordination were pivotal.[68] When doing so, this line of analysis demonstrates that race and class are different realizations of generative logic which aims to subordinate people to the global operations of capital, that they are both expressions of relationships to the means of production. Altogether, the Group outlined a conception of justice predicated upon attention to extensive harms caused by long causal production chains that developed during the modernity.[69]

The great value of the Group was to conceptualize then demonstrate how multiple historically contingent modes of domination co-articulate in ways that can amplify or dampen one another. Through mutual reinforcement or occasional antagonism, these modes have their own effects. This granular approach allows scholars and researchers to identify the mechanisms by which capitalist rule occurs in a specific times and places, and how this rule is connected to other times and places. For example, if Robert Paxton is correct to note how fascism is the application of technologies of colonialism to subjects in the metropole[70]—like how factories and the task system were tested in the Caribbean before being imported to Europe—then the Group offers a prescient critique of how and why authoritarian tendencies are presently emerging in the North. The point is not about blowback (or even comeuppance) but about the geographic connections of contemporary governance. In doing so, the Group’s scholarship reaffirms how the subordinated have a history of responding to unfavorable conditions not solely with agony, but with political acumen. Acknowledging this reality can greatly improve the contemporary analysis of value struggles as well as accurately comprehend the authoritarianism consolidating the world over.

In the post-independence period the Group took stock of the various contradictions, competitions, and antagonisms that circulated in the social life in the West Indies and suggested that efforts to induce modernization were short-sighted. Rather as Best wrote, first it was necessary to “erode the intellectual and philosophical foundations of the old order so as to guard against the mere substitution of one political elite for another.”[71] This agenda put the group in conflict with the post-independence political class, whose budding radicalism was tempered and redirected into cultural nationalism.[72] For example, contra the views of notable Caribbean political economists like Sir Arthur Lewis who thought that Caribbean development was hampered by unemployment and a weak local capitalist class and so required ‘industrialization by invitation,’ James stressed how propensity could be achieved through labor taking a greater control of production. Effectively, moving Caribbean societies from an agricultural base to industrialism would likely prove difficult unless there was greater attention to the legacies of colonial governance created by racial capitalism. In summary, for James emancipation can best be achieved through a social reconstruction of the way people relate to one another. Sadly, James’ views did not prevail.

Legacies of The New World Group

So what of the impact of the Group? Given that he spent time in James’ London reading groups and wrote for the Group’s journal,[73] Walter Rodney’s work on the history of capital in Africa can provide an example of the operationalization of the Group’s conceptualization of capitalist development, a topic discussed in the beginning of this paper. Rodney’s thesis is that over centuries, the war machines Anderson describes were used by European imperialists to loot and otherwise reverse African social development. “The wealth that was created by African labor and from African resources was grabbed by the capitalist countries of Europe; and in the second place, restrictions were placed upon African capacity to make the maximum use of its economic potential,” he wrote.[74] Simple, but hardly simplistic. Echoing Williams’, James’ and the Group’s insight that so-called peripheral spaces were not marginal to global economic flows, Rodney argues that it is the prevailing ideology that marginalizes and diminished Africa’s central role in the expansion of European capitalist development. Indeed, the human and ecological damage was so intense and so enduring that only “an act of the most fraud” could “arrive at the conclusion that the good outweighed the bad.”[75] This looting—accumulation by dispossession in current parlance—reflected capitalist tendencies to forcefully exploit humans and nature to produce wealth for a few by immersing the many.

To wit, between 1445 and 1870, Portuguese, French and British mercantilism enslaved Africans for use in their Western Hemisphere colonies. With trade narrowed to the enslaved and a few other goods, as well as with depleted labour, and social shockwaves of internal conflicts for enslavement, this undermined the development of African productive capacities. Technical stagnation, even in regions not directly affected by enslavement, was the result. “A loss of development opportunity” that was “destructive…or at best extractive.”[76] From 1870s onwards European capitalist states occupied African territory to extract raw materials like metals and so on. The sad contradiction was “what was called ‘profits’ in one year came back as ‘capital’ the next”, Rodney wrote, “what was foreign about the capital in colonial Africa was its ownership and not its initial source.”[77]

As in the Caribbean and North America, racist ideologies sought to justify this naked power restructuring Africa from Cape to Cairo. And like enclosure before, policies were designed to make Africans build infrastructures for extraction and the means of their oppression. Peasants were turned into wage labourers and a reserve industrial army. Subsistence farming was replaced by cash crops. Political organizations were outlawed. Suitable local agents were cultivated that by independence, the African nationalists who came to power were “frankly capitalist, and shared fully the ideology of their bourgeois masters.”[78] Rodney’s analysis demonstrates the explanatory utility of the Group to understand the dynamics of post-colonial institutions, norms, and relationships, and how these same things undermined universal needs. In short, Rodney uses his initial situation in Caribbean social theory to argue for matters pertaining to (neo)colonial economic drainage, facilitated by compradors who themselves partake in practices of elite enrichment, often at the expense of workers. As Rodney’s work demonstrates, the Group had an influence in shaping the agenda in the critique of neo-colonialism.

The New World Group had other intra-Caribbean discussions that revolved around how independent Caribbean countries be part of the late 20th century world economy. In short, the terms were whether these countries would be vulnerable to metropolitan capital inducing competition between countries if they industrialised independently of one another, or whether it would be more prudent for the region to form a trading bloc. While generally against Sir Arthur Lewis’s industrialization agenda, the Group was split. Best and Beckford argued that the Caribbean consisted of distinct differently plantation economies with associated institutions, meaning that any regional agreements had to take account of these factors. This observation was related to the debate on pluralism: was the Caribbean composed of plural societies with persons who only shared functions to produce, as M.G. Smith argued, or were there other unifying factors, again like worldviews and social values, as R.T. Smith had argued. Ultimately this theorization amounted to little as the new ruling class endorsed and implemented the Lewis model because it allowed for more opportunities for elite enrichment.

It is beyond the purview of this paper to extensively discuss why the Group disbanded in 1973, “why...this rich flowering of creative, Pan-Caribbean intellectual effort [withered], and eventually died,” as Girvan wrote. For most members, the fracture was nominally over debates about the Caribbean Free Trade Association in Trinidad and the Rodney Riots in Jamaica that played out through unreconcilable personality clashes. Another common explanation is that a younger generation of scholar-activists like Walter Rodney and Trevor Munroe did not share Best’s hostility to Marxism, nor did they treat it as an ‘imported’ ideology. Conversely, Best argued that the younger generation were impatient to take political power while being ill-equipped to govern well. For his part, Best was wary of Caribbean Marxism, which he thought displayed neo-Stalinist tendencies and was prone to “simply fudge from Monthly Review.”[79] Instead, a prerequisite course of action was to “erode the intellectual and philosophical foundations of the old order so as to guard against the mere substitution of one political elite for another”, Best argued.[80] (Best’s assessment would only grow stronger from the mid-1980s following the Grenada Revolution, a moment where as Charles Mills wrote “the left spectacularly discredited itself.”)[81] Another immediate reason is that the Group’s scholarship did not have much purchase within the rising Black Power movement.[82] But these accounts are rather unsatisfying because while they may involve events in history, regrettably they are insufficiently historical. Rather the rollout of neoliberalism in the region did much to reorientate scholarship away from critical questions while positioning potential collaborators as present competitors, as I explain below.

With the passage of time, the failure to form the West Indian Federation ever more appears to be a key political error for the Anglo-Caribbean. As Girvan writes, regardless of the design at the time, the failure to pursue economic integration meant there was little material delivery to support the ideals of independence. “Insular statehood”, he writes brought about a situation where “Caricom economies are probably more dependent, with less autonomy in policy-making, than fifty years ago.”[83] The result is that their economies are more susceptible to global recessions, meaning many countries that would have been in the bloc have had to relinquish policy control in any case, but now it is the IMF whose austerity programme is even stringent by the standards of those that endorse that policy course. Structural adjustments have caused a cascade of other problems, like dependency on food imports, criminogenic environments that aid transnational crime networks, extremely high murder rates, and compromised political systems. Granted Caricom has commissioned innumerable technical reports on economic transformation, but as Girvan notes, regardless of the soundness of these policy suggestions, they lack sovereign legal enforcement. There is, he writes, “no real machinery to ensure implementation.”[84]

Another factor in the wain of the Group’s influence can be attributed to the rise of neoliberalism and its local impact on the production, circulation, and consumption of research and scholarship. For the most part Anglo-Caribbean social scientists were on hand to undertake commissioned research, consult on policy, or undertake technical reports for governments and international organizations. Undeniably government contracting re-directs the focus and efforts of research activities while also greatly narrowing the scope for radical analysis and critique. Writing in Jamaica, Brian Meeks testifies to how nascent neoliberal hegemony “contributed to a hermetic atmosphere in which many intellectuals abandoned the occupation of creative thinking for narrowly conceived consultancies”; lamentably, “little has changed” Meeks writes in “thirty years” hence.[85] One consequence was intellectual flight abroad, “to migrate to a place where the university professors and their projects where still valued.”[86]

Meanwhile as neoliberalism consolidated in the Caribbean in the 1980s, so social scientists found that they could supplement their incomes by conducting research for NGOs, development banks, and international organizations. There was also the prospect of earning dollars or pounds through overseeing research directed by foreign universities. For radicals facing entrenched administrators who frequently saw little value in critical projects, like Best did when Sir Arthur Lewis was principal of UWI, Mona, they left the academy to pursue private ventures.[87] Given the already small pool of academics, the shift from focusing on publishing critical peer-reviewed scholarship to unpublished internal consultancy reports curtailed the dissemination and preservation of critical ideas, but it also reflects how the international political economy more broadly shapes how and what gets studied in the Caribbean. Migration also shaped the scholarly agenda as many academics emigrated. With the main site of Caribbean Studies moving to North American and the UK academic spaces, so Meeks is very adamant that academics studying the Caribbean were “insulated from the worse corrosive effects” of local experiences of neoliberalism; with distance these scholars were more willing to forgive the local political class their sins. In these conditions, each successive generation of diasporic Caribbeanists overlooked the New World Group’s critique of capitalism.

In later years Girvan was despondent about the Group’s intellectual contributions. But this self-assessment is too harsh, I believe. The theory that they produced was a good precursor to 1990s analysis of globalization and 2010s analysis of enclave extractivism, thus validating the general tendency of capital to restructure societies in line with the imperatives of value in motion. While I endorse Girvan’s insights about the current provincialism in the Caribbean academy (it would be a mistake to provincialize Caribbean Studies because from the beginning it was always global[88]) I otherwise find his pessimistic assessment unwarranted. In broad strokes, perhaps even to first approximation, it is correct. Granted, the Group needed to broaden its scope to include due attention to the global dispossession and genocide of indigenous peoples. They also needed to acknowledge the role of gender in capitalism, with women as commodities and—through birthing—the main producers of capital. But I want to be clear: additions are not negations.

For the purposes of this essay, in addition to a rich archive of empirical social scientific studies on firms, industries, and the circulation of commodities in the Atlantic, the Group’s most important contribution was to provide a perspective on early capitalist development that differed from the accounts typically circulated in white metropolitan Marxist parties. It is for this reason that I fully endorse Brian Meek’s assessment that “New World still remains the most ambitious attempt to build a postcolonial, Pan Caribbean movement of radical intellectuals.”[89] Along these lines there is one related point worth making. As a broad tradition encumbered with a complex genealogy that shapes the structure of inquiry, Marxism nevertheless is perhaps the most perceptive critique of capitalist modernity. Within this tradition, the Group’s output stands as testament to help scholars better appreciate how the entrenched forces in metropoles and the lay assumptions that they generate can inadvertently creep into Marxist critique thereby sidelining work that is equally perceptive and comprehensive. This acknowledgement can perhaps make current critical practitioners less hubristic, recognising that the current fashion in the theorising might not represent the best theorising taking place today.

So to return to Girvan’s self-criticism, if he had cause to be critical of his compatriots in the Group, it would have been interesting to hear his critique of the historiographies in The New History of Capitalism. While this turn displays an array of new data, new methods, new techniques, and new concepts, it is still very much either mainstreaming or catching up to the insights that Black Radicals had in the first half of the 20th century. Indeed, much of this turn comes without reference to the enslaved ways of life. As Walter Johnson writes, “uncannily, the most ambitious and perceptive examples of the “new history of capitalism” turn out to have been written over seventy years ago.”[90] But inclusion of Black Radical insights means little if it amounts to simply inviting these insights into pre-existing and unchanged spaces. The proper barometer is whether those included have a say and resources to shape the structure of and relations in that space. And it is why the work of Group remains the benchmark that this turn still must meet. They accomplished far greater insight through a Black internationalist imagination fostered by movement and migration. So, while the scholars in this turn are being awarded tenure at Ivy League intuitions, it is important to remember that in his old age James languished in absolute poverty, starving in a room above the OWTU Building in South Trinidad.

Conclusion

Although members had different stances and intramural debates with Marxism more broadly, the New World Group—well known for offering interventions on what Stuart Hall called “the contradictory, stony ground of the present conjuncture”[91]—arguably sets the stage and agenda for much of the critical scholarship on capitalism, through for instance focusing attention to the role of Black labour in creating the value of billion-dollar digital corporations. Extending the range and utility of this line of critique is especially important when noticing how Black Radicals more broadly have been marginalized in the New History of Capitalism.[92] In my estimation the Group has had one of the most comprehensive critiques of modernity, but due to the coloniality of knowledge and ‘white ignorance’ much of this has been insufficiently recognised. So altogether the Group have earned a place to weigh in on the current debates on race and class, and more. Indeed, through their emphasis on totality as well as in their social commitments, the Group presents a model of scholarship that very much stands adjacent to the ones practiced in the late 20th early 21st century academy, models that reward increased narrow disciplinary specialization all but ensuring that holistic revolutionary activism is thoroughly excommunicated.

During its decade of operation, the Group produced a considered conceptualization of how the West Indian plantation was the instrumentalization of human beings in service of capitalist forms of exploitation and expropriation; technical mechanisms coded distinctions while operative civic hierarchies working hand-in-hand with fiscal instruments to support the extraction of surplus value, with all of the above policed by a combination of public and private interests. Involving the spheres of circulation, conflicts, and constraints, black bodies were sites of financial experimentation. Throughout, plantations feature and foster racial discrimination, white supremacy, and massive exploitation, features that are all too common in our contemporary social relations. And indeed, the degree to which the vulgar nationalism version of the plantation society thesis had adherence and purchase in the Caribbean Girvan believed it was indicative of an isolated regional intellectual politics more concerned with performative claims than empirical demonstration.

Although capitalism has undergone tremendous change since the early 19th century, there are also certain continuities that persist in the early 21st century. The path determinacy of the commodities associated with the plantation still haunts distributions of privilege and abjection the world over. With respect to research and practice, scholars need to appreciate how this legacy (mis)shapes contemporary politics across the globe. One response to these conditions is to develop a politics centered on expanding the autonomy to ultimately ensure that subordination becomes a relic of the past. This cannot simply be about redistribution, recognition, or reparation. It calls forth an alternative kind of polity with new social relations that do not feature value struggle. As a prerequisite step, this means addressing powerlessness and establishing egalitarian demos that can steer an economy orientated towards priority and sufficiency. In Walter Rodney’s spirit, this line of analysis seeks to reinforce the conclusion that development is possible “only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system.”[93]

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[1] Strictly, Thomas and Brewster would not include themselves in the Group, but their companionship, orbit and influence in heterodox Caribbean political economy warrants recognition.

[2] For Girvan, these tributaries included Marxist economists ranging from Paul Sweezy to Andre Gunder Frank, with supplementation by Caribbeanist anthropologists like Sidney Mintz’s ideas about a creolized oikouménē and American sociologists like Erving Goffman’s ideas about total institutions. Girvan 2006.

[3] As Girvan 2007 wrote, “The 1960s in the Anglophone Caribbean was a time of transition—psychological, no less than political. The old colonial order was in dying, but there was much debate over what would replace it.”

[4] On the general process see Marx 1859.

[5] Lindsay 1975.

[6] See Gray’s 1991 extraordinary study of radicalism and social change in Jamaica in the post-Independence era for an example of the kinds of national contests taking place in West Indian countries.

[7] Tapia’s main electoral planks were constitutional reform through devolution of power away from central government, the pursuit of full employment policies, and “a fully blown welfare state which would ensure cheap and adequate social services.” Ryan 2002, p. 47. The aim was to eliminate gross social inequalities.  

[8]Ryan, 2002, p. 55.

[9] Meeks 2001

[10] Meeks 2001

[11]Part of the journal’s archive can be found at https://newworldjournal.org/.

[12] See Brenner 2001, Wood 2002.

[13] Wood, 2002, p. 50.

[14] Rey 1982, Bois 1984.

[15] Anderson 2013, Anderson 1974.

[16] Streeck 2019.

[17] Rosenthal 2019.

[18] Also see Beniger 1986.

[19] Streeck 2019.

[20] Peach 1967. Also see Tidrick 1986

[21] Rodney, 1972, p. 199-200.

[22] Streeck 2019.

[23] Robinson 2000, p. 2.

[24] Robinson 2000 p. xxxi, p. 76. For more on Robinson’s critique of Marxism see Timcke 2022.

[25] Orlando Patterson defines enslavement as “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons” with Moses Finley adding that “The slave was himself a privately owned commodity, denied in perpetuity ownership of the means of production, denied control over his labour or the products of his labour and over his own reproduction.” Herein, a person’s reproduction depends entirely on the will of those that own the enslaved. Rife with ‘social death’ the discretion over life and death makes the system conducive to atrocities. Patterson 1982 13; Finley 2001 496.

[26] Robinson 2000, p. 166.

[27] I follow Sidney Mintz in including Du Bois as a contributor to the Caribbean archive. In addition to Haitian paternal linages, trips to the Antilles, like to Jamaica in 1915, helped cultivate a sense of what society could be “beyond the color line” Mintz, 2010, p. 3.

[28] Gilroy 1993, p. 1, p. ix.

[29] Acemoğlu and Robinson 2005; Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012.

[30] Planters distorted the voluntary limited contacts of servitude into a property relation, while Williams claims was accomplished because it accentuated prevailing European norms where “subordination was considered essential.” Williams 1994, p. 9.

[31] Williams 1994, p. 54-55. Douglas Hall provides comparable figures for Jamaica in 1790. See Hall 1962.

[32] See Hall 1961.

[33] Williams 1994, p. 98.

[34] Williams 1994, p. 98.

[35] Williams 1994, p. 1.

[36] For more details on some of these points see Patterson 1970.

[37] James 1989, p. 35.

[38] An example of the transnational movements of Big Whites as well as the politics between governors and planters, see Cudjoe 2018.

[39] This complicated politics is crisply encapsulated by James when he writes that, “The higher bureaucrats, cultivated Frenchmen, arrived in the island without prejudice; and looking for mass support used to help the Mulattoes a little. And Mulattoes and big whites had a common bond-property. Once the revolution was well under way the big whites would have to choose between their allies of race and their allies of property. They would not hesitate long.” James 1989, p. 44.

[40] James provides some background for this jockeying. He writes that “the Negro Code in 1685 authorized marriage between the white and the slave who had children by him, the ceremony freeing herself and her children. The Code gave the free Mulattoes and the free Negroes equal rights with the whites.” In the decades following the Negro Code, Mulattoes “were beginning to fill the colony, and their growing numbers and riches were causing alarm to the whites.” So Mulattoes were begrudgingly accepted to the extent that they could provide numbers to repress slave insurrections. James 1989, p. 36-37.

[41] James 1989, p. 100.

[42] James 1989, p. 35.

[43] Du Bois 2013, p. 3.

[44]Du Bois 2013, p. 3.

[45] Williams 1994, p. 23.

[46] James nd.

[47] Mills, 1998.

[48]Girvan nd.

[49]Girvan nd.

[50] Beckford, 1972.

[51] Beckford, 1972, p. 155-156, p. 37.

[52] Best 1992, p12, p 6.

[53] Best 1992, p. 233.

[54] Best and Levitt, 2009, p. 19.

[55] See Lewis, 1950; Lewis 1954.

[56] Best 1992, 11.

[57] Girvan 1973.

[58] Best 1992, p. 15.

[59] Girvan 1971, Girvan 1973.

[60] Editor’s Introduction 1967.

[61] Witter, nd.

[62]Writing in another context but to a similar debate, Cornel West asked, “to what extent are Marxist explanations of social history capable of grasping the many dimensions of racial oppression?” West 1988, p. 51.

[63] See Maharaj-Bell, nd.

[64] While the New World Group did not have access to the full archive of Marx’s work, they very much anticipate some of Kevin Anderson’s conclusions, these being that Marxism was not wedded to a singular view of history nor periodization. The Group also followed Marx’s internationalism to find the anti-colonial analysis in this tradition thereby coming to reject the claims that Marxism was Eurocentric and unable to adequately account for race. Anderson 2010.

[65] See Beckford 1999, p. 259.

[66] Beckford 1999, p. 259.

[67] E.g., Charle 1966.

[68] Beckles 2013.

[69]E.g., Ramphal 1962. Beckles 2013 following in this spirit.

[70] Paxton 2004.

[71] Best 1967.

[72] See Oxaal 1968. Farler 1968.

[73] Rodney, 1966.

[74] Rodney 1972, p. 25.

[75] Rodney 1972, p. 206.

[76] Rodney 1972, p. 105, p. 107.

[77] Rodney 1972, p. 212.

[78] Rodney 1972, p. 279.

[79]Best, 2002, p. 63.

[80]Best 1967.

[81]Mills, 2010, p. 146.

[82] See Quinn, 2014 for context.

[83] Girvan, 2011.

[84] Girvan, 2011

[85]Meeks, 2014, p. viii.

[86]Meeks, 2001, p. xiv.

[87] See Maharaj-Bell, nd; also Meeks 2001.

[88] Wolf 1982. Gomes and Timcke 2021.

[89] Meeks, nd.

[90] Johnson 2018.

[91] Hall 1989, p. 151.

[92] For a critique of how some of these scholars in this turn have overlooked Black Radicals see Hudson 2016.

[93] Rodney 1972, p. ix.

Did Marx Defend Black Slavery?

On Jamaica and Labour in a Black Skin

Gregory Slack

Over the past 40 years a tradition of Marx interpretation has built up around a single passage concerning black slavery in an 1853 letter from Marx to Engels, in order to demonstrate that Marx’s support for emancipation was conditional on the level of ‘civilization’ attained by black slaves. I will argue that this interpretation, which attempts to prove Marx’s racist defense of slavery, is overdetermined by an inattention to historical context and a hypersensitivity to Marx’s nineteenth-century epithets. This is important because the alleged anti-black racism of Marx and the place black workers occupy in his historical materialist vision of class struggle are of the utmost significance for properly conceptualizing the relationship between Marxism and black liberation.

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

The last several years have been especially good for Marx scholarship seeking to retrieve a more ‘inclusive’ Marx, who was concerned not only with European or ‘white’ labour but also colonial and non-white workers. One thinks especially of Kevin Anderson’s Marx at the Margins andAndrew Zimmerman’s new edition of Marx and Engels’ writings on the US Civil War.[i][ii] There is still work to be done, however. Over the past 40 years a tradition of Marx interpretation has built up around a single passage concerning black slavery in an 1853 letter from Marx to Engels, in order to demonstrate that Marx’s support for emancipation was conditional on the level of ‘civilisation’ attained by black slaves.[iii] The most recent incarnation of this interpretation is the scholar of communism Erik van Ree’s piece ‘Marx and Engels’s Theory of History: Making Sense of the Race Factor’, which, given its wide availability online, has even been picked up by the likes of conservative IR magazine The National Interest to help make thecase that ‘Karl Marx Was a Total Racist’.[iv] It has also been cited on the Left by the sociologist of racism Wulf D. Hund, who employs it to help make sense of Marx’s relative silence on the Haitian revolution.[v] I will argue that this interpretation, which attempts to prove Marx’s racist defense of slavery, is overdetermined by an inattention to historical context and a hypersensitivity to Marx’s nineteenth-century epithets. Marxists should face these epithets head-on and never seek to whitewash history, but they also shouldn’t allow these epithets to cloud their judgment and impair their perception of Marx’s actual political positions on the substantive issues. In the words of Kevin B. Anderson, we have to learn to recognise when Marx is ‘using what today would be considered a very racist phrase to make an equally strong anti-racist point.’[vi] Or, as August Nimtz has put it: Marx and Engels’ ‘comments in personal correspondence that were unambiguously racist, sexist or anti-Semitic must be seen in context and in relation to their entire corpus of writings and actions … [We] should be cautious and not rush to judgement based on the vapid criteria of “political correctness.”’[vii]

In the course of demonstrating the falsity of this interpretation, we will be led into an exploration of Marx and Engels’ comments on free black workers, those of Jamaica in particular and of the Americas and the Caribbean in general. To my knowledge, this specific topic has virtually never been discussed in Marx scholarship.[viii] We will thus also give the lie to some of the claims of J. Lorand Matory in his recent book, The Fetish Revisited: Marx, Freud, and the Gods Black People Make, where among other things he asserts that ‘Black “wage slaves”’ – i.e. free black wage-labourers – is ‘a category Marx fails even to acknowledge.’[ix] What might to some seem a trivial exercise in Marxology has in fact profound symbolic importance. It is no coincidence that both Carlos Moore – the black Marxist turned anti-communist Pan-Africanist – and Charles Mills – the late black Marxist turned ‘black radical liberal’ – each marked their departure from the Marxist tradition with an essay seeking to show that Marx and Engels were anti-black racists. As Moore recounts in his recent memoir Pichón:

My definitive break with communism in all its forms took place at the end of the 1960s when I drafted an essay on the Marxist position on race, Were Marx and Engels Racists? It appeared in 1972 to general condemnation from the left. I was confirmed by many as an unrepentant stooge of American imperialism. However, severing my last tenuous links to world communism was an act of personal liberation.[x]

And for Mills, writing ‘in what was to be my last paper explicitly within the Marxist tradition’,[xi]

Marx and Engels’ colorless, raceless workers are actually white … we must ask whether their contemptuous attitude toward people of color does not raise the question of whether they … should not be indicted for racism and the consignment of nonwhites, particularly blacks, to a different theoretical category.[xii]

So, I would support that the subsumption of the experience of    the colonized and the racially subordinated under orthodox Marxist         historical materialist categories is doubly problematic. These raceless categories do not capture and register the specificities of the      experience of people of color; and though they are now deployed          race-neutrally, they were arguably not intended by the founders to      extend without qualification to this population in the first place.[xiii]

As Manning Marable put it in his explanation of ‘Why Black Americans Are Not Socialists’, ‘Part of the rationale for some black nationalists’ fears that Marxism is a form of “left-wing racism” must be attributed to the writings of Marx himself.’ Citing the 1853 passage I will examine in this paper, henotes that such ‘blatantly racist statements by the early proponents of socialism must give pause to many contemporary would-be black leftists.’[xiv] Thus, the alleged anti-black racism of Marx and the place black workers occupy in his historical materialist vision of class struggle are of the utmost significance for properly conceptualising the relationship between Marxism and black liberation.

 

‘Freshly imported barbarians’

Let us begin by looking at the 1853 passage in question and the responses it has provoked. Marx is reporting to Engels his assessment of a new book published that year by the American economist Henry Carey, The Slave Trade, Domestic and Foreign: Why It Exists, and How It May Be Extinguished. Marx first explains that ‘here ‘SLAVERY’ covers all forms of servitude, WAGE-SLAVERY, etc.’ Marx had been critical of Carey in the past as a ‘harmoniser,’ i.e., one aiming to show that the interests of capital and labour are in harmony rather than antagonistic as Marx believes. He explains to Engels in a mocking tone that Carey had formerly preached ‘free trade’ but had now arrived at ‘protectionism’ as the solution to all of America’s economic ills. Then comes the crucial passage (the original letter is in German; words written in English are capitalised; the italics are Marx’s):

The only thing of definite interest in the book is the comparison   between Negro slavery as formerly practised by the English in Jamaica and elsewhere, and Negro slavery in the United States. He demonstrates how the main STOCK of Negroes in Jamaica always consisted of freshly imported BARBARIANS, since their treatment by the English meant not only that the Negro population was not   maintained, but also that 2/3 of the yearly imports always went to waste, whereas the present generation of Negroes in America is a native product, more or less Yankeefied, English speaking, etc., and hence capable of being emancipated.[xv]

What has the aforementioned tradition of interpretation made of this passage? Of its representatives, some are critical interpreters of Marx and Engels’ views on race while others are generally sympathetic defenders of Marx and Marxism. They nonetheless all come to the same conclusion. Diane Paul notes that ‘Marx’s and Engels’ public writings on the American Civil War are certainly sympathetic to the cause of the ‘Negroes,’’ but then adds in a footnote alongside the offending passage: ‘However, abolition for Marx presumably depended upon a certain level of civilization.’[xvi] Manning Marable says something similar:

Marx’s famous and pithy quotation, ‘labour with a white skin cannot     emancipate itself where labour with a black skin is branded,’ characterizes the generally anti-racist and egalitarian orientation of   his entire work. But there were also lapses. … In Marx’s correspondence with Engels in June, 1853, he compares Jamaicans        and Afro-American slaves, arguing that the former ‘always consisted of newly imported barbarians,’ whereas Black Americans were   ‘becoming a native product, more or less Yankeefied, English speaking, etc., and therefore fit for emancipation.[xvii]

Andrew Zimmerman, whose whole editorial apparatus for his new edition of Marx and Engels’ writings on the Civil War is geared to basically vindicating their views – ‘Marx and Engels opposed racism at every turn,’ he first declares – nonetheless then feels compelled to do an about-face and appease those who will balk at the language of the passage in question:

When Marx remarked, in 1853, that US blacks who were born into slavery were not “freshly imported barbarians” from Africa but rather “a native product, more or less Yankeefied, English speaking, etc., and hence capable of being emancipated”, he did not only denigrate African cultures; he also blinded himself to the many African and    African American political traditions that contributed to the defeat of slavery in the Americas.[xviii]

Finally, Erik van Ree essentially echoes Paul, whose article he relies on heavily for his whole orientation to the question of Marx and Engels on race:

Both men strongly supported abolitionism. Then again, the question of race remained an issue for them: whether the ‘negroes’ were capable of emancipation at all did represent a real question. In a 14 June 1853 letter to Engels, Marx indicated that, in the past, Jamaica had been importing new negro slaves all the time, making for a population mostly consisting of ‘newly imported barbarians’. On the contrary, the ‘present negro generation in America [represents] an indigenous product, more or less turned into Yankees, English speaking etc. and therefore becomes capable of emancipation’.[xix]

What all of these interpretations seem to agree on is that Marx thinks support for the emancipation of black slaves should be conditional on their being more ‘civilised’ than ‘freshly imported barbarians’ from Africa. There is of course also justified condemnation of the use of the insulting term ‘barbarians’ as applied to Africans. However, these interpretations are wrong. Marx is giving conditional support neither for slavery noremancipation. Both Marx’s condemnation of slavery and his support for emancipation are unconditional.

Henry Carey and the bourgeois viability of emancipation

Remember, firstly, that Marx is telling Engels what he thinks is most interesting about Carey’s book. Why does Marx find this argument of Carey’s interesting? The answer becomes obvious once we get past the antiquated and offensive language of ‘barbarians’, a term used by Carey in his own discussion, and one used by Marx and Engels in a variety of contexts in a variety of ways. Carey was a prominent – if not the most prominent – economist ofnineteenth century America, now ‘often called the founder of the American school of economics.’[xx] According to the Encyclopedia Brittanica of 1911, his 1837-1840 work Principles of Political Economy, ‘which was translatedinto Italian and Swedish, soon became the standard representative in the United States of the school of economic thought which, with some interruptions, has since [i.e., up to 1911] dominated the tariff system of that country.’[xxi] And he became ‘the trusted adviser of both [President] Lincoln and [Lincoln’s Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P.] Chase.’[xxii] Thus, what Marx found interesting was that this prominent economist, spokesperson of American industrial capitalism in the North, who would go on to become Lincoln’s economic adviser, was arguing that American slaves are ‘capable of being emancipated’, i.e., their emancipation can be justified from an economic standpoint – it is economically viable. Just three years prior Marx and Engels themselves had predicted that the forces of American industrialcapitalism would act to emancipate the slaves as soon as it became profitable for them do so, i.e., as soon as the slaves became more valuable as free workers than as slaves:

American cotton production is based on slavery. As soon as industry has developed to the point when the cotton monopoly of the United States has become intolerable to it, cotton will be successfully produced in vast quantities in other countries, which almost everywhere can now only be done through free workers. But as soon as the free labour of other countries provides industry with its cotton supplies in sufficient quantity and more cheaply than the slave labour of the United States, American slavery will have been broken at the   same time as the American cotton monopoly, and the slaves will be emancipated because as slaves they will have become unusable.[xxiii]

This is why Marx italicises capable of being emancipated, so as toemphasise the striking confirmation of their own view in Carey’s conclusion. Note that there is no mention here of the black slaves’ readiness for emancipation depending on their level of ‘civilisation’. Lest one think that this analysis is an instance of ‘economic reductionism’ and thus somehow insensitive to black agency, it should be borne in mind that exactly the same analysis was made a few years laterby Martin Delany, the ‘father’ of black nationalism.

Delany hoped to establish a cotton-producing settlement overseen by African Americans on land purchased from the ruler of Abeokuta. Such a settlement, he believed, would help to make Africa into an economic power by inspiring cotton production throughout the continent. And if that were to happen, he maintained, the South’s cotton monopoly would be broken and slavery would soon come to an end.[xxiv]

But what about Carey’s comparison between the black slavery practiced in Jamaica and the other British plantation colonies, and black slavery in the United States? What does his talk of ‘barbarians’ amount to and what relevance does it have for determining whether American slaves are ‘capable of being emancipated’? The British abolished slavery throughout their colonies in the 1830s, but by the 1850s ‘increasing numbers of prominent Britons [had come] to view ‘the mighty experiment’ [of emancipation] as a dismal failure.’[xxv] Carey concurred, and traced the economic failure of immediate emancipation in England’s colonies to the conditions of its slaves prior to emancipation, which he contrasted with the conditions of slaves in America.

In the islands [of the British West Indies] it was held to be cheaper to buy slaves than to raise them, and the sexes were out of all proportion to each other. Here [i.e., in the US], importation was small, and almost the whole increase, large as it has been, has resulted from the excess of births over deaths. In the islands, the slave was generally a barbarian, speaking an unknown tongue, and working with men like himself, in gangs, with scarcely a chance for improvement. Here, he was generally a being born on the soil, speaking the same language with his owner; and often working in the field with him, with many advantages for the development of his faculties. In the islands, the land-owners clung to slavery as the sheet-anchor of their hopes. Here, on the contrary, slavery had gradually been abolished in all the States north of Mason & Dixon’s line, and Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky were all, at the date of emancipation in the islands, preparing for the early adoption of measures looking to its entire abolition.[xxvi] ....TheProspective Review, (Nov. 1852,) seeing what has happened in the British colonies, and speaking of the possibility of a similar course of action on this side of the Atlantic, says— 

-----"We have had experience enough in our own colonies, not to wish to see the experiment tried elsewhere on a larger scale. …we have no reason to suppose that the whole tragi-comedy would not be re-  enacted in the Slave States of America, if slavery were summarily abolished by act of Congress to-morrow. Property among the plantations consists only of land and negroes: emancipate the negroes—and the planters have no longer any capital for the cultivation of the land…It is allowed on all hands that the negroes as a race will not work longer than is necessary to supply the simplest comforts of life. It would be wonderful were it otherwise. A people have been degraded and ground down for a century and a half: systematically kept in ignorance for five generations of any needs and enjoyments beyond those of the savage: and then it is made matter of complaint that they will not apply themselves to labour for their higher comforts and more refined luxuries, of which they cannot know the value!"----

The systematic degradation here referred to is probably quite true as regards the British Islands, where 660,000 were all that remained of almost two millions that had been imported [i.e., the 2/3 mortality rate Marx refers to – Author]; but it is quite a mistake to suppose it so in regard to this country [i.e., the US], in which there are now found ten persons for every one ever imported, and all advancing by gradual steps toward civilization and freedom.[xxvii]

In other words, while emancipation had been an economic failure in Jamaica et al, where most of the slaves who were emancipated were Africans who wanted nothing more than to abandon the plantations and work their own land, it would not necessarily fail in the US, where slaves were almost completely ‘Americanised’ and therefore more amenable to integrating into American society as free wage-labourers post-emancipation. Carey’s ultimate prescription, as Marx points out in his letter to Engels, is protectionism rather than immediate emancipation. Marx has no special sympathy for protectionism as against free trade,[xxviii] and is certainly no ‘harmoniser’ like Carey, who is actually quite defensive in the book of American slaveholders, whom he views as victims of British free-trade policies. Indeed, in 1869 Marx writes sneeringly to Engels apropos Carey’s 1858-60 Principles of Social Science, that ‘Mr. Carey, as a harmoniser,defended [the slave-owners] in all his previous works.’[xxix] But what interests Marx about Carey’s work is that it is nonetheless arguing that America’s slaves are ‘capable of being emancipated’, contrary to the protestations of naysayers – like the English Prospective Review whichCarey quotes – that emancipation was a disaster in the British colonies and so will be a disaster in the US.

Thus, we can see that the aforementioned interpreters seem to have gotten things backwards. Understandably put off by the word ‘barbarians’ and the phrase ‘capable of being emancipated’, they conclude that Marx must be claiming that the African slaves of Jamaica et al are incapable ofbeing – i.e., should not be – emancipated. Such a conclusion would be remarkable indeed, for it would signal a complete reversal in 1853 of Marx’s position up to that point. But none of these commentators look into Carey’s book itself, and most fail to even note the discussion of Carey’s book as the context that elicits Marx’s comments.

 

Marx on Jamaica

Nonetheless, for the sake of argument let us entertain the view that Marx’s support for the emancipation of black slaves is conditional on their level of ‘civilisation.’ One way to test this view would be to examine Marx’s other writings on Jamaica. If the critical commentators are correct, then we should expect to find Marx claiming that the former slaves should not have been emancipated, or that they should be re-enslaved. However, we find just the opposite.

Just four years after the ‘barbarians’ passage, Marx was composing a draft of Capital, part of which would later be published as theGrundrisse. Inhis ‘Chapter on Capital’, in order to elucidate the nature of capital and wage-labour as transitory socio-historical relations as opposed to eternal or necessary ones, he drew on the example of the situation of the formerly enslaved blacks and their descendants in Jamaica, about whom an anonymous author (‘Expertus’) had recently wrote to the editor of The Times of London (of which Marx was an avid reader). The author’s argument is that England should cease supporting the costly suppression of the slave-trade and the citizenship of Jamaican blacks, unless it finds a way to provide the colonies with labourers who will restore value to its plantations. In language reminiscent of Carey’s discussion, but far more virulently racist, ‘Expertus’ begins by describing the adverse consequences and economic ruin he sees as having followed from emancipation:

The freed West-India negro slave will not till the soil for wages; the free son of the ex-slave is as obstinate as his sire. He will cultivate lands which he has not bought for his own yams, mangoes, and potatoes. These satisfy his wants: he does not care for yours. Cotton, and sugar, and coffee, and tobacco, he cares little enough for them. And what matters it to him that the Englishman has sunk his thousands and tens of thousands on mills, machinery, and plant, which now totter, on the languishing estate, that for years has only returned begary and debts? He eats his yams, and sniggers at ‘Buckra.’

Twenty millions of gold [i.e. the compensation paid to the slaveholders upon emancipation – Author] have been distilled from the brains and muscles of the free English labourer of every degree to fashion the West-Indian negro into a ‘free and independent’ labourer. ‘Free and independent’ enough he has become, God knows, but labourer he is not; and, so far as I can see, never will be under the present system of things. He will sing hymns; he will quote texts; but honest, steady industry he not only detests, but despises.

Exasperated, he asks, ‘Is there no way of filling some of our islands with an adequate population—a population which will feel the stimulus of competition sufficiently to be urged to work? Is there no mode of inundating that proud and lazy Quashee who cumbers our lands with an influx of men who will give a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wages?’ (One can see from this use of ‘a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wages’ how effortlessly it can be made into an apologia for the subordination of the working population, something Marx and Engels were no doubt aware of.) The anonymous author then suggests that in order to provide this labouring population England could perhaps import ‘Coolies from India’ or even buy African slaves, ‘free’ them, and then employ them as indentured labourers for a fixed contract according to strict labour demands. He repeats the now-familiar line that emancipation will not be tried by other nations after England’s failure to demonstrate its viability. In breathtakingly racist tones, ‘Expertus’ then concludes defiantly:

But if we are not to try this experiment, for God’s sake do not sacrifice English pith, toil, and money to Quashee. If Quashee won’t raise cotton, sugar, and coffee, don’t pamper his idleness by reducing other tropical colonies to the state of our own. Do not enter on a crusade to forbid the nigger from working. Cruelty to the African may be a bad thing; but, in my opinion, cruelty to our own kith, kin, and countrymen is much worse. And our present system involves both kinds of cruelty.[xxx]

So, given the hypothesis that Marx thinks black slaves should not be emancipated unless they are adequately ‘civilised’, we might expect him to agree with ‘Expertus’ that these Caribbean blacks are undeserving offreedom and that means should be found and employed for making them or their substitutes ‘give a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wage.’

Let us test this hypothesis. Here is the lesson Marx draws from the above screed (aside from reproducing the author’s English epithets like ‘Quashee’ and the n-word, Marx does not quote ‘Expertus’ at all):

The Times of November [21,] 1857 contains a most endearing scream of rage from a West Indian planter. With great moral indignation this advocate—by way of plea for the reintroduction of Negro slavery—explains how the Quashees (the free NIGGERS of Jamaica[xxxi]) content themselves to produce only what is strictly necessary for their own consumption and apart from this “use value”, regard loafing itself (INDULGENCE and IDLENESS) as the real luxury article; how they don’t give a damn about sugar and the fixed capital invested in the PLANTATIONS, but rather react with malicious pleasure and sardonic smiles when a planter goes to ruin, and even exploit their acquired Christianity as a cover for this sardonic mood and indolence. They have ceased to be slaves, not in order to become wage workers, but SELF-SUSTAINING PEASANTS, working for their own meagre consumption. Capital as capital does not exist for them, because wealth made independent in general exists only either throughdirect forced labour, slavery, or throughmediated forced labour,wage labour.[xxxii]

It should be clear enough which side Marx is on. Marx immediately detects the class and race prejudice of the ‘West India Planter’ behind the pen of ‘Expertus’, and delights in the irony of an argument for slavery whichemploys moral indignation at the workers’ idleness. ‘Expertus’ had in fact spun his argument not as a ‘plea for the reintroduction of Negro slavery’, but as the only sure method of convincing Spain and America of the viability of free black labour, and even as the only guarantee that they would not reimpose slavery on the British colonies themselves! But Marx, unlike what we might imagine to be the response of one sympathetic to the ‘emancipate only if civilised’ view, is not taken in by this ploy and sees clearly that this is a ‘plea for the reintroduction of Negro slavery.’ He is clearly sympathetic to the black workers who ‘don’t give a damn’ about capital and who mock the ruined planters. They are, as Marx puts it, peasants concerned only with use values and their own enjoyment of the good life. Because of the natural wealth provided by abundant unowned land and good weather, the free blacks of Jamaica are not compelled by circumstances to work for wages to survive. (‘Expertus’ had claimed that Barbados did not have this problem, for ‘the pressure there has been that of people on subsistence, not of redundance on the people; the labourers have been looking for masters, not the masters for men.’[xxxiii]) This all proves Marx’s point that capital is a transitory socio-historical relation dependent on the forced labour – whether ‘direct’ or ‘mediated’ – of the worker. 

Eight years later in October of 1865, when poor black workers erupted in protest at the colonial government in Jamaica, prompting brutal reprisals directed by the colonial governor Eyre, Marx and Engels followed the events closely in the British press. In response to what became known as the Morant Bay Rebellion, Eyre imposed martial law and upwards of 400 Jamaicans were killed, ‘many of them hanged in reprisals after the fighting had finished.’[xxxiv] If the hypothesis that Marx believed black slaves in Jamaica incapable or undeserving of emancipation were true, we would again expect him to be less than sympathetic to these rebelling poor black workers. After all, according to this hypothesis, for Marx they were either former slaves or descendants of slaves who had been emancipated ‘before their time.’ It is thus extremely interesting to find that, despite Engels’ use of the n-word, both he and Marx are patently on the side of the black rebels and are appalled (but not surprised) by the mass of extra-judicial killings committed by the English.

The Daily Telegraph of November 17th, 1865, had relayed the newsof the rebellion by first playing up the alleged unprovoked atrocities committed by the rebels and then celebrating the devastating British military response.[xxxv] Nonetheless, Engels from the first takes the side of the rebels and is aghast by the behavior of the British, writing to Marx the same day of the Telegraph piece: ‘What do you say to the NIGGER-rebellion in Jamaica and the atrocities perpetrated by the English? The Telegraph says today: ‘We should be very sorry if the right was taken away from any British officer to shootor hang all and every British subject found in arms against the British Crown!’’[xxxvi]

Three days later TheTimes of London published a brazenly racistapology for British behaviour, protesting that ‘It were useless to follow the special pleadings of those who in the atrocities committed on their countryman refuse to see aught but the grievances of negroes and thewickedness of the white race.’ Seeking to ‘refute the platitudes of rhetorical sentimentality’, the paper claimed that ‘the negro had no grievances – no grievances, at least, but what he had a legal mode of redressing’, and that as a peasant he had it better than any peasant in England, Scotland, France, or Belgium. Continued the Times: ‘He had Anglo-Saxon institutionsand a constitutional form of Government. Within two generations of African savagery he acquired what the English people won after six centuries of civilised despotism. If he had wrongs, he had the legal means of obtaining redress.’ The Times then proffered a ‘racial’ (and very racist) explanation ofwhy the rebellion occurred, given the supposed bliss of black life in Jamaica:

Why, then, did he not avail himself of these? Why did he plot foul treasons and murders? The answer is not far to seek. The wonderful influence of race has operated as strongly on the negro as on the Sclave, the Magyar, and the Celt. The negro views with jealousy and hatred – we speak, of course, generally and subject to exceptions – the contiguity of another race numerically inferior, but which he feels to be morally superior, to his own. He dreams of the glorious island in which he lives being owned in perpetuity by himself and his posterity.[xxxvii]

The paper then invokes the boogeyman of Haiti and its ‘barbaric independence’, claiming that the Jamaican blacks were inspired by the neighboring country which flattered the black man’s ‘pride, his vanity, his indolence.’ The paper ends its column by hoping that the British response will halt the ‘treasonous infection’ from spreading to other Caribbean islands, and by praising the loyalty of the Maroons who helped put down the rebellion. 

Marx, reading this, writes to Engels the same day:

The Jamaican business is typical of the utter turpitude of the ‘TRUE ENGLISHMAN’. These fellows are as bad as the Russians in every respect. But, says the good old Times, these DAMNED ROGUES ENJOYED ‘ALL THE LIBERTIES OF AN ANGLO-SAXON CONSTITUTION’. I.e. they ENJOYED THE LIBERTY, amongst others, of having their hides taxed to raise money for the PLANTERS to import COOLIES and thus depress their own labour market below the minimum. … The Irish affair and the Jamaica BUTCHERIES were all that was needed after the American war to complete the unmasking of English hypocrisy![xxxviii]

Whereas The Times had dismissed the blacks’ grievances, blamed theirrebellion on racial envy and Haiti, and defended the actions of the British military, Marx does just the opposite. He points out the rebels’ legitimate economic grievances, born of the class struggle waged by the planters – the British government having since taken ‘Expertus’’ advice and set about importing to Jamaica indentured labourers from India[xxxix] – and condemns in the strongest terms the moral bankruptcy and hypocrisy of British pretensions to moral supremacy.

A few weeks later Engels is increasingly aghast as more details emerge about British behavior in crushing the rebellion: ‘Every post brings news of worse atrocities in Jamaica. The letters from the English officers about their heroic deeds against unarmed NIGGERS are beyond words. Here the spirit of the English army is at last expressing itself quite uninhibitedly. ‘THE SOLDIERS ENJOY IT.’ Even The Manchester Guardian has had to come out against the authorities in Jamaica this time.’[xl] Then when a Parliamentary Commission condemned the actions of the British and The Times was forced to eat its words and side with outragedpublic opinion, Engels wrote to Marx in March 1866: ‘Fine revelations from Jamaica. And what an embarrassment they are to The Times…The paper is going DOWN very rapidly.’[xli]

With the massacre of poor black workers and the economic factors that had prompted the rebellion in Jamaica fresh in his mind, Marx warned German workers not to become the tools of British capitalists who were trying to roll back concessions won by the nascent tailors’ union in London. On May 4, 1866, writing in the German press on behalf of the General Council of the International Working Men’s Association, he wrote: ‘The purpose of this importation [of German tailors to Edinburgh] is the same as that of the importation of Indian COOLIES to Jamaica, namely, perpetuation of slavery.’[xlii]

In a letter to Engels two months later, Marx commented on the recent mass meeting organised by the Reform League to agitate for manhood suffrage. ‘Tens of thousands of workers, some of them armed’[xliii] met in Hyde Park, London, nearly leading to violent clashes with the police and military. After opining that the British working class ‘will accomplish nothing without a really bloody clash with those in power’, he criticised the conciliating measures taken by some of the League’s leaders so as to avoid a violent confrontation while, in the meantime, ‘that cur Knox, the police magistrate of Marylebone, is sending people down in a summary fashion, which shows what would happen if London were Jamaica.’[xliv] For Marx, the black workers’ uprising had become a symbol of both workers’ rebellion and ruling class retribution.

That this is so can be further seen from the fact that two years later in 1868, in a history of the International Workingmen’s Association attributed to Wilhelm Eichhoff but written with Marx’s ‘active assistance’[xlv] and on the basis of his extensive notes, documents, and advice, Eichhoff and Marx again invoked the rebellion in Jamaica. Speaking of the widespread strikes that had just taken place in Belgium, where ‘Hunger and misery drove the wretches to rebellion and pillage’ and in response ‘the capitalists let the government and military forces intervene and most deliberately provoked bloody conflicts in which many workers were killed, wounded or thrown behind bars’, Eichhoff and Marx state: ‘In modern history only the scenes of carnage and bloodshed during the Negro uprising in Jamaica can compare with these atrocities. Here, as in Jamaica, the capitalists celebrated bloody orgies. Here, as in Jamaica, they hoped to break what was left of the workers’ spirit of resistance and self-esteem by acts of extreme brutality.’[xlvi]

Finally, Marx again invoked the ruthless crushing of the Jamaican rebellion the following year in 1869. Writing on behalf of the General Council of the International Working Men’s Association ‘To the Workmen of Europe and the United States’ about ‘The Belgian Massacres’, he opposedhis own explanation of the clashes, based in class struggle, to the view that the Belgian authorities, under French Imperial influence, were looking for a pretext to justify French intervention:

Other politicians, on the contrary, suspect the Belgian ministers to be sold to the Tuileries, and to periodically enact these horrible scenes of a mock civil war, with the deliberate aim of affording Louis Bonaparte a pretext for saving society in Belgium as he has saved it in France. But was Ex-Governor Eyre ever accused of having organized the Negro massacre at Jamaica in order to wrest that island from England and place it into the hands of the United States? No doubt the Belgian ministers are excellent patriots of the Eyre pattern. As he was the unscrupulous tool of the West-Indian planter, they are the unscrupulous tools of the Belgian capitalist.[xlvii]

How mistaken was Carlos Moore, then, when he averred in the 1970s that ‘to Marx and Engels,’ the struggles of black workers in Jamaica and elsewhere

were, above all, only “nigger” events. This is seen in Engels’ short reference to the Jamaican insurrection of 1865, led by Paul Bogle. In a letter to Marx, dated December 1, 1865, Engels expressed no more than an amused “sympathy” for the “pitiful” struggle against British bayonets and rifles on the part of these “unarmed Niggers."[xlviii]

We have seen that there was far more to their commentary on events in Jamaica than Moore was and is ready to admit. For doing so would seriously jeopardise his mission to paint Marx and Engels as ‘Aryan’-style white supremacists. Wulf Hund, who thinks Moore treats the issue of Marx’s anti-black racism ‘denunciatively’ from a ‘distortive perspective’[xlix], nonetheless himself argues that Marx ignores the Haitian revolution because for Marx, ‘On the eve of revolution, the black slaves there were predominantly not a “native product” (as in the United States) but “freshly imported barbarians” (as in Jamaica)’[l]. Thus Hund employs precisely the same reasoning as Moore: Marx ignored the Haitian revolution, as he ignored all the other uprisings of black workers, including in Jamaica, because these were mere ‘n-word’ or ‘barbarian’ events. But if, as I have tried to show, this argument fails in the case of Jamaica and the Morant Bay Rebellion, why should it succeed in the case of Haiti and its revolution? Although Marx had little to say about the Haitian Revolution, he clearly sided with ‘the insurgent Negroes of Haiti’[li] in their struggle to free themselves, recognised Haiti as a ‘Negro Republic’[lii], and noted the pivotal role played by Haiti and its president Alexandre Pétion in ‘the South American revolution’ – by providing Simón Bolívar with arms in exchange for Bolívar’s promise to emancipate black slaves[liii] (an event Anténor Firmin later adduced as evidence of Haiti’s world-historical significance in his Equality of the Human Races[liv]). So, while Hund’s query about Marx’s relative silence on the Haitian Revolution remains an important one, his contention that it stemmed from Marx’s anti-black racism – specifically the belief that Haitian blacks were ‘barbarians’ incapable of making history – is firmly refuted by the textual evidence.

 

The free black worker in Capital

Recently the distinguished cultural anthropologist and scholar of African religions, J. Lorand Matory, has followed Moore and Mills in attempting to make the case that the Eurocentric Marx’s free workers were all implicitly or explicitly white. Matory claims that ‘Marx’s greatest feat of theoretical abstraction and distortion’ can be found in the brief concluding chapter of Capital vol. 1 on ‘The Modern Theory of Colonization’, where

Marx celebrates – as counterexamples of the metaphorical “enslavement” of the free (white) worker and as examples of his proper condition – those parts of the US and Australian settler colonies where almost all of the (white) workers have land of their own, where they can thereby resist the capitalist’s coercive demand for their labor, and where they therefore enjoy a high standard of living and culture.[lv]

In his reading of Marx’s account of the struggle between capital and labour in the colonies of the Americas, Matory thus imagines that Marx means to refer only to white workers as the representatives of labour. According to Matory, ‘Black “wage slaves”’ – i.e., free black workers or wage-labourers – is ‘a category Marx fails even to acknowledge.’[lvi] The text, however, does not support such a reading.

We might have wondered how reliable a reader of Marx Matory is by attending to his very next sentence, where he seeks to admit that ‘At moments, Marx does lament the fact that similar land in another settler colony, South Africa, was stolen from its indigenous African inhabitants ([1867] 1990: 48).’[lvii] The passage Matory cites in fact refers not to anything written by Marx but to a discussion of South Africa from Ernest Mandel’s introduction to the Penguin edition of Capital vol. 1.When we do attend closely to the text in question, namely the final chapter of Capital vol. 1 on ‘The Modern Theory of Colonization’, we findnot only that Matory is mistaken but that it is precisely here where Marxincorporated his earlier thoughts on the Jamaican class struggle into the fabric of Capital. For in Marx’s footnote to thetitle of this chapter, he tellsthe reader explicitly that he is dealing with both (white) European immigrant workers and formerly enslaved (black) workers: ‘We are dealing here with true colonies, i.e. virgin soil colonized by free immigrants. The United States is, economically speaking, still a colony of Europe. Apart from this, old plantations where the abolition of slavery has completely revolutionized earlier relationships belong here.’[lviii]

Recall that Capital vol. 1 waspublished in 1867, within two years of both the abolition of slavery in the US and the Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica. Hence Marx is including both the newly freed African American workers and the other free black workers of the colonies in his discussion of the colonial class struggle. Later in the chapter Marx explicitly discusses the class struggle between (black) workers and capitalists in the Caribbean (i.e., the West Indies) by way of a take-down of ‘that mild, free-trading, vulgar economist [Gustave de] Molinari’, in a manner reminiscent of his earlier criticisms of ‘Expertus’ and The Times. Marx first quotes Molinari and then adds someacerbic commentary:

‘In the colonies where slavery has been abolished without the compulsory labour being replaced with an equivalent quantity of free labour, there has occurred the opposite of what happens every day before our eyes. Simple workers have been seen to exploit in their turn the industrial entrepreneurs, demanding from them wages which bear absolutely no relation to the legitimate share in the product which they ought to receive. The planters were unable to obtain for their sugar a sufficient price to cover the increase in wages, and were obliged to furnish the extra amount, at first out of their profits, and then out of their very capital. A considerable number of planters have been ruined as a result, while others have closed down their businesses in order to avoid the ruin which threatened them. . . It is doubtless better that these accumulations of capital should be destroyed than that generations of men should perish’ (how generous of M. Molinari) ‘but would it not be better if both survived?’ (Molinari, op. cit., pp. 51-2). M. Molinari, M. Molinari! What then becomes of the ten commandments, of Moses and the Prophets, of the law of supply and demand, if in Europe the‘entrepreneur’ can cut down the worker’s ‘legitimate share’ and in the West Indies the workers can cut down theentrepreneur’s? And what, if you please, is this ‘legitimate share’, which, according to your own admission, the capitalist in Europe daily neglects to pay? Over yonder, in the colonies, where the workers are so ‘simple’ as to ‘exploit’ the capitalist, M. Molinari feels a powerful itch to use police methods to set on the right road that law of supply and demand which works automatically everywhere else.[lix]

Molinari’s lament for the ruin of sugar planters unable to employ profit-creating cheap wage-labour is exactly the complaint ‘Expertus’ had made, while his ‘itch to use police methods’ to discipline recalcitrant labour recalls the bloody and repressive aftermath of the Jamaican rebellion.

 

Marx: against black slavery and for black labour

So, to return to the claim for which these passages furnish essential evidence, it is exceedingly unlikely that Marx held the ‘emancipate only if civilised’ view attributed to him by the scholars whose interpretation we explored above. Marx did not think that the Jamaican blacks who had been emancipated by the British in the 1830s, though majority African-born, were undeserving or incapable of emancipation. On the contrary, he recognised them as workers – peasants and wage-labourers – who rightly fought attempts by the planter class and British government to reestablish conditions akin to slavery on the island. Far from believing that slaves must first be ‘civilised’ before they can or ought to be freed, in Capital v. 1 Marxeven criticised the British Emancipation Act of 1833 – which ‘forced the “freed” slaves to undergo a period of uncompensated “apprenticeship”’[lx] – for having ‘administered freedom drop by drop’.[lxi]

What all of this shows – quite clearly, I think – is that Marx viewed defenses of black slavery (and of slavery in general) as self-evidently absurd from the standpoint of justice. For Marx, if one’s argument involved a moral justification or apology for slavery then this was an immediate reductio of one’s position. He never abandoned the principles he articulated in some of his first work as a radical journalist: that ‘slavery, can never become lawful [i.e., just], even if it exists a thousand times over as a law’;[lxii] and that ‘man [as opposed to any idol or deity – Author]is the highest being for man’, that there is a ‘categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicablebeing.’[lxiii]

Even more than this, though, what our exploration of Marx’s neglected writings on free black labour shows is just how misguided it is to attempt to drive a wedge between Marxism and black liberation. The representatives of the ‘Marx as anti-black racist’ interpretation have got it wrong – in their rush to subject Marx to a race-first reading and uncover what they feel must be his inevitable racism, they have neglected to look past the epithets and at what he actually said.

 

Bibliography

Anderson, Kevin B. 2016 [2010], Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies, Expanded edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Avineri, Shlomo (ed.) 1968, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His Despatches and Other Writings on China, India, Mexico, the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Doubleday.

Carey, Henry C. 1853, The Slave Trade, Domestic and Foreign: Why It Exists, and How It May Be Extinguished, Philadelphia: A. Hart.

Cohen, G.A. 2001 [1978], Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, Expanded edition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Davis, David Brion 2006, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World, New York: Oxford University Press.

Eichhoff, Wilhelm 1985 [1868], ‘The International Workingmen’s Association: Its Establishment, Organisation, Political and Social Activity, and Growth’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 21, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Encyclopedia Britannica 1911, ‘Carey, Henry Charles’, Eleventh edition.

Encyclopedia Britannica 2021, ‘Henry C. Carey’, last modified 11 December 2021, available at: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-C-Carey.

Engels, Friedrich 1987a [1865], ‘Letter from Engels to Marx’ (November 1865) in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 42, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Engels, Friedrich 1987b [1865], ‘Letter from Engels to Marx’ (December 1865) in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 42, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Engels, Friedrich 1987c [1866], ‘Letter from Engels to Marx’ (March 1866) in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 42, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Erickson, Edgar L. 1934, ‘The Introduction of East Indian Coolies into the British West Indies’, The Journal of Modern History, 6, 2: 127-146.

Expertus 1857, ‘Negroes and the Slave Trade’, Times, 21 November: 9.

Firmin, Anténor 2002 [1885], The Equality of the Human Races, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Heuman, Gad 1991, ‘1865: Prologue to the Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica’, New West Indian Guide, 65, 3/4: 107-127.

Hobbs, J. Francis et al. 1865, ‘The Negro Insurrection’, Daily Telegraph, 17 November: 3.

Hund, Wulf 2021, ‘Marx and Haiti: Notes on a Blank Space’, Journal of World Philosophies, 6, 2: 76-99.

Huzzey, Richard 2015, ‘Jamaica’s Morant Bay Rebellion: Brutality and Outrage in the British empire’, History Extra, 5 December, available at:https://www.historyextra.com/period/victorian/jamaicas-morant-bay-rebellion-brutality-and-outrage-in-the-british-empire/.

Levermore, Charles H. 1890, ‘Henry C. Carey and his Social System’, Political Science Quarterly, 5, 4: 553-582.

Levine, Robert S. (ed.) 2003, Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Marable, Manning 1987, African and Caribbean Politics: From Kwame Nkrumah to the Grenada Revolution, London: Verso.

Marable, Manning 1996 [1983], ‘Why Black Americans Are Not Socialists’ inSpeaking Truth to Power: Essays on Race, Resistance, and Radicalism, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Marx, Karl 1973 [1857], Grundrisse, translated by Martin Nicolaus, London: Penguin.

Marx, Karl 1975a [1842], ‘Debates on Freedom of the Press and Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 1, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1975b [1844], ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 3, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1976 [1867], Capital Volume 1, London: Penguin.

Marx, Karl 1982 [1858], ‘Bolivar y Ponte’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 18, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1983a [1853], ‘Letter from Marx to Engels’ (June 1853) in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 39, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1983b [1857], Grundrisse inMarx Engels Werke Volume 42, Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

Marx, Karl 1984 [1862], ‘A Criticism of American Affairs’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 19, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1985a [1866], ‘A Warning’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 20, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1985b [1869], ‘The Belgian Massacres’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 21, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1986 [1857], ‘Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 28, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1987a [1865], ‘Letter from Marx to Engels’ (November 1865) in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 42, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1987b [1866], ‘Letter from Marx to Engels’ (July 1866) in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 42, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1988 [1869], ‘Letter from Marx to Engels’ (November 1869) in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 43, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl 1992 [1848], ‘On the Question of Free Trade’ in The Poverty of Philosophy, New York: International Publishers.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels 1976 [1932], The German Ideology inMarx and Engels Collected Works Volume 5, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels 1978 [1850], ‘Review, May to October 1850’ in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 10, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Matory, J. Lorand 2018, The Fetish Revisited: Marx, Freud, and the Gods Black People Make, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Mills, Charles W. 2003, From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Moore, Carlos 1972, Were Marx and Engels White Racists?: The Prolet-Aryan Outlook of Marx and Engels, Chicago: Institute of Positive Education.

Moore, Carlos 1974, ‘Were Marx and Engels White Racists?: The Prolet-Aryan Outlook of Marxism’, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 19: 125-156.

Moore, Carlos 2008, Pichón: Race and Revolution in Castro’s Cuba: A Memoir, Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books.

Nimtz, August H. 2003, Marx, Tocqueville, and Race in America: The “Absolute Democracy” or “Defiled Republic”, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Paul, Diane 1981, ‘“In the Interests of Civilization”: Marxist Views of Race and Culture in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 42, 1: 115-138.

Sazonov, Vladimir 1987, Notes to Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 42, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Stepman, Jarrett 2020, ‘Karl Marx Was a Total Racist’, The National Interest, 15 July, available at:https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/karl-marx-was-total-racist-164792.

Times 1865, ‘The first incidents which gave rise to the terrible outbreak in Jamaica’, 20 November: 8.

van Ree, Erik 2019, ‘Marx and Engels’s Theory of History: Making Sense of the Race Factor’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 24, 1: 54-73.

Vasin, Yuri 1985, Notes to Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 21, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Zimmerman, Andrew (ed.) 2016, The Civil War in the United States by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 2nd edition, New York: International Publishers.

 


[i] This article draws on research supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).

[ii] See Anderson 2016 and Zimmerman 2016.

[iii] The first appearance in English of the passage in question seems to have been Avineri 1968, p. 430.

[iv] See van Ree 2019 and Stepman 2020.

[v] See Hund 2021. Hund’s question of why Marx did not say more on the Haitian revolution is an interesting one. However, Hund’s explanation – which partially rests on an appeal to the ‘freshly imported barbarians’ line discussed here – is put in doubt to the extent that the line fails to provide such support, as I show below.

[vi] Anderson 2016, p. 98.

[vii] Nimtz 2003, p. 132, n. 35.

[viii] Apart from a few sentences here and there. See Anderson 2016, p. 160; Nimtz 2003, p. 188, n. 6; Cohen 2001, p. 321, n. 3.

[ix] Matory 2018, p. 72.

[x] Moore 2008, pp. 287-288. See also Moore 1972, and 1974–75.

[xi] Mills 2003, p. 122.

[xii] Mills 2003, p. 151.

[xiii] Mills 2003, p. 153.

[xiv] Marable 1996, pp. 236–7, n. 2.

[xv] Marx 1983a, p. 346.

[xvi] Paul 1981, p. 127.

[xvii] Marable 1987, p. 32.

[xviii] Zimmerman 2016, p. xxvi.

[xix] Van Ree 2019, p. 65.

[xx]Encyclopedia Britannica 2021.

[xxi]Encyclopedia Britannica 1911.

[xxii] Levermore 1890, p. 571.

[xxiii] Marx and Engels 1978, p. 501–2.

[xxiv] See Levine 2003, p. 11.

[xxv] Davis 2006, p. 238.

[xxvi] Carey 1853, pp. 19–20.

[xxvii] Carey 1853, p. 32–3.

[xxviii]‘Do not imagine, gentlemen, that in criticizing freedom of trade we have the least intention of defending the system of protection.

One may declare oneself an enemy of the constitutional regime without declaring oneself a friend of the ancient regime.

Moreover, the protectionist system is nothing but a means of establishing large-scale industry in any given country, that is to say, of making it dependent upon the world market, and from the moment that dependence upon the world market is established, there is already more or less dependence upon free trade. Besides this, the protective system helps to develop free competition within a country. Hence we see that in countries where the bourgeoisie is beginning to make itself felt as a class, in Germany for example, it makes great efforts to obtain protective duties. They serve the bourgeoisie as weapons against feudalism and absolute government, as a means for the concentration of its own powers and for the realization of free trade within the same country.

But, in general, the protective system of our day is conservative, while the free trade system is destructive. It breaks up old nationalities and pushes the antagonism of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme point. In a word, the free trade system hastens the social revolution. It is in this revolutionary sense alone, gentlemen, that I vote in favour of free trade.’ See Marx 1992, p. 154.

[xxix] Marx 1988, p. 384.

[xxx]

 Expertus 1857.

[xxxi]Both the Collected Works and the Nicolaus translation of theGrundrisse give ‘blacks’ instead of ‘niggers,’ but in the original German text the phrase used is ‘die freien niggers von Jamaica.’ See Marx 1983b, p. 245.

[xxxii] Marx 1986, p. 251. Cf. Marx 1973, p. 325-6.

[xxxiii] Expertus 1857.

[xxxiv] Huzzey 2015.

[xxxv] Hobbs et al 1865.

[xxxvi] Engels 1987a, p. 197.

[xxxvii]Times 1865.

[xxxviii] Marx 1987a, p. 199. For historical evidence proving black workers themselves complained in the lead-up to the rebellion that the importation of indentured labourers – funded through burdensome taxation – hurt their wages and employment prospects, and in general strong support for Marx’s analysis of the causes of the conflict, see Heuman 1991.

[xxxix] Erickson 1934, p. 144.

[xl] Engels 1987b, p. 205

[xli] Engels 1987c, p. 236.

[xlii] Marx 1985a, p. 162.

[xliii] Sazonov 1987, p. 640, n. 366.

[xliv] Marx 1987b, p. 300.

[xlv] Vasin 1985, p. 517, n. 394.

[xlvi] Eichhoff 1985, p. 359.

[xlvii] Marx 1985b, p. 49.

[xlviii] Moore 1974, p. 140.

[xlix] Hund 2021, pp. 77, 91, n. 7.

[l] Hund 2021, p. 87.

[li] Marx 1976, p. 309.

[lii] Marx 1984, p. 229.

[liii] Marx 1982, p. 224.

[liv] Firmin 2002, p. 396.

[lv] Matory 2018, p. 71.

[lvi] Matory 2018, p. 72.

[lvii] Matory 2018, p. 71.

[lviii] Marx 1976, p. 931. My emphasis.

[lix] Marx 1976, p. 937.

[lx] Davis 2006, p. 238.

[lxi] Marx 1976, p. 392.

[lxii] Marx 1975a, p. 162.

[lxiii] Marx 1975b, p. 182.

Race and Reification

Matthew Dimick

This article uses Marx’s idea of commodity fetishism and subsequent theories of reification to understand the social-construction of race. Race is typically defined as a socially-constituted category that is misattributed as a natural one. The goal of this article, in contrast, is to explain how this misattribution arises. In addition to this main objective, the article uses this explanation of race to contest recent attempts that locate the ‘persistent entanglement’ of race and capital in their functional relationship. Finally, the article engages with related, commodity-based theories of race and racism and concludes with thoughts on what the socially-constructed category of race can teach us about the nature of value and capitalism.

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

Introduction

Marxists often invoke class to help them understand race. [1][2] But this approach has always been met with considerable difficulty. Such a strategy typically has the character of subsuming race within class, in a way that inevitably fails to account for the distinctiveness of race—its autonomy. This article charts a different path and, instead of looking to class for insights into race, turns to capitalism in its most abstract form: value. Building on Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism and subsequent writings on reification and the form of value’s objectivity, the article explores the idea that the social relation between ‘things’ that comprises the world of commodities is also the objective form that socially constitutes race as an apparently unmediated natural or social fact. The popular social-constructionist approach to understanding race and racism, standardly defines race as a socially-constituted category that is misattributed as a self-sufficiently natural thing. The goal of this article, in contrast, is to explainhow this misattribution arises.

In his critique of political economy, Marx analyzes value, ‘something purely social,’[3] which emerges only within historically-specific social relations. These social relations are those of the ‘exchange society,’ where production is undertaken for the purpose of exchange, rather than need. Within these relations, value exists as a ‘thingly’ form of objectivity that obtains, with absolute social validity, a real independence and autonomy. However, this form of objectivity—the thingly existence that value attains within the practical activity of the producers—also creates the appearance that value is a natural property of the concrete, material ‘use values’ that are value’s bearers.

The nature of value also has broader, societal implications. In a world of generalised commodity production, the objectification of social relations as the misattributed natural properties of things generates a social world where relations between people are merely material, one populated by individuals where social outcomes are only aggregates of the characteristics of individuals. One consequence of this ‘asocial sociality’[4] is that the stratification of individuals by ‘race’ according to income, status, or location appears to derive from the attributes and traits of the individuals belonging to racialised groups. In reality, racism produces race, and yet the specifically historical and social factors that constitute race—colonialism, enslavement, discrimination, segregation, as well as the indifference of ‘colorblind’ capitalism—disappear in the value form’s objectivity along with the historically-specific social relations of value production themselves. Moreover, the objectivity of value not only naturalises race for the racist, but also constitutes race’s form as a fact for the non-racist observer. If the racist misattributes phenotype with a set of race-specific natural abilities or traits, the non-racist view reduces race to mere phenotype, shorn of any historical or social meaning. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the reification of race is not merely a subjective delusion; because the source of the epistemic error derives from the form of value’s objectivity itself, recognition of this may ‘destroy the semblance’ of the ‘accidental’ facticity of race, ‘but by no means abolishes that determination’s material form.’[5]

The concept of reification comes to us primarily from the work of Georg Lukács. In Lukács’ famous essay, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,’ it is clear that he develops this concept out of an engagement with Marx’s theory of the fetishism of commodities. However, it is an open question how much reification is a concept fully developed by Marx or whether it owes more to the innovations of Lukács and others. Lukács’ analysis also relies greatly on both Weber and Simmel, just as much as on Marx, which may set his theory apart from Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism. Members of the Frankfurt School also subsequently engaged with the concepts of fetishism and reification, in ways that further critique and refine the concept. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article, these various refinements and subtleties need not preoccupy us. As the reader will see, this article relies primarily on Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism for its explication of race as reification. We therefore do not need to be overly concerned with the concept’s subsequent evolution in the hands of Marx’s intellectual inheritors.

Nevertheless, this article will use the term ‘reification’ (meaning literally ‘thing-ification’) because it is simply a good, overarching description of the phenomenon under investigation, namely, the process by which abstract, historically-contingent social relations are turned into the natural or independent properties of things. In this article, the process we are concerned with is racialization, but similar processes occur in commodity fetishism and elsewhere. Indeed, using this broader term of ‘reification’ also acknowledges, like Lukács himself did, that the theory of commodity fetishism can be used not just in the critique of political economy, which was Marx’s primary concern inCapital, but also as the basis for a wider critical theory of society. Finally, using ‘reification’ discloses, forthrightly enough, that my reading of Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism has been informed by these subsequent thinkers in the tradition of critical theory, including contemporary theorists of social form such as Patrick Murray.[6]

The foregoing framing of the concept of reification will help situate the article among other studies of reification, including those that directly consider race. For example, Timothy Bewes’s wide-ranging cultural investigation of reification as ‘the anxiety of late capitalism’ has a far wider panoramic than the way reification is used in this article.[7] Perhaps for that reason, Bewes’s cultural analysis is also much less concerned either with the commodity structure of reification or the relationship between those phenomena and racial domination.[8] More related to this article is Joseph Gabel’s use of reification in what he describes as the ‘schizophrenic structure of racist ideology.’[9] However, unlike the notion of reification used in this article, which is closely tied to the fetishism of commodities, Gabel’s is far broader and, as he acknowledges, has no necessary connection to the commodity form, or even to capitalism. Gabel explains that ‘just as in psychopathology there can be a form of ‘reified consciousness’ unrelated to economic reification (schizophrenia), so also in sociology there can be (and indeed there are) forms of ‘reified consciousness’ which are linked to the conditions of existence so to speak without being in any way a reflection of a form of economic reification.’[10] Because one purpose of this article is to explore, in Nancy Fraser’s words, the ‘persistent entanglement’ of race and capital,[11] Gabel’s assertion that reification arises from the (universal) conditions of human existence is not free of problems, to put it mildly. Locating that persistent entanglement requires precisely that we view the reification of race as part of the value (or commodity) form’s fetishised objectivity found with capitalism, not a universal but a historically-specific form of production. Gabel’s unmooring of reification from commodity fetishism also essentially turns reification exclusively into an aspect of thought. Gabel’s explicit analysis reduces racism to the reified or schizophrenic psychology of the racist. Certainly, the social psychology of racist ideology undoubtedly constitutes an essential part of a much broader investigation of racial domination, and Gabel’s analysis contributes several interesting insights to this crucial component. However, a complete analysis of racial domination would also have to include the social psychology of the subjects of racial domination, as well as the historically-specific social conditions in which these psychologies arise. This article is concerned with the latter aim, and specifically with a critique of the subtle ontological and epistemological nature of the value form’s ‘false objectivity,’ which establishes just that social world in which racialised psychologies inhabit.[12]

A few other scholars have recently brought race and racism into conversation with the concept of ‘real abstraction,’ a concept which is closely related with the fetishism of commodities. However, at this stage, thinking of race as a real abstraction remains under-elaborated.[13] In the most important contribution to date, for example, Brenna Bhandar and Alberto Toscano catalogue several moments of abstraction. They write, ‘We would need to be able to think the articulation between events andprocesses of abstraction/dissolution … the ‘unconscious’ abstracting socialpractices … the high-levellogic of abstraction intrinsic to value as a social form of capitalism; and the relatively autonomous and deliberatepractices anddevices of abstraction.’[14] What Bhandar and Toscano, in addition to Alberto Toscano’s earlier contribution,[15] fruitfully offer us is an agenda for how we should think about race and racialization in contemporary capitalism. This article does not object to subscribing to race as a ‘real abstraction,’ in the sense of a conceptually-mediated, ‘mind-dependent’ social construction that has practical purchase in the social world. Just to that extent, however, ‘real abstraction’ would seem to be ubiquitous, even beyond one that would ‘tie[] the singularity of real abstraction to capitalism and capitalism alone.’[16] Moishe Postone clarifies for us that all social practice is conceptually mediated.[17] In his doctoral dissertation, Marx asks, ‘Didn’t the Moloch of the Ancients hold sway? Wasn’t the Delphic Apollo a real power in the life of the Greeks?’[18] Humans have always lived, worked, and died through abstraction. Real abstraction, however, at least in the theoretical tradition that I am most familiar with, is something other than this more quotidian and generic kind of abstraction. In this sense, real abstraction is the process by which labour becomes abstract through exchange (specifically,practically abstract[19]), ‘behind the backs’ of society’s members, a process that precedes their conscious awareness.[20] To emphasise, ‘race’ can certainly and productively be thought of as a ‘conceptuality [or abstraction] which holds sway in reality,’[21] that is, as that generic kind of conceptually-mediated social practice. As this article will also claim, the real abstraction of the value form plays a crucial role in the hypostatization of race as a ‘thing,’ without reducing the latter to the former. However, whether in the more restricted sense, as something which is only cognised post festum, race counts as a real abstraction is an extraordinarily interesting question, but one that space prohibits me from entertaining.

The article proceeds in the following order. This first part engages the central question of the article, posed in the introduction, and shows how the value form can explain the social construction of race and how race is misattributed as fact or nature. The second part of the article applies this explanation to the ongoing problem of the ‘persistent entanglement’ of race and capital. It argues that understanding race as a form of reification can avoid problematic functional approaches to race and class (or even capitalism) to which Marxist analyses often resort. Rather than approach the relationship between race and capital within a functional framework, viewing race as a form of reification grasps that relationship at an epistemological and ontological level.

There are surprisingly few investigations of race and reification. The third part of the article critically engages two of the best-known contributions, Moishe Postone’s analysis of Nazi antisemitism and Hylton White’s investigation of antiblack racism.[22] Both are remarkably insightful contributions which, like the present article, link racism with capitalism’s commodity structure. However, I question, first, what the racialised subjects of antisemitism and antiblack racism are said to represent and, second, exactly how capitalism’s abstract dimensions establish the ‘historical-epistemological frame of reference’[23] within which ‘race’ is practically and conceptually understood and produced. The article argues that the Jews or the black body do not represent abstract dimensions of capitalism (capital and labour, respectively), but rather that racialised attributes appear to have a thingly, pre-social existence because the abstract value-form hypostatises as natural or factual that which is actually social and historical.

Race and Reification

One of the most persistent ideological depictions involved in the production of race is the ‘naturalization’ frame. I take a broad view of ‘naturalization.’ Within this conception, a socially-constructed category, ‘race,’ is identified phenotypically but mistaken for fixed and immutable traits of the racialised grouping. In the extreme case, these traits are biological, as in nineteenth- and twentieth-century, ‘race science.’ More commonly today, these traits are said to be based not in biological but in no less invariant (and therefore, one could say, natural) ‘cultural’ differences.[24] In fact, the now predominant social-constructionist account of race would say that this naturalization frame defines what race is: ‘a symbolic category, based on phenotype or ancestry and constructed according to specific social and historical contexts, that is misrecognized as a natural category.’[25]

But we cannot be satisfied with a ‘definition’ of race as a misattributed natural category. We want to know why the naturalization of race is such a persistent ideological manifestation. Naturalization is not the only possible ideological construction of race. Historically, the naturalization frame has existed alongside religious and nationalist ones. This section of the article will propose that the theory of reification can explain why naturalization persists as the dominant ideological justification of race. As in the social-constructionist account, racism is a practice that produces race through a set of social relations. Adding to the social-constructionist account, this article will argue that the production of race as a misattributed natural kind is part of capitalism’s value form, a historically-specific form of objectivity and phenomenology.

I will first need to lay out what I will be calling the theory of reification. It begins with Marx’s account of the commodity and what he calls the fetishism surrounding it. A commodity has a dual character, comprised of both value and use value. The commodity’s concrete characteristics constitute its use value, its ability to satisfy some human want or need. A commodity is also a value, a product of human labour in the abstract, as distinguished from the concrete labour that produces particular use values. Marx calls abstract labour the substance of value. The magnitude of value—determined by the socially necessary labour time required for the commodity’s production—regulates the proportions at which commodities are exchanged when brought into relation with one another in the market. Value is a therefore a thoroughly social and—limited in time and place to a certain mode of production—historical category. However, the fetishism of commodities is that (like race) value does not present itself as a social and historical category.

There are both objective and subjective dimensions to the constitution of value. In its objective dimension, value is the objectified expression of the purely social characteristics of individual human labours undertaken privately. Marx calls this the ‘fetish character’ of the value form, ‘the essential determination consisting in the real inversion of human social powers as attributes of things.’[26] The objectivity of value is thus real, particularly in the sense that it has ‘social validity.’ This objectivity is autonomous, allowing the various, otherwise private and independent, producers to coordinate their activities (in a post hoc form) and which mediates the private labours of the various producers. Value is an objectified form of social mediation. However, it does not appear as mediated. Rather, in its subjective dimension, value appears to derive from the commodity’s character as use-value. Value, a ‘supra-natural property,’ ‘something purely social’ appears instead as a natural property of the use value, like its weight or color.[27] Marx calls this the ‘fetishism’ of the commodity, ‘the illusory consciousness that naturalises this social power of the commodity.’[28] Finally, the fetishism arises from the fetish character of the value form, ‘from the peculiar social character of the labour which produces’ commodities.[29] Because the specific social characteristics of labour only appear within exchange, the social relations between producers’ private labours ‘appear as what they are, … material [dinglich] relations between persons and social relations between things.’[30] The way that value is rendered thing-like through exchange—the way value in practice is objectified, through exchange, as an attribute of the use-values which are their bearers—makes it appear as an inherent property of the use values themselves.[31] One crucial dimension of this insight is that if the social relation between the producers and the sum total of their labour appears as a social relation between objects, ‘a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers,’ then the historically-specific nature of those social relations in which the value form exists will disappear.[32] This insight about the hypostatization of social relations is as true for race as it is for the value form, as we will shortly see.

Subsequent thinkers have generalised Marx’s insight, extending the theory of commodity fetishism to a critique not just of political economy and of the nature of value, but also of capitalist society. We can call this the theory of reification.[33] ‘[T]he problem of commodities must not be considered in isolation or even regarded as the central problem in economics,’ Georg Lukács famously wrote, ‘but as the central, structural problem of capitalist society in all its aspects.’[34] When Marx speaks of ‘material [dinglich] relations between persons and social relations between things’[35] he is referring as much to capitalist society as he is to the capitalist economy. With the universalization of exchange relations, the social, not just the ‘economic,’ world appears as a set of things: discrete, independent, even accidentally-related objects that can, in this form, be immediately apprehended, without requiring meaning, interpretation, or history. It is a world of reference rather than inference. This objective dimension is contrasted with a subjective one, characterised by abstract operations like logic and the attribution of properties and relations. Within this strict dichotomy between object and subject, the task of the social scientist is to subsume the concretely given and immediate objects of sense data under formally rational, abstract laws. Because of the thing-like form of objectivity, the social world takes on a ‘fragmented’ character, which imparts a subdivision and autonomy both to the various intellectual disciplines and the institutions of society, such as the state, the law, and the economy. Similar to Marx’s concerns, ‘Lukács’s starting point is the appearance of autonomy of the economy and, modeled on it, other apparently autonomous social institutions. Society appears as a collection of independent social ‘things’ ruled by the laws of the differentiated domains.’[36] The aim of Marx, Lukács, and other critical theorists is to not merely describe these facts, but to show that that ‘facticity is not a self-evident category. It must be constructed in the social world to which it is effectively relevant. This is the deepest function of the concept of reification. It is meant to explainhow the world can appear as a collection of facts.’[37]

One of these ‘facts’ is ‘race,’ and indeed the socially-constructed category of race exemplifies this process of reification at work. Racism, a set of social relations and practices, hypostatises race as a taken-for-granted, concrete and (or) natural fact.[38] On this the social constructionist and reification view agree. The task now is to demonstrate that the same process that hypostatises value as a thingly objectivity also accounts for the reification of race. Just as value appears as a natural attribute of the concrete use values which are their bearers, ‘race’ appears as the immutable or natural traits of the individual members of the racialised group. But this is not merely analogy: it is because a commodified, exchange society produces a peculiar kind of sociality (‘material relations between persons and social relations between things’) that the social and historical consequents of race appear as their causes.

Besides showing how value appears to be a pre-social, natural attribute of use-values, Marx extends his analysis of the fetishism of commodities to several other features of capitalist society. For example, money, a universally exchangeable commodity and the most general expression of value, underscores this same phenomenon.[39] Money, like any other commodity, appears to have value itself, ‘as a social property inherent in its nature,’[40] and so the social relation that money in fact expresses ‘vanishes in its own result, leaving no trace behind.’[41] As a consequence of this, money allows people to be ‘related to each other in their social process of production in a purely atomistic way.’[42]

To be clear, this is the way social relations actually operate in practice in capitalism, but it is also this practice that makes the social relation appear natural or material, rather than social.[43] But if the social relations of production appear material, then so does the socially-constructed category of race. To believe that people relate to one another in an atomistic way is to explain social outcomes in terms of the properties of the individuals themselves. Hence, if social outcomes are stratified by race, this must be—especially but not only in the reified mind of the racist—because of naturally-occurring traits held by members of the (in fact, socially constructed) ‘races.’ Because of money, Marx says that in capitalism the ‘individual carries his social power, as well as his bond with society, in his pocket.’[44] Consequently, we should not be surprised that, ‘if the knapsack of privileges is carried by an individual already identifiable as white,’ as described by Peggy McIntosh in her influential article ‘White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack,’ ‘then whiteness must necessarily be understood as a biological trait.’[45]

Marx’s broad application of commodity fetishism can also be grasped more sharply when recognizing that the attribution of value to use-values holds with greater significance for labour power and means of production. In the famous section on the ‘Trinity Formula,’ Marx contends that profits and wages appear to arise naturally from the material objects that bear them rather than from the social relations of the exchange society: on the one hand, means of production (‘capital,’ in the reified sense) and, on the other, the individual ability and intelligence of the individual wage-labourers. In fact, profits are a division from the ‘the total value of the annual product, which is nothing more than objectified social labour’[46]: profits come from exploited labour, not from the machines that labour uses. For the same reasons, if the income distribution is stratified by race this can be interpreted as a result not of de jure andde facto discrimination; a history of enslavement and expropriation; or the dynamics of profit accumulation, labour market stratification, and superfluous labour; but of the abilities and intelligence shared by members of a given ‘race.’[47]

Marx therefore extends his theory of commodity fetishism in his analysis of money, profits, and wages. By this, and numerous other indications, he also clearly intends this theory to have broader social and political implications. Scattered in various places, Marx urges us to recognise that bourgeois ‘individualism’ is not merely an ideological trope, legitimating discourse, or strategic manipulation.[48] Rather, it has a practical basis in the kind of ‘asocial sociality’[49] that exists in a society characterised by generalised commodity production, where relations between people are treated as merely material.[50] In this sort of society, social outcomes are perceived simply as the aggregates of individual choices, preferences, and capabilities—all properties of individuals.[51] Again, therefore, if social outcomes are stratified by races, these consequences are turned into their causes, and the social and natural are conflated by attributing them to natural or factual differences in ability at the racial level. To introduce past or present racism, discrimination, or expropriation appears to fit only arbitrarily or accidentally with value’s form of objectivity.[52] Race is therefore not a simple analogy of the fetishism of commodities; rather it is the way that generalised commodity exchange reifies social relations that makes it possible for ‘race’ to emerge conceptually and practically in modern society.

The reification view of race really gains traction because it not only historically situates the beliefs of the avowed racist, but also the facticity-of-race view of the non-racist. That is, one might be tempted by a functionalised approach to account for racial ideology out of self-interested and strategic ideological manipulation by a dominant race or class. But even those with a sincere desire to eradicate racism, or at least mitigate its effects, frequently adopt a taken-for-granted view of race as natural or given fact.[53] An ‘objective’ view of race—one that attempts to grasp race from a perspective outside the subjectively held beliefs of the racist—is characterised by the same form as, even if its content is the opposite of, racist ideology.

In this view, racism is the product of an unmediated, given set of attitudes, ‘tastes,’ or ‘preferences’ of the individuals who hold those views about, likewise, objectively given races.[54] Racism is a manifestation of animus or hatred or, less explicitly, intentional or disparate treatment, whether conscious or unconscious, of one race against another. Inequalities of race, expressed socially in differences in status, income, political influence, education, and so forth, are understood as the effect of such attitudes, norms, or institutions. Even from the standpoint of institutional or structural racism, race often retains its thingly facticity. In this perspective, racism is institutionalised in the facially-neutral rules, laws, or practices of organizations, firms, or states that nevertheless have racially-disparate impacts. But as long as those impacts are assessed like a treatment effect in a counterfactual causal model, the concept of race will preserve its unmediated, factual fixity. In fact, as Kohler-Hausmann persuasively demonstrates, the distinction between disparate treatment (intentional) and disparate impact (unintentional) racial discrimination only makes sense if race is simply defined as skin color, phenotype, or some other physical or social signifier.[55] Unless one acknowledges that these practices are part of the constitution of race itself, the notion that race can simply be toggled off or on, as if it was just phenotype, will persist.[56] Thus, in all of these anti-racist views, race remains a given, a taken-for-granted category.

Before moving on to the next section, I offer four clarifying points about the preceding account of race and reification. First, I wish to emphasise that fetishism is not equivalent to consciousness or ideology. It is not a theory of consciousness, but neither does it have nothing to do consciousness.[57] It is better described as the way the social world of commodities presents itself immediately to consciousness as observed in a pre-conscious or unreflective conscious way. How this unreflective consciousness is brought into reflective consciousness is an interpretive act—certainly an inevitable act, but no less interpretative for that.[58] Moreover, given that interpretative stage, the ‘sense data’ available to consciousness does not cause racist ideology or beliefs, at least not in any sort of deductive, unique, or immediate way.[59] Nevertheless, the value form’s objectivity has definite predispositions for acts of interpretation, especially as they interact with other prevailing assumptions about the nature of the world, social and natural, and which are not free of extant economic or political biases and ‘interests.’ For these reasons ofinterpretation, we can say that racist ideology, in its manifold forms, including its construction as a natural category, is anexpression of capitalist commodity relations.[60]

Second, for these reasons, the theory of reification and commodity fetishism is not a ‘pierce the veil’ theory of race and the relationship between reality and representation. That is, reification is not reducible to an ideological representation, a sort of veil that covers a deeper, more fundamental reality, and which requires only an intellectual debunking for this false belief to be eliminated.[61] To the contrary, destroying the false semblance of race—including in its more explicit, reflective, and ideological forms—does not abolish its material form, to paraphrase Marx on value.[62] The form of objectivity, the fetish character described earlier, established in commodity exchange is a process that operates ‘behind the backs’ of the producers themselves—i.e., without their direct conscious awareness—and will itself nurture the ‘false semblance’ of race even after it is demonstrated to be a social construction.[63] Value and race have a practical validity; their ‘falsity’ resides not in their existence sans phrase, but in their seemingly immediate, pre-social existence. The reification theory of race is therefore not just consistent with, but explanatory of, the persistence and resurgence of race in our contemporary times, where race stubbornly survives even in the wake of the civil rights and anticolonial movements.

Third, because everyone in capitalist society inhabits this world of commodities, no one has the privilege of being exempt from its self-presentation. The reification theory of race is not a standpoint epistemology, and does not promise, as some necessary process of social change, that a privileged subject will, in a moment of subject-object identity, see purely through the world of commodities. (In any case, as I have just insisted, the problem of representation—as if race were some pure error—is secondary to the real epistemological issue: race’s seeming facticity.) At the same time, this hardly means that the effects of reification are uniform—once again, as if interpretation were a mechanical and deductive causal process. The conditions of the colonised in a relatively pre-commodified society may, for example, be experienced in sharply different ways than the colonisers, who bring to their colonies the experience and epistemology of their commodified societies. Du Bois, as well as Fanon, recognised that the racially dominated may experience, through a ‘double consciousness,’ a profound diremption within their subjectivity that calls into question the objectified category of ‘race.’[64] Nevertheless, the crucial point is that because no one is exempt from the social world in which they live, nor the historicised epistemologies that come with them, there is no necessary guarantee that anyone will transcend this division between subject and object, between one’s own experience of race and its seeming facticity.[65]

Fourth, just as it is common to refer to race as a social construction it also common to treat race normatively as a form of inequality or difference.[66] However, the race-as-reification view presented in this article necessarily suggests instead a critique of race as a form of domination. A complete account of this problem would require exploring the meaning of domination and why race and racialization count as forms of domination. Also crucial to this account would be how reification partly constitutes racial domination through an act of subject-object inversion, by substituting ‘race’ for racism.[67] The question, again, is how this inversion takes place. I would contend that the form of objectivity constituted by the creation of value also accounts for the inversion of race and racism, and that reification is therefore essential for understanding how, within capitalism, racial domination instead comes to be seen as a problem of difference or inequality. That argument, however, must await another time, and for that reason, this article does not claim to offer, by any means, a complete treatment of race, racialization, and racial domination.[68]

Race and Its Reproduction

This section uses the concept of reification to untangle race’s tenacious attachment to capitalism. Nancy Fraser pointedly asks what accounts for capitalism’s ‘persistent entanglement with racial oppression’?[69] Similarly, Chris Chen acknowledges the deep and obstinate relation between race and capital: ‘“Race” is not extrinsic to capitalism or simply the product of specific historical formations such as South African Apartheid or Jim Crow America.’[70] This section argues that this association cannot be understood in terms of a functional relationship, which is where Marxist approaches to race have traditionally turned. Rather, it is only at an epistemological and ontological level—the level on which the fetishism of commodities and, more generally, reification operate—that this association can grasped.

What accounts for capital’s persistent entanglement with racial domination? Traditionally, Marxist approaches to race have been pitched at a functional level. Race exists because it is functional for capital. Racism either facilitates the accumulation of capital or serves the interests of capitalists, by dividing the working class and impeding the emergence of a revolutionary class consciousness. The limitations of a functional analysis are well known, and examples of the failure of functional analysis are easy to multiply. For instance, the Nazi regime’s antisemitism may have served the interests of German industrial capital, but this view makes it difficult, if not impossible, to grasp other crucial dimensions of Nazi antisemitism. The operation of the extermination camps wasnot a benefit to capitalists, which drew away resources from industrial production, and even impeded the Nazi war effort.[71] Moishe Postone emphasises this, pointing out that the extermination of the Jews was scarcely a means to an end ‘but was its own goal—extermination in order to exterminate—a goal which acquired absolute priority.’[72] Racial domination cannot be reduced to its functional effects.

As other recent contributions have recognised, a traditional Marxian focus on waged labour also frustrates the attempt to understand the ubiquity of ‘gratuitous violence’ in antiblack racism, both historically and contemporarily.[73] Assuming that the ‘privileged subject’ ‘is a subaltern who is approached by variable capital—a wage,’ distorts the nature of the domination of the unwaged, those who stand outside the wage relation.[74] Unable to directly apprehend the unwaged relation, this assumption makes that relation derivative to the waged relation. The assumption also obscures the way that those standing in an unfree or unwaged relation to capital have historically conferred, as their social others, a privileged political status on waged labour and helped to bring workers within the ambit of ‘free citizens.’ Finally, the assumption underscores a progressive view of capitalism, which would, sooner or later, eliminate racism as the expanding circuits of capital would bring more and more previously excluded dependents into the wage relation. As our present-day ‘planet of slums’[75] makes conspicuous, this view of capitalism has not been born out. Ultimately, viewing race through the lens of wage labour amounts to what Postone has described as an affirmative critique of capitalism, one made from the standpoint of labour and the improvement of waged work within capitalism, rather than its abolition.[76]

Several recent contributions have, in my view, successfully responded to the wage-labour critique of Marxist approaches to race. In short, capital’s drive to accumulate entails the constant expulsion and expropriation of labour, creating massive surplus populations in excess of any functional requirement of capitalism.[77] However, even those who avoid an affirmative critique of class and capital still tend to explain racial domination in terms of its function for capital. Nancy Fraser, for example, contrasts wage-based exploitation with expropriation, and rightly conceives of the latter as a mode of accumulation that doesnot depend on the wage relation.[78] Yet tying race and capital together through expropriation (rather than exploitation) still cognises race as functional for capital: ‘Expropriation lowers capitalists’ costs of production, supplying inputs for whose reproduction they do not fully pay.’[79] In other words, according to Fraser, racial domination exists because race-as-expropriation facilitates capital accumulation.

Likewise, in an illuminating contribution, Chris Chen effectively criticises and avoids the problems with a Marxist view of race made from the standpoint of waged labour. ‘In these [traditional Marxist] accounts,’ Chen acknowledges, ‘“race” becomes a functional or derivative component of class rule.’[80] More carefully than Fraser, Chen avoids the language of ‘expropriation as accumulation,’ and brings vivid attention to the ‘superfluity’ that capital renders to staggering numbers of humanity.[81] Nevertheless, even Chen seems to slip into functional language, asserting that ‘[c]apitalism … has required the systematic racialisation of … labour,’ as much through the wage relation as through its absence.[82] While avoiding the ‘privileged subject’ of the waged labourer, the problem with this formulation is that if capital requires racialization, how is racialization also not functional for capital? At the very least, Chen leaves open the question: if the relation between capital and race is not a functional one, what is it?

There is an even more fundamental problem with a functionalist analysis of race and class. This problem is that the functional relation between race and class can only be contingent. An interesting historical feature of capital is its social autonomy, both independent from direct formal relationships (i.e., status) and as social form.[83] As a real abstraction, capital exhibits an absolute indifference to other social forms. Marx’s method, to the extent it relies on abstraction, is not a clever way to marginalise the existence of racial domination, but rather a method adequate to the phenomenon under examination.[84] Chen recognises this, but in doing so inadvertently admits a serious incongruity. Chen writes, ‘If capital is first and foremost an indirect or impersonal form of domination (unlike black chattel slavery or feudalism, for example), in which production relations are not subordinated to direct social relations, there is no necessary incompatibility between this and the persistence or growth of direct, overt forms of racial and gender domination.’[85] Yet, the incongruity is that, by precisely the same token, there is neither any necessary functional connection between capital accumulation and race (or gender) domination. If capital as an impersonal and abstract form of social domination is indifferent to the existence of labour in free or unfree forms, then it is necessarily indifferent to the non-existence of unfree and racialised labour. To stress this point, as a functional matter, capital is indifferent to the continued existence or non-existence of racial domination. Once again, we need to look for the ‘persistent entwinement’ of race and capital somewhere other than in capital’s functional requirements.

This is hardly to deny that racial domination has exactly these functional effects for capital. Racialised wage differentials and occupational segmentation fragment the working class, frustrating its formation into a class for itself. Formal and informal status differentiation generates privileged free and ‘unfree’ (or ‘undeserving’) political categories of citizenship, further undermining social and political opposition to capital. Racialised expropriation and colonization ‘cheapens’ the costs of capital accumulation. All of these effects and more are too agonizingly true to be questioned. These functional effects undoubtedly figure heavily into any account of the reproduction of racial domination. I only deny that such functional effects are sufficient to account for theexistence of race, in light of that functional account’s evident shortcomings. One need only recall the example of the Nazi extermination camps mentioned previously.

Rather than locate the ‘persistent entanglement’ of race and capital in their functional imbrication, this article proposes that we find it in the ontological and epistemological horizon of the exchange society. By situating this as an epistemo-ontological problem we raise a different question about race: not how race functions for the origin reproduction of capitalism, whether as expropriation or exploitation, but what is race and how do we know it?[86] Throwaway concepts, such as operationalizing definitions, are inadequate to this task. Rather than begin with a definition, the understanding of a concept and its object requires as much thought and analysis as the functional analysis of race and capital.[87]

Following on race’s problematic standing in the functioning of capital, it is not surprising that critiques of affirmationist approaches to race and capitalism are pitched at an ontological level. For example, the writing of Frank Wilderson is replete with the language of ‘being’ and ‘ontology.’ Wilderson writes, ‘[V]iolence against black people is ontological and gratuitous as opposed to merely ideological and contingent.’[88] Wilderson argues that violence against black people—antiblackness—is what constitutes blackness in modern society. Wilderson wants us to understand what the nature of black being is, not how it functions for some other end. In a traditional Marxist or waged-labour view, ‘racism is read off the base, as it were, as being derivative of political economy.’[89] In contrast to its functional instrumentalization, the gratuity and pointlessness of antiblack violence underscores the ontological status of the black subject.

But we have to be clear about what sort of ontology we are after in this approach to race. By raising questions about the existence and nature of race, ontology responds to a genuine ‘need,’ a ‘lack,’ as Adorno calls it, that is left by functional analysis and a factualizing positivism.[90] However, ontology is a slippery subject. Pointing to ‘being’ promises something fundamental, absolute—even immediate—by exploiting an ambiguity in the term itself. ‘Being’ suggests something prior to or outside mind, something independently existing, and yet, because ‘being’ is distinct from concrete, individual beings, this usage actually obscures its more properly conceptual status.[91] In Wilderson, the search for a fundamental grounding is evident where, after objecting to the Gramscian attempt to ‘read’ racism ‘off the base,’[92] he proposes substituting ‘white supremacy as a matrix constituent to the base, if not the base itself.’[93] The immediacy of this form of black being is also evident in the putatively non-discursive images of violence and the body. Wilderson writes, for example, ‘State violence against the black body … is not contingent, it is structural and, above all, gratuitous.’[94] Thus, appeals to being and ontology are often ontologizing, and run the risk of attempting to ground claims outside of subjectivity and history.

In addition to avoiding the pitfalls of functional accounts of race, the race-as-reification view advanced in this article also avoids the problems ahistorical ontology. The kind of ontology proposed here is a critical one, a negative ontology. Appeals to being or existence cannot be made outside the historical conditions and subjective categories that establish them. Ontology, according to Adorno, encourages us not to be ‘hindered from pursuing that which ultimately matters.’[95] But ‘if this claim still survives, then it can genuinely do so only in the form of critique, which has taught us that the attempt to grasp ‘being’ immediately is impossible.’[96] Being, in whatever shape or form, is always conceptually and subjectively mediated, however violently, objectively, and structurally it is constituted. Because any possible being is subjectively mediated, there exists the possibility that the objective constitution of that being will appear ‘wrongly’ to consciousness, even if practically valid. This is the case with value—as well as race. Like value, race exists and does not exist. Race has a practical validity, not a natural one. Race has no existence outside historically specific, and conceptually mediated, circumstances. The goal of a critical ontology is to demonstrate this contradiction, to show why ‘race’ is a false ‘being,’ why race does not exist, but also why it persists and subsists as an apparent fact or natural object.

We reach a contradiction. On the one hand, race and capital are autonomous. They are distinct social forms. One cannot adequately account for race by instrumentalizing it in terms of functions or interests. Even speaking in terms of the ‘material interests’ of the racially dominant group cannot account for cases where the annihilation of a ‘race’ acquires such an absolute priority that it requires sacrificing those exact material interests. On the other hand, racism and capitalism are inextricably linked. Not only are race and capital intimately connected in their mutual, historical constitution, but capitalism contributes to the reproduction of race with all of its cold, ‘colorblind,’ indifference. If there is a determinate negation of this contradiction it lies in the commodity structure of capitalism itself. The varying degree of overlap between race and class that we observe historically and comparatively demonstrates, at a functional and causal level, the contingent nature between them. That functional-contingent relationship, however, is ontologically rooted in the reified structure of the exchange society. The value form that constitutes race and capital as autonomous forms of domination is what unites their existence. Furthermore, once historically and contingently joined, value’s reflection form makes that history disappear. Consequently, the notion that white supremacy could be eradicated under capitalism—the notion that there could be a race-neutral form of domination—strikes me, like Hegel’s moon falling to the earth, as the kind of abstract possibility whose actuality finds no adequate ground within present-day society. The struggle against racism and capitalism cannot be separated.

Race and Its Critique

Also finding limitations in class-based views of race, other writers have turned toward Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism to glean insights into the sources of modern racism. Moishe Postone pioneered this approach, applying it to the Jewish Holocaust and modern antisemitism.[97] More recently, Hylton White has built on Postone’s interpretation to develop a theory of antiblack racism.[98] This section will compare Postone’s and White’s accounts with this article’s analysis, in order to clarify the present argument and point to alternative paths forward.

According to Postone and White, antisemitism and antiblack racism are the fetishised forms of appearance of different, abstract dimensions of capitalism, money and labour, respectively. For Postone, in modern antisemitism, the Jews become a personification of ‘money,’ which he describes ‘as the manifestation of the purely abstract … form of the value dimension.’[99] For White, in antiblack racism, Blacks, and ‘above all the identification of blackness with the untamed biological,’ are ‘precisely the form that abstract labour assumes within its fetishised representation.’[100]

Both Postone’s and White’s analyses remain unsurpassed accounts of how capitalism’s commodity structure constitutes forms of racial domination. Ultimately, I largely agree with Postone and White that antisemitism and antiblack racism are fetish forms associated with the commodity structure of capitalism. Where I differ is in, first, precisely what those forms represent and, second, exactlyhow these processes of fetishization (or reification) work. Let me first give a brief overview. As to the first point, I disagree with Postone and White that the abstract dimensions of capital and labour, respectively, have their forms of appearance in, respectively, the Jewish and Black ‘races.’[101] Rather, I argue that what in fact are arbitrary, contingent, and historical social circumstances—the place of the Jews in medieval and early modern Europe or the role of colonization and slavery in global history—appear as properties of these ‘races,’ as attributes that have a misattributed natural or even biological basis. As to the second point, it is precisely because the abstract social and relational dimensions of capitalism do not directly appear, as real abstractions that take place behind the backs of society’s members, that makes these contingent social and historical factors appear as the attributes of ‘race.’ Thus, it is not capitalism’s abstract dimensions that appear in the form of racialised subjects; rather, those abstract forms explain how what does appear is taken as fact, natural or otherwise.

Understanding these objections requires that we reconstruct both of these prior accounts. Postone is particularly concerned to explain why antisemitism, in worldview and practice, targets the Jews as a personification, or representation, of capitalism’s social dislocations. Postone explicates this personification by identifying how the attributes of the Jews are similar to those of capital itself, especially money. Modern antisemitism, according to Postone, attributes a peculiar form of power to the Jews. Perhaps all forms of racism attribute power to the other, Postone explains, but in antisemitism this power is ‘mysteriously intangible, abstract and universal.’[102] It is not a concrete power (material or sexual) but a hidden, conspiratorial power—an abstract power. ‘The Jews represent an immensely powerful, intangible, international conspiracy.’[103] Postone then reminds us that these are precisely the same characteristics shared by capital: ‘When one examines the specific characteristics of the power attributed to the Jews by modern anti-Semitism—abstractness, intangibility, universality, mobility—it is striking that they are all characteristics of the value dimension of the social forms analyzed by Marx.’[104]

Postone clarifies that the Jews became the personification of the abstract domination of capital ‘not because the Jews were consciously identified with the value dimension.’[105] Rather, Postone insists that anti-capitalist discontent became directed toward the Jews because capitalism is itself antinomical. Capitalism appears in two different, opposed dimensions, abstract and concrete. He derives this from the commodity itself, which has the ‘double character’ of being both use-value and value:

The effect of this externalization [i.e., the ‘doubling’] is that the commodity, although it is a social form expressing both value and use-value, appears to contain only the latter, i.e., appears as purely material and ‘thingly’; money, on the other hand, then appears to be the sole repository of value, i.e., as the manifestation of the purely abstract, rather than as the externalized manifest form of the value dimension of the commodity itself.[106]

As capitalism develops, this antinomical structure of capitalist society becomes more and more entrenched, with ‘both sides of the antinomy’ becoming ‘objectified’ and each appearing as ‘quasi-natural.’[107] Society comes to be understood more and more in organicist terms.[108] The division of society into concrete and abstract dimensions allows a positive, material, and industrial capitalism to become separated from a negative, abstract, and financial capitalism. ‘The opposition of its abstract and the concrete dimensions allows capitalism to be perceived and understood in terms of its abstract dimension alone; its concrete dimension can thereby be apprehended as noncapitalist.’[109] This separation acquires an increasingly Manichaean character.[110] ‘The opposition of the concrete material and the abstract becomes the racial opposition of the Arians and the Jews.’[111] Postone argues that the Jews become the personification of financial capitalism, not because of some conscious manipulation to exploit their status as such. Rather, capitalism’s division into positively-valued concrete and negatively-valued abstract dimensions itself permits the association of Jews with financial capitalism, and from thence their persecution and the horrors of the Holocaust.

White’s analysis of antiblack racism follows a similar arc, and extends Postone’s analysis without however erasing the particularities of antisemitism and antiblack racism as distinct forms of racial domination. Following Fanon, White says that what is striking about antiblack racism is its concrete, bodily form, which sets it apart from antisemitism.

The Black of antiblack racism is hated not as a member of a people but as a concrete bodily being. Unlike the Jew, the Black does not control others through the exercise of will. To be black is to be the opposite of control: an uncontrolled bodily energy. And the violence that this calls forth is a destruction of life in its concrete, corporeal, visible existence, rather than as the agent of a race. For Fanon, this is the key generic difference between the industrialised mass murder of the Holocaust and the ritualised destruction of the individual black body by a lynching mob.

The ‘polarised’ way that antisemitism and antiblack racism express themselves leads White to identify the source of this opposition in the dialectical contradiction of Marx’s concept of value. For Postone the Jews represent money or finance capital, ‘the human body of money.’[112] But, explains White, ‘[T]he other side to capital is labour. Indeed, they are the same thing in different appearances: both of them are moments in the manifestation of value.’[113] As White continues to argue, where the Jews are a representation or personification of (finance) capital, Blacks are a representation of labour, capital’s dialectical opposite.

Moreover, when labour does appear, it does so as ‘biological energy,’ unlike capital, which is ‘monetary intelligence.’[114] When labour appears, it does so in ‘its most brutish, biological expression: animal vigour.’[115] The forms of power expressed in capital and labour are also different. The power of money is ‘cunning,’ while the power of labour is ‘brute.’[116] Labour ‘appears … as a visceral human capacity, intrinsically and constantly in need of external direction.’ Consequently, ‘Money is a power of control, but the biological body is a power that requires control.’[117] This contrast returns us to one of White’s most insightful points: that the commodity structure explains the modernity of ‘race’ across its different manifestations, but that antisemitism and antiblack racism are nevertheless distinct forms of racial domination.

Finally, why, in White’s account, does abstract labour take this form of appearance, in the ‘brute,’ ‘bodily,’ and ‘biological’ form of antiblack racism? For White, the history of slavery and colonialism is the crucial link that answers this question: ‘[T]he history of Atlantic slavery … and of European colonialism in Africa has bequeathed a lasting identification of Blacks with regimes of forced labour.’[118] The legacy of slavery and colonialism grounds the identifying association of antiblack racism as abstract labour’s form of appearance.

We are now in a position to discuss some of the limitations in these otherwise illuminating arguments. Both Postone and White argue that the racialised subjects of antisemitism and antiblack racism are said to represent different abstract dimensions of capitalism, capital and labour. Perhaps the most fundamental problem with this argument is that the abstract dimension of capital—value—already has its forms of appearance in capital’s variouseconomic categories: prices, money, rent, wages, profit, etc. The first three chapters ofCapital can be regarded as a painstaking effort to explain how value necessarily takes these forms. If value is already represented in these forms, why do they also take on different racial representations, as Postone and White argue? Of course, it is not impossible that value could have forms of appearance in addition to these categories. This duplication of appearances nevertheless raises doubts about whether the problem of race is understood as what capitalism’s abstract dimensions represent—or whether, as this article contends, it is better understood as what the abstraction of value does not represent, that is, what it forgets.

Let us take a closer look at Postone. Another of the difficulties in Postone’s argument is his insistence that capitalism appears in both concrete and abstract dimensions. Postone is correct, in my view, to link this with a particular, historically-situated epistemology. But what is characteristic about epistemology in capitalist society is that the abstract not only does not appear but does not ‘exist.’ In capitalism’s historical epistemology, ‘appearance’ is an empirical category and only ‘real,’ concrete objects appear. This epistemology is characterised by a ‘purist split,’ a hard-and-fast division between subject and object, mind and world, logic and experience.[119] ‘All rational cognition,’ says Kant, ‘is either material and concerned with some object, orformal and occupied only with the form of the understanding and of reason itself …’[120] Thus there is a real, independent world of concrete, material objects and a logical and abstract world of the mind. In this dualist epistemology the abstract does not appear.[121] Rather, everything concrete is part of the empirically given ‘real’ world and assigned a ‘thingly’ status while, in contrast, everything abstract is associated with pure mind. Postone’s argument depends crucially on establishing the link between finance capital and antisemitism by identifying the Jews with this abstract dimension of capitalism’s appearances. But if capitalism’s abstract dimensions do not directly appear—in other words, do not appear as abstract—then Postone cannot explain how the Jews become associated with finance capital.[122]

We can push this line of critique even further, contrasting Postone’s claim with how Marx talks about money’s thingly, non-abstract appearance. Postone references Marx’s concept of the double character of value and use-value, saying that money is the ‘sole repository of value’ or the ‘manifestation of the purely abstract.’[123] Marx does in fact emphasise the universality of money as a general commodity. Marx even remarks, ‘Exchange … produces a differentiation of the commodity into two elements, commodity and money, an external opposition which expresses the opposition between use-value and value which is inherent in it.’[124] To that extent, Postone’s association of money with the abstract dimension of the commodity (its value as distinct from its use-value) is correct. But it is not quite so simple, as Marx makes clear in the passage immediately following: ‘On the other hand, both sides of this opposition are commodities, hence themselves unities of use-value and value.’[125] Money is therefore just as much use-value as it is representation of value, and, as such, is prone to all of the fetishism of the commodity—in fact, even more prone. As we have already seen, Marx writes pervasively about our unreflective perception of money as a ‘thing,’ as distinct from its being an expression of value, as stressed by Postone. Marx says, ‘All the illusions of the Monetary System arise from the failure to perceive that money, though a physical object with distinct properties, represents a social relation of production.’[126] Thus, the conception of capitalist society is not that money appears as value’s abstract dimension, but that the abstract value form, although expressed in various forms of appearance including money, appears concretely rather than abstractly. In capital’s historically-given epistemology, capitalism appears concrete through and through. This is problematic for Postone, who argues that it is because capitalism appears in both abstract and concrete dimensions that Jews become the representation of abstract money or capital.[127]

There are similar challenges with White’s analysis of antiblack racism. According to White, the Black body in need of discipline and control is a representation of abstract labour, that is, of labour under capitalism. However, abstract labour is not capital’s dialectical opposite; rather, abstract labour is capital. White writes, ‘Most importantly, the other side to capital is labour. Indeed, they are the same thing in different appearances: both of them are moments in the manifestation of value.’[128] But this expression actually reverses the order of the presentation of the categories. Abstract labour is not a manifestation of value, but the source of value. Marx describes abstract labour as the substance of value.[129] More precisely, capital is one of abstract labour’s forms of appearance: abstract labour is value, value’s finished form is money, and money, in its most adequate expression (as value in-process) is capital.[130] It is true that labour and capital appear as opposites under capitalism, each generating distinct forms of ‘return,’ wages and profit (or interest). But then we no longer have a problem of representation: the Black body cannot be the representation of abstract labour because abstract labour—value—is already represented by (or, appears as) wages and profit. Similar to the problem in Postone’s account, if value already has its forms of appearances, in wages and profits, why does value—or abstract labour, in White’s approach—also appear in the form of the racialised subjects of antiblack racism?

It might be better not to see antiblack racism as a ‘representation’ of abstract labour, or indeed, of anything else. Rather, to paraphrase Marx, racialised subjects ‘appear as what they are,’ that is, as reified stereotypes of historically-contingent social relations. The explanation for antiblack racism is not that the black body represents abstract labour in need of discipline and control, as White would propose. Race in its antiblack form emerges, rather, as the reified ‘cause’ of what are in reality the consequences of the social and historical production of this racialised category. The black body is in need of discipline and control because the actual social and historical process of colonial enslavement, domination, and control vanish within these reified social relations. These processes ‘appear’ in a set of biologically or culturally innate characteristics imputed to a racialised category that necessitate discipline and control. This inversion is made possible by the fetish character of the value form, which makes society a material, rather than a social, relation between persons. Within this reified social world, antiblack racism misattributes outcomes of capitalism and colonialism to the characteristics of a particular ‘race.’

We can also explain modern antisemitism in terms more consistent with Postone himself, who writes, ‘The structure of alienated social relations which characterise capitalism has the form of a quasi-natural antinomy in which the social and historical do not appear.’[131] In my alternative construal, the Jews do not represent capitalism’s most ‘abstract’ elements, but are made to bear the burden of capitalism’s not conforming with the abstract and formal laws prescribed to it by bourgeois political economy.[132] One consequence of the reified world of commodities is the attempt to describe (concrete) objects according to (abstract) laws. For Lukács, for example, because this objectivity is separated from any broader social processes, these laws take on an increasingly formal character. Synthesizing the world of objects and appearances, capitalism is assumed, like the natural world, to operate under self-regulating and self-equilibrating objective laws. There is therefore something inexplicable when economic crises occur, or whenever social upheavals and dislocations of capitalism do not obey these formal laws of ‘second nature.’[133] A product of capital’s own contradictory movements, these economic catastrophes operate outside the conscious control of any individual member of society. Certain individuals or institutions—banks, financiers—stand in proximate relation to these crises and perhaps even to stand to benefit and, at the very least, are shielded from them. Because the abstract relation of value is not immediately apparent to consciousness, we observe only their concrete appearances: prices, use-values, money, profits. Just as the fetishism of commodities imputes value as a natural property of the commodity itself, capitalism’s woes, which are in fact immanent to capital, are assigned to seemingly concrete individuals and institutions: ‘the Jews.’ On the one hand, according to the impersonal domination of the law of value, no single individual or group can be assigned blamed for capitalism’s catastrophes. On the other hand, political economy’s ‘proper’ and formal laws of the economy (e.g., a self-equilibrating and harmonic system of exchange with a rational allocation of resources),requires that someone must be blamed. Under the abstract laws of reified consciousness, capitalism’s crises cannot not be the product of capitalism itself, since this would defy its formal laws, based on an understanding of capitalism as a world of objects, a social relation between things. Rather it is the greed, cunning, or deviousness of a particular ‘race,’ historically associated with finance, that must bear responsibility for capitalism’s shortcomings.

In this argument antisemitism is not the identification of capitalism’s abstract forms with the Jews, because the abstract never appears as such. Value already appears concretely in the form of money. As to what the racialised ‘Jews’ represent or personify, it is not the abstract dimension of capitalism, but all of capitalism’s crises and dislocations, which are inconsistent with its fetishised apprehension as a rational and formalised process of allocating resources. As to how this personification arises, we agree with Postone that it is not merely the product of scapegoating or an irrational, atavistic prejudice. However, in contrast to Postone, the Jews are not personified as capitalism’s abstract dimension through capitalism’s antinomical appearance, as concrete versus abstract, because, as I have argued, capitalism appears concrete through and through. Rather, it is precisely because the abstract, historical, and social do not (directly) appear within capitalist exchange relations that what is actually historically contingent (i.e., the relationship between Jews and finance) is hypostatised as the biological properties of a racialised group. In this reified view, capitalism’s social dislocations are not the result of capital’s abstract and contradictory drive to accumulate profit but are caused by a powerful conspiracy of concrete individuals and institutions. The same processes can be said to operate in antiblack racism, as described in our discussion of White. Given the very different histories and social relations, those processes yield two very different forms of ‘race.’

Conclusion

This article has tried to answer a few questions: how is it possible for race to be a social but misattributed natural category? How are race and capital both autonomous and imbricated? Rather than recapitulate the answers to those questions, the conclusion will discuss what ‘race’ can teach us about the nature of our exchange society. In their brilliant book Racecraft, Barbara Fields and Karen Fields pose the following question: Is race true or false, rational or irrational? Comparing race to the practice of ‘witchcraft’ in historical or non-capitalist societies, they are puzzled by our modern sensibility to accept race as ‘real’ or rational but witchcraft as false or irrational.[134] Both however, are founded on false assumptions and yet have a legitimate social validity for those who practice them. It is therefore a ‘mistake’ to treat one as rational the other as irrational, when they should both be judged the same, either both false or both true.

The Fields’ question is the same that which confronts scholars in the Marxist tradition when grappling with the nature of the fetishism surrounding the commodity. The current trend demotes talk about the ‘false semblance’ of value. For example, according to William Clare Roberts, ‘Fetishism is … first and foremost’ a political problem concerning domination and freedom ‘and an epistemic problem only derivatively.’[135]

Yet, ultimately, to ask whether value is true or false does not do justice to the complexity of the problem. Our deep ambivalence about ignoring the falsity of race explains why. For Marx, value is a true contradiction. While ‘[n]ot an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values,’[136] and so the naturalization of value is false, value nevertheless has a ‘social validity.’ Value is therefore both true and false. Likewise with race.[137] Race is true because it has a practical validity. Race is false because these practices are premised on the epistemic error that race has an objectivity that exists outside of these practices of race domination. If we are less inclined to accept the falsity of race as truth, neither should would shirk from acknowledging the falsity of value. To insist on the falsity of value is neither to succumb to delusion nor to believe that freedom is found merely by piercing the veil of illusion. Rather, what is delusion is to believe that one can practically transform the real objectivity of race or value without a conscious contestation of their false reflections. Marx never flinched from attacking the ‘false semblance [falschen Scheins]’[138] of value because of the way the ‘bourgeois political economy’ bolstered—and continues to bolster—the taken-for-granted, thingly nature of value into capitalist apologetics.[139] Destroying the false semblance of race or value will not abolish their material form, but neither is the abolition of value’s or race’s form of objectivity possible without the critique of their forms of appearance.

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Smulewicz-Zucker, Gregory R. 2020, ‘Linking Racism and Reification in the Thought of Georg Lukács’ in Confronting Reification: Revitalizing Georg Lukács’s Thought in Late Capitalism, 252–270, edited by Gregory R. Smulewicz-Zucker, Leiden: Brill.

Sohn-Rethel, Alfred 2020, Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology, translated by Martin Sohn-Rethel, Leiden: Brill.

Sorentino, Sara-Maria 2019, ‘The Abstract Slave: Anti-Blackness and Marx’s Method’, International Labor and Working-Class History, 96: 17–37.

Starosta, Guido 2017, ‘The Role and Place of “Commodity Fetishism” in Marx’s Systematic-dialectical Exposition in Capital’,Historical Materialism 25(3): 101–39.

Toscano, Alberto 2008, ‘The Open Secret of Real Abstraction’, Rethinking Marxism 20(2):273–87.

Wilderson, Frank, III 2003, ‘Gramsci’s Black Marxism: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?’, Social Identities, 9(2): 225–40.

White, Hylton 2013, ‘Materiality, Form, and Context: Marx contra Latour’, Victorian Studies, 55(4): 667–682.

White, Hylton 2020, ‘How is Capitalism Racial? Fanon, Critical Theory and the Fetish of Antiblackness’, Social Dynamics, 46(1): 22–35.

 


[1] For questions and comments, I wish to thank Guyora Binder, Luis Chiesa, Nate Holdren, Rob Hunter, Rob Knox, Ashok Kumar, Sarah Ludin, Athena Mutua, Sara Ludin, Tad Skotnicki, Tico Taussig-Rubbo, Dom Taylor, the editors of Historical Materialism, and two anonymous reviewers.

[2] Along with Chen 2013, p. 207, the term ‘race’ is used throughout this article not as an object to which independent causal properties are attributed, but rather as the consequence of ‘racial ascription’ or ‘racialization processes’ that ‘justify historically asymmetrical power relationships through reference to phenotypical characteristics and ancestry.’ See also Fields and Fields 2014, p. 16–19.

[3] Marx 1976, p. 149.

[4] Murray 2016, pp. 211, 213.

[5] Marx 1976, p. 168.

[6] Murray 2016. See also Feenberg 2013 and Elbe 2020 for more recent analyses of the relationship between fetishism and reification.

[7] Bewes 2002.

[8] Bewes does make several brief and scattered statements about race and racism which align with the argument of this article. See Bewes 2002, pp. 4, 75–76, 160, 174.

[9] Gabel 1975, pp. 119–136.

[10] Gabel 1975, pp. 86–87.

[11] Fraser 2016, pp. 163, 173.

[12] I am therefore in complete agreement with Postone 1980, p. 107: ‘The intention is not to negate socio-psychological or psychoanalytical explanations, but rather to elucidate a historical-epistemological frame of reference within which further psychological specifications can take place.’

[13] O’Kane 2020, p. 281.

[14] Bhandar and Toscano 2015.

[15] Toscano 2008.

[16] Toscano 2008, p. 277.

[17] Postone 1993, pp. 48­–49.

[18] This passage is quoted in Lukács, who cites Marx precisely to undermine dialectically the hard Kantian distinction between subject and object, mind and world. It should be noted, however, that Marx uses the phrase in a different, more specific sense, namely, to challenge Kant’s critique of the ontological proof for the existence of God. Lukács 1971, p. 127.

[19] Murray 2016, pp. 120–188.

[20] Bhandar and Toscano 2015, p. 9; Toscano 2008, p. 281, both recognise this distinctive approach to real abstraction, whose explicit elaboration comes from Sohn-Rethel 1978.

[21] Adorno 1976, p. 80.

[22] For another noteworthy contribution, see Smulewicz-Zucker 2020.

[23] Postone 1980, p. 107.

[24] Etienne Balibar nicely distinguishes the newer, ‘cultural’ racism from the older, ‘biological’ racism: ‘[Current racism] is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions … .’ Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, p. 21. What unites these two forms of racism and makes the reification theory of race a suitable explanation for both, is that in either case the attributes or characteristics of the supposedly different races are the pre-social and invariant properties of the individual members, inherited either biologically or culturally.

[25] Desmond and Emirbayer 2009, p. 336; see also Golash-Boza, p. 2.

[26] Starosta 2017, p. 102 n. 1. Both White 2013 and Elbe 2020 also emphasize the objective, ‘real inversion’ of the commodity form.

[27] Marx 1976, p. 149.

[28] Starosta 2017, p. 102 n. 1.

[29] Marx 1976, p. 165.

[30]Marx 1976, p. 166.

[31] Patrick Murray draws a helpful distinction between ‘abstract labour as “physiological” labour’ and ‘“practically abstract” labour.’ Labour of any form, in any sort of society, can be considered abstract ‘[b]y making a distinction of reason,’ for example, by measuring chronologically the amount of undifferentiated physiological labour expended in production. But Murray argues, and I agree, that Marx thinks of abstract labour as labour that ‘society treats as abstract … in practice.’ ‘“Practically abstract” labour is socially validated in a way that shows society’s actual indifference toward labour’s specific character, that is, toward labour’s specific ways of transforming nature and toward the specific use-value characteristics of its end product.’ Murray 2016, pp. 136, see also 136–45. Heinrich 2012, pp. 50–51, makes a similar distinction.

[32] Marx 1976, p. 165.

[33] I wish to focus on the underlying continuities in the accounts of Marx, Lukács, and subsequent writers, including Adorno and Horkheimer. Like Lukács, Horkheimer and Adorno’s ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment could be read as an anthropological extension of the concept of fetishism.’ Hall 2011, p. 67. Adorno’s main objection is that Lukács’s reification is too subjective, and is fixated on the ‘reflection form’ rather than the objectivity—even if ‘false’—that lies beyond the subject. Adorno 1973; Hall 2011. In other words, Adorno says that Lukács reduces the fetish character of the commodity to fetishism. It should be clear in this article, that I am using reification in the more capacious sense that embraces both its objective and subjective dimensions.

[34] Lukács, 1971, p. 83

[35] Marx 1976, p. 166.

[36] Feenberg 2014, p. 86.

[37] Feenberg 2014, p. 86 (emphasis in original).

[38] Kohler-Hausmann 2018, p. 1169.

[39] Already, in the section on commodity fetishism, Marx alludes to the crucial role that money plays in making social relations disappear under capitalism: ‘It is however precisely this finished form of the world of commodities—the money form—which conceals the social character of private labour and the social relations between the individual workers, by making those relations appear as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly.’ Marx 1976, p. 168–69.

[40] Marx 1976, p. 187.

[41] Marx 1976, p. 187. See also Adorno and Benjamin 1999, p. 321: ‘For all reification is a forgetting: objects become purely thing-like the moment they are retained for us without the continued presence of their other aspects: when something of them has been forgotten.’ Cited in Lijster 2017, p. 57.

[42] Marx 1976, p. 187.

[43] On the ‘asocializing’ effects of money, see also Murray 2016, pp. 290: ‘Because value, which is something purely social, appears, first, to be a natural property of a commodity (the fetishism of the commodity) and, still more perversely, to be a thing, money (the money fetish)—social relations seem to be absent.’ For further discussion, see pp. 290–93.

[44] Marx 1973, p. 157.

[45] Haider 2018, p. 46.

[46] Marx 1981, p. 961. See also the entire section on ‘The Trinity Formula’. Marx 1981, pp. 953–70.

[47] Typification versus individuation.

[48] Marx 1973, p. 84. Marx frequently reflects upon how the universalization of exchange relations underwrite bourgeois society’s conceptions of freedom and equality. Think, for example, of the famous passage on ‘Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham,’ Marx 1976, p. 280. Elsewhere, he writes similarly: ‘[A]ll inherent contradictions of bourgeois society,’ says Marx, ‘appear extinguished in money relations as conceived in a simple form … .’ Marx 1973, p. 241. The exchange relationship is one of equality: ‘Each of the subjects is an exchanger; i.e. each has the same social relation towards the other that the other has towards him. As subjects of exchange, their relation is therefore that of equality.’ ibid.

[49] This is Patrick Murray’s phrase, not Marx’s, but it nicely captures what I believe is Marx’s meaning when he suggests that commodity relations reduce society to ‘material [dinglich] relations between people and social relations between things,’ Marx 1976, p. 166. See Murray 2016, pp. 211, 213.

[50] Murray 2016, p. 502: ‘It is not only that capitalist social relations naturally reproduce the ideologies of vulgar and classical political economy; they engender the many faces of bourgeois philosophy generally’ including ‘“state of nature” and social contract theories’; see also Habermas 1996, p. 44: ‘To be sure, the model of the social contract found support in the evidence that modern exchange society seemed to secure some­ thing like a natural autonomy and equality for private persons through their participation in market transactions.’

[51] Within the social sciences, these conceptions survive in the influential perspectives of ontological and methodological individualism. Although methodological individualism is said to eschew the more controversial claims of ontological individualism, it is hard to take these claims seriously. Otherwise, methodological individualism quickly collapses under its own weight.

[52] Left-wing liberalism has a curious way of recognizing the ‘historical,’ distinguishing between a possibly tainted origin of capitalism with the possibility of a perfectly just present-day capitalism. It recognises history only as a kind of artificial obstruction with a natural system of free and equal individual exchange. ‘Thus, there has been history, but there is no longer any.’ Marx 1976 [1847], p. 174.

[53] Loveman 1999.

[54] Becker 1957.

[55] Kohler-Hausmann 2018, p. 1175.

[56] Kohler-Hausmann 2018, p. 1171 n. 19. Kohler-Hausmann also cites Martin and Yeung 2003, pp. 521–25, who show ‘that although the constructivist position is explicitly embraced by social scientists, many fail to operationalize it in any meaningful way in their research methodology.’

[57] I take it that a basic starting point, beginning with Hegel, and continuing with Marx and the Frankfurt School, is the rejection of a hard dichotomy between subject and object. The tendency to describe fetishism as ideology or a purely subjective category is symptomatic of this dichotomised way of thinking.

[58] Beverly Best puts a similar point this way: ‘the perceptual economy of capital establishes the foundation, building blocks, or “raw material” for the development of collective imaginaries, common sense, and so on.’ Best 2015, p. 106; see also, pp. 107 n. 7, 120, 127.

[59] Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that ‘sense impressions’ are a cause of what it is that is being interpreted. See, e.g., Sellars 1956, p. 290; O’Connor 2004, p. 90.

[60] Another point that can be emphasised is that reification is not an ‘economism.’ While the reification theory avoids the reductionist problems of making race a problem of class, it would still be inaccurate to describe it as one where ‘the economy’ determines, in a causal sense, ‘race’ or ‘racial ideology.’ The main reason for this is that we are not describing a causal form of explanation. Race is the expression of a certain kind of society, rather than a functional effect of a hypostatised ‘part’ of society, e.g., ‘the economy.’ This kind of society happens to be a commodity-producing society.

[61] Pepperell 2018 criticises Lukács’ theory of reification as a ‘pierce the veil’ theory of knowledge and representation, a criticism I do not believe is entirely warranted.

[62] Marx 1976, p. 168.

[63] Marx 1976, p. 135. In this sense, the real abstraction of the world of commodities is critical for the abstract category of race to become objective (i.e., to have practical validity), whether or not one wants to think of race as a real abstraction in its own right.

[64] Du Bois, 2008; Fanon, 2008. See also Henry 2005.

[65] Perhaps the main problem with Lukács’s reification essay is the implication that the proletariat would achieve a ‘subject-object’ identity. Postone 2003.

[66] On problematic politics of ‘difference,’ see Chen 2013, p. 206.

[67] Karen Fields and Barbara Fields write that the production of race through racism ‘has permitted the consequence under investigation to masquerade among the causes’ and that the ‘substitution [of ‘race’ for ‘racism’] … transforms the act of a subject into an attribute of the object.’ Fields and Fields 2014, pp. 41, 96, 41. ‘Racecraft’ is the Fields’ terms for this subject-object reversal. ‘Like physical terrain, racecraft exists objectively; it has topographical features that American regularly navigate, and we cannot readily stop traversing it. Unlike physical terrain, racecraft originates not in nature but in human action and imagination.’ Fields and Fields 2014, p. 18.

[68] Also useful in this discussion of racial domination would be the roles of ‘double consciousness,’ in Du Bois 2008 and Fanon 2008, and the related concepts, ‘personification’ and ‘character masks,’ which are counterparts to reification, in Marx 1976, p. 179; Heinrich 2012, pp. 88, 232n21.

[69] Fraser 2016, pp. 163, 167, 171, 173.

[70] Chen 2013, p. 214

[71] A functional interpretation, according to Postone, also results in the view that the Nazi extermination camps were instances of indiscriminate mass murder, murder in general, either misapprehending precisely who were among its victims, European Jews most conspicuously, or leaving them unexplained. Postone 1980, p. 101.

[72] Postone 1980, p. 105.

[73] Wilderson 2003, p. 237.

[74] Wilderson 2003, p. 225.

[75] Davis 2006.

[76] Postone 1993, p. 17, 64–71. Applying the idea of an affirmative critique to race, see Chen 2013, p. 207–08, 212.

[77] Chen 2013.

[78] Fraser 2016, pp. 166–69.

[79] Fraser 2016, p. 167.

[80] Chen 2013, p. 220, very astutely observes, ‘“Race” typically persists in academic Marxist discourse as a social division internal to the working class and sown by economic elites in order to drive down wages, fragment worker insurgency, and create the permanent threat of a nonwhite reserve army of labour. In these accounts “race” becomes a functional or derivative component of class rule.’ However, Chen never fully makes clear how the colorblind process of stratification, superfluity, policing, and incarceration emphasised throughout the article are also not ‘functional’ components of, if not class rule, then the rule of capital.

[81] ‘From the point of view of capital, “race” is renewed not only through persistent racialised wage differentials, or the kind of occupational segregation posited by earlier “split labour market” theories of race, but through the racialisation of unwaged surplus or superfluous populations from Khartoum to the slums of Cairo.’ Chen 2013, p. 217.

[82] Chen 2013, pp. 214, 215 (emphasis in original).

[83] Reichelt 2007, pp. 5–6.

[84] For example, Sorentino 2019 lodges this critique, unsuccessfully in my view, against Marx’s method of abstraction.

[85] Chen 2013, p. 212.

[86] Adorno 2019, p. 36: ‘The linguistic form which is supposedly substantiated in the concept of being is the copula. The copula is simply nothing but the “is” in the predicative judgment A is B.’

[87] Adorno 2000, p. 5: ‘I believe that while philosophy may well terminate in definitions, it cannot start out from them.’

[88] Wilderson 2003, p. 229.

[89] Wilderson 2003, p. 225.

[90] Adorno 2019, pp. 104, 95–105. ‘[T]he influence exerted by the new ontology [i.e., of Heidegger and others] … is the perfect complement to positivism,’ p. 103.

[91] Adorno 2019, p. 90.

[92] Wilderson 2003, p. 225. The attempt at fundamental grounding is also evident in Sorentino 2019, which ‘moves to substitute the abstraction of labor with that of slavery,’ p. 17.

[93] Wilderson 2003, p. 231.

[94] Wilderson 2003, p. 229 (citing Martinot and Sexton 2003).

[95] Adorno 2019, p. 167.

[96] Adorno 2019, p. 167 (original emphasis).

[97] Postone 1980.

[98] White 2020.

[99] Postone 1980, p. 109.

[100] White 2020, p. 10.

[101] As I will also argue below, value, an abstract social relation, already has its forms of appearance in the economic categories analyzed by Marx: prices, wages, rents, profits and, above all, money. Furthermore, the relationship between money and antisemitism, central to Postone’s account, is more complicated than his presentation suggests.

[102] Postone 1980, p. 106.

[103] Postone 1980, p. 106.

[104] Postone 1980, p. 108.

[105] Postone 1980, p. 112 (emphasis added).

[106] Postone 1980, p. 109.

[107] Postone 1980, p. 109.

[108] Rather than in the eighteenth-century mechanical terms borrowed from Newton’s physics.

[109] Postone 1993, p. 174 n. 115.

[110] Postone 1993, p. 163; Postone 1980, p. 106.

[111] Postone 1980, p. 112; Postone 1993, p. 174 n. 115.

[112] White 2020, p. 9.

[113] White 2020, p. 10.

[114] White 2020, p. 10.

[115] White 2020, p. 10.

[116] White 2020, p. 10.

[117] White 2020, p. 10.

[118] White 2020, p. 11 (citations omitted). White’s answer to this seems to depart somewhat subtly from Postone. Although Postone acknowledges the association between modern antisemitism and its premodern, historical antecedents, he appears eager to distance himself from that connection, at least as the linchpin for his account. For White, by contrast, the historical is the link.

[119] Murray 2016, p. 69–70.

[120] Kant 1999, p. 43.

[121] Rather, as Lukács and others have made clear, bourgeois epistemology, to use a phrase borrowed from Murray 2016, p. 69–70, presents us with a ‘purist split.’

[122] We might also add that the Jews were not vilified by the Nazis because of their representation of the abstract dimension of capitalism, in contrast to its material and thingly ‘good’ dimension, but because finance capital, especially as credit and interest-bearing capital, appears as a concrete perversion of capital’s concrete dimension. Through the M–M´ circuit, interest ‘seems to derive from capital as its own independent source,’ inexplicably. Marx 1981, p. 968. It is not because money appears as abstract that makes this property of money suspect, but rather than the abstract social relations which are their actual basis does not appear in the circuit of exchange.

[123] Postone 1980, p. 109.

[124] Marx 1976, p. 199.

[125] Marx 1976, p. 199.

[126] Marx 1986 [1867], p. 276 (emphasis added). Marx also remarks, ‘But money is itself a commodity, an external object capable of becoming the private property of any individual. Thus the social power becomes the private power of private persons,’ Marx 1976, pp. 229–30. Further: ‘[T]he mystifying character’ of capitalist social relations ‘still more explicitly transform[s] the relation of production itself into a thing (money),’ Marx 1981, p. 965. For discussion, see Murray 2016, pp. 37–42, 290–92. See also Smith 2014, p. 31, for a brief recapitulation of the ‘thingness’ of money and its relation to value.

[127] Not only does the effort to establish the link between capitalism’s abstract dimension and antisemitism run into the problem that capitalism, in any dimension, does not appear directly as abstract, but there are also other complications in Postone’s account. If ‘[m]odern anti-Semitism involves a biologization of capitalism … as International Jewry,’ Postone 1980, p. 112, this should bring the Jews into the concrete, thingly, and positively-valued dimension of capitalism, according to Postone’s dichotomization of capitalism’s appearances.

[128] White 2020, p. 9.

[129] Marx 1976, pp. 125–31; for discussion of the use of the term ‘substance,’ see Heinrich 2012, p. 49.

[130] Mau 2018.

[131] Postone 1980, p. 109.

[132] Earlier in his essay, Postone 1980, p. 107, acknowledges, ‘It is not that the Jews merely were considered to be the owners of money, as in traditional anti-Semitism, but that they were held responsible for economic crises and identified with the range of social restructuring and dislocation resulting from rapid industrialization … .’ At this stage, what the racialised ‘Jews’ personify are the consequences of capitalism’s crises and development. Later, however, Postone shifts, and the Jews then come to represent ‘money,’ or capital in the abstract.

[133] Lukács 1971, p. 105: ‘[W]e see that it is the very success with which the economy is totally rationalised and transformed into an abstract and mathematically oriented system of formal ‘laws’ that creates the methodological barrier to understanding the phenomenon of crisis.’

[134] Fields and Fields compare what they call ‘racecraft’ with E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s famous study, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande. Fields and Fields 2014, p. 16. Evans-Pritchard’sWitchcraft is renowned for abstaining from any judgment about the ‘falsity’ regarding the beliefs about witchcraft among the Azande. Interestingly, Paul Mattick has also described Marx’s project inCapital in terms of Evans-Pritchard’s,Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande. Marx approaches not just the world of capital, but the way that we (including the ‘political economists’) interpret and experience this world, and how these particular forms of experience and interpretation can arise within the world they inhabit. Mattick 2020, p. xxi.

[135] Roberts 2017, p. 85.

[136] Marx 1976, p. 138.

[137] Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, pp. 137: Fascist antisemitism is ‘true and false at the same time. … [it] is true in the sense that fascism has made it true.’

[138] Marx 1976, p. 187.

[139] Marx 2016, p. 897.

Misperceptions of the Border

Migration, Race, and Class Today

Rafeef Ziadah and Adam Hanieh

This paper addresses the role of global migration and the nature of national borders within the co-constitution of class and race. We begin with Marx’s critique of the value-form – a critique that rests upon a distinction between the ‘essence’ of social reality and its immediate appearances. The paper elaborates how Marx’s understanding of the emergence of a society based upon generalised commodity production leads to a certain conception of the ‘political state’ and citizenship – and thus borders and national belonging. This reveals the distinctive territorial forms of capitalism vis-à-vis those found in pre-capitalist societies, and moves us away from transhistorical conceptions of borders and the nation-state.  In the second half, the paper turns to look at what this conception of borders and migration might mean concretely for how we think about the co-constitution of race and class today. Here the focus is on three crucial aspects of the contemporary world market: (1) the relationship between the cross-border movements of labour and processes of class formation (2) migration and the determination of the value of labour power, and (3) coercive and unfree labour.

 

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

 

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

In recent decades, a rich current of Marxist literature has insisted that categories of race and class under capitalism cannot be separated from one another, in either a theoretical or historical sense.[1] The basic premise of this work is that processes of class formation are always racialised in specific, historically concrete ways; and that, likewise, racialised groups are necessarily marked by class inequalities and differences in social power.[2] While race and class are not identical they are simultaneous and co-constituted, and as such, positivist and crudely reductionist forms of Marxism that demote race to a ‘secondary contradiction’ or even a distraction from working class struggle need to be fully rejected.[3] The production (and exploitation) of difference needs to be considered as internal to the logic of capital[4] and thus, as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor notes, “racism, capitalism, and class rule [are always] tangled together in such a way that it is impossible to imagine one without the other”.[5]

This insistence on the co-constitutive and entangled character of race and class builds upon an earlier generation of Marxist work that sought to unpack the enduring character and legacies of racism in the US, Britain, and elsewhere, as well as attempts to understand why the experience of class itself was typically expressed through racial categories.[6] Overlapping considerably with debates around gender, sexuality, and imperialism, these earlier theoretical contributions were largely generated from (and served to corroborate) the lived experience of anti-racist and communist movements throughout the 20th century – including, most critically, the work of black feminists.[7] Activists and intellectuals involved in anti-colonial struggles examined and conceptualised the mutual ties of race, class, and imperialism, including the emergence of national bourgeoisies within their respective societies.[8] This connection with struggle is often omitted in the sanitised versions of social theory inherited from the past; for this reason, it is crucial to recognise that much of the recent debate on race and class is similarly rooted in the practical politics and theoretical challenges presented by movements such as Black Lives Matter.

All of this has proven exceptionally invigorating to Marxism, and our argument in this paper draws heavily upon many of the insights generated by this existing literature (both new and old). In what follows, however, we single out one dimension of this work that we feel needs to be explored much more systematically: the role of global migration and the nature of national borders within the co-constitution of class and race. By this, we are not at all suggesting that migration, the migrant experience, and the crossing of borders have not figured centrally within Marxist analyses of race and class. There is a strong tradition, particularly exemplified in the work of some British black writers[9], which has paid close attention to the intersection between racial formation, migration, and labour.[10] This work has opened up critical insights into the relationship between migration, class, and processes of racialisation, particularly through the post war period. However, in our opinion, this work often takes the national scale and its borders as an assumed given, and does not go far enough in problematizing and demystifying the particular place of migrant labour and borders in global capitalism. In what follows, we seek to challenge these common-sense perceptions of national borders, and ask what can be learnt about the interconnections of race and class through more systematically foregrounding migration within the circuit of capital accumulation.

In doing so, our intervention is also aimed as a contribution to recent critical scholarship on borders and migration. A key theme of this literature is an insistence that borders should not be viewed as fixed or immutable lines, but rather understood as sites of social and political contestation that are productive of what Novak describes as ‘socio-spatial criteria’.[11] By allowing the movement of some and denying that of others, borders act like filters that work to create difference and inequality, both inside and across the world market.[12] As such, “[a]ny definition of borders is in itself a representation of the social [while] any representation of the social rests on a conceptualisation of borders”.[13] Borders are thus deeply entwined with the making of modern bureaucratic and state power – evidenced, for example, through the securitisation of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers as a ‘threat’ to citizen populations, or the externalisation of border controls deep into migrant origin and transit countries. As numerous scholars have emphasised – particularly those associated with the Autonomy of Migration (AoM) approach – the movement of people across borders is a constitutive and untameable force, possessed of its own diverse sets of desires, aspirations, and needs that are not reducible to those of capital.[14] The migrant’s battle against the border is thus part of what shapes the form of the border itself. This complex dialectic is inextricably bound up with the production of migrant (and non-migrant) subjectivities[15], including that of race.[16]

Nonetheless, despite a range of important insights that have helped explicate the role and nature of contemporary borders, much of this critical literature tends to adopt rather functionalist interpretations of border practices.[17] Borders are assumed to exist because they ‘do’ certain things for capital (or capitalist states) – they cheapen labour power, fragment populations, provide a national base for the projection of international power, and so forth. Without a doubt, all of these border ‘effects’ are indeed fundamental to how capitalism works, but the form itself – the ‘border-ness’ of the world as it appears in popular consciousness – is typically assumed as an unproblematic and a priori fact,an already-given backdrop that forms the canvas on which categories of race and class come to be inscribed. One of our goals in what follows is to interrogate this form in greater depth – to ask why, within everyday perception, global capitalism appears to take the territorial form of nationally-organised sovereign units, demarcated by borders, and regulated through border practices and different citizenship regimes. It is our contention that starting with this question not only helps to better understand the interplay of race and class across the world market today – it also points to the enduring relevance of Marxist work on race and class to the study of borders and migration.

Our approach to this question begins with Marx’s critique of the value-form – a critique that rests upon a distinction between the ‘essence’ of social reality and its immediate appearances. We elaborate how Marx’s understanding of the emergence of a society based upon generalised commodity production leads to a certain conception of the ‘political state’ and citizenship – and thus borders and national belonging. This approach reveals the distinctive territorial forms of capitalism vis-à-vis those found in pre-capitalist societies, and moves us away from transhistorical conceptions of borders and the nation-state. Crucially, however, Marx’s critique was a critique of form – an attempt to understand why the forms in which the world appears to us serve to misrepresent how social reality actually operates.In exploring this theme, we draw upon a certain Marxist tradition that has been somewhat overshadowed by a widespread interpretation of Marx’s work that insists on a sharp separation of the ‘material’ and the ‘ideal’ (frequently encapsulated in a vulgar reading of Marx’s ‘base-superstructure’ metaphor). This alternative tradition includes Derek Sayer’s powerful reframing of Marx’s critique of ideology, and the related ‘internal relations’ approach ably articulated by writers such as Bertell Ollman, Dorothy Smith, Himani Bannerji and others.[18] This work, we will argue, offers a useful way of conceptualising both the ‘form of appearance’ of borders, as well as a deeper understanding of what borders and migration do in relation to race and class.

In the second half of this paper, we turn to look at what this conception of borders and migration might mean concretely for how we think about the co-constitution of race and class. Here we focus on three core features of the contemporary world market: (1) the relationship between the cross-border movements of labour and processes of class formation (2) migration and the determination of the value of labour power, and (3) coercive and unfree labour. Each of these themes powerfully illustrates the centrality of borders – and, crucially, the misrepresentation of borders in our everyday consciousness – to processes of class formation and racialisation. Our discussion of these themes is not meant to be exhaustive and in no way fully encompasses the complexities of the issues involved. Rather, as we discuss in the conclusion, our goal is to more fully centre migration within discussions around race and class – challenging the dominant forms of left-nationalism and valorisation of national borders that mark much of Left political debate today. 

Borders and the Mystifications of the National Form

The deployment of race as a social category is closely bound up with the emergence of discrete national states enclosing putatively free individuals, each possessed with the rights of citizenship, located within sovereign and clearly bordered territories.[19] As one of the key markers of national ‘belonging’ and territorial attachment, notions of racial difference and racial superiority came to underpin the competitive aspirations of national states in their conquest of territory and resources from the 15th century onwards.[20] A wide panoply of other social categories also emerged in complex interaction with these racialised notions of identity – sovereignty, citizenship, ethnicity, nationality, and so forth – all of which were fundamentally linked to the gradual development of a world that appeared to be ordered by and through national states. The existence of borders was crucial to this process – borders demarcated the boundaries of supposedly discrete national units, and thus all the various social categories that rested upon the national form necessarily presupposed and posited borders as their sine qua non.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully disentangle these social categories, their different manifestations across time and space, and their relationship to the national form. Instead, our focus here is on the form itself – the enduring everyday perception that we live in a world constituted by discrete national states delineated by national borders. What we hope to show in this initial section is two-fold: first, to demonstrate how this perception of the national form (i.e. the existence of borders) emerges directly out of the nature of capitalism as a society based upon generalized commodity production, and, second, to illustrate that this perception is ultimately a mystification, an ideological misrepresentation of social reality.[21] Thus framed, we will then be able to move in subsequent sections to understanding how the (mis)perception of borders is so closely tied to the ways that race and class are co-constituted.

Making these two arguments necessitates beginning with Marx’s value theory and his understanding of the commodity-form. As is well-known, a central objective of Marx’s theoretical project was an attempt to grasp what was distinctive about a society based upon the generalised exchange of commodities, rather than the incidental, or territorially limited use of exchange found in pre-capitalist societies.[22] Unlike pre-capitalist forms of human society where direct relations of coercion and compulsion regulate social life, in capitalist society we confront each other as independent and individual owners of commodities. At the same time, as in all human societies, our relationship with nature and the reproduction of ourselves must take place through society – we are gregarious social animals – and this demands the distribution of social labour in particular proportions.[23] Under generalised commodity production, the mechanism for this distribution takes place through the private exchange of the individual products of our labour (commodities). The paradox of capitalist society is that the decisions about what, when, and how to produce are made autonomously by independent private holders of commodities – yet society is somehow able to regulate the distribution of social labour in definite proportions that more or less guarantees its continued existence.[24] Marx’s key goal is to show how and why this is possible. Beginning with the ‘simplest cell’ in which this exchange takes place – the real commodity – Marx traces the two-fold nature of the commodity as a both an object of utility as well as a bearer of a certain proportion of abstract social labour. From this he draws out the existence of value as a means of regulating the distribution of abstract social labour time.

But for Marx, capitalism “is not simply an ‘exchange society’ but rather one built upon the exploitation of labour power”.[25] For the majority of us, the only commodity we are consistently able to bring to the market is this labour power, or our ability to work. Following from this, Marx describes the nature of human labour under capitalism as ‘doubly-free’: we are freed from the means of subsistence, yet simultaneously free to sell our labour power as we see fit.[26] The latter implies the removal of direct force outside of the moment of production – although, as we explore below, this does not mean that labour is actually free, or that various forms and different degrees of coerced labour are not present within capitalism. Likewise, the owners of the means of production relate to each other as free and equal commodity owners, and political power is no longer directly constituted through customary privilege. But this nonetheless remains a society of class domination. It is therefore dependent upon organised force and forms of social regulation that guarantee private property rights and the process of exchange. Political power must exist somewhere – and in capitalist society, it is uniquely constituted outside of the capital-labour relation as an autonomous sphere of politics. Thisappears to us as the separation of the political and economic spheres.[27]

Extending this argument, numerous authors have connected the generalisation of the commodity-form as the principal mechanism for mediating material and social exchange to the constitution of particular legal and juridical subjects and the capitalist state form.[28] For our purposes, the key point to emphasise here is the relationship between the commodity-form and the emergence of our personhoods as abstract citizens (i.e. without regard to the particular work we perform or any inherited or perceived status) who are located within territorially-delimited sovereign states.[29] The apparent separation of the political and economic spheres involves the positing of both the worker and the bourgeois as abstract figures who are formally equal bearers of rights within the territory controlled by the political state.[30]

It is this process that we perceive through various social categories – citizenship, race, ethnicity, nationality etc. –which ultimately carry within themselves a sense of national belonging and connection to territory (and thus state). The nation represented “the institutionalisation of the difference between citizen and foreigner, between 'us' and 'them'”.[31] I am from here, and others are not - this is my territory, and not that of others who exist outside of it.[32] At the same time, the nation was also a “destroyer of parochial divisions and ancient privileges and ... guarantor of the rights of citizenship”.[33] My fact of belonging brings with it a certain set of privileged rights (vis-à-vis those who exist outside of this space) and simultaneously establishes a formal (equal) relationship with other fellow citizens. These rights exist as law, guaranteed by an abstract force (the state) that exercises force over my sovereign territory and constitutes my personhood as a sovereign subject of this impersonal power. In other words, the social categories through which we perceive the world are necessarily bound (both logically and historically) to the everyday notion of the world as a patchwork of mutually-exclusive, discrete national territories, delimited by borders, and conceived in isolation from one another.

Of course, this territorialisation of the commodity-form within apparently distinct geographical units did not occur immediately and everywhere at once.[34] In Western Europe, the protracted crisis of the feudal system, numerous wars, and intense social conflict drove the emergence of the national form and the appearance of categories such as citizen and foreigner that came to mark national belonging. The temporal and spatial unevenness of this process meant that these social categories developed in very different ways across the world market. In all cases, however, the consolidation of the citizen/foreigner divide was deeply bound up with the racialisation of difference, which, as Malik has convincingly shown, involved the transformation of the concept of national belonging into identification with a particular ethnic, linguistic or racial identity.[35] The birth of this racialised worldview drew upon earlier logics of racism forged within Europe itself – notably the “racialized religious superiority” of Christian armies seeking to overcome Muslim rule in the Iberian Peninsula through the 13th century.[36] With the building of colonial empires and the forceful imposition of national borders on subordinated areas of the world, racial classifications were generalised as part of marking certain populations as unfree.[37] This was closely associated with the reworking of a wide range of earlier forms of social categorisation within the newly constituted national borders of dominated states, including caste, ethnic and sectarian identities that continue to reverberate today.[38] In all cases, these processes indicated that the emergence of capitalist states was marked by a tendency “not to homogenise, but to differentiate – to exaggerate regional, subcultural and dialectical differences into ‘racial’ ones”.[39]

At this point, however, it is crucial to clarify a key aspect of Marx’s method that is often poorly understood: the relationship between the ideas and categories through which we think about the world, and the underlying social relations that mark capitalism as a social system of generalized commodity production. Marx’s key analytical thrust is not to establish some kind of economic determination by the ‘material’ over the ‘ideal’ in the ways sometimes thought to be implied by the base-superstructure metaphor, but rather to deny the very possibility of separating out the ‘ideal’ as a really existing order of reality that is distinct from the ‘material’ in the first place.[40] Derek Sayer makes this point persuasively, noting that Marx’s critique of idealism (articulated in the German Ideology and elsewhere) consists of a challenge:

[to] the very possibility of distinguishing the material and the ideal as separate spheres in the first place. The primacy of the ideal is not denied simpliciter; this denial is a consequence of one that is logically prior, that of the existence of the ideal as an independent entity. So whereas the idealists, according to Marx (and Engels in 1846), severed consciousness from the real individuals whose consciousness it was and were thus enabled to construct the fictitious subjects of their ideology,The German Ideology does not propose merely to turn the idealists right side up again. If the ideal as constituted by the philosophers is fictitious as a subject, it would be no less so as an object. Marx and Engels focus their attack on precisely theseparation of consciousness from 'the individuals who are its basis and from their actual conditions' … which makes idealism possible.[41]

Seen from this perspective, the categories through which we think about the world – state, law, citizenship, race, borders, national belonging etc. – are the forms through which the world appears to us in our thoughts. Their effects, in that sense, are real (because these categories belong to us as active, thinking human beings) – but we should not mistake these phenomenal forms as actually-existing things that are separate from ourselves as real, active human beings. They are “forms of thought expressing with social validity the conditions and relations of a definite, historically determined mode of production”[42]; ideal forms through which the material relations that make up society are manifested to our consciousness.[43] To think otherwise is to reify these categories as a separable ‘really existing’ order of reality. Once again, Sayer puts this succinctly:

“Law, state, religion and so on can be conceived as independent, self-acting spheres only by virtue of a reification… they are not, as they immediately appear to be, levels of reality which are substantially separate … They are, rather ideological forms of appearance – Erscheinungsformen, to use [Marx’s] own concept – of the totality of social relations … and their ideologicality consists precisely in their appearance of real independence … They are the ‘social forms of consciousness’ in which the ‘essential relations’ of society are immediately grasped, and their analysis is coterminous with Marx’s critique of immediate appearances”.[44]

At the end of this paragraph, Sayer points to a further critical aspect to Marx’s perspective that must also be grasped: the “critique of immediate appearances”. Not only do the conceptual categories through which we perceive the world constitute the ‘forms of appearance” of the “totality of social relations”, they simultaneously serve to misrepresent this social reality. This was the overriding theme of Marx’scritique of political economy, and it is also precisely how Marx frames the emergence of the supposed equality of the ‘citizen’ alongside the generalization of the commodity form. For Marx, the double-freedom of labour and the apparent equality of commodity owners doesnot mean that the political and economic spheres areactually separated in capitalist society; rather, theyappear to us in this way as a result of the basic property relation, and the effect of that appearance is to obfuscate the real processes of exploitation embodied in the commodity-form and the social power that the bourgeoisie continues to hold within society. The ‘political emancipation’ implied in the notion of the juridically free and equal citizen acts to hide the reality of the state as “a form of class rule… the form in which the modern bourgeoisie publically organizes its social power”.[45] Or as Colletti puts it: “One obtains man as an equal of other men, man as a member of his species and of the human community, only by ignoring man as he is in really existing society and treating him as the citizen of an ethereal community. One obtains the citizen only by abstracting from the bourgeois”.[46]

Importantly, however, this argument should not be taken to imply that the categories through which we comprehend the world are false, in the sense that we err inhow we see reality. The world actually does appear to operate according to these concepts – we behave in accordance with them, they are regulated in particular ways through the laws and social institutions that we establish, and to the degree that we feel that the particular rights attached to concepts such as citizenship are infringed, we seek redress. But we must not mistake the appearance of reality, for reality itself (‘otherwise all science would be superfluous’, as Marx famously commented). These categories appear to us in a manner akin to a mirage – we really see them, but they obscure their status as forms of thought expressing the ‘essential relations’ of the commodity-form, and we invest in them explanatory and causal effects as independent powers separate from sensuous human beings. We thus fail to see how these forms of appearance serve to conceal the true substance of the basic property relation.[47] In this sense, Marx can write that the idea of citizenship “should read: domination of the bourgeoisie” and the citizen is an “imaginary member of an illusionary sovereignty” which, as Sayer contends, we should understand in a very literal sense.[48]

One of the consequences of this reification of the state and its associated categories of citizenship and sovereignty is a deeply-ingrained tendency to view the territories demarcated by national borders as discrete, separable units that contain within themselves neatly bounded sets of social relations.[49] Within the everyday popular imaginary, national units are thought of as isolatable fragments akin to pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, which are “ontologically prior to the whole; that is, the parts exist in isolation and come together to make wholes… the parts have intrinsic properties, which they possess inisolation and which they lend to the whole”.[50] In this manner, we see the parts (the national units) as existing first, and the social whole (the international) as emerging subsequently through the interactions of these individual parts (Paolucci 2011: 87). There are two separable orders of territorialisation at play in our minds – the national and the international – with the latter coming into being through the additive summation of the (pre-constituted) first. At the core of this spatial disjuncture is the presupposition of the ‘national’ as a reified, discrete unit – a mistaking of the surface appearances of reality, for reality itself. And as Paulucci notes, “When the researcher accepts the level of appearance, that is, when relations are grasped as things, the view of the whole is rendered less complete, even distorted” (2011: 89 italics in original).

A critique of this kind of atomistic ‘Cartesian reductionism’ (Levins and Lewontin 1985) can be found in Marx’s ‘internal relations’ approach (Ollman 1976, 2003; Sayer 1979, 1987; Smith 2004; Paolucci 2011). According to this perspective, the relations existing between objects (and concepts) should not be considered external to the objects themselves but as part of what actually constitutes them. Any object under study needs to be seen as “relations, containing in themselves, as integral elements of what they are, those parts with which we tend to see them externally tied” (Ollman 2003: 25). Objects, in other words, are not self-contained, preexisting, independent, or autonomous things but are actually made up through the relations they hold with one another. These relationships do not exist ‘outside’ these objects but are intrinsic to their very nature. As these relations change, so do the things themselves. The analytic method thus focuses on exploring the manifold relations that exist between things and the movement of these relations over time, rather than considering objects of study as discrete building blocks that can be compared or contrasted but remain understood, in an ontological sense, as existing a priori or separate from one another.

Such an approach helps move us away from methodologically nationalist perspectives that take “the nation-state as the self-evident container of political, cultural, and economic relations … [and] the organization of the inter-state system as a series of mutually exclusive, spatially bounded nation-states”.[51] Ultimately, these perspectives stem from taking the mystified appearance of the national form as actually existing social reality. Instead, we should understand these national spaces as internally-related elements of a broader totality – the world market – which “is global in content and national only inform”.[52] In other words, rather than a dichotomous view of the national and global, we need to consider both the unity and interdependencies of a single world market, which simultaneously recognizes the persistence of multiple states, and the sharp hierarchies and unevenness within the global.[53] As Dale Tomich, who employs a similar framework in his highly perceptive work on the development of colonial slavery, notes: “The whole [i.e. the global] is understood as being formed and reformed by the changing interactions among its constituent elements. Each particular element derives its analytical significance through its relation to the totality ... Each contains, encompasses and expresses the totality of world-economy while the totality expresses, unifies, and gives order to the relations among the particulars”.[54]

This account helps to explain both why we tend to see the world as a patchwork of discrete national territories and simultaneouslyhow this form of appearance is a fundamentally misleading and deceptive perception (because it denies the internally-related character of these spaces). Borders are essential to maintaining this perception in both its actual and illusory forms. As the apparently ‘hard’ edges of our national containers, they work to circumscribe and delimit discrete sets of social relations from one another. Things – money, people, goods, ideas etc. – ‘cross’ borders, and in doing so theyappear to leave one set of social relations and enter into another. This appearance is real, has substantial material effects, and is underpinned by human practice – most sharply felt by those trying to cross borders ‘illegally’ – but it is an appearance that ultimately rests upon a mistranslation of reality in our thoughts: a reification of the state as a discrete, pre-existing space that is externally-related to other national spaces.In truth, cross-border flows are internal to the social relations of these national spaces – they simultaneously exist in both the ‘here’ and ‘there’, and it is the fact of this simultaneity that feeds into how both the capital-labour relation and the value-form are constituted across the world market.

Borders, Migration and Class Formation

This demystification of borders and the national form can help us better understand the immense significance of cross-border migration to processes of class formation in any particular national context. Many authors have noted that we need to understand cross-border migration as a means through which a ‘global reserve army of labour’[55]  is accessed in any given country, particularly by capital located in wealthier zones of the global economy.[56] Surplus populations from across the world provide a ready pool of labour – “a mass of human material always ready for exploitation”[57] – that can be drawn upon depending upon the ebbs and flows of capital accumulation. Of course, the precise character of such flows is a historically determined question – with huge variability across different sectors and countries.[58] But the key point is that the international mobility of labour disrupts any assumed national-boundedness to where working classes come from and how they are continually made; migration is thus a process of class formation – an association of labour in one part of the world with capital from another.[59]

In this respect, scholars have long noted how migration has underpinned the making of class in capitalist states. In Britain, of course, we can see it in the successive waves of migration that were so closely tied to the contours of Empire and often targeted particular nationalities or displaced groups (e.g. Caribbean workers; Bangladeshi women workers in textiles; Jewish, and more recently, workers from the European Union).[60] All of these migrations express the movement of surplus populations from across the globe to Britain – which, as a result, have made the British working class what it is today.[61] Similar patterns are seen across other European states, as well as in all the settler-colonies.

Outside of Europe, the massive scale of cross-border displacement as a result of war or other crises also needs to be seen as part of the process generating new reserve armies and class configurations. Regardless of rights, status, or employment, such displaced populations make up a very significant proportion of labour in many countries today. Syrian refugees, for example, are currently the largest population of displaced peoples in the world, and many have sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey (in addition to being internally displaced). In these ‘host’ countries, Syrians now constitute a very large proportion of the population itself (alongside earlier waves of displacement, e.g. Palestinian refugees) – currently more than 10% of Jordan’s population and 25% of Lebanon. As such, these displaced peoples now essentially constitute a significant component of the ‘reserve army’ in these countries (Hanieh 2018a). Cross-border displacement as a result of war and conflict, in other words, also needs to be viewed as a crucial dimension of contemporary class formation.

Framing migration as a process of class formation allows us to see the critical role of borders in shaping how various fractions of labour are demarcated, contained, and brought into relation with one another.[62] Capital needs to both keep labour ‘in place’ as well as allow it to move.[63] Through the differential constraints they place on various types of movement, borders act as constantly-shifting ‘filters’ that regulate the speed, volume, and type of migrants that can (or cannot) enter into any national territory.[64] They are, in this sense, polysemic – that is, they “never exist in the same way for different individuals belonging to different social groups”.[65] This filtering role is established through the exercise of state sovereignty as well as the agency of migrants themselves[66], and results in processes of ‘differential inclusion’, where a multiplicity of mobility routes and different forms of ‘status’ are regulated through border controls.[67] All of this acts to generate different subjects of labour.[68]

As James Anderson observed a decade ago, this means that “capitalism’s ‘reserve army of labor’ is now effectively globalized”.[69] But borders do not create this global reserve army, and analysis cannot stop at simply describing their functional effects. Rather – as with the processes that Marx discusses at the national scale – it is the capital-labour relation that posits particular populations as ‘surplus’. This is a dynamic process generated by the uneven consequences of capitalist accumulation at the global scale, and any historically specific account of this would need to incorporate a variety of aspects to this process: including histories of colonialism and imperialism, the international concentration and centralisation of capital, war, economic, political, and ecological crises, etc. In this context, borders mediate how the various aspects of a globally-constituted capitalism manifest themselves, concretelyfixing[70] the distribution of surplus populations – and the ways that they interlock – across various national spaces.

Such an understanding returns us to the mystifications of the national form that sit at the root of how we usually think about class in an everyday sense. Instead of considering borders as the ‘hard edges’ of territorial silos that enclose separately formed and distinct sets of social relations, we need to consider the ways that any ‘national’ class of labour actually comes into being through the relations that exist between different national spaces.[71] The relations between these different geographical spaces are internal (in the sense posited by Ollman and others), i.e. they are part of, and help to constitute, both spaces. This can be seen very clearly in the case of countries such as Britain. Sitting among the top ranks of the global hierarchy of states, British capitalism’s relationship with the rest of the world is an integral part of the processes that generate labour surpluses at the global scale; simultaneously, these very same labour surpluses help to constitute British capitalism itself. This relation has long been well-understood by migrants to Britain – it is elegantly captured in Sivanandan’s maxim “we are here because you were there”, or Stuart Hall’s famous aphorism, “I am the sugar at the bottom of the English cup of tea”.

This approach provides a powerful critique of the typical ‘push’/‘pull’ approaches that are so pervasive within the common-sense imaginary of cross-border movement. Migration is not a consequence of disparate, contingent, and unconnected factors –– it is ultimately a process of separation and dispossession (and hence class formation) that arises from the way that capitalism reproduces itself at the global scale. Concretely, this cannot be appreciated without taking into account the effects of imperialism – both in its contemporary forms and its historical development. What Britain, the US, and other imperialist states do overseas – not just through violent acts such as war and military intervention, but also through the multiple ways in which they superintend the financial and political structures of the world market in ‘peaceful’ times – lies at the core of how dispossession occurs. Marx commented (at the end of his discussion of the reserve army of labour) that the “accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole. i.e., on the side of the class that produces its own product in the form of capital”[72] – this is precisely how we should understand the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ of cross-border movement today: internally related factors, mutually-conditioned by the accumulation of capital and the hierarchies of the global state system.

The role of borders in mediating these processes of class formation not only sets particular geographically-dispersed groups of labour in relation to one another, it is also critically tied to the construction of race and racial categories.[73] Here again, however, we should note that racism is one form of appearance of the misrepresentation of social reality noted above: the reification of citizenship and the nation-state is expressed through the projection of a racial identity to those from ‘over there’, while the abstract citizen of a distinct sovereign territory is simultaneously constructed as being ‘from here’. This may certainly occur through overt forms of direct racism, but it is similarly expressed in many Western states through liberal terms (e.g. multiculturalism, tolerance, respect for difference, and so forth) – all of which implicitly presume a primordial (typically white European) identity that serves as the innate, organic measure through which the fact of ‘difference’ is construed[74] and, as a result, working classes are always “reproduced as … racially structured and divided”.[75] This is not a new phenomenon. From the very birth of capitalism, the positing of racial difference to those living outside Western borders has been immutably linked to the emergence of the abstract citizen as one who belongs organically inside the preternatural borders of a distinct national territory.[76] As CLR James noted more than half a century ago: “the national state, every single national state, had and still has a racial doctrine. This doctrine is that the national race, the national stock, the national blood, is superior to all other national races, national stocks, and national bloods. This doctrine was sometimes stated, often hidden, but it was and is there, and over the last twenty years has grown stronger in every country in the world”.[77]

As such, Marx’s ‘imaginary member of an illusionary sovereignty’ is always saturated through-and-through in categories of race. Moreover, precisely because racial categories serve to express the reification of the nation and its borders, forms of racism are indubitably arrayed against the migrant as the consummate violator of national sovereignty. Of course, we should not deny the complex histories of race that vary irreducibly across both time and space – the forms taken in Europe are not the same as they are in the US, the settler-colonies of Australia, Israel, and South Africa, or places such as Saudi Arabia and Lebanon[78]– but nonetheless, the figure of the migrant necessarily looms large in the diverse forms that racism takes globally. Today, this is perhaps most sharply illustrated in the ways that racism is so often configured against the so-called illegal migrant, whose crime lies in the act of border ‘transgression’.[79] But it can also be seen in the ways that the sedimented populations of earlier waves of migration (both in its forced and voluntary variants) are racially constructed in on-going and ever-shifting forms – one never ceases to be from ‘somewhere else’, however differently that might look from generation to generation.[80]

In this manner, we can understand how the common-sense perception of borders – ultimately an ideological misrepresentation of social reality – actually makes possible the various functions of race and racism within processes of class formation. These functions have been thoroughly analysed in the literature, they include: the essential role of race in justifying imperialism, overseas settlement and colonisation[81] the ways that racial difference serves to accentuate and mark hierarchies among workers, thereby fragmenting and atomising working class struggle[82]; the function of race in creating relatively privileged layers of workers, in both a material and psychological sense[83]; and, of course, the centrality of race to settler colonialism, where the destruction of indigenous societies and the on-going growth of settler capitalism are so closely coupled with notions of racial supremacy.[84] As is widely acknowledged, these critical functions of race confirm that racial categories are neither biologically-determined nor static, but socially constructed. However, this well-established conclusion does not fully grasp the root of the issue: the misrepresentation of the border as an ideological form, which, to a considerable degree, actually enables and makes racial difference possible, and therefore underpins the functionality of race to capitalism.

Taken as a whole, all of this points to how the racial categories posited by borders are simultaneously part of the ways in which class in any given national space comes into being. Borders mediate both the distribution of surplus populations across various national spaces, as well as the forms of racialisation that arise as part of the reification of these territories. These two processes – class and racial formation – happen concurrently and as part of the same act. In this sense, while Stuart Hall is certainly correct to note that in national contexts such as Britain “the class relation … function as race relations” – it is also necessary to recognise the ways that this ‘co-articulation’ of race and class is ineludibly mediated through the reifying effects of the border. Class, as Satnam Virdee rightly notes, is “a representational form and material relation [that is] indelibly nationalized and racialized”[85] – the stress needs to be placed equally here on the nationalised as much as the racialised dimensions of class, both of whichcan only beposited through the border. The concrete ways in which this occurs may certainly vary immensely across time and space – but foregrounding borders and migration helps us understand race as fundamentallyinternal to the capital-labour relation in any given context.

Borders, Race, and the Value of Labour Power

Framing migration under capitalism as a process of always-racialised class formation opens up a whole set of questions around how borders and race play into the determination and mediation of the value of labour power. In general, Marx understands the value of labour-power to be “determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the labour-time necessary for the production, and consequently also the reproduction, of this special commodity”.[86] This includes all of the various means of subsistence required for labour-power to be brought to the market and exchanged with the capitalist for wages, and thus the socially-necessary labour time required for the production of labour power is equivalent to that “necessary for the production of those means of subsistence; in other words, the value of labour-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner”.[87] It follows from this that the value of labour power (as opposed to its price) can only change as a result of two factors: a change in the value of the means of subsistence, or a change in what makes up those means. It is due to the latter that Marx speaks of the “historical and moral element” that enters into the determination of the value of labour power – a factor that can differ due to a myriad of factors, including “the level of civilization attained by a country” and “the conditions in which, and consequently on the habits and expectations with which, the class of free workers has been formed”.[88]

On the surface, these and other comments by Marx on the value of labour power appear relatively straightforward, yet – as the subsequent vigour of the Marxist debates attests – this is not the case.[89] Numerous issues have been raised: including whether labour power can actually be considered a commodity (as it is produced outside of capitalist production relations); to what degree the class struggle ‘determines’ the value of labour power, and how autonomous this factor is from the materiality of the production process itself; how to conceptualise the reduction of ‘skilled’ to ‘simple’ labour that occurs at the moment of exchange; the relationship between productive and unproductive labour; and how to theorise the place of gendered social relations and the household in the production of labour power.[90]

It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into these debates fully, but for our purposes, one aspect of Marx’s approach to the value of labour power remains under-explored: the effects of cross-border labour mobility on the determination of labour power’s value, and the interaction of this with the wider circuits of value production and realisation. Marx’s comments on the value of labour power (mostly elaborated in Chapter 6 of Capital Volume 1) are largely a-spatial, and put forward at a level of abstraction that assumes the determination and realisation of labour power’s value occurs within the single and same set of social relations. What happens if we break with this assumption (however valid it may be at a certain level of abstraction)? In other words, what happens to our conception of the value of labour power if we admit that the place where labour power is actually sold (i.e. where the valorisation of capital takes place) may be separated by borders from the place where labour power is produced (and reproduced), but that these two spaces are nonetheless internally-related to one another, and thus mutually-constituted?

Consider, for example, the socially-necessary labour time required to produce the labour power of a productive worker in their home country – Country A. This has undoubtedly involved a whole range of costs over the lifetime of the worker such as training and education, health, infrastructural expenditure, the costs of social reproduction, and so forth.[91] But when the worker migrates to Country B, none of this earlier socially-necessary labour time has been borne by capital in their new abode. When the migrant worker arrives in Country B, she arrives, in effect, as fully-formed; the value of her labour power is thus cheaper than the average value of equivalent labour power raised over a lifetime in Country B. In practice, this is a subsidy provided by Country A to capital located in Country B – “a direct transfer of wealth” as Cindi Katz has noted in regard to gendered migrant labour and social reproduction, which occurs “from generally poorer to richer countries … [that] is no less a capital transfer than the extraction of raw materials, debt servicing, and the like”.[92]

It should be stressed that these transfers apply to all forms of migrant labour (skilled and non-skilled, forced migrants, refugees, and so-called ‘economic migrants’) – it does not matter why and how people may have moved from one place to another. Such a value-theoretic approach can thus help us go beyond the rather sterile debates around ‘brain drain’ that typify contemporary migration discussions. The key question is not whether an individual migrant (or country) ‘wins’ or ‘loses’; more fundamentally, it is thefact of the border between where the production of labour power takes places and where it is exchanged that serves to increase the mass of surplus value appropriated by capital in Country B. This observation points to the critical significance of national borders in mediating such differentials in the value of labour power.

Once again, however, these national differences in the value of labour power are profoundly seeped in categories of race and processes of racialisation (and, of course, gender). Workers from ‘over there’ can be paid less than workers ‘from here’ because ‘after all, that’s all they expect to get paid’ – indeed, ‘they should count themselves lucky, at least they have a job’! Through such tropes, we can see how spatially constituted differences in the value of labour power take an ideological form, habitually expressed in racial categories. This form of appearance is real (we do tend to see the world in this way, and racedoes actually mark differences in the value of labour power), but this appearance is nonetheless an inverted – and thusideological – misrepresentation of reality (it ascribes causal powers to arbitrary genetic phenotypes rather than the social relations that actually determine the value of labour power). Most importantly, as is always the case when appearances are mistaken for essence, acceptance of such ideological forms ultimately serves to legitimate and naturalise the existing status quo.

The imbrications of racial categories, borders, and the value of labour power, can best be seen in the proliferation of ‘temporary labour migration’ (TLM) programmes – a situation where migrant workers are contracted for limited periods of time by employers in another country and are then expected to return to their country of origin. These programmes have a long historical pedigree irrevocably stamped in race and racism – from the indentured labour schemes utilised by the British Empire after the formal end to slavery in the mid-19th century[93], to the ‘guest worker’ programmes that brought workers from North Africa and Turkey to Western Europe in the post-war period.[94] In recent years there has been a considerable boom in these schemes, particularly in seasonal agricultural programmes such as Spain’s use of Moroccan women to pick strawberries, or Canada’s use of Mexican workers in Ontario fruit and vegetable crops.[95] Indeed, in the case of Canada, a dramatic rise of TLM in the early 21st century actually saw the number of temporary migrants exceed those from permanent migration for the first time in history.[96]

Much of the academic and policy debates around TLM have been highly Eurocentric, largely focused on the North American and European experiences.[97] At a global level, however, the most important zone of TLM is actually found in the six Gulf Arab states of the Middle East, where the majority of the labour force is made up of temporary labour migrants.[98] Importantly, the case of the Gulf illustrates that the race-making and value-mediating role of borders is not simply a European or North American affair. In the Gulf states, as elsewhere, the category of citizen plays a pivotal role in this process – through the sharp demarcation of a tiny proportion of the resident population from the majority of the labour force in ways that are irrevocably racialised and gendered.[99] The subsequent production of racial difference both legitimates and embodies the diminished value of a Gulf migrant worker’s labour power. Here, the value of labour power is not only affected by the historical costs of producing the migrant worker, but the current measure of that worker’s labour power value is also largely established by the socially-necessary labour time required to produce and reproduce the worker in their home country (perhaps with a small difference that induces the worker to migrate). An Indian temporary migrant worker in Dubai, for example, receives a wage that is more or less proportional to the cost of reproducing the worker (and his/her family) in India – not in Dubai.[100] This is true not simply in relation to the value of the means of subsistence in India, but also in relation to the concrete use-values that may enter into these means of subsistence (i.e. the determination of the ‘historical and moral element’). Thus, not only do Indian workers constitute part of the Gulf’s reserve army of labour (in the sense argued above), the magnitude of surplus value extracted by, say, a construction firm in the Gulf, is also established through the ‘moral and historical’ value of labour power extant in India.

The materiality of these kinds of relations appears palpably in the global economy through the massive levels of cross-border remittances. Indeed, it is estimated that around 1 billion people today – a remarkable figure of one in seven people globally – are either senders or receivers of remittances.[101] Yet while these flows may be based on a physical move of the worker from their home, at the same time they express the ways in which sets of social relations across different territories are mutually-constituted (internally-related) with one another. In this manner, the valorisation of an individual labour power sits concurrently in both the migrant’s place of origin and their place of work. And once again, the category of race serves as one of the ideological forms of appearance through which this actual unity of the ‘here’ and ‘there’ is misconstrued in our consciousness as a relation of separation.

Migration, Coercion, and ‘Unfree’ Labour

At the root of these various value transfers is the physical separation of the migrant from a particular territory (and thus an associated set of social relations) and their imbrication with another. While a variety of different proximate reasons may appear as the cause of this separation – war, economic or political crises, ecological pressures, and so forth – we should avoid any dichotomous categorisation of migration as either ‘forced’ or ‘economic’. The movement of refugees, trafficked people, and other forms of displacement may certainly be linked to the immediate reality of violence – but those who migrate in the face of neoliberal restructuring or economic dispossession are also subject to forms of coercion.[102] Indeed, all of these various ‘causes’ inevitably intersect and reinforce one another; for this reason, separating out the ‘pushes’ of migration – much less locating these at the level of the individual or national scale – is an impossible task that can only be resolved in the tidy ontologies of Cartesian reductionism. In the same way that Jairus Banaji urges us to reject the ‘fictions of free labour’[103] – noting that Marx’s critique of wage-labour was ultimately based on demystifying its apparent voluntaristic form – so must we reject an understanding of cross-border labour flows as somehow the ‘free’ choice of rationally-acting individuals.

In this sense, there is an intimate connection between one of the ‘double-freedoms’ identified by Marx as foundational to the capital-labour relation – a worker’s separation from the means of subsistence/production – and a migrant’s separation from a specific territory. This is not simply true at an analogous or conceptual level – cross-border movement has often been the actual form through which labour is first ‘freed’ from the land and other means of independent survival, and then becomes inserted into capitalist commodity circuits. The transatlantic slave routes of the 15th-19th centuries, for example, were (particularly brutal) examples of the separation of the direct producers from their means of subsistence and their conversion into commodity producers for the world market[104] – indeed, the scale of this separation far exceeded coterminous movements of European peasants from the land into waged-labour markets. Following the formal end of slavery in 1833 the emergence of indentured labour replicated this pattern, with the removal of South Asian peasants from their land coming to underpin commodity production across the far-flung territories of the British Empire. As Radhika Mongia demonstrates in her fascinating history of this moment, the latter case saw the development of sophisticated means of classifying and filtering the movement of these indentured workers, many of which were to presage modern border technologies (including the passport).[105]

Clearly, all of these historical movements of people are overlaid by the creation of racial categories – indeed, to a considerable degree, the very idea of ‘race’ has its origins in these violent cross-border displacements that were constitutive to the early genesis of capitalism.[106] But here we can see a further way in which racialised migrant labour is bound up with the trajectory of the value-form.Most specifically, these earlier histories illustrate how physical separation from home can serve to accentuate greater vulnerability to coercive capital-labour relations. Indeed, the owners of colonial plantations explicitly identified the separation of enslaved peoples from their native territories as a productive factor in their ability to compel them to work – transplanted into new sets of social relations, they lacked the continuities of social and familial structures that made indigenous labour more resistant to capitalist modes of work.[107]

In the contemporary moment, beyond the obvious cases of ‘modern slavery’ and trafficked people, we can see the link between territorial separation and vulnerability to coercion (whether sanctioned by contract or not) throughout all forms of migration. In the case of TLM programmes, for example, migrant workers typically experience restrictions on where they are allowed to work and live, their ability to leave the country, and their access to political and labour rights.[108] These kinds of restrictions are usually legally codified in various laws and regulations, and always sharply gendered. They are further buttressed by ideologies of xenophobia and racism that configure migrant labour as ‘not from here’. The precariousness that migrants face –– which is as much about residing in a particular space as it is about economic marginalisation – works to accentuate vulnerability to coercion.[109] Increasingly, this precariousness is now a permanent fact of a migrant’s racialised existence; experienced even by those who have obtained citizenship but nonetheless remain vulnerable to the withdrawal of their right to live within a certain set of national borders.[110] Banaji (2010) is absolutely correct to argue (following Marx) that all forms of capitalist labour are marked by some degree of coercion; but migration needs to be understood as one way in which this fundamental element of the capital-labour relation is further intensified.

All these processes reduce the price of racialised migrant labour power (allowing it to be paid at below the value of non-migrant labour), and further serve to fragment and sharpen the divisions of how class is experienced in any particular national context. But in line with the arguments made above, we also need to consider the ways in which racialised migrant labour helps to constitute the value of labour power in general. At a global level, migrants working under varying degrees of coercion are deeply involved in the production of a significant number of commodities that we consume on a daily basis (including services).[111] Feminist scholarship has been crucial to mapping the gendered nature of these processes, including in global care chains.[112] The vulnerable nature of this labour – reinforced by all of the other factors outlined above – means that there is a tendency towards the overall cheapening in the value of the means of subsistence (and hence in the value of labour power) for all workers, including non-migrants and those in better conditions of employment.[113] Once again, this is not a new feature of capitalism – scholars of slavery have long noted the significant role that the cheaply produced commodities such as tobacco, sugar, coffee, and tea played in lowering the value of European waged-labour.[114] But in the contemporary world, the pervasive use of highly coerced – and always racialised – migrant labour is a key element to determining the value of labour power everywhere.

Conclusion: Border Politics Today

There can be little doubt that the issues of borders and migration have moved centre-stage in political debate over recent years. From the global resurgence of far-right and xenophobic movements that seek to mobilise popular support through racist tropes and physical violence directed against migrants and foreigners; to the ways in which parties of the ostensible left have also adapted themselves to concepts of national sovereignty and ‘responsible’ approaches to migration. The latter cohort of left-nationalists is particularly important to highlight in the current political moment – represented through leading figures in the DSA, Die Linke, and of course that long-standing bulwark of imperial sovereignty, the British Labour Party. In all these cases, defence of the national border is recast as a foundational corollary of ‘social democracy in one country’, with refugees and migrants depicted as potential fifth-columnists who – inadvertently or not – serve to undermine hard-won working conditions and the fast-diminishing accoutrements of a putative welfare state.

In this context, it is crucial to move beyond a view of racism as simply an opportunistic vehicle used by political elites to divide workers and cultivate a support base for far-right movements and capitalist restructuring. While these ideological explanations certainly capture a key element to how race operates at a functional or instrumental level, they do little to elucidate the origins of racial categories as modes of thought connected to the mystification of the national form. Here, Marx’s key insights into the emergence of bourgeois notions of citizenship, the modern political state, and the apparent separation of the political and economic spheres under capitalism are essential to understanding why we have come to see the world as one divided into a patchwork of discrete national territories to which we ‘naturally’ attach our identities and sense of belonging. This common-sense view of the world is at root a reification of the state and its borders – one that mistakes the appearance of reality for reality itself. Foregrounding cross-border migration helps to demystify this reification and the assumed national-boundedness of labour, but to do so we must situate the ‘flows’ of migrant labour within the internally-related nature of various national spaces. Migration certainly represents a physical movement, or uprooting from one set of social relations to another – but at the same time, it confirms and expresses the simultaneity and co-constitution of these social relations. In this manner, we can begin to think about categories such as class and race in ways that move us beyond the obfuscations arising from the reified categories in which the world immediately appears.

Throughout this discussion, the role of borders has repeatedly emerged as central to how these obfuscations take concrete form. While borders appear to us as hard ‘edges’ – a necessary corollary of the way we think of the world in distinct, separable national containers – in reality, they mediate the internally-related character of different national units. At one level, borders demarcate potential pools of relative surplus populations – attempting to contain them within particular territories and filtering their movement when needed. The relations between these geographically dispersed labour surpluses – even when they are stationary – are part of how class actually exists in any given national space. Additionally, by circumscribing particular sets of social relations, borders fix the customary living standard of workers – in both its ‘historical and moral’ as well as physical and technical components. As migrants move, the value of this labour power is realised in another national space through its exchange with capital, while the reproduction of the labourer and their family is simultaneously made dependent upon this act of valorisation. Borders act to condition the precise shape of this relation, giving concrete form to the magnitude, intensity, and direction of value transfers, and the distribution, selection, and movement of labour surpluses. The net effect of all these processes is that the social relations of both national spaces cannot be thought of in separation, they exist through their relation to the other.

Such an approach opens the way to a powerful critique of the dominant forms of migration politics. Precisely because we internalise the reifications of the state and its borders, our approach towards migration typically begins from a judgement of what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for our nation or (in supposedly left-wing versions)our nationally-bound class. This is not simply a discursive feature of the far-right racist tropes that posit migrants as an existential threat to jobs and living conditions, moral standards, or cultural values. It is just as evident within much of the language used to defend migrants from such racism. Attempts to support migration on the basis that it ‘creates jobs’ or is ‘good for business’ ultimately start from the same vantage point, a judgement framed around what is beneficial to ‘us’ (however nebulously that may be defined).[115] They thus frequently reinforce the distinction between the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ migrant, and, in the worst examples, end up valorising national sovereignty as a supposed path to socialism.

The approach we have outlined in this article also allows us to understand the significance of borders and migration to moments of capitalist crisis. As workers are expelled from production and capital confronts barriers to its self-valorisation, moments of crisis are both generative of surplus populations as well as symptomatic of the breakdown in the value-form. As a result, moments of crisis are also always moments about migration, in which capitalist states attempt to overcome crises through channelling their effects in ways propitious to capital itself.[116] To be clear, this is not at all about stopping migration; rather, states seek to ‘manage’ migration through a multiplicity of means, including the current proliferation of new techniques aimed at border securisation and externalisation. All of this is necessarily expressed in ideological forms such as anti-migrant racism and xenophobia, which help to configure and enact border techniques, and depend ultimately on the mystifications of the national form discussed above. For all these reasons, it is no accident that in a contemporary moment marked by multiple forms of crisis throughout the world system – a global health pandemic, overaccumulation and financial bubbles, widespread war and violence, the relative decline of US hegemony and the rise of new powers, the reality of ecological collapse, the breakdown of political legitimacy, and so forth – we see questions of migration, race, and borders emerge so centrally to the strategies of capitalist states. An analysis of these issues must therefore be placed central to Left politics today.

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Smith, Murray. 2009. Marxist Phoenix: Studies in Historical Materialism and Marxist Socialism. Canadian Scholars Press.

Smith, Dorothy. 1987. The everyday world as problematic: A feminist sociology. University of Toronto Press.

Smith, Dorothy E. 2004, “Ideology, Science and Social Relations: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Epistemology” European Journal of Social Theory 7: 445.

Solomos, John, Bob Findlay, Simon Jones and Paul Gilroy, 1982. “The Organic Crisis of British Capitalism and Race”, in The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 1970s Britain edited by John Solomos, Bob Findlay, Simon Jones and Paul Gilroy, London: Routledge.

Starosta, Guido and Alejandro Fitzsimons 2017. “Rethinking the Determination of the Value of Labor Power” Review of Radical Political Economy,Volume: 50 issue: 1: 99-115.

Tazzioli Martina. The making of racialized subjects: Practices, history, struggles. Security Dialogue. 2021;52 :107-114.

Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. 2016. From #BLACKLIVESMATTER to Black Liberation, Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Tomich, Dale W. 2004, Through the prism of slavery: labor, capital, and world economy. Rowman & Littlefield.

Vickers, Tom 2019, Borders, Migration and Class in an Age of Crisis: Producing Immigrants and Workers. Policy Press.

Virdee, Satnam 2014. Racism, class and the racialized outsider. Macmillan International Higher Education.

Virdee, Satnam 2021, The Longue Duree of Racialised Capitalism Brooklyn Rail

Walia, Harsha 2021,  Border and Rule: Global Migration, Capitalism, and the Rise of Racist Nationalism (Chicago: Haymarket Books).

Williams, Eric. 2014, Capitalism and slavery. UNC Press Books.[First published 1944]

Wolfe, Patrick. 2016, Traces of history: Elementary structures of race. Verso Books.

Yuval-Davis, N., Wemyss, G. and Cassidy, K., 2018, ‘Everyday bordering, belonging and the reorientation of British immigration legislation’. Sociology,52(2), pp.228-244.

 

 

 


[1] The authors would like to thank Sue Ferguson, Robert Knox, Paolo Novak, Parvathi Raman, Dale Tomich, and Jeffrey R. Webber for valuable criticisms and comments on earlier versions of this article. We dedicate this piece to the memories of Mary-Jo Nadeau and Aziz Choudry, dear friends whose writings and activism helped inspire many of the arguments herein.

[2] Bannerji 2005.

[3] Roediger 2017.

[4] Lowe 1996; Roediger and Esch 2012.

[5] Taylor 2016, p.217.

[6] Alexander 1979; Hall et al 1978; Roediger 1991; Ignatiev 1974.

[7] Davies 2007; Davis 1983; Bhandar and Ziadah 2020.

[8] Fanon 1963; Rodney 1972.

[9] David Roediger nots that debates in the US context – particularly those around theorising whiteness – have paid much less attention to “non-white immigrant labor” and thus have “contributed, even among its critics, to keeping left attention focused on Black and white” (2017).

[10] Brah 1996, Gilroy 1991, Sivanadan 1978, Virdee 2014.

[11] Novak 2016.

[12] Casas-Cortes et al 2015, p.57.

[13] Novak 2016, p.4.

[14] Mezzadra 2011; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Moulier-Boutang 2011; Rodriguez 1996; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008; De Genova 2017. Drawing inspiration from the Italian workerist tradition, the AoM framework considers migration through the lens of labour’s contradictory position as an “incorrigible subject” (De Genova 2017) – that is simultaneously both ‘for and against capital’. Despite heavy repression directed against those attempting to transgress borders, the AoM approach emphasises the migrant as an autonomous and insubordinate figure whose struggle against immobilisation cannot be fully controlled. This has important methodological and political implications, not least in how to view the border in relation to the making of labour itself (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013).

[15] Isin 2002.

[16] Tazzioli 2021.

[17] Novak 2016.

[18]Ollman 1976; Smith 1987; Bannerji 1995, 2005.

[19]Malik 1996; Nisanciglu 2019; Bhandar 2018.

[20]Knox 2016.

[21] To be clear, we are not suggesting that race and racism should primarily be understood in terms of ideology. Our concern here is to explore how the emergence of the value-form is connected to ways of perceiving borders, and what this might say about the relationship between processes of racialisation and class formation. Camfield (2016) presents an insightful critique of the racism-as-ideology approach that accords with many of our arguments here, although he does not explicitly theorise the place of borders and migration within his critique.

[22]Mandel 1975; Smith 2014.

[23]Rubin 1972; Pilling 1972.

[24]Rubin 1972; Smith 2014.

[25]Knox 2016, p.89.

[26]Banaji 2010.

[27]Sayer 1987; Anderson 2012.

[28]Clarke 1991; Sayer 1987; Pashukanis 1980; Meiville 2005; Knox 2016.

[29]Clarke 1991; Holloway and Picciotto 1978. Knox, following Pashukanis, notes the importance of sovereignty within this framework, tracing the commodity-form to the emergence of an international legal-form that is closely connected to imperialism: “The formal, abstract equality that Pashukanis ascribed to the legal form very closely resembles one of the key elements of international law: sovereignty. Pashukanis argued that ‘sovereign states co–exist and are counterposed to one another in exactly the same way as are individual property owners with equal rights’, since the territory of a state is functionally its private property and states engage directly in exchange. Since capitalism was only generalised through imperialism, international law is also intimately connected with imperialism.”

[30]Hirsch 1979.

[31] Malik 1996, p.136.

[32]Nyers 2009; Bhandar 2004.

[33] Malik 1996, p.136.

[34]Holloway and Picciotto 1978.

[35]Malik 1996, p.137.

[36]Virdee 2021.

[37]Lowe 2015.

[38]Shehabi 2020.

[39] Robinson 1983, p.27.

[40]Sayer 1979, 1987; Smith 2004; Camfield 2016.

[41] Sayer 1979, p.4.

[42]Marx 1990, p.169.

[43]Sayer 1987, p.84. Sayer presents a powerful critique of ‘traditional’ base-superstructure models of Marxism – most clearly embodied in the work of G.A Cohen – to argue that Marx’s critique of idealism was not, as it is traditionally conceived, an attempt to place ‘material’ factors in front of the various ideal categories proposed by Hegel and his subsequent followers (such as the Spirit, ‘the cunning of reason’ etc.) as primary drivers of history and social change. Rather, Marx’s much more fundamental point is “to deny the very ‘existence’ of the ideal as a separable entity … [Hegelian ideal categories] cannot for Marx be the subject of history for the simple reason that they do not exist. They are reifications: philosopher’s fictions, abstractions made flesh, speculative constructions” (p.85).

[44]Sayer 1987, p.91.

[45]Sayer 1987, p.103.

[46] Colletti 1975, pp. 35-36.

[47]Sayer 1987, p.110.

[48]Sayer 1987, p.104.

[49]To be clear, we are speaking here of ‘commonsense’ consciousness – not the work of scholars who foreground a critique of methodological nationalism and the socially-constructed nature of borders.

[50] Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p.269, italics added.

[51]Goswami 2002, p.794.

[52]Arboleda 2020, p.26, italics added.

[53]Gordon and Webber 2020.

[54]Tomich 2016, p.30–31.

[55] Foster and McChesney 2011; Anderson 2012; Battarchaya 2018.

[56] Castles and Kosack 1973; Miles 1986, Hanieh 2018a; Vickers 2019.

[57] Marx 1976, p.784.

[58] Ferguson and McNally 2015.

[59] Castles and Kosack 1973.

[60] Raman 2018.

[61] Gilroy 1991; Virdee 2014; Ramdin 2017; Battarchaya 2018.

[62]Hanieh 2018a.

[63]Harvey 1999, p.381.

[64]De Genova and Peutz, 2010.

[65]Balibar 2002, p.79.

[66]Papapodopoulos et al 2008; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013.

[67] Anderson 2012; Yuval-Davis 2018.

[68]Sharma and Wright 2008; Casas-Cortes et al 2015.

[69] Anderson 2012, p.149.

[70]We draw this formulation (i.e. the idea that borders mediate, or fix the form of, labour surpluses, but do not determine the content of these surpluses) from an analogous argument made by Starosta and Fitzsimons in respect to the role of class struggle and the value of labour power. They write: “the material conditions of the reproduction process of capital constitute the content of the determination of the value of labor power. They do so by determining the differentiated forms of productive subjectivity that compose the collective laborer and, as consequence, the quantity and kind of means of subsistence that workers need to consume to reproduce those variegated qualitative attributes (both technical and moral) of labor power. In turn, the class struggle becomes the necessaryform thatmediates the establishment of the material unity between the productive and consumptive requirements of the reproduction of the total social capital.” (Starosta and Fitzsimons 2017, p.110).

[71]Calavita 2005; Castles and Kosack 1973; De Genova 2005; Hanieh 2018b.

[72] Marx 1976, p.799.

[73] Balibar 1991.

[74] Balibar 1991; Bannerji 1995; Sharma and Wright 2008.

[75] Solomos et al 1982, p.46.

[76]Lowe 2015; Mongia 2018.

[77]James 1953, pp.10-11.

[78] Chit and Nayel 2013; Wolfe 2016; Alexander 1979.

[79] Walia 2021.

[80] Bannerji 1995, p.65.

[81] James 1963, Cesaire 1972, Fanon, 1963, Rodney 1972.

[82] Allen 1994, Hyslop 1999; Ignatiev 1979.

[83] Virdee 2014; Camfield 2016; Roediger 2017; Schilliam 2018; Battarchaya 2018.

[84]Byrd 2019; Coulthard 2014; Dunbar-Ortiz 2016.

[85] Virdee 2014, p.5.

[86] Marx 1976, p. 274.

[87] Marx 1976, p. 274.

[88]Marx 1976, p.275.

[89] Starosta and Fitzsimons 2017.

[90] Mies 2014; Arruzza 2016; Bhattacharya 2017; Ferguson 2019; Mezzadri 2020.

[91] Castles and Kosack 1973, pp. 409-411.

[92]Katz 2001, p.709.

[93] Lowe 2015; Mongia 2018.

[94] Castles and Kosack 1973.

[95] Choudry and Smith 2016.

[96] Choudry and Henaway 2012.

[97] Most of the academic and policy debate on TLM focuses on assessing the ‘success’ of these programs, i.e. whether migrants actually return to their country of origin at the end of their contract (in this respect, the post-war Western European schemes are generally viewed as a ‘failure’ due to the long-term settlement of ‘guest’ workers and their families in France, Germany and elsewhere).

[98] Khalaf et al 2014.

[99] Buckley 2014; Longva 2000.

[100] Workers in the Gulf’s construction sector, for example, are typically housed by the company in sub-standard dormitories and transported to work on company buses. In addition to paying off any debts accrued for work visas, the bulk of their actual wage is remitted to their family back home, not spent in Dubai.

[101] IFAD 2017, p.5.

[102]Hanieh 2018a.

[103] Banaji 2010, p.131.

[104] McNally 2020; Tomich 2004.

[105] Mongia 2018.

[106] Williams 2014; Roediger and Esch 2012; Allen 1994.

[107] Patterson 1982.

[108] Choudry and Smith 2016. More recently, in the case of the Gulf Arab states, the pronounced shift away from Arab to Asian workers through the 1990s and 2000s was likewise conceived as a means of discouraging workers from forming bonds of cultural and belonging, and was also organised through the spatial separation of these workers from local Gulf citizens (Hanieh 2018a).

[109] Calavita 2005; Anderson 2012.

[110] Kapoor and Narkowicz 2019.

[111]Chang 2015, Shelley 2007.

[112] Farris 2020.

[113] Of course, this is not an automatic outcome – it is possible, for example, that the changing bundle of the means of subsistence seen as necessary for the ‘average worker’ could mean an increase in the overall value of these commodities. This tendency may also be experienced differently for different groups of workers. It nonetheless appears to be an observable phenomenon, and the presence of coerced migrant labour throughout global value chains (particularly at its base) can be seen in many sectors of the world economy today.

[114]Blackburn 1997.

[115] They are also typically analytically incorrect – it is the tempo of capital accumulation that creates (or more frequently, destroys) jobs.

[116] Anderson 2012.

Steam and Stokehold

Steamship labour, colonial racecraft and Bombay’s Sidi jamAt

Tania Bhattacharyya

In the late nineteenth century freedpeople rescued from slaving boats on the Indian Ocean by British anti-slavery cruisers were sent to Bombay, where many of the young men found employment as stokers in the stokehold of P&O steamships. British administrators discussed the future of freed “Africans” strictly as profitable sources of labour. Freedpeople however went on to form their own Muslim communities or jamãt in Bombay known as Sidis or Habshis. While colonial “liberation” was bound up with ideas of race, Sidis rejected ideas of singular racial biological origin with their itinerant notion of a community descending from the Prophet. This article is a historical critique of the terms of the colonial racecraft that gives us the category of “African” and the natural division of humans into races, and an effort to read the colonial archive against the grain for the explication of a subaltern Sidi or Habshi notion of jamãt.

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

The 1840s were marked as a significant decade in the history of the western Indian Ocean by two concurrent developments: the British Empire’s campaign against the slave trade in those waters and the introduction of transoceanic steam travel. In 1841 a British Agency was established in Zanzibar under the control of Bombay[i] and in 1843 the first slave trade prohibition treaty was signed between the Sultan of Zanzibar and Britain.[ii] The primary interest of the British Foreign Office in Zanzibar, apart from keeping the French out of East Africa, was to maintain it as a base for its anti-slavery crusade in the Indian Ocean.[iii] At the same time, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company was constituted by a Royal Charter of incorporation (1840) and in 1842 they sailed the first steamer, SS Hindostan, from Southampton to Calcutta, inaugurating the first Indian mail service across the Indian Ocean. By 1853 the P&O had acquired the mail contract for India through the overland route via Suez and at the height of the British Empire’s grip over the ocean it ferried mail, passengers and cargo all across the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and beyond. When theP&O was acquired in 2006 by Dubai Ports World for nearly £4 billion the New York Times described it as “a sinew of empire, a shipping line that ferried soldiers and diplomats, even royalty, on the Victorian mail runs that tied Britain to its outposts far to the east and beyond.”[iv]

These two developments- the abolition of slave trade and the rise of steam capital- were not coincidental but complementary pillars of the career of Victorian era imperialism in the Indian Ocean. The British East India Company had already begun converting its fleet to steamships in the 1830s, provoking the colonial Government of Bombay to conquer Aden on the southern Arabian coast as a coaling station in 1839. They were joined in the 1840s by the British Admiralty[v] and together these three steam-powered wings of empire- imperial navy, company fleet and merchant navy- laboured to claim the Indian Ocean as a “British lake”[vi] the way they feared the Mediterranean was becoming a “French lake” after the occupation of Algeria in 1830 and the Black Sea a “Russian lake”.[vii] These early steamships required huge amounts of coal to burn fires for adequate steam and the consequent expansion of overseas trade in coal spurred industrialization in Britain.[viii] Coal from Wales and northern England but also Bengal, Borneo and Natal[ix] flowed into Aden, Basra, Bombay and other imperial ports along the ocean rim, and goods, capital and labourers poured in and out of them.[x] Even before the opening of the Suez Canal, which gave yet another boost to British shipping and trade, the net tonnage of British goods transported by steamships had increased from 168,474 to 948,367 between 1850 and 1869.[xi] Alongside the explosion in trade and shipping the power of steam gave British gunboats in the IO a new force, a power not infrequently used to force new treaties on the Sultans of Zanzibar, Oman and chiefs of the Arabian coast, including the treaties for the abolition of slave trade.[xii] British ships-of-war were also deployed to patrol the waters off the coast of Zanzibar and Muscat on the lookout for dhows carrying people from Africa as slaves for sale in violation of the treaties.

The abolition of slave trade and the “liberation” of enslaved humans from dhows in the Indian Ocean became a boon for companies like the P&O. Men, women and children from Africa, emancipated by British steamers from the dhows of slavers were frequently sent to Bombay, between 1843 and 1890, where many of the men found employment as stokers and firemen in the stokeholds of steamships, both naval and commercial.[xiii] While Pathans and Punjabis from the Northwest Provinces of British India, and Yemeni Arabs and Somalis from Aden were also employed in the stokehold, companies like the P&O appear to have preferred Sidis and occasionally Yemenis. Sidis (likely derived from the title “sayyid”, signifying eminent descent from the Prophet Muhammad), variously known as Habshis, Seedees, Sheedis or Siddis, are identified in scholarship as South Asians of African descent whosejamāts (caste-like communities) are spread across Gujarat, Sindh, Baluchistan, Karnataka, Hyderabad, and Mumbai.[xiv] An 1890 collection of drawings by W.W Lloyd published for the company under the name P&OPencillings included a drawing of Sidis labouring in the stokehold.[xv] In 1986 a book commemorating the hundred and fifty year history of the P&O Company included Llyod’s sketch with the caption, “For steamers, you had to have coal. That was difficult and dirty enough. Then you had to have stokers, frequently ‘seedies’ from East Africa, and the ‘stokehole’ where they had to work was indescribable.”[xvi] Even as late as 1921 when the value of coal had been diminished by the discovery of oil, the Shipping Master of Bombay reported that “approximately three to four hundred a year of Arabs and East Africans [found] employment annually in P. and O. ships”.[xvii]

The elision between “Sidi” and “East African” is common in colonial archives, because to colonialists Sidis were of interest for their presumed racial identity, a typology which linked Africa as a place to “African” as a race of human beings. Nineteenth century colonial and missionary discourses on emancipated Africans, indeed on emancipation and slavery itself, were steeped in ideas about racial “types” that linked human behaviour and abilities to biology and place of birth.[xviii] They insisted on the defining African-ness of the Sidis they encountered in Bombay, despite the fact that many Sidis had spent greater portions of their lives on Arabian and South Asian shores than on the continent of Africa, or were even born in the subcontinent. S.M. Edwardes, the Commissioner of Police in Bombay in 1912 knew better when he wrote in his book By-Ways of Bombay about the “Sidis or Musulmans of African descent, who supply the steamship companies with stokers, firemen and engine-room assistants, and the dockyards and workshops with fitters and mechanics.”[xix] In reality the Sidis whose labour powered the steamers were probably as mixed as the jamāts on shore themselves- a combination of people from Central and East Africa (including Zanzibar and Madagascar) who had been recently “liberated”, freedpeople from Africa who had lived for years in Aden and other ports of the Gulf, and descendants of older Sidis born in Bombay Presidency. Unlike the homogenizing racial category “African”, “Sidi” or “Habshi” (derived from the Arabic “al-Habash” or Abyssinia) in nineteenth and twentieth century Bombay marked a diverse and itinerant Muslim community with semi-porous borders. This article is a historical critique of the terms of colonial racial discourse that gives us the category “African”,[xx] and an effort to read the colonial archive against the grain for the explication of a subaltern Sidi or Habshi notion of jamāt, illuminated further in conversation with Sidi Abdul Rauf, themaqwā or head of Mumbai’s present-day community of Sidis.[xxi]

Sidis and freedmen aboard steamships were almost always employed in the stokehold, the boiler and the engine room[xxii]- the lowest, hottest and most manually exacting parts of the vessel. This was a direct consequence of the racialization of labour by colonial administrators, steamship companies and missionaries in the Indian Ocean alike. Labour aboard the nineteenth century steamship was severely hierarchized (even where the element of race was absent) and the stoker, fireman and trimmer came to occupy the lowest of these positions. The position was not automatically inferior- though it required extremely difficult and dirty work under very painful circumstances, British stokers in the early days of the Royal Navy’s conversion to steam were not only paid more than their seamen counterparts, they were also recognized as being crucial to the powering of ships and their smooth running, in some cases serving as effective engineers before the post of artifice engineer was formally introduced.[xxiii] In the Indian Ocean however commercial companies like the P&O (and their rival French Messageries Maritime Steam Navigation Company, as well as Dutch, Italian, Austro-Hungarian and German steamers[xxiv]) discovered the benefit of employing non-European men as seamen and stokers at far cheaper rates than Europeans, introducing a racial hierarchy of labour. In the mid-nineteenth century predominantly South Asian seamen known as lascars (which also sometimes included Adenese, Yemeni, Chinese, Malay and East African sailors) received between one-fifth and one-third the pay of European “able bodied seamen”[xxv] and made up roughly a quarter of the workforce on British merchant ships well into the 1960s.[xxvi]

While lascars manned the decks the position of stokers, firemen and coal trimmers were filled predominantly by Sidis, freedmen and Yemeni Arabs, and increasingly by Pathans and Punjabis as the nineteenth century wore on. Even though legally all these non-European seamen were often included under the category “lascar” when shipping from British colonial ports, in practice stokehold Sidis were ranked below decklascars. The racist colonial imaginary could ascribe some kind of skill to the labour of “Asiatic” decklascars, but Sidis were seen as valuable for some imagined raw, bodily strength and resistance to high temperatures. As commercial shipping companies strove to maximize the traveling speed offered by the “technology” of steam engines, the highest possible extraction of labour from stokers and firemen to maintain consistent fires became of utmost importance. The same racializing colonial discourse that permitted Asian, African and Middle Eastern seamen to be hired at substantially lower rates of pay than European seamen and have discriminatory legal restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement and employment on foreign shores, also classified “Africans” and “Yemenis” as more adept at grueling manual labour and inexplicably more acclimatized to the extreme heat of the stokehold. These ideas of body types predestined for certain kinds of labour became so ingrained as the century progressed that in 1872 an Admiral in the Royal Navy mourned the “well known inferior physique” of British stokers, saying that if the numbers of these stokers could not be increased or replaced by “the services of the same class and style of men that are to be found in the stokeholes of the great steam companies”, the navy would have to run ships-of-war at speeds far less than what they were capable of keeping.[xxvii] Thus what appeared as a purely technological “capability” for greater speed could only be realized by more intensive exploitation of labour.

As Andreas Malm has demonstrated so well for the history of the transition to steam power in the cotton mills of nineteenth century England, the real advantages of steam power lay in its mobility and ability to facilitate the extraction of ever greater rates of surplus value from human labour in less and less time (i.e., relative surplus value).[xxviii] In the case of steam companies plying the Indian Ocean greater traveling speeds meant greater profits, which they maximized not only by hiring lascar, Sidi, Somali and Adenese seamen at cheaper rates of pay, but also by subjecting some sections of that racialised labour force to particularly grueling intensive work to maintain the constant production of steam from coal. In other words, if capital’s drive for endless valorization was the motor for the explosion of steam technology in the nineteenth century, this technology in turn had to be attended by a hierarchical set of labours aboard the steamship at sea- a hierarchy that the colonial social order organized by the artifice of race.

By the late nineteenth century the job of the stoker had been rendered so menial in colonial imagination that even British naval stokers, no less educated or more alcoholic than British seamen (the much beloved “bluejacket”), came to be looked down upon as the sooty “black gang”, a drunken, insubordinate class of workers constituting “the lowest of the low”.[xxix] This article argues that the steamship which was a particularly globalized, mobile form of factory, produced and perfected in seas off colonized shores, created a racial hierarchy of labours, differentiating not only European seaman from non-European lascar as extant scholarship[xxx] has pointed out, but also between lascar and Sidi. This particular differentiation was made possible when colonial administrators engaged in the task of apprehending and freeing enslaved humans in the mid nineteenth century Indian Ocean were confronted with the “disposal of emancipated Africans” as a problem. To the colonial mind freedmen’sbodies, though no longer acceptable to be exploited under the whip of the slave master, were nevertheless still the most valuable thing about “Africans”. “Liberation” therefore transferred many enslaved humans from the dhows of slavers to the stokeholds of steamers, providing in effect a stable source of manual labour for burgeoning steamship companies.[xxxi]

Indrani Chatterjee describes this as a process of primitive accumulation.[xxxii] Marx’s idea of primitive accumulation specifically refers to the violent alienation of people from land by the creation of enclosures thereby producing a landless proletariat “doubly free” to become a source of capitalist accumulation. I interpret Chatterjee’s use of this term to mean that the “liberation” of bondsmen from Africa created a maritime proletariat which became a source for the production of surplus value for colonial capitalists, a description which is certainly accurate. However, the use of primitive accumulation as an analytical concept to describe this process does not adequately address the question of race. This article is concerned with explaining how strategies of “liberation” were integral not only to capital accumulation but also to the remaking of race in the maritime British Empire as nature’s way of ordering the social division of labour. Chatterjee’s article demonstrates very well how categories of race derived from Atlantic slavery have been erroneously superimposed on the study of “Afro-Asian” populations in pre-colonial South Asia. However, the study of colonial “liberation” discourse/practice and Sidi jamāt formation in nineteenth century Bombay has more to say not only about the history of South Asians of African descent but about the socio-historical underpinnings of the idea of race itself in imperial Britain.

While colonial discourse and policy corralled all freedmen in the Indian Ocean into their distinct racial identity as “Africans”, on the ships and shores of Bombay city the categories of living and association were not so neat. Newly “liberated” “Zanzibaris”, “Nubis” (Sudanese), “Habshis” (Ethiopians) and people from other parts of Africa were welcomed into Muslim communities of Sidis to form a particularly working class Muslimjamāt (caste-like community).[xxxiii] The jamāt’s origin narratives connected them to the continent of Africa through saints (Sidi Mubarak Nobi of Nubia or Sudan, Bava Habash of Ethiopia and Mai Misra of Egypt), but also to Arabia through Hazrat Bilal, a manumitted habshi who became a companion of the Prophet and the firstmuezzin (one who gives the call to prayer) of Islam.[xxxiv] Often, the introduction of newly arrived freedmen in the streets of Bombay to Islam was by way of the poor Arabs of the city, an ever-looming thorn-in-the-side for missionaries eager to bring these Africans under the fold of Christianity. As Yemenis and Sidis sometimes worked side by side in the stokeholds, so they lived and prayed side by side in the chawls (tenements) of the city.[xxxv] In 1874 Sidis and Arabs of Bombay, many of them shipworkers, certainly rioted together as they clashed against their Parsi (Zoroastrian) neighbours. Opposed to the racial colonial and missionary discourse of identity based on singular biological and geographical origins by birth, the fragmentary documentation on the Sidis of Bombay city in the nineteenth century offers an itinerant’s map of belonging: one that links Zanzibar and Kilwa to Ethiopia and Sudan, and also to Mecca, Medina, Aden, Muscat, Karachi and Bombay. These many stops of enslaved Africans’ journeys before “liberation” and arrival at Bombay were grafted into ritual narratives of kinship and belonging that united Africa, Arabistan and Hindustan and are performed through Sidi rituals and storytelling even today.  

Liberation as racecraft

The question of what was to be done with enslaved humans rescued from slaving boats in the Indian Ocean was not decided by asking those who had been “liberated”. The first freedpeople started arriving at Bombay city in the 1830s, with numbers picking up after the signing of the treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1843. In 1847 Reverend Eisenberg of the Bombay Mission of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) sought to bring as many of these Africans under the care of the society as possible. However, the government of Bombay refused his offer of asylum and Christian instruction to the former slaves, “having preferred to place some of the boys into the Mechanic’s Institution, the rest of the boys in the Indian Navy and to distribute the females indiscriminately among Christians, Mohammedan and other families in the island.”[xxxvi] While this policy was largely followed through the next few decades, in 1860 the Government sanctioned the formation of an African Asylum under the auspices of the CMS in Sharanpur, a hundred miles north of Bombay city. Between 1860 and 1872 the Asylum received about two hundred youth, while much larger numbers of people from Africa continued to be set free in Bombay city itself[xxxvii], either distributed amongst families in the city, employed in the navy, sent to institutions for vocational training like the Indo-British Institution or the Robert Money School, or left to their own devices.[xxxviii] 

It was not until the 1890s that manumitted individuals were given the choice to return to Zanzibar. By then those being freed were rarely youth from Africa who were rescued off boats taking them for sale. Instead they were people from Africa who had long been enslaved and lived along the Arabian coast, often since childhood, and who sought out the support of the local British consulate when they wanted to be manumitted. Many such people chose not to return to Africa after manumission but to continue working where they lived or travel to Bombay. In 1900 the Political Agent and Consul at Muscat informed the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf that manumitted slaves mostly preferred to remain in Muscat or go to Bombay where there was a greater possibility of employment, rather than returning to Zanzibar:

Once armed with a manumission Certificate these freed men have no wish as a rule to return to Zanzibar or their own forgotten country. There is a large negro population in Muskat among whom they apparently prefer to remain. Full grown men can command better wages in Muskat, as coolies or boatmen than they could in Zanzibar, and if they desire to leave Muskat at all it is generally for Bombay, which the description of their friends imbues them with a curiosity to visit, and about 20 find their way thither annually. Very few ask to be sent to Zanzibar and those that do go not unfrequently return.[xxxix]

Similarly for the Persian Gulf the Political Resident observed that based on his experience and his study of the slave trade files for the past five years, very few freedmen wished to go back to Zanzibar, preferring to stay on in Bandar Lengeh or Bushehr (in Iran) where they had been living, or go away to Muscat, Basra or Jeddah. “At the most 5% will like to go to Zanzibar unless we send the slaves there without consulting their wishes.”[xl]

The offer to return freedmen to Zanzibar instead of sending them on to Bombay came after the governments of both Bombay and Muscat objected to their increasing presence in their cities. In 1889 Bombay’s Commissioner of Police complained that “the number of Africans in the city [was] already considerable” and any expansion of this “excitable and turbulent element in the population” might become a source of danger. Besides, “the cost of maintenance of freed slaves who [were] too young to earn a living” was a drain on the government’s resources, and older youth with “insubordinate spirit[s]” posed a further problem when they had to be dismissed from the care of missionary societies.[xli] Accordingly, the Government of Bombay inquired if the Government of India might be able to suggest any way of “disposing of these slaves in other parts of India” or if “in regard toslaves landed at Aden, Her Majesty’s Government, which directs the East African policy, cannot be moved to arrange for theirdisposal, especially in the event of largecaptures being made, otherwise than by sending them on to Bombay or leaving them in Aden.”[xlii]

The racialized association of freedmen with “excitability,” “turbulence” and “insubordination” was echoed by both missionaries and mainstream English media in Bombay. The annual report of the CMS African Asylum in 1861 commented on the ease with which “Africans and Native Christians” in their care were getting along, adding that each “race” was benefitting the other:

No disagreements between the races; on the contrary much mutual benefit has resulted from their close connexion. The greater energy of the Africans has to a certain extent roused the feebler Indians, who on their part are exercising a somewhat softening & polishing influence on the moreuncouth sons of Adam.[xliii]

After the riots in 1874 when crowds of poor Sidis and Arabs from the chawls of Umerkhadi in Bombay city clashed with their Parsi house and shop-owning neighbours, Parsi English language media in particular took a withering stance against the Sidis of the city. An anonymous correspondent to theTimes of India wrote about the Sidis:

If they are to be emancipated from the shackles of perpetual slavery let them be sent to some other place not so thickly inhabited as Bombay is, for we do not want such illiterate rif-rafs to break occasionally our public peace through the instigation of some of their co religionists.”[xliv]

This image of freedmen and Sidis as strong and “excitable”, “uncouth” “rif-rafs”, in essence an unintelligent but dangerous tinderbox waiting to be ignited at the will of more scheming others, became more popular among administrators and city elites after 1874, eventually provoking the Police Commissioner’s remarks quoted earlier. We encounter here the image of the fearful black man of the racist imagination[xlv], a human being reduced to the simple “cycle of the biological” as Frantz Fanon described in a different colonial context: “To have a phobia about black men is to be afraid of the biological, for the black man is nothing but biological. Black men are animals. They live naked. And God only knows what else.”[xlvi]  

The reverse side of this characterization of “Africans” as unmitigated bodily forces prone to being exploited by scheming anti-socials was the belief that if controlled by the right forces, these strong bodies could be put to work towards “profitable” ends.[xlvii] The Bombay Government’s reluctance to keep harbouring freedmen opened a conversation among the colonial administrators of the Indian Ocean rim about the most “profitable” ways in which to “dispose” of emancipated slaves. This discourse is remarkable because it begins to clarify the skeleton of what I call racecraft following the formulation of Barbara and Karen Fields: first, for colonial administrators the “liberation” of humans from slavery was seen as a problem of disposal; second, the disposal of humans was evaluated in terms of labour and its profitable use; and finally, the question of how and where to dispose of these displaced people as labour was solved by race, reducing hundreds of people to their bodies and their presumed capacity for grueling labour.

After making its plea to the Government of India for help in 1889, the Government of Bombay wrote to the Colonial Secretary in Fiji, asking if the government there would be willing to receive the rescued Africans “with the view of utilizing their services in the Fiji Islands”[xlviii]. In response the British government at Fiji asked a list of questions to decide if these Africans were fit “for the work required and the cost of their introduction as free (agricultural) labourers” in Fiji. The questions and answers of this interaction classified the humans in question through a taxonomy of “higher” and “lower” body types or “classes” that were valued according to their ability to do different kinds of work and be “amenable to discipline”: 

  1. Are the Africans referred to mentally and physically of a low class or otherwise? Mostly of good type mentally and physically.
  2. Are they inclined to good order and amenable to discipline? Yes. How do they compare with the average Seedee or Kruman?Many are similar. Some are of higher type as the Abyssinian.
  3. To what extent numerically is it likely they could annually be availed of? Impossible to say now as all the conditions are altered and are still in course of rapid alteration.
  4. Are they males or females or of both sexes? If the last in what proportion? Of both sexes—the proportion has been about 33 females to 100 males for 5 years from 1883 to 1887.
  5. Are they fit for service as agricultural labourers? The males doubtless would be. Most of those imported into Oman are employed on date plantations. Both males and females usually make excellent domestic servants.[xlix]

The fate of a person born on the African continent or to African parents was simply limited to the realm of physical labour or service (domestic service or spiritual service in the case of Christian missionaries) by colonial administrators, missionaries and “liberators”. Any education, in the few instances that it was provided (mostly by missionaries), was either vocational (as blacksmiths and carpenters for men, and needlework for women) or spiritual, with a view to using these “Bombay Africans” as assistants to preachers and explorers in East Africa. If the “African” was useful in the colonial view only for their capacity to do labour, often grueling labour of the kind performed in the stokehold or on plantations, or to serve the will of others, it was important for them to be “inclined to good order and amenable to discipline”, a function which missionary institutions such as the African Asylum served. And yet at the same time, “excitability” or “docility” were treated as inherent nature-given, race-bound traits. Africans were “strong” but “excitable” while Indians were “feeble” but “docile”, a pattern replicated in the characterization of obedient lascars and undisciplined Sidis on board ships as we shall later see. In practice, a refusal by those who had been “liberated” to cooperate with the plans of “liberators” branded them as being “insubordinate”, a familiar complaint about Sidis in the reports of missionaries and the police.

Of course, the “excitable” Sidi or African existed no more than did the supposedly “docile coolie”[l] or lascar. For example, as Ravi Ahuja has shown in great detail, any lack of trouble for shipowners (such as desertion or protests) on the part of South Asian seamen orlascars was to be attributed to the severe set of discriminatory labour and immigration laws that were in place for “coloured seamen” well into the twentieth century, as well as informal networks of power used by shipping companies to ensure obedience.[li] For example, under special “lascar agreements” of shipping laws, lascars were denied the customary right to shore leave on African and North American ports, or the right to gain employment with a different shipping company than the one with which they left South Asia. Additionally, desertion bylascars was punished by incarceration, a rule abolished for European seamen in the twentieth century but not until well after Indian independence forlascars. In effect therefore, alascar or Sidi could not leave a ship at a foreign port in order to escape harsh working conditions or seek better employment under European rates.“A South Asian seaman’s only chance to terminatea contract outside South Asia was to break it, thereby committing thecriminal offence of ‘‘desertion’’ and forfeiting all payments due from hisemployer.”[lii] Therefore, in reality not only were Sidi shipworkers circumscribed by the same set of legislations and extra-legal restrictions as their other lascar shipmates, the supposed “insubordination” of one race of workers and the “docility” of another were complementary racial fictions.

In other words, there was a disjunct. On the one hand was the capitalist claim to discover in nature the perfect brute labourer in the figure of the “African”- the adequate amount of biological strength untethered by will embodied in a human, to supply the necessary labour-time required to produce the maximum possible surplus value given the current level of technological prowess (to run the ship at maximum possible speed, for example). On the other hand was the effort and intricate system of regulations and domination that went into disciplining and creating workers in the image of these racial types (“African” and “Asiatic”) that did not in reality exist. Borrowing from the conceptual labours of the Fields siblings[liii], if racism describes the latter set of actions which treated a certain group of people according to a separate set of standards from other humans based on assumptions about their different “physical and mental characteristics” (i.e., colonial administrators sending freedmen to work in the stokeholds of steamships, and the legal racism of shipping laws), the former social structure that enabled colonialists and missionaries to see in nature that which did not really exist (i.e. racial types that fit different classes of workers) and had to be produced through a regime of discipline can be called racecraft.

After the refusal of Bombay’s government to keep harbouring rescued slaves the conversation about the “profitable” use of freedmen’s labour continued, echoing similar ideological assumptions. In 1897 the India Office in London took up the Government of India’s suggestion that “the slaves freed in Turkish Arabia might with advantage be sent to the British possessions in East Africa.”[liv] The Foreign Office inquired of the British Agent and Consul in Zanzibar if these men may be employed in the building of the Uganda Railway.[lv] The British government in Zanzibar responded with a range of options- agricultural holdings on government estates at Zanzibar and Pemba (cultivated half the week gratis for government), or paid labor as “hamals or carriers” for European mercantile firms in Zanzibar, or as town laborers for the Railway, Public Works and Shipping Departments at Mombasa. He added that “The domestic slave born and bred in an Arab household in Arabia proper…and trained to follow their masters…as armed retainers, would probably not be very suitable for any kind of agricultural or porterage work, and any importation of freed slaves of this class would indeed constitute a very undesirable addition to our population both here and on the mainland. But ordinary agricultural freed slaves, employed in the date plantations, or accustomed to manual labour, whether born or not in Arabia, would probably be very useful, and both here and at Mombasa we would gladly arrange for their reception.”[lvi]

The classification of physically “strong” Africans into two “types” or “classes”- the manual labourer and the military man- characterized this racecraft. While some like the British Agent at Zanzibar feared the presence of men trained in the use of arms as social “undesirables”, others thought they could be a valuable addition to the cause of empire. Reverend Price of the African Asylum wrote in 1872 that it was better to give freedmen in Bombay a military training instead of leaving them free in the city, “strangers in a strange land” waiting to “fall into the hands of Arabs of Bombay whose first care is to turn them into Mussulmans, and then to use them for their own purposes.”[lvii] For one accusing Arab Muslims of having ulterior motives for fraternizing with freedmen, the missionary goes on himself to transparently state his case for military training: “Many of them would make capital soldiers, and the time may come when an African Battalion, inspired with gratitude and loyalty towards Government, might be felt to be an element of safety in the country.”

The British anti-slavery crusade in the nineteenth century Indian Ocean was therefore far from anti-racist. To the contrary, it was undertaken by both colonialists and missionaries as part of a civilizing project (different motivations but similarly conceived) that took race to be a given reality. This racecraft not only structured the question of freedom from slavery as an imperial project of liberation and disposal of labour (i.e., something that is done to the enslaved), it also set the limitations on the available futures for freedmen, destining them to nothing more than a life of difficult manual labour, (or in the case of a limited few a life in the service of the Christian Missionary Society’s East Africa Mission). At the same time the ideology of liberation, as an element of racecraft, obscured the fast-expanding relations of capital in the Indian Ocean that, coupled with the abolition of slavery, produced the need for large numbers of workers, human beings who would labour in the “indescribable” conditions of stokeholds and other “hidden abode[s] of production”[lviii] to enable the technological marvels of the century to perform to their fullest capacity. This is therefore in part a story of how “liberation” became a boon for companies like the P&O and how the recruiting practices of such companies and maritime law reinforced in turn the fiction of race.

The stokehold and the reification of race

Both the colonial government of Bombay and company administration of the P&O were responsible for tethering the future of male Sidis and freedmen to the steamship. Early records indicate that the Bombay police, when saddled with the problem of arranging for the futures of newly arrived freed youth in the city, sent them either to serve as domestic help in local households or to work in the Indian Navy.In October 1853 the Senior Magistrate of Police in Bombay sent five young men who had been rescued from a Portuguese brig to serve in the Indian Navy. He claimed that he had “consulted their own wishes on this subject, and they have all expressed their willingness to enter the Indian Naval Service. They are remarkably fine youths; and I am of opinion that they would be much better provided for in that service than in the families of Portuguese and others, as domestic servants.”[lix] He had earlier noted that all communications with the five youth (“boys”) had been conducted by “a Negro Seaman of the Indian Navy named Parry Williams, who interpreted in the preliminary investigations at this office, and also in the Supreme Court yesterday. He was the only medium we could obtain of communicating with the boys in their own language.”[lx] Sidis or freedmen on Indian Navy ships thus appear to have been a common feature by the mid nineteenth century.[lxi] Accordingly, the Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy wrote back that “The African Boys attested to in the accompanying letter can be received into the Indian Navy, and I have to recommend that they be sent to this office in order that their physical capabilities for sea service may be inquired into.”[lxii] The police magistrate’s promise of the “remarkable fineness” of the youths in question (presumably he was referring to their physical build, considering he could not have learnt much about their mental universe given the language barriers) had of course to be confirmed by a physical examination by the navy itself.

As the Sidi and the freedman became a common feature on Indian Navy ships, so did he on passenger and mail ships, especially of the P&O. Even British passengers who were disgruntled about the increasing employment oflascars and Sidis on board British shipping lines agreed that “A certain number of lascar seamen are of course required in a service like the P.&O., as in the Red Sea no European could face the engine room.”[lxiii] The idea that “Africans” and Sidis were somehow more naturally able to withstand the terrible high heat of the stokehold captured the colonial imagination. Frank Thomas Bullen, an officer on several British merchant ships who became a novelist, dedicated an entire chapter in his book about the merchant marine to the firemen and trimmers of steamships. After describing at length and with great sympathy and admiration the difficulty, skill and danger of these labours that were conventionally seen with much prejudice amongst sailors, he observed that “the engine-room of a large steamship is a terrible place”[lxiv] and that “no man with longings for decent life would or could remain in such employment”[lxv]. From this utterly humane observation he went on to remarkably conclude that since the job of firemen and trimmers in “tropical seas was so utterly unfit for white men to do… it would be a good thing if stokeholds were entirely manned by negroes, who from their constitutional experience of heat must be far better fitted to endure the conditions of the stokehold. Many southern-going ships carry them now. I should not be sorry to see them the rule, and my countrymen doing something better.”[lxvi] The need for speed dictated the need for a certain kind of extreme labour which in turn produced the desire in the metropole to seek in nature bodies “constitutionally” suited for that kind of labour.

Both deck and engine room labour for steamships in the Indian Ocean came to be recruited on an explicitly ethnic or regional basis. Companies established relationships via shipping agents and port officials with “licensed shipping brokers” and various other middlemen (recruitment agents called ghat serangs, trade unions, village clubs, boarding house keepers and moneylenders, village elders, andserangs or boatswains)[lxvii] to recruit particular groups for particular jobs on board. The French Messageries Maritime Steam Navigation Company employed Yemeni Arabs as stokers;[lxviii] the P&O preferred Sidis and sometimes Arabs as stokers, trimmers and firemen for most of the nineteenth century, until they began to be pushed out by Punjabis and Pathans[lxix], deckhands from coastal Gujarat and Ratnagiri, and Catholic stewards from coastal Goa; the Clan, British India and other companies preferred firemen from the “seaman’s zone” of central Sylhet; others hired Maldivian deckhands frequently.[lxx]

Romantic colonials who approved of the employment of non-European labour on British shipping lines described this diversity of labouring people as though the ship were a veritable garden of differently coloured animals “amicably” working away at their own tasks. An article in the Daily Telegraph in 1885 described the crew and passengers aboard a newP&O ship, theParamatta in pointedly “pleasant” and colourful terms that illustrate the fantasy of racecraft: an image of perfect harmony between the order of the division of labour in society and the order of racial types supposedly given by nature.

Everybody knows and does his duty, from the veteran commander to the little Bengali boys scouring the screws of the Parramatta’s steam pinnace and the jet-black Seedees glistening like the coal they shovel into the huge furnaces. It is pleasant to observe how well the native sailors are treated, and how satisfied they appear with their service. The “tindal”, a small, wizened, wiry, indefatigable low-caste from Chittagong, withsparse beard reddened by lime and grizzled by many tempests, might have been boatswain to Sinbad, he has such a weather-beaten look. There arebrown lively Bombay men, coffee-coloured Malays,ink-dark Africans, and most curious of all an Afghan stoker, while the quietpatient ayahs glide about like cats,purring Hindustani songs, and ceaselessly watching and fondling theblue-eyed English children, the tender shipmates of ourbronzed colonels and captains, married Indian ladies, unmarried belles on their first visit, and travellers for pleasure.[lxxi]

The hierarchy in the ranks was smoothly glossed over by the praise that “everybody [knew] and [did] his duty”- that is they knew their place- and even the difficult, often dangerous task of the stokehole was rendered picturesque in this narration. Another account in the Times of India in 1892 similarly noted the many kinds of people who took refuge in theStranger’s Home for Asiatics in London, and emphasized “how amicably they all [got] on together”:

The Home, however, is not only used by “Asiatics” but by Japanese, Chinese, Malays, Arabs, Seedees, and Africans of all sorts, the majority, of course, being lascars and firemen discharged from ships and steamers from India…..There are stewards, who maintain order without any difficulty, and see that each man has access to the particular kitchen of his race, where he can cook his own particular mess very savoury no doubt to his palate, but generally very unappetising to English taste, and fearfully high smelling withal. The “Surtee” apparently finds no difficulty in London in obtaining his favourite half rotten fish, or the Seedee his hideous offal, which he seems to prefer to anything else that can be bought. … It is wonderful how amicably they all get on together, and how they manage to make themselves understood, by the medium of “pigeon English”, which, though it differs from every port, has still a great many words in common.[lxxii]

The commentary on Sidi steamship labour has either been subsumed under this colonial gaze that saw the racial division of labour as a sign of necessary and harmonious diversity, or by scholarship that has pointed out the racist hierarchy between European seamen and lascars but included Sidis aslascars since they shipped underlascar articles on British ships.[lxxiii] The latter is obviously correct in some regards: in the administrative debates over the definition of “lascar” in 1921-22, the Shipping Master at Bombay argued that “the most suitable formula for the definition of “Lascar or other native seaman” would be—(1) Natives of India including the Native States and foreign possessions in India, and(2) Arabs or East Africans generally.”[lxxiv] Sidis, counted as lascars, had legal restrictions on foreign ports that did not apply to Somalis and other East African seamen because they did not ship underlascar agreements.[lxxv] The experience of all “Africans” at sea in the nineteenth century Indian Ocean were therefore not generalizable.

However, at the same time, the nature of labour aboard the steamship in the era of coal was undeniably organized on a steep ladder, a hierarchy that was spatially enforced, with the labours of the engine room and stokehole occupying the very bottom. The earliest seamen’s unions in Bombay— the Goa Portuguese Seamen’s Club (1896) and the later Asiatic Seamen’s Union (1918)— both excluded engine-room workers (stokers, coal trimmers, naval engineers) and were limited to saloon workers. Even the Indian Seamen’s Union formed as a merger of all existing seamen’s unions in 1919 limited its membership to saloon workers until 1926. When deck and engine room workers were welcomed into this union it caused a rupture and the Bombay Seamen’s Union was formed to maintain the old distinctions- a rupture that was not healed until 1931 when a single National Seaman’s Union of India Bombay came into existence.[lxxvi] In the context of a steeply hierarchized workplace such as this, the consistent hiring of particular regional or “racial” groups to fill particular rungs of the ladder not only reified such identities, making them appear natural, but also marked the groups thus formed by the kind of labour they performed. Thus, the figure of the “jet-black Seedee” was produced in the nineteenth century as synonymous with the stokehold and the “glistening coal” that it was full of, in colonial imagination and in the operations of the P&O. As these displaced humans of diverse origins, languages and itineraries gathered in Bombay city were incorporated into the capitalist labour market, they came to form a community known as Sidis[lxxvii], sharing origin stories and cultural practices with the Sidi communities of Gujarat, Sindh and Karnataka, but also unusual in its association with the steamship industry.  

Compared to the scholarship on lascars, their service on board steamers and their lives as immigrants in London, Wales and Tyneside, that on Bombay’s Sidi stokers, firemen and trimmers is negligible. This invisibilizing of Bombay’s maritime Sidi community in scholarship is owed in part to the barely visible (to passengers, officers and deck crew) nature of the work they performed at the very bottom of the ship. It was a function of the spatial ordering of power that rendered the Sidi or on board the ship invisible on the scene of history, except when he violated this spatial prescription, as when faced by death on the shipwreckedTasmania. On 17th April 1887 aP&O steamer,Tasmania, sailing from Bombay to London was wrecked by a reef off the coast of Corsica. Though of the total loss of life numbering thirty-four not a single person was a passenger, and most were lascars and Sidis (apart from the European captain and a few officers), an outraged passenger wrote a letter to theStandard in London about the general failure of discipline amongst the crew of the ship and specifically about the “utter and lamentable collapse” of the predominantly “lascar crew”[lxxviii]. According to the correspondent, Mr. Allen, not only had several of the lifeboats been lost in the process of lowering them due to the inefficiency and “panic” of the lascar crew, who were “impervious alike to order, remonstrance or threat”, but more inexcusably, a few Sidi firemen had “calmly cut the rope before [their] eyes” and stolen one of two improvised rafts, in a bid to escape before their turn.

The debate that followed in British and colonial newspapers between supporters and critics of lascar labour made clear not only the lines that separated European passengers, officers and saloon crew from the Asian crew who manned the decks but also the further lines that separated the latter from the Sidi crew of the stokehold in moments of crisis. Mr. Allen, the outraged passenger ended his letter to theStandard with the accusation: “The deaths were almost wholly among the Seedee boys and lascars, from cold and exposure.”[lxxix] Another passenger, Mr. Roughton bemoaned that the native crew “began to die in the most horrible manner, quite early in the afternoon of the 17th, and the contemplation of their sufferings must have added infinitely to the horror of their position to those of us (the great majority) who were unused to such sights.”[lxxx] A woman, Miss Habgood, who had partaken of that “delightful passage from Bombay until the calamity occurred”, volunteered that “the lascar crew were worse than the ladies would have been in their places—completely lost their heads and thought only of saving themselves.”[lxxxi] Yet another passenger scoffed that “it [was] well known what sort of men these lascars [were], and that from the first moment that any danger assailed the vessel they would be wholly devoid of even the show of discipline.” “Of course,” he added, “we are well aware that for stoking the furnaces during some portions of the passage, and especially through the length of the Red Sea, the assistance of lascars is very desirable, and, indeed, almost imperative. Still, for the safety and comfort of the passengers, a fair proportion of white men ought to be a sine qua non.”[lxxxii]

Not only were the native crew blamed by passengers for trying to save themselves or for losing the lifeboats to a rough sea, they were, as one advocate for the lascars wrote, simply blamed for dying. If hot weather was an acceptable explanation for why Englishmen were poorly able to serve in the unbearable conditions of the stokehold in the Red Sea, the same compassion was not extended tolascars and Sidis who suffered, half-clothed, in the cold rain and storm of the deck. Accusations flew that “lascars have no stamina, and …. [they] die off like rotten sheep, in cold weather… and in any serious case of emergency they are worse than useless”.[lxxxiii] In response, several Englishmen who had served on P&O steamers, fierily rejoined that they had never seen a lascar dying from exposure, that they “stand cold quite as well as Europeans” and “that they do our work better than any European crew could is beyond question.”[lxxxiv] More importantly, their defense of lascars came at the cost of the reputation of the Sidis. A commodore of theP&O Company’s fleet pointed out in his letter to theStandard on April 30, “I fancy that it will be proved, when the trial takes place, that the men who misbehaved at the trial of the Tasmania were not lascars, but the native firemen and the Seedee, or African coal trimmers.”[lxxxv] Another article in the Globe which described the history and utility of lascars in favourable terms emphasized this distinction: the deck crew ofP&O steamers consisted oflascars, “used to designate native Indian and Malay seamen generally”, while their engine room crews consisted of “coal trimmers, mostly African “seedie boys”; and stokers native of Bombay, amounting in all to about 50 more.”[lxxxvi] A few days later another sympathetic passenger reiterated that “it was the Seedee boys and not the lascars who died of cold.”[lxxxvii]

The lascar crew of theTasmania gave an interview to a bilingual journal, which while it was sympathetic to the plight of their Sidi shipmates and not racist like the English commentators, participated nevertheless in distinguishinglascar from Sidi in trying to defend themselves. Thelascar narrative of the incidents on board described how they had attempted to lower the boats successfully, at risk to their own lives as per orders and even going further. They then went on to clarify that the seamen who tried to escape on the stolen raft were Sidi firemen and coal trimmers. Their interview, published as an English statement in theTimes, declared their loyalty to the company and explained why some Sidis died:

With such encouragement and guidance from officers, if we, who have eaten the salt of the company for so many years, were called upon to risk our lives in perilous times to save our ships, we would work away cheerfully and manfully, not caring a jot for the consequences. We remained without food or water, unsheltered and unprotected, for  nearly twenty-seven hours. Some of the men of the engine-room crew, the Seedee firemen and the coal-trimmers, began to die in the evening. They were necessarily very scantily clothed, as they had to work near the hot furnaces, as were also those men who came to relieve them when their watch for the day was over. Of the lascars only two men died doing their duty, and yet we have heard that on the representation of one or two of our passengers, the English Press raised a cry and denounced us as a class.[lxxxviii]

The lascars were the first to hint at the true plight of the Sidis on board, taking into account the conditions in which they worked, their scanty clothing and the biting cold as reasons for death instead of some inherent racial weakness. Nevertheless, despite their understanding, the racialized hierarchy of the ship reinforced itself in thelascars’ defense of their “class”. ATimes of India editorial a few days later came once again to the defense of this “gallant class of men [who] were unwittingly wronged”, and reinforced the racial distinction: “Seedee boys and lascars are a different class of men altogether, almost as different as are English sailors from lascar sailors.”[lxxxix] The same author then put in a word for the Sidis who died on board:

On the steamer striking they came up to the deck with hardly a loin cloth to cover their bodies, from a temperature of some 150° to a cold wind of 46° and a still colder sea. In this sorry plight, shelterless and provisionless, for seven and twenty hours, it is cold hearted brutality to speak of them as having “died off like rotten sheep.” Taking the correspondent who denounced in the most uncompromising terms the mortality among the native crew, we can show even from his words that no European could have survived under similar circumstances. Describing the scene in the smoking room, he spoke of “the pitiful cry of the lascar or Seedee boy, who would force himself desperately into the doorway… and who was in mercy to the rest ejected only to die of exposure in the open.” It is to be remembered also that even the brave first officer had to be nursed back to life in the arms of some of his companions after twelve hours’ continuous exposure on deck. As for the other Seedee boys who cut the rope of the raft, we need only say now that they paid dearly for their treachery, all but one of their number perished from cold before they reached the shore.[xc]

The Sidi was thus either consigned to work under insufferable conditions, or die on board, clinging to the rigging, soaked and scantily clothed in the cold and forbidden to enter the dry smoking room where the European passengers and crew were sheltering with warm blankets, or to die at sea as punishment for their “treachery” and “cowardice” in seeking to save themselves out of turn.[xci] Space aboard the steamship was no simple metaphor for power. It was rigidly apportioned according to class, “race” and labour and held the power to decide over life and death in emergencies like shipwrecks.

Jamāt: producing likeness among itinerants

“Habshi, Arabi baddu sab ek hi hai.” “Habshis and Arab Bedouins are one and the same.”[xcii]

Branching off amongst the many by-ways of Dongri in South Mumbai is a lane that is easy to miss- Sidi Mohalla (Urdu or Hindi word for neighbourhood). On this lane stands a long low-ceilinged room, Arabic lettering on the front announcing the shrine of Bava Gor. The room is divided into two. The front room hosts the shrine of the saint, Bava Gor himself. In the longer backroom two more shrines- to Mai Misra and Bava Habash- share space with the family of the caretaker (mujāwar) of the shrine, Maqwa Sidi Abdul Rauf. That is their home. Sitting on the floor in the front room in July 2016, Sidi Rauf tells me about Sidi saints and ancestors, their history, their music and theirjamāt. For months after we speak I struggle to fit the story he tells me with what ethnographic studies and archives have painted to me as “true”- that the history of the Sidis, Siddis, Sheedies, Habshis or “Africans” of South Asia begins in Africa.[xciii] Sidi Rauf however insists that I begin the story of Sidis with Bilal ibn Rabih (“Hazrat Bilal se hi shuru karna”) singing the first call to prayer (āzān) in Mecca. Confused by his narration of beginnings in Arabia, I ask naively what he makes of the books saying that Sidis hail from Africa. “The books are wrong,” he tells me confidently. “They don’t know. Where Saint Bilal and Islam begins, that is where we are from too.”

I learn later that the story of Bilal ibn Rabih, the Habshi who was manumitted by the Prophet and became one of his first companions and the first mu’ezzin (one who gives the call to prayer) of Islam was shared as an origin narrative by Sidijamāts across the subcontinent. This origin story coexisted with the story of the three founding saints from Africa- Bava Gor or Mobarak Nobi of Abyssinia (though the name “Nobi” also suggests Sudan), his brother Bava Habash of Abyssinia and his sister Mai Misra of Egypt (Misr).[xciv] These descendants of Habshi Bilal, Sidi Rauf explained to me, came to Mumbai 780 years ago, a divinely pure land (pākīzāh sarzamīn). He does not deny hisjamāt’s origins in Africa, but situates both Africa and his origin in an itinerary of places that were accrued through a collective, mobile past of slavery, manumission and Islam. “Africa” was tied to “Arabistan”, “Bambai” and “Hindustan” in this lineage of places.[xcv] The story of British anti-slavery cruisers or steamship stokeholds were nowhere present in this historical narrative. Instead, a past of violent individual displacements and slavery was reclaimed through an illustrious collective lineage of kinship and service that created a community. As Sidi Rauf said to me with pride, “Thanks to Allah we have three gifts: voice (āwāz), strength (tāqat), and loyalty (wafādāri).”

Sidi Rauf’s narrative of multiple origins and belonging importantly pointed to the dispersed and itinerant pasts of those who came under the wing of this jamāt in colonial Bombay, and to affinities built beyond race. Archival records amply suggest that many freedmen who arrived in Bombay in the nineteenth century spent great parts of their lives in ports of the Arabian coast. Upon landing in Bombay many among them preferred to socialize with “Arab Mussalmans” and adopt Islam instead of remaining under the care of missionaries, as betrayed by the reports of missionaries like Reverend Price. Shipping records indicate that companies like theP&O hired not only Sidis but also poor, itinerant Yemenis to work in their stokeholds, possibly often together. Above all, the colonial records on the Bombay 1874 riots repeatedly describe crowds composed of “Seedees and Arabs” rioting on the streets, either when leaving the Jama Masjid together after Friday prayers, or rushing out together from the same congested city circle of Chakla and attacking the liquor shops and temples of Parsi petty bourgeois neighbours on Abdul Rohimon Street. In the sparse and fragmented archival footprint of “liberated Africans” and Sidis in nineteenth century Bombay, the figure of the “Arab” frequently appears alongside.

I stumble upon a possible explanation for this recurring archival proximity of “Sidi” and “Arab” when I ask Sidi Rauf where most Bombay Sidis live today. He answers that most Sidis have dispersed to different parts of the city and elsewhere, but his description of his neighbourhood defies the automatic affinity of identity assumed by race as an objective category and suggests one built on shared religion, habitation and language. He says that the neighbourhood is all Sidi Mohalla, even though the only remaining Sidi family there is theirs. “The others are all Arabi Baddus (bedouins).” I ask who the Baddus are and he explains that they are the same as Habshis, adding “Those who were negroes in Arabistan, they came to be called Habshis. And those who were not, those who were sheikhs, they came to be called Arabi. They’re all one and the same.” While Sidi Rauf notes “Habshis” and “Arabi Baddus” as distinct to some extent, he fundamentally identifies the kinship or sameness between them. Itinerant Habshis and Arabs are “all one” (sab ek), united by an illustrious genealogy of place (Arabistan and Bambai) and Islam, in this twenty first century Sidi’s representation of himself and hisjamāt. It is possible that because the colonial census apparatus never counted Sidis as a separate community because of their small numbers, including them variously under the category of “Other Mussalmans”, “Negro Africans” or “People from Africa”, thisjamāt was able to elude objectification and retain its porous identity under the modern state.[xcvi] 

Another complementary explanation for the affinity between Sidi and “Arab”, emphasizing occupational solidarities, may be arrived at by way of speculating with the grain of the archives. The shared experience of working to load coal onto steamships, firing, stoking and cleaning large fires in the awful heat and sound of the engine room, and shoveling coal into the stokehold from the dusty darkness of the bunkers, all amidst the unpredictable roiling of the ship and with the many layers of the ship- physical and social- bearing down upon them, could conceivably have contributed to creating a sense of kinship not imitable by race. Such solidarity would have been produced not by the automatic fact of doing a difficult job together but by the recognition of the precarity of their lives and the racist structure that made them invisible and derided as a “class” even if indispensable to the working of the ship.  The extraordinary memoir of Ibrahim Ismaa’il, a Somali seaman in the early twentieth century, describes an event in the stokehold that gives us a rare glimpse of how solidarities may have been built by the structure of hierarchy aboard the ship instead of automatically following from racial identities.

Ismaa’il was born into the Warsangeli tribe who inhabited what was then the British Somaliland Protectorate. He was Somalian and had never been enslaved, but like many Sidis he spent much of his youth in Aden, working odd jobs with and for Arabs, and was Muslim himself. A friendly observer in England once described him as being “rather like an Arab in appearance”[xcvii]. The exact meaning of that statement is unclear. Once when employed on a ship to Liverpool and Lisbon he was put to work stoking fires with “a West Indian called Moses”[xcviii]. Besides them the crew consisted of “a German, a Pole and two jolly Irishmen.” Ismaa’il starts this tale by telling us that he became “great friends” with the German, while Moses developed an inexplicable animosity for him. What began as an argument over who would use the better shovel developed into a violent situation when Moses threw a red hot slice (a long tool for cleaning ashes from the fire) at Ibrahim, saying “Take it you Arab bastard.” Whatever Moses’ reasons for thinking of Ismaa’il as an Arab may have been, it is clear that he considered Ismaa’il more foreign than familiar. There was no natural alliance, liking or friendship between the two men of colour on board the ship by virtue of a shared “race”.

An alliance, a friendship, was forged nevertheless. After retaliating at Moses by trying to kill him with a hammer, missing and then fighting him until they were both exhausted, Ismaa’il wrote:

At the same time we realized what fools we had been. If one of us had killed the other, he would have been hanged, and nobody would have cared about either of us. And after that we became good friends.[xcix]

Affinity was born not from spontaneous liking or recognition of sameness, kinship did not follow from nature-given bodily characteristics (if anything Ismaa’il’s physical appearance seems to have misled Moses), but from the understanding that society valued both their lives equally poorly and on the ship they were allies. Sidis and itinerant Arabs hired as coal loaders, trimmers, stokers and firemen working together at sea, praying together and living as neighbours in Bombay could very well have been allies, kin and friends in much the same way.

The jamāt offered a way for a community of formerly enslaved itinerants in colonial Bombay to cohere around a collective prideful identity in a way that made room throughout the nineteenth century for new arrivals from distant shores. While this article has offered thejamāt as a concept for expressing affinity and likeness used by Muslim freedmen in South Asia that rejects the colonial taxonomy of race, and the locally familiar identifiers Sidi or Habshi instead of the homogenizing “African”,jamāt is by no means a simple alternative to race which we should uncritically embrace. While the Sidi’sjamāt is a critique of racecraft, it is similar to caste orjatī in many ways, and thus a part of a rigid structure of social hierarchy that serves to disenfranchise and impoverish Sidis in contemporary South Asia.  The research on the cultural and spiritual universe of the Sidis of South Asia is rich and complex and this article is not intended to address those questions. It is instead the study of how a specific set of modern subaltern subjects were interpolated as members of a race of brute labourers by colonial “liberators” on the one hand, and as kinfolk of a Muslimjamāt on the other by the subjects themselves. This juxtaposition allows us to examine the socio-historical production of race as something that appears to be natural (as opposed to racism which is conventionally treated as social discrimination between nature-given races). I hope this will encourage further critical research on concepts of collective identification such asjamāt used by subjects who continue to be incongruously treated in scholarship as specimens of a given racial entity.[c]

The British colonizer liked to view the nineteenth century Indian Ocean as an arena populated by slavers (“Arabs”), slaves (“Africans” or “negroes”) and liberators (secular English servants of the Queen or Christian missionaries). These roles were racially scripted and the British anti-slavery crusade sought only to end the trade in enslaved human beings and rewrite the role for formerly enslaved Africans as “free” labourers, not question or demolish race or racism. Instead, a belief in the existence of racial “types” or “classes” watered the capitalist desire for tailormade labouring forces, particular forms of abstract labour given human form by nature so to speak. The displacement of formerly enslaved people from East Africa to colonial Bombay via the Arabian coast and their incorporation into a burgeoning steamship industry as stokers, firemen and trimmers reinforced a racial identity that was created in the first place by European racism. The categories of race thus sought to be definitive in their characterization of human beings, leaving little scope for expression outside of their own terms. As Fanon asked of the colonized in a different colonial context (North African “Arabs” and Algerian subjects of the French empire specifically): “Who are they, in truth, those creatures, who hide, who are hidden by social truth beneath the attributes of bicot, bounioule, arabe, raton, sidi, mon z’ami?”[ci]

The Sidis of Bombay however, while accepting the racialized futures prescribed to them of manual labour in steamships and dockyards and domestic labour in households, appear to have tried to answer Fanon’s question by moving beyond race. Africa, the continent, is an important part of the Sidi jamāt’s ritual construction of kinship, origins and self, but so is Arabistan, the land of Hazrat Bilal the Habshi, Prophet Muhammad and Islam, and Bambai, thepākizāh sarzamīn (pure land) where their ancestors arrived. “Negro”, Sidi Rauf tells me, is an insult that the English created. He refers to himself as a Habshi, sometimes as Sidi.  “I will tell you things that you will not find in books, things that only the poor, that fakirs know. Perhaps Sidi Rauf is right and the Sidijamāt, in ways that are alien to the taxonomy of race, has always had room to encompass Muslim Habshis and Arabis alike.

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[i] In 1840 the sultan of Oman shifted his capital to Zanzibar, his East African dominion, and the British agent reluctantly followed. The establishment of the British consulate at Zanzibar in 1841 marked the inauguration of a dual role for the British agent stationed there- Political Agent of the Bombay Government and British Consul of the imperial government in London. The British Agency at Zanzibar was under the command of the colonial government in Bombay from 1841 to 1873, when administrative control was transferred to Delhi and eventually to London in 1883. In 1890 Zanzibar became a British Protectorate and remained so until 1963.

[ii] While slavery had been abolished in Britain in 1833 it was not until 1843 that it was abolished in the colonial territories of the British East India Company, which is also when the British campaign against slave trade in the Indian Ocean began in earnest. See Campbell 2005.

[iii] It is important to not be misled, however, by the rhetoric of this abolitionist crusade- that tireless British abolitionism ended Indian Ocean slavery by the end of the nineteenth century. As Matthew Hopper’s work (Hopper 2015) demonstrates in detail, slavery in some parts of the Indian Ocean such as Arabia and the Gulf began to thrive in the late nineteenth century, driven by the demands of the expanding global capitalist market for commodities such as pearls and dates, and persisted into the 1920s. He attributes the incoherence of colonial policy with regards to slavery in the Indian Ocean to the fact that the aims of imperial abolitionism were often contradicted by the imperatives of empire’s economics. For the halting history of colonial abolitionism and the end of slavery in the Indian Ocean also see Campbell in Robert Harms (eds.) 2013, pp. 23–44.

[iv] Cowell and Timmons 2005.

[v] Khalili 2020, p. 23.

[vi] Alpers in Harms (eds.) 2013, pp. 45–54.

[vii] Hoskins 1928, pp. 140–41.

[viii] Barak 2015, pp. 425–45.

[ix] Headrick 1988, p. 44. 

[x] Barak 2020.

[xi] Fletcher 1958, p. 556.

[xii] Sheriff 1987, pp. 223–38.

[xiii] Chatterjee in Campbell (ed.) 2005, pp. 150–68. Also, Mathew 2016, pp. 76–9. A large number of freedpeople were those coded as women, though they are not the subject of this essay, largely due to their relative absence in archival records. Freedwomen were usually employed as domestic labourers in Bombay households, or sought to be married off to “respectable gentlemen” (Mathew 2016, p. 78), or when possible to Christian “Bombay Africans” who were tutored as wards of Christian missionaries.

[xiv] Janet Ewald writes at length about Sidis and seafaring in the northwestern Indian Ocean from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries, tracing the changing meanings of the term. However, despite the incredible range of her historical knowledge and observations, the geographically located identifier “Sidi” does not cause her to reconsider the use of “African” as a descriptor of the historical subject. “Sidi” appears as a local variation of an universal category “African”. Here I make a conceptual and historical argument for why that is incorrect. See Ewald in Harms (eds.) 2013, pp. 200–15.

[xv] The P&O heritage website offers this drawing for sale, describing it as “View inside the “Stokehole” with “Seedie boys” “Firemen at work””.https://www.poheritage.com/the-collection/galleries/Prints-and-Drawings/Pencillings/The-Stokehole---Seedie-boys

[xvi] Howarth & Howarth 1986, p. 82.

[xvii] Letter from the Shipping Master, Bombay to the Secretary to Government, Marine Department, Bombay, 24th February 1921, in “Seamen: Definition of the term “Lascar or other native seamen”,” File no. 193. 1921- 22, Marine Department, MRA, Mumbai.

[xviii] Indeed, British ideas of slavery were so centred around the figure of the “African” they often neglected the Indian Ocean trade in enslaved people, frequently women, from Balochistan, the Arabian peninsula and Circassia. Johan Mathew describes how it was easy for slavers to pass off enslaved women as their wives as long as they were not “African” because colonial administrators were inclined to suspect the latter of being enslaved subjects by virtue of their Africanness, and not others. Mathew 2016, pp. 67–73.

[xix] Edwardes 1912, p. 88.

[xx] When I use the word “African” in quotation marks I am referring to the colonial category of African as a race. In my own usage I try to use Sidi or Habshi to be specific, except in cases where I am speaking of recently enslaved people who were rescued and sent to Bombay, whom I describe as freedmen. The implication is that such people may not have yet been incorporated into the Sidi jamāt or were assigned to Christian missionaries, many of whom tutored their wards to think of themselves as “Bombay Africans”.

[xxi] I met Sidi Abdul Rauf in the summer of 2016, when I visited the Sidi shrine of Bava Gor in Mumbai for research. We conversed in Hindi or as he called it “Bambaiyya”. I knew from the work of ethnomusicologist Amy Catlin-Jairazbhoy about Asumaben, the previous mujawari (head and caretaker) of the shrine, who had recently passed away. Sidi Rauf introduced himself to me as the currentmujawar (caretaker) of the shrine andmaqwa (“patel” or head) of the Sidis of Bombay. His detailed narrative of the pasts and present of the Sidis of Bombay enhanced the lens through which I analyzed and interpreted the fragmentary evidence of the archives.

[xxii] Ewald 2013, pp. 211–12.

[xxiii] Chamberlain 2013, pp. 30–2.

[xxiv] Lawless 1994, p. 35.

[xxv] Ahuja 2006, p. 112.

[xxvi] The strict hierarchy of steamship labour and wage discrimination continues into contemporary times, though modified by significant changes in the nature of shipping technology and maritime law. Most shipping companies based in Europe depend on Filipino crew, for example. “The processes of cost-cutting, the trough in shipping business, and the national deregulations of the 1970s saw an exponential expansion of ships sailing under flags of convenience. The latter came about when European states established a secondary or ‘international’ registry to relax crewing rules and slacken health and safety standards aboard ships. The requirement to hire nationals to staff the ships was also set aside under deregulation and with the open or international registries. From the 1970s onwards, the number of foreign crews on ships proliferated, and some countries began to specialize in supplying shipboard labour. While the top five ship-owning countries- Greece, Japan, China, Germany, and Singapore- together marshaled 49.5 per cent of all shipboard tonnage, in 2015, the five largest suppliers of officers and crew, were China, the Phillipines, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and India. The number of seafarers in that year was estimated at 1.6 million, and Chinese officers surpassed the number of Filipino officers, though the latter still dominated among crews. Filipino seafarers are an astonishing 14 per cent of all seafarers. Arbitrage on the international wages of crews earns shipowners handsome profits.”  Khalili 2020, p. 239.

[xxvii] Report by Admiral George Elliot and Rear-Admiral A.P. Ryder, Members of the Committee Appointed to Examine, 'The Designs Upon which Ships of War Have Recently Been Constructed,' (London, HMSO, 1872), House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, C. 489, 31–2. Quoted in Chamberlain, pp. 68–9.

[xxviii] Malm 2013. For a much more extensive treatment of the subject see Malm 2016.

[xxix] Chamberlain 2013.

[xxx] Ahuja 2006 & 2012; Seddon 2014; Sherwood 1991; Visram 1986; Hyslop 2014; Jaffer 2015.

[xxxi] It is likely that the Bombay government referred freedmen to P&O recruiting agents. Jones 1989, p. 339.

[xxxii] Chatterjee 2018.

[xxxiii] As mentioned before, this community of Sidis being formed in abolition era Bombay comprised not only of recently emancipated “Zanzibaris”, “Nubis”, “Habshis” and others, but also incorporated those who had arrived from the shores of Africa in the preceding century, mostly as slaves brought by the Portuguese and British. (Archival evidence suggests the presence of a “Madagascar Town” in eighteenth century Bombay in “Dungaree” or Dongri, the neighbourhood where Mumbai’s Sidi shrine still stands today. I am grateful to Amy Catlin-Jairazbhoy for drawing my attention to this evidence.) These mid-to-late nineteenth century “liberated” arrivals in Bombay are also not to be confused with the Sidi rulers of the neighbouring princely state of Janjira- South Asians of Ethiopian lineage who first arrived on the subcontinent in the medieval period as military slaves and administrators. (See Banaji 1932). The Sidi jamāt of Bombay city was diverse, and accrued over time with multiple waves of arrivals, acquiring a historically specific form through their incorporation into the world of steamship labour in the nineteenth century. This is the process that this article sheds light on.

[xxxiv] As told to me by Sidi Abdul Rauf in Mumbai, 2016. Also see Basu 2001, pp. 3–4.

[xxxv] Ewald points out that by and large Sidis were employed as stokers on large British steam liners while Yemenis and Somalis were employed on smaller tramp steamers. Ewald 2013, p. 212. However, her own archival evidence suggests that while the numbers of Adenese employed alongside Sidis in British steamship stokeholds were few, they nevertheless occurred (footnote 84). As the evidence cited in this article also suggests, the P&O Company itself hired both Sidis and “Arabs”. Thus stokehold socialization between Sidis and Yemenis was certainly possible, and on land in Bombay it was certain.

[xxxvi] Letter from Reverend Eisenberg to the Bombay Corresponding Committee, 15th December 1847. CMS/B/OMS/CI3/01/11. Cadbury, Birmingham.

[xxxvii] Report on the African Asylum by Reverend Price, 30th June 1872. CMS/B/OMS/C I3 O61/261C.

[xxxviii] The Sidi population of the city is hard to estimate because Sidis were usually subsumed in the category “Other Mussalmans” in the census. In 1872, the population of “Negro Africans” was 2074, which was 0.3% of Bombay city’s population (644,405). The 1901 census lists the population of “People from Africa” as 694, or 0.08% of the city’s population (776,006). S.M. Edwardes, Census of India-1901, Vol. XI:Bombay (Town and Island). Part VI: Tables (Bombay: Times of India Press, 1901), 128–129.

[xxxix]  Letter No. 351 of 1900 from the Political Agency and Consulate, Muskat to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, 4th  July 1900. ‘File 5/65 I. Question of disposal of emancipated slaves and proposal to check traffic between Muscat, Oman and Zanzibar’. IOR/R/15/1/200: 18 Jan 1889-14 Jul 1905, pp. 968. BL, London.

[xl] Note from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 27th May 1900. Ibid., p. 91.

[xli] Letter from Secretary to the Government of Bombay to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, 2nd February 1889.Ibid., p. 5–7

[xlii]Ibid. Italics mine.

[xliii] Copy of report on the African Male Asylum at Sharanpur, Nasik to the Director of Public Instruction, Poona. September 13, 1861. CMS/B/OMS/C I3 O38/65A. Italics mine.

[xliv] Common Sense, writing on the “Mahomedan riot” of 1874, The Times of India, Bombay, Feb 19, 1874, p. 3, (ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Times of India).

[xlv] For a very illuminating, parallel discussion of abolitionists’ preoccupation with the body of the enslaved African woman see Turner 2017. Turner demonstrates the centrality of childbearing Jamaican women’s bodies and reproductive abilities to the plan of abolitionists like Wilberforce to produce an industrious and moral new population of “free” labourers who would keep England’s West Indian colonies running profitably and blamelessly after slavery had been phased out. She also argues that the struggle between enslaved mothers, midwives and caregivers on the one hand and slaveholders, doctors and abolitionists on the other, over control of reproduction on the plantation, displays the resistance offered to the imperialist and capitalist purposes attributed to birthing and raising children by the latter.

[xlvi] Fanon 2008, p. 143.

[xlvii] Hylton White argues that the racist caricature of “the Black of anti-blackness… as a brute biological force that lacks self-governing will and is thus in need of socializing violence to make it useful to civil society” is the fetish form of abstract labour that is produced by the alienated structure of social action in a capitalist society. White 2020.

[xlviii] Letter No. 2233 of 1889 from Colonial Secretary’s Office, Fiji to the Acting Secretary to Government of Bombay, 19th August 1889.File 5/65 I, IOR/R/15/1/200: 18 Jan 188914 Jul 1905, pp. 1213. 

[xlix]Ibid., pp. 15–16.

[l] Ghosh 1999.

[li] Ahuja 2006.

[lii] Ahuja 2006, p. 119.

[liii] Fields & Fields 2012.

[liv] Enclosure No. 1, letter from India Office to Foreign Office, 16th February 1897.File 5/65 I, IOR/R/15/1/200: 18 Jan 188914 Jul 1905, p. 17, BL, London. Italics mine.

[lv] Enclosure No. 2, letter from Foreign Office to India Office, 24th February 1897,Ibid.

[lvi] Enclosure in No. 3, letter from A.H. Hardinge, British Agent and Consul General at Zanzibar, to the Marquis of Salisbury, Foreign Office, 14th April 1897,Ibid., pp. 18–19. Italics mine.

[lvii] CMS/B/OMS/C I3/O61/261 C.

[lviii] “The consumption of labour-power is completed, as in the case of every other commodity, outside the market or the sphere of circulation. Let us therefore, in company with the owner of money and the owner of labour-power, leave this noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in full view of everyone, and follow them into the hidden abode of production… The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man... When we leave this sphere of simple circulation or the exchange of commodities, which provides the ‘free-trader vulgaris’ with his views, his concepts and the standard by which he judges the society of capital and wage-labour, a certain change takes place, or so it appears, in the physiognomy of ourdramatis personae. He who was previously the money-owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his worker.” Marx 1976/1990, pp. 279–80.

[lix] Letter from Senior Magistrate of Police, Bombay to J.G. Lumsden, Secretary to Government, 6th October 1853, inSlavery. Vol. 95, No. 1048, 1853, Judicial Department. MRA, Mumbai.

[lx] Letter from Senior Magistrate of Police to Secretary to Government, 5th October 1853,Ibid.

[lxi] A Times of India article from 1882 describes an athletic entertainment event for seamen of the Indian squadron, both British sailors and native lascars. The man who is noted as having won the flat race as well as the sack race for sailors of the Indian Marine is described as a “Seedee, who took to the race with considerable jollity”, “made a very favourable impression” on the onlookers, and “once his feet were off the ground, … ran along with amazing rapidity, and, excepting in one instance, outdistanced his competitors.” He is depicted as a figure of entertainment, an “irrepressible” “son of Ham”, but his appearance in the ranks of the sailors is not treated as an anomaly (“Entertainment to the Indian Squadron,” The Times of India, Bombay, November 20 1882, p. 5). Another article from 1903 mentions a row in Bombay involving “Seedee seamen” from “His Majesty’s Ship Perseus”, with the man who died being described by one of the European witnesses as a “Seedee seaman in man-of-war costume” (“Row in Bazaar Gate Street. Alleged Assault on a Seedee,”The Times of India, Bombay, July 24 1903, p. 6).

[lxii] Report of the Commander in Chief of the Indian Navy, Bombay to Secretary of Government, 18th October 1853,Slavery. Vol. 95, No. 1048, Judicial Department, 1853. MRA, Mumbai.

[lxiii] Letter in the Standard, reprinted under the heading “The Wreck of the Tasmania” inThe Times of India, Bombay, May 17 1887, p. 5.

[lxiv] Bullen 1900, p. 317.

[lxv] Bullen 1900, p. 324.

[lxvi] Bullen 1900, p. 327.

[lxvii] Ahuja 2006, p. 129.

[lxviii] Lawless 1994, p. 35.

[lxix] Hood 1903, p. 11. Also, Hope 1990, p. 324.

[lxx] Ahuja 2006, p. 130.

[lxxi] “India Revisited,” The Times of India, Bombay, December 10 1885, p. 5. Italics mine.

[lxxii] “Talk Of the Town. An old Anglo Indian. The Wanderer,” The Times of India, Bombay, May 4 1892, p. 4.

[lxxiii] The exception to this pattern is Janet Ewald who points out in detail that “the P&O Company displayed particularly sharp divisions between almost exclusively Indian deck crews and often predominantly African engine room crews.” Ewald however speaks of Sidis often as synonymous with Africans, pointing to the birth or departure from Zanzibar of many stokers in the crew lists of P&O ships. Part of this problem is a result of grappling with the difficulty of knowing which terms to use to designate groups in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that did not fit the moulds (“African”, “Arab”, “Indian”) which we use for categorization today or simply accepting colonial terminology when they used those categories of identification for “native peoples”. Ewald 2000, p. 87.

[lxxiv] “Seamen: Definition of the term “Lascar or other native seamen”,” File no. 193. 1921–22, Marine Department, MRA, Mumbai.

[lxxv] Ewald 2000, p. 88.

[lxxvi] “National Seaman’s Union of India Bombay, Constitution and Rules,” 1933, in ‘Bombay’, IOR/Q/IDC/6: 19131935, BL, London.

[lxxvii] Wolf 2009, pp. 353–69.

[lxxviii] Letter from G.W Allen in the Standard, reprinted under the heading “The Wreck of the Tasmania” inThe Times of India, Bombay, May 17 1887, p. 5.

[lxxix]Ibid.

[lxxx] Letter from James W. Roughton in The Times of India, Bombay, May 24 1887, p. 5.

[lxxxi] “The Wreck of the Tasmania” in The Times of India, Bombay, May 17 1887, p. 5.

[lxxxii]Ibid.

[lxxxiii]Ibid.

[lxxxiv] Letters in The Times of India, Bombay, May 24 1887, p. 5.

[lxxxv] Letter from Fred Cates, Commander of Steamship Rome and the Commodore of the P&O Company’s Fleet, in ibid.

[lxxxvi] Republished in The Times of India, Bombay, May 17 1887, p. 5.

[lxxxvii] “The Wreck of the Tasmania: The Vexed Points Cleared up by a Passenger,” in The Times of India, Bombay, May 31 1887, p. 5.

[lxxxviii] “Statement by the Lascar Crew of the Tasmania,” in The Times of India, Bombay, June 16 1887, p. 4.

[lxxxix]The Times of India, Bombay, June 27 1887, p. 4.

[xc]Ibid.

[xci] The same coal and steam-powered process of accumulation premised on the abstraction of labour and time that did this violence to Sidi men’s bodies in steamship stokeholds, also destroyed the landscape of the coal-rich Chhota Nagpur plateau in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Matthew Shutzer writes in detail about how colonial law, in its effort to legitimize mining since the coal boom of the 1890s, abstracted land from its crop and tree bearing concrete attributes into a space governed by the value of minerals beneath it. Shutzer 2021, pp. 400–32.

[xcii] Notes from the author’s interview with Maqwa Sidi Abdul Rauf, 24th July 2016. Mumbai, Sidi Mohalla, shrine of Bava Gor.

[xciii] Catlin-Jairazbhoy & Alpers 2004; Jairazbhoy & Catlin-Jairazbhoy 2003; Shroff 2013; Obeng 2007; Basu 2008; Jayasuriya & Pankhurst 2003; Prasad 2005; Ali (eds.) 2020.

[xciv] Helene Basu’s detailed work on the Sidis of Gujarat also explains the importance of Bava Gor and his siblings, Bava Habash and Mai Misra, in the construction of a Sufi, African-Gujarati jamāt united by ties of kinship. Basu 2001, p. 265. Unlike the Sidis of her study however, who disliked the use of the term “Habshi” to describe themselves because of its connotations with slavery, Sidi Rauf of Bombay proudly laid his claim to “Habshi”, using it to denote his jamāt more frequently than “Sidi”, and also explicitly claiming a past of slavery through a narrative of strength and loyalty.

[xcv] Sidi Rauf’s representation of Sidi origins through a lineage of travel and service to Islam resonates in many ways (though not all) with Mana Kia’s description of itinerants in the early modern Persianate world (Iran, Turan, Hindustan) and their articulation of origins not in simple terms of birth but as lineages of place, service, achievements and learning. While the many individual subjects of Kia’s study are scholars and administrators who authored histories and commemorative texts unlike working class Sidis, her description of lineages as “polyglot, multiple, aporetic, and contextually determined” still apply to Sidi Rauf’s origin story. Names, she says, were “condensed narratives of origin” that accrued over time and changed contextually, taking a fixed form only when demanded by the modern state. (Sidi Rauf initially introduced himself to me as Abdul Rauf, then added, “Please write Sidi. And before that write Maqwa, which means the leader (patel) of thisjamāt.” “Maqwa Sidi Abdul Rauf” was thus how he chose to represent himself to me, an interviewer seeking to write about the history of his community.) “Although place was part of origin, it did not by itself structure origin’s meaning. Even in lineages of place a person’s birthplace and subsequent homes constituted a list, along with other types of places, such as ancestral homelands, … destinations marking passages, or locations of… devotional apogee.” Kia 2020, p. 104.

[xcvi] Cohn 1987, pp. 224–54.

[xcvii] Shaw 1935, p. 208.

[xcviii] Ismaa’il 1928/1977, p. 375.

[xcix] Ismaa’il 1928/1977, p. 376.

[c] I am grateful to my anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to the work of Milinda Banerjee on the violence done by the abstract, patriarchal and bourgeois notion of “dynasty” globalized and imposed by European colonialism (similar to that of “race” in this article), and the more collective forms of regality (such as ‘rajvamshi’ and ‘Kshatriya’) embraced by subaltern communities of Tripura in resistance against both colonisers and upper caste elites. Banerjee 2020. Also see Banerjee & Afnasyev 2020.

[ci] Fanon 1964, p. 4. I know from Fanon that “sidi” was used by French colonialists to refer to Algerians, but am unaware of the history of that name in the Algerian context.

Where Does Caste Fit in A Global History of Racial Capitalism?

Sheetal Chhabria

This paper asks how whether and how caste fits into a global history of racial capitalism? The misidentification of caste as custom has long misled analysts and thwarted solidarities. Drawing on the insights of two important literatures, this paper seeks to remedy that misdiagnosis and show that 1) caste abolition must be central to any effective anti-capitalist politics in South Asia, 2) a focus on ‘local’ systems of racialization like caste is necessary in any history of global racial capitalism. The two literatures I engaged with to achieve these aims are: scholarship on racial capitalism and scholarship on the Indian transition to capitalism. The result is an expanding of the geography of racial capitalism and the centering of caste-based unfreedoms as central to the history of capitalism in the Indian subcontinent. 

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

In 2001 at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa, anti-caste and Dalit activists argued that caste should be understood like race, with dehumanizing violence and discrimination holding both systems up.[1] The Indian government countered that the caste problem should not be internationalized since caste was India’s unique cultural problem.[2] The contention that caste was a unique cultural feature of India and therefore unlike race served to protect casteism from international censure.

Safeguarding casteism by calling it a protected religious right was a tactic as old as at least colonial rule. In The Pariah Problem, the historian Rupa Viswanath has uncovered how in the 1890s colonial officials and missionaries sought to investigate what they referred to as “Indian slavery,” upper-caste landholders insisted that caste was not comparable to Atlantic slavery because it was a religiously sanctioned and therefore a gentler form of servitude which was mutually beneficial to upper and lower castes. Given that interference in native religion had already proven detrimental to colonial legitimacy during the 1857 uprising, rendering caste “religious” allowed landlords successfully to escape scrutiny and retain their hold on cheap labor. Caste was thus rendered religious, customary, and traditional not by transhistorical religious texts but because of the specific way religion was mobilized by upper caste elites and landholders.

In internationalizing caste in 2001, anti-caste and Dalit activists disrupted this manufactured separation between caste and race and tried to find common cause with African slaves of the new world, an effort that anti-caste thinkers had been making for a long time. Since the late 19th century, Ambedkar and Dalit workers looked to the American experience to understand their own situation as once-enslaved people. Subaltern actors – bonded laborers, low caste, untouchable or Dalit workers – invoked the American struggle with slavery as a resource for their own struggles.[3] Decolonization for these actors meant much more than the removal of “foreign rule”: it meant attending to the local structures of power and accumulation that subjugated them.

The misidentification of caste as custom has long misled analysts and thwarted solidarities. Studies of caste that do not engage class, political-economy, or the fact of the need for capital accumulation projects from land, labor, money, most often re-affirm the irrationality or arbitrariness of caste/casteism. Such studies do not help us understand the specific material basis of caste nor help us ally with concrete solutions that come from anti-caste actors on the ground, many of whom embraced both anti-caste and anti-capital ideologies simultaneously.[4]Drawing on the insights of two important literatures, this paper seeks to remedy that misdiagnosis and show that 1) caste abolition must be central to any effective anti-capitalist politics in South Asia, 2) a focus on ‘local’ systems of racialization like caste is necessary in any history of global racial capitalism. The two literatures I engaged with to achieve these aims are: scholarship on racial capitalism and scholarship on the Indian transition to capitalism. The result is an expanding of the geography of racial capitalism and the centering of caste-based unfreedoms as central to the history of capitalism in the Indian subcontinent.

In the former body of work, Black Marxist scholars like W.E.B. DuBois and Cedric Robinson have challenged conventional Marxist accounts of capitalist accumulation by showing the centrality of racialization and unfree labor in the operations of capitalism, which is too often understood as a domain of impersonal exchange and free labor. Drawing on the work of Black Marxists, I argue that the durability of caste—as a form of racialized unfreedom—is a feature of capitalism, not a bug, because capitalism relies on both free and unfree, impersonal and racialized labor. Caste, then, is not evidence of capitalism’s non-arrival or underdeveloped state because of colonial rule but rather itself a logic of racialization within capitalism. This implies that caste-oppressed workers must be part of any anticapitalist movement that seeks to win.  

The second literature this paper draw on is scholarship on South Asia’s transition to capitalism. Black Marxists’ work holds important insights but falls short in assuming that racial capitalism emerged in Europe and emanated outward from there. Looking at scholarship on South Asian ‘origins’ of capitalism, however, makes it clear that racial capitalism developed at multiple ‘origin’ points, only later subsumed within a European colonial frame. This makes it possible to understand race and caste as like-structures of economic and social domination, and lay the foundations for a truly internationalist movement against racial capitalism.

This paper is organized in the following manner. The first section establishes the basis of my argument by reviewing recent scholarship that has challenged the notion that caste is a traditional or religious system. The second section lays out the implications of studies of global racial capitalism for understanding caste, with a particular focus on the work of W.E.B. DuBois and Cedric Robinson. The third section uses scholarship on South Asia’s colonial transition to ‘globalize’ understandings of caste, positioning it in the same history of capitalism as race so as to make true internationalism imaginable. The final section concludes by sketching the implications of this paper’s argument for anti-capitalist movements both within India and around the world. What emerges is the need to see the Indian subcontinent’s history as one that is shot through with a fundamental antagonism between capital and unfree labor. Indeed, it is the distinction between peoples rather than distinction between places gives capital its power, everywhere.

Caste and Capitalism

As mentioned above, the mode of understanding caste as traditional and customary is a view that aligns with dominant caste interests. It is also the prevalent way of thinking about caste within the academy,[5] both in India and in the United States. (The caste-status of most academics might have something to do with this.) The anthropologist David Mosse has called this obfuscating scholarly framing an “enclosure” around caste: “the scholarly framing of caste mirrors a public-policy ‘enclosure’ of caste in the non-modern realm of religion and ‘caste politics’, while aligning modernity to the caste-erasing market economy.”[6] In this vein, far too many economic historians of India have blamed the prevalence of caste on India’s failure to progress through capitalism towards a sanitized version of modernity. Scholars have frequently confused caste’s longevity with a proof that it is rooted in tradition.

However, the longevity of caste has not to do with its moorings in tradition, but the powerful counterrevolutionary forces that have foiled caste emancipation again and again.[7] It is much more revealing to see the way caste is entangled with capitalism just as the way race is entangled with capitalism. Arguing to conceptualize caste in this way is not meant to create an analogy nor argue that race and caste are the same. Rather, it is meant to embed caste identity and caste-ism into the historical and material processes of accumulation.[8]

One of the earliest studies that questioned the narrative that colonialism had caused India to undergo a failed transition to capitalist modernity was that of the economic historian Dharma Kumar. In her 1965 publication, Land and Caste, Kumar showed that the creation of a large class of landless laborers was not the effect of colonialism as scholars had thus far contended, but a condition older than colonialism and one that mapped on to caste.[9] This was a profound challenge to conventions of colonial historiography, and Kumar’s insights became a truth mostly buried amongst subsequent histories.

It wasn’t until the 2014 book, The Pariah Problem, that Rupa Viswanath showed that land rights amongstmirasidars included land plus “all the natural resources” including the Pariahs on the land. In other words, rights over land and rights over hereditarily unfree laborers were one and the same; Pariahs were essentially property. Viswanath’s work deftly built upon but moved into a new frame what Dharma Kumar had recognized decades earlier. Kumar had  relegated the casteist-nature of peasantization to the realm of “social explanation” rather than economic, but Viswanath accomplished much by refusing to separate the social from the economic. Viswanath’s work demonstrated exactly why and how landless laborers preceded the process of peasantization and deindustrialization that most historians assumed characterized colonialism. Viswanath showed how appealing to caste as a religious right helped upper caste landholders avoid the consequences of juridical abolition that had materialized across the British Empire, explaining exactly why the poverty and precarity of landless laborers in India has been such a durable form of inequality.[10] Untouchable status, imbricated in both custom and contract all at once and therefore caste and class all at once, gave caste-based poverty its durability.

Caste rendered inequality durable in urban India as well. By the inter-war period, colonial liberal governance claimed to have empowered new Dalit publics to raise the “caste question,” but as Anupama Rao has shown, segregation in housing, education, public goods, and so on, was never overcome by a regime of liberal, anonymous, individuated property rights. Rather than a capitalist regime of property extinguishing caste, the “custom” of caste inflected property itself. As Rao incisively puts it: “In [an] incremental alignment of custom with the contract-inflected regimes of private property, a new foundation for segregation was produced.” [italics mine] Rao’s insights here challenge the notion that an extension of capitalist private property regimes overcomes caste, instead showing caste as constitutive of capitalist modernity.[11]

What we learn from these critical historians of caste and capitalism is that the history of caste is complicated but also kind of simple. Colonialism didn’t invent it, nor was it an aberration of a longer history of benign Hindu practice, nor was it limited to Hindu or even Indian communities.[12] Instead, caste has long been useful in the organization of materially hierarchical society before, throughout, and after colonialism. Certainly, more regional histories are required to rigorously analyse the local specificities of caste and capitalism’s entanglements. Nonetheless, the continuity of caste-based enslavement in the subcontinent is probably the most remarkable structural feature of capitalist modernity in the region.[13]

Once we start looking in this way, we see that caste-slavery, debt-bondage, and discriminatory spectral violence are not phenomenon so categorically distinct from the global trajectory of race-based oppression.[14] It is imperative to see the Indian subcontinent’s history as one that is shot through with a fundamental antagonism between the power of capital and unfree labor, an antagonism that is maintained by recourse to caste as an organizing feature of a deeply unequal society.

Caste & Black Marxism

  1. An Anti-Progressive History

One of the reasons it is profoundly difficult to see something like caste as a constitutive part of capitalist modernity is the very narrow way in which capitalism is understood in the first place. Dominant Marxist understandings of the history and process of capitalism are diffusionist and progressive. In such a story, places and peoples with unfree or “insufficiently proletarianized” labor are narrated as the “outside” of capitalism proper, which is located solidly in places where wage labor prevails. Such views come from Marx’s own understanding of slavery as “primitive accumulation,” and his accounts of industrialization as a progressive force towards world historical transformation.[15] Diffusionist views play a role in developmentalist paradigms, where peoples and places come to be seen as outside of “the economy” proper waiting to be brought in by modernization and technology. We can call this dominant view the “progressive” view of capitalism whereby capitalist relations lead to progress towards capitalism’s own undoing. It was in response to this progressivist view that Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism offered an anti-progressive view of capitalism.Black Marxism was exemplary but not alone in its criticisms of traditional progressive Marxism.

Published in 1983, Black Marxism was written against what Robinson himself called “the tradition” of Marxism that included Marx, Engels, and Lenin, despite the disagreements between them.[16] In Black Marxism Robinson reframed the history of capitalism as something quite different from Marx’s account.

While there were numerous insights in Black Marxism, one is particularly salient for understanding Robinson’s anti-progressive understanding of capitalism. Robinson argues that, contra Marx, “capitalism was less a catastrophic revolution (negation) of feudalist social orders than the extension of these social relations into the larger tapestry of the modern world’s political and economic relations.”[17] He argued that even within Europe, capitalist productive relations grew inside social relations that were precapitalist, racial, and feudal. Thus, the advent of capitalism did not overcome feudal social formations so much as extend them. Colonial processes of racializing and enslaving Africans in the sixteenth century were thus an extension of racial hierarchiesinternal to Europe, with Africans replacing the Irish and the Germanic peoples in the position of the enslaved.

One of Robinson’s key anti-progressive arguments is that not only is racialism a key component of capitalism, but so are the seemingly “feudal” labor regimes of slavery, informal labor, day labor, and bondage. Together, these form racialized capitalism, not because places or peoples were excluded from the full effects of a capitalist transition but because regimes of unfree and free labor working in tandem were natural to the system. Poverty, precarity, and informality was the correct outcome of racial capitalism because it was not a progressive force. If these things were accepted to be true, then one had to accept that the history of capitalism was not simply the march towards juridical freedom that mystified economic unfreedom, as Marx had argued, but the reinvigoration and wholesale creation of unfreedom itself.

  1. A New Revolutionary Subject

Robinson’s work was a profound rewriting of Marxist histories of both capitalism and industrialism. He showed that because it was embedded in racialized and feudal relations, “the Industrial Revolution…was never quite the phenomenon it has become in the hands of some of its historians and in the popular mind.”[18] As he explains, “the appearance of industrial production was [not] revolutionary (in the sense of a sudden, catastrophic change).” By the eighteenth century, the power of industry developed in an already racial context and did not eradicate forms of enslavement and bondage. Instead, industrial capitalism was born as one component part within racialism’s long and dynamic history. As such, it did not produce a particularly revolutionary proletariat. Instead, workers maintained their cultural, national, and racial identities and capitalized on those to find a footing in new pyramids of production.

This might be Robinson’s most significant interruption of Marxist histories. Understanding capitalism as always already racial is not simply an academic exercise for Robinson. Instead, it allows him to reconceptualize the anti-capitalist revolutionary subject. In traditional accounts, the (European) male factory worker was a privileged counter to the power of capital and became the principal subject of revolution. This was not simply a theoretical position but much organizing and labor activism poured its energy into the factory floor to the exclusion of other workplaces throughout the 20th century. Robinson challenged this at the outset, noting in his introduction that the industrial working classes of Europe never replaced their racial and national identity with their class identity. As such there was no way the industrial working classes could be a world historical force. In the preface to the 2000 edition ofBlack Marxism, Robinson began with a quote from Oliver Cromwell Cox: “The workers in the advanced nations have done all they could, or intended, to do—which was always something short of revolution.”[19]

For Robinson, the political counter to capitalism could not solely be the industrial proletariat. History showed otherwise. Reviewing the Indian mutiny of 1857 and the Boxer Rebellion, and other struggles against imperialism, Robinson underscored the importance of nationalist rebellions: “And in every instance, peasants and agrarian workers had been the primary social bases of rebellion and revolution. Nowhere, not even in Russia, where a rebellious urban proletariat was a fraction of the mobilized working classes, had a bourgeois social order formed a precondition for revolutionary struggle… The idiom of revolutionary consciousness had been historical and cultural rather than the “mirror of production.”[20] He argued that revolts by slaves who, even if temporarily, fled slavery, or slaves who foiled their oppressors and masters in other ways offered a political template with which to challenge racial capitalism. Such rebellions revealed the astute political understandings of those enslaved by a system that depended on their racialized and unfree labor.

Robinson was not alone in trying to reconceptualize the revolutionary subject who could overthrow capitalism. In the 1980s and 90s, many scholars in colonial studies, feminist studies, and studies of race and slavery challenged the valorization of the factory worker as the exclusive container of revolutionary struggle. Feminist Marxists, for instance, have shown how gendered, racialized, domesticated and unfree labor is in fact that on which capitalist development depends. Thus, gendered unfree labor not only survives the capitalist transition but thrives under it. Sylvia Federici has shown how the very creation of the industrial proletariat required a war on and against women. She showed that under capitalism, housework underwent “real” rather than “formal” subsumption, becoming central to capitalist accumulation even as it remained outside the wage.[21] By placing Robinson within this milieu of critique we can understand more clearly the limitations of Marxism in the traditional sense and how Robinson intervened interventions against the progressive story of capitalist development. Robinson and other scholars challenged the many myths of capitalism, including the notion that markets & capitalism are blind to race, gender, and nationality. The political counter to racial capitalism was not simply wage labor’s industrial strikes, but resistances of other kinds even from juridically unfree or domesticated laborers.

  1. Applying Black Marxists’ Insights to Caste

South Asianists’, postcolonialists’ and nationalists’ understandings of colonial racialism have only entered our study of colonial rule as that which installs a Manichean line as Fanon called it,[22] between the colonizer and the colonized. Rather than understand caste-ism as an older form of racialism inside of which the power of capital grew such that unfreedom and poverty were the inevitable outcome, caste is separated from the economy, imagined as a religious system that serves only to justify a distinctly colonial capitalism that underdeveloped India. That unfree forms of bondage and labor remain in South Asia is explained as simply because the subcontinent’s capitalist transition had been thwarted and that we failed to form a national bourgeoisie who could revolutionize the mode of production.

Robinson provided an account of the durability of unfreedom, the limited effects of industrialization even in England, and most especially the very exclusions on which England’s own story of revolutionary transition depended.[23] In Robinson’s analysis, Marx was not Eurocentric, rather he had made a more fundamental error. Marx had extrapolated from a very narrow experience even in England and used it to define in advance, even predict, what constituted true political engagement.[24] In contrast to this valorization of the revolutionary potential and promises of industrial labor, Robinson challenged it. The long history of factory labor’s compromises with capital, often on the backs of racialized and unfree labor, were best understood by understanding capitalism as racialized not just in its onset but even in the way it solved its crises.

“Racial capitalism” demands we investigate how racialization serves capitalist accumulation either by managing labor by disorganizing movements against capital or by creating networks of affiliation that motor newer and newer projects of expansion and accumulation. As such, race and racism, rather than rendered transhistorical or manifestations of group-based enmity, are historicized by connecting specific political economic conjunctures and the specific processes of racialization they depend on and produce to antagonisms between labor and capital. This process of racialization pertains to “cultures” or locations wherever the power of capital must revitalize itself in the face of its demise. By extension to the Indian case, we can identify caste and casteism as important component parts of capitalism’s processual nature. This caste-capitalism is a process prone to crisis and re-consolidation by the use of caste to solve capitalism’s problems.

In India for instance, as Stephen Sherlock shows, this progressivist version of Marxism came from Moscow and dominated communist parties who eventually amalgamated nationalism to working class demands. Sherlock shows that “In the colonies such as India this meant that the communists should all but dissolve themselves into the nationalist movement, regardless of its class character or anti-imperialist potential.”[25] The dangers of abandoning the class character of anti-colonial nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s are probably obvious, but especially damaging was the long term effect this had on the survival of the Left in postcolonial India where left organizers focused on organizing a declining mill-hand and industrial workforce rather than the growing sector of informal workers. In postcolonial India, a focus on the declining industrial workforce meant that the growing informal sector provided a constant reserve army of labor that prevented any limits on capitalist power. What’s worse, the “Left in India has most of its life striven to appear more nationalist than the nationalists.” This was and is so true, that, again as Sherlock notes, “Marxism became one of the tools of the Indian state in its developmental project.”[26] Indeed this diffusionist model of capitalism had a lot of power even amongst anti-capitalists. Placing the history and theory of racial capitalism against it was and is a powerful move with both theoretical implications as well as implications for praxis.

Caste & the Transition Debates

In W.E.B. DuBois’ 1935 text Black Reconstruction in America, DuBois observed that the legal abolition of slavery in 1865 didn’t end slavery. Rather, abolition began the movement of capital from “white to black countries where slavery prevailed.” In providing such an analysis, Dubois connected the downward mobility of the white farmer, the freed Black laborer, laborers across South America, Africa and Asia in a common system where agriculture, industry, and property worked in tandem to generate profits for the few. However, despite this astutely internationalist understanding of racial capitalism,it was unfortunate that in Dubois’ otherwise powerful story, “Asia,” “Africa” and “South America” appeared as undifferentiated masses, lands providing a geographic container or backyard for the northern capitalist’s greed. Rather than staging a longer history of racialized class conflict of their own, places named Asia, Africa, and South America entered history on an American timeline. Moreover, despite understanding the common system connecting free and unfree laborers, Dubois continued to see the non-Western world as a locus of unique, primitive forms of unfreedom. At one point, Dubois expressed his frustration at the degradation of the Black worker’s power in the US South by saying, “caste has been revived in a modern civilized land. It was supposed to be a relic of barbarism and existent only in Asia. But it has grown up and has been carefully nurtured and put on a legal basis with religious and moral sanctions in the South.”[27]The social system of “caste” appears here as a relic of the past and of “barbarism,” a system of unmoving status endorsed by tradition or custom rather than itself a system contingent upon particular political economic conditions and accumulation projects that had ever narrowing or widening geographic scales. It was thus difficult to conceive of caste as modern or Asia as having its own history of racial capitalist development.

Like Dubois, racial capitalism within the non-West remained a blind spot for Robinson. He provided a history of capitalism that was rather Eurocentric. In the introduction to Black Marxism, Robinson wrote, “Though hardly unique to European peoples, its appearance and codification, during the feudal period, into Western conceptions of society was to have important and enduring consequences.”[28] So even as he acknowledges that the history of racialism in which capitalism grew could occur in other societies, he himself focused on Europe alone. Robinson’s history of capitalism depended heavily on the work of Henri Pirenne, a Europeanist who believed so strongly in European exceptionalism that he placed medieval Europe singularly on a path to capitalist development – because of its invention of double entry bookkeeping ­– from centuries long before “capitalism” was even conceivable.[29] In following Pirenne, Robinson didn’t engage with the scholarship contesting this Eurocentric origin story of capitalism.

Not only DuBois or Cedric Robinson but numerous thinkers who depend on them have failed to challenge the Eurocentrism of Robinson (or American centrism of DuBois). To overcome these latent Eurocentrisms in the work of Black Marxists, we need to build upon Robinson’s own anti-progressive history of capitalism and expand racial capitalism’s geography to unmoor it from European soil. We need to ask what would a global history of racial capitalism look like that was neither Eurocentric nor so diffuse that it had no meaning? And what kind of internationalism would it allow us to think and imagine differently? Pointing to those mistakes also allows us to counter a dominant Eurocentric history of racial capitalism that has long held dangerous implications for internationalism. is it possible that what is called “racial capitalism” in North Atlantic modernity is a more geographically widespread process, a process that neither originates in a single location — not in Europe or the North Atlantic as is widely assumed — nor develops the same way everywhere?[30] Finally and relatedly, what is gained by expanding the geography of racial capitalism? But what would happen if we combined the insights of, for instance, Andre Gunder Frank’s ReOrient with Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism? In other words, what would happen if we extended Robinson’s insights into the “old world” and spaces of purported underdevelopment to show how even extra-European early modern commercial societies were structured on “internal” and external racialisms inside of which colonial capitalism grew?

Challenging the Eurocentric origins of capitalism had a bit of a career especially in the scholarship that challenged Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory and the transition debates that valorized English agricultural development.[31] When Wallerstein placed Europe at the center of the world economy already by the 1600s, South Asianists challenged Wallerstein’s Eurocentric temporality.[32] After the 1990s, much scholarship on South Asia, especially that produced in the United States, abandoned class-based analysis by dismissing “capitalism” as a western analytic construct that distorted more than it revealed. Thus, interest in the question of capitalism’s origins, capitalist transitions, and the role of colonial India in economic history waned. Barring a few important exceptions, it wasn’t until 2008’s financial crisis that a renewed interest in the history of capitalism in America brought along a similarly renewed interest in such histories of the subcontinent.

Before that dismissal, vibrant debates about the subcontinent’s history of capitalism took place. Much of this could be broadly characterized as debates over continuity and change with regards to European colonial power. In other words, what was new and what was old about European colonialism? Did European colonialism cause an irreversible break with the subcontinent’s past or were their older forms of power into which European power was grafted? Rather than rehearsing those debates here, I can instead point to some important summaries and state that at best these debates are best understood as abandoned and not solved, a feature that can be gleaned by reading Dipesh Chakrabarty’s posthumous concession to Chris Bayly upon Bayly’s passing.[33] A recent essay by Andy Liu in the Journal of Asian Studies does an excellent job connecting those older debates to contemporary forces of de-industrialization in the 1980s, signaling a shift from a Marxist story of production to an at least nominal Smithian story of commercialization.[34] Doing so, Liu asks scholars to more clearly integrate commercialization and production based stories of capitalism, rather than see them as linearly opposed. Such would enable the possibility of writing histories of capitalism firmly situated in China and India, amongst other places.

An important challenge to a Eurocentric history on the origins of capitalism emerged in those transition debates. Historians of South Asia provided accounts of continuity that were and sometimes still are about how “our” commercial classes were on par with or commensurable to Europe’s commercial classes up until the onset of colonialism. This parity was only to be thwarted and foiled by colonial exclusions later. But in the decades prior to the eighteenth century, the Indian subcontinent had ingenious merchants who crisscrossed overland trade and oceanic routes as cosmopolitan and rational economic actors.[35] The rule of property that institutionalized in the 19th century was a final outcome of long and gradual changes that entailed centuries of intensifying commercialization.[36] Thus it wasn’t until 1800 or even 1850 that India and Europe truly diverged, in other words this continuity thesis pushed the moment of divergence forward in time.[37] Until that moment, the subcontinent had potentialities to capitalism, or at the least, we could safely argue against Wallerstein that commercial capitalism did not originate in Europe in the 16th century and then incorporate India,[38] but rather had diverse local contexts of origin. As Frank Perlin, an advocate of the “proto-industrialization thesis,” once put it, “…events within India need to be recast as an inseparable part of an international forum of activities.”[39]

This idea of multiple origins was important for decentering Europe and challenging scholars like Henri Pirenne. What our version of commensurability followed by dependency accomplished was that it firmly placed the power of at least commercial capital on Indian soil, not as an imposition from outside that radically disrupted our history. Yet scholars often conceded that while there might have been capitalist potential in the subcontinent prior to European rule in the 19th century, such potential was thwarted by the colonial encounter. A version of the “dependency” thesis, in colonial India, the economy supplied the raw materials for industrial output in England and as such it was forced into a prior stage of development.[40] Peasantization and de-urbanization were the outcomes of colonial rule, as evidenced by the poverty and dependence on agriculture that the majority of Indians inherited. If India had industrialization, it was in select enclaves, the economy as a whole was not characterized by it.

Rethinking commercial capitalism in the “old world” or the colonial world was also important to countering Henri Pirenne. Jairus Banaji’s scholarship over the years has done this most forcefully, showing the expansion and generalization of the formal subsumption of labor, the persistence of commercial capitalism, and the power of merchant capital to dominate production relations rather than simply being a commercial transfer. Analyzing capitalist development from the colonies and in the Deccan countryside brought up a different set of problems and solutions. What was the history of capitalism if not the generalization of wage labor and industry? A powerful and much read essay by Banaji argued that indebtedness amongst the peasantry in colonial India was not a remnant of a prior mode of production but persisted through colonial commercial capitalism. Debt was paid in advance of a season of production and so this debt functioned as a wage.[41] In doing so, Banaji modernized our understanding of debt bondage and showed how it was central to colonial commercial capitalism.

In a more recent work, Banaji argues that what is considered commercial capitalism as an era prior to industrial capitalism persisted much further in time than Marx thought, closer to between 1880-1914. What’s more, merchant capital certainly dominated over production relations.[42] As such, attention to this commercial capitalism could reveal the plurality of capitalist relations of production. Banaji has elsewhere stated, “Capitalism is characterised by the drive to accumulate capital regardless of the specific form in which labour is dominated and surplus-labour extracted. To the individual capitalist it makes no difference whether the worker is free or unfree, works at home or in a factory, and so on. Those decisions are purely economic and technical; they relate to issues like costs of production, availability of labour, and whether a certain kind of worker (female, home-based) is more suitable for a certain kind of production. At this level (individual capital) even the construction of ‘skill’ is a highly subjective matter.”[43]

Yet the accomplishments of these arguments had a very important limitation. Such accounts made the same mistake Robinson accused Marx of making, namely ignoring the political capacities of all the informal and unfree labor that continued or was even created alongside the industrial transitions. Most importantly, neither such Marxist scholars of colonial India nor Marxist labor organizers on the ground drew out the political potential of anyone but the industrial working classes.[44] This was because challenging periodization or the exclusion of other kinds of labor besides wage-labor did not radically alter Marxian understandings of the history of capitalism, it simply added to Marx without challenging the fundamentally progressive qualities Marx attributed to industrial capitalism. At worse, ambiguity was maintained on whether anti-capitalist organization was even possible in colonial societies so long under the rule of commercial capitalism.

But we neither have to carve out Indian factories from their social mileu to prove that India had capitalism too nor must we find commercial men in the Indian Ocean to be equivalent counterparts to commercial agents working for European trading companies. Rather the structural continuities of labor exploitation, both free and unfree, continuities that traverse city and country, factory and plantation, and the wage and debt, are central components of capitalist logics, and they can be commercial, industrial, and slave-based.

In many ways Robinson’s argument in Black Marxism should have been the continuity thesis South Asia’s historians looked for. A theory of racial capitalism would have demanded that we recognize the necessary and causal link between the casualization of labor, deindustrialization, rising debt bondage, and the power of capital, everywhere. As a historical theory and method, this was not a question of connecting class and caste, but rather asking how they had come to be seen as distinct. We should have been answering the question so well-posed by Walter Johnson: By which historical processes had the “boundaries between slavery and freedom been drawn?”[45] While the impulse to demonstrate the persistence of commercial capitalism has created welcome historiographical insights on the role of the colonies in world capitalism writ large, it has been limited in its ability to engage the question of politics, of how specifically racialization is a political maneuver meant to both keep accumulation projects going and a potential force of its undoing.

Conclusion: On Internationalism

Once we accept the profound implications of Cedric Robinson’s disruptions of the myths of capitalist development, some of which even Marxists had bought into, we can start to see why caste is not an atavistic relic but rather institutionalized in caste-capitalism. By endowing political potential in a non-factory class and overcoming the progressive model of history, Robinson not only provided a historical retelling but atheoretical account of the history of the modern world, not one that added to or was deviant from the theory of capital created by Marx but one that ought to replace it. As such it wasn’t an “economic history” that bracketed off questions of politics but treated the political-economic as a single field of actions of exploitation and dispossession against which some rebelled.

Yet, his story of racial capitalism has a history not captured by a Eurocentric frame. Robinson was right that the history of capitalism necessarily and always entailed enslavement and unfreedom, but he was wrong that such a system originated singularly in Europe. Instead, racial capitalism has multiple origins and its geographic and uneven development cannot be understood by “west versus rest” paradigms. What we learn by extending racial capitalism’s history is that most places in the world have longer capital-labor relations that are themselves racialized and do not progress towards industrialization. These facts help us overcome many of the teleological anticipations of “development,” “modernization,” and even “globalization” that are offered up as anti-colonial. To overcome racial capitalism, a “Black Marxism” must inform internationalist projects in ways that don’t reify industrial labor to the expense of other forms of labor, but must also inform internationalist projects in ways that don’t simply ask for the removal of “foreign meddling” in domestic affairs such that Asian capitalists and developers, whether at the helm of native industries or heads of state, are propped up as the vanguard of Asian postcolonial liberation.

The story of Black Marxism, in spite of slave rebellions against the system of racial capitalism, is still one of unfreedom to unfreedom. Black Marxism was not a simple celebration of the power of revolt, counter-movements of property and labor exploitation found newer and newer tactics of control. Robinson said,

In the year 1877, the signals were given for the rest of the century: the black would be put back; the strikes of white workers would not be tolerated; the industrial and political elites of North and South would take hold of the country and organize the greatest march of economic growth in human history. They would do it with the aid of, and at the expense of, labor, white labor, Chinese labor, European immigrant labor, female labor, rewarding them differently by race, sex, national origin, and social class, in such a way as to create separate levels of oppression—a skillful terracing to stabilize the pyramid of wealth.[46]

This skillful terracing depended on ideological, “cultural” and local regimes of meaning-making that could justify and enshrine inequality as natural to certain peoples and places. This was the tactic of racial capitalism both in the United States and in India. If we take Robinson’s work to heart, we find the world we live in today is much more “feudal” than often recognized with coercive, non-economic, and filial-based networks driving production and extraction.

DuBois engagement with Indian politics and history was more sustained than the reading of Black Reconstruction that this paper opened with. Yet, producing the true internationalist political that was necessary to counter the fact that freedom anywhere negated freedom everywhere couldn’t exactly be found in DuBois other work. While India figured prominently in DuBois thinking on anti-colonial resistance as exemplary of the struggles of African Americans in the United States, India remained an ahistorical trope rather than a concrete reality with a history and politics of its own.

DuBois corresponded with Indian nationalist Lala Lajpat Rai, watched Gandhian agitations closely, and thought India showed a path forward. It was probably these views that led him to author the novel Dark Princess in 1928, a story of love and resistance. But scholars have questionedDark Princess not only for its patriarchal and heteronormative positioning of colonized peoples as feminine, but also for its ahistorical understanding of India. Dohra Ahmad’s book,Landscapes of Hope: Anti-Colonial Utopianism in America notes the contrast of how realistic DuBois’ depictions of Chicago were in contrast to the almost fantastical princely figures that served as metonyms of Indian life. In fact, as Ahmad notes, the fantastical places inDark Princess “staunchly and notoriously collaborationist” not anti-colonial. Ahmad further warns, “The romance of India, its ahistoricity, and the inconsistent analogy between colonized India and black America all demand that we approach the idea of a global South with caution.”[47]

Indeed, DuBois’ positioning of figures of old-world authority as exemplary of colored peoples’ pre-capitalist sovereignty was of a kind with some of the understandings of pre-colonial African history that are mobilized to challenge colonialism. A sustained focus on caste-based violence as class-based violence and exploitation within a longer history of what would become colonized lands has not yet been undertaken.[48] Doing such a project would require us to ask how caste and accumulation projects served one another from the 1400s onwards without starting with the assumption that Europe was already at the center of the world. It would require us to take Gunder Frank’s ReOrient much more seriously and yet move beyond it to criticize the labor exploitation practices on which Asian centrality in the pre-European economy was based.

Placing coercive labor at the center of capitalist dynamics allows us to “stretch Marxism” without falling into a new universalism. It allows us to make sense of India’s regionally specific forms of capitalist class power. Doing so should caution us against decolonization or national liberation projects that depend on more traditional Indian marxists as allies against colonial and neocolonial rule, and caution us against overlooking the concrete particulars of India’s class dynamics, coercive labor regimes, and the racialization that manifests as caste and religion. Racism is always about labor discipline; informal, precarious, gig, "traditional," feminized, etc. is the main form of labor everywhere, not a sign of economic stagnation or an incompleteness of the capitalist transition. The power of caste-capitalism has certainly continued into the present where the ongoing racialization of labor creates what Malini Ranganathan calls “environmental unfreedoms” that render life precarious all over again as housing evictions and ecological scarcity threaten urban communities.[49]

A fundamental insight of racial capitalism is that it is difference between peoples and not difference between places that keeps racial capitalism going, development discourse fails to recognize this.What would it take to build an internationalism that recognized the importance of class stratification everywhere? Unfreedom is metaphorically like a force of gravity, it pulls the power of all labor everywhere down. But this force of gravity functions in historically materialist ways; as long as there is cheaper unfree labor somewhere, easier to discipline and exploit, the power of labor everywhere to resist exploitation is reduced. To see this play out one doesn’t even need to oppose “first world” to “third,” one can see this in the way in which cheap prison labor in the United States has undermined the power of labor on “the outside.”[50] This is the point of Du Bois quote in the beginning, that unfreedom anywhere threatens freedom everywhere. As a problem it is always already an international problem. What would the implications be of analyzing unfreedom as a connected phenomenon across the old world and new? How can we understand both race and caste identity as outcomes of a single imperial dynamic relation between labor and capital?

By the 20th century, if not earlier, there are some remarkable parallels between how caste and how race function. One parallel is the way the question of whether there can be an anti-racist politics without anti-capitalism serves to clarify political struggles against race and caste. The answer to this question has formed an important line between liberal anti-racists and Black Marxists and allies; it informs the debates over reparations and the emancipatory role imagined for property.[51] About caste, we can ask can caste be annihilated, as Ambedkar asked for, without confronting capitalism? On the one had is demands for inclusion into the spoils of production, be it national wealth or private enterprise, and on the other is the radical dismantling of that production process itself. In postcolonial India, especially since the 1980s, inclusion in representation has more prominently replaced radical challenges to caste-capitalism.[52] We know, however, that there were Dalit Communists like R.B. More who gave the communist party whatever anti-caste leanings it had. But More was also constantly negotiating both the casteism of communist party members, many whom were upper caste, and their conception that caste was atavistic and therefore irrelevant to class struggle.[53] This problem has been most beautifully rendered in Sujata Gidla’s Ants Among Elephants, where Untouchables struggle to find a place in India’s burgeoning Communist movement, at times challenging and at times accepting the movement’s caste-blindness.[54]

Even the spectacular violence against Dalits has parallels to anti-black violence, rooted as they both are in retaliation against successful efforts towards emancipation. Anand Teltumbde has shown how casteist violence against Dalits is often retaliation against successful Dalit upliftment, as such it is rooted in specific conjunctures of political economy beginning in the 1970s when low-castes were pitted against untouchables for reserved positions — a dynamic similar to that between poor whites and Blacks in the United States. Teltumbde is currently jailed on state charges of anti-nationalism and has not received the attention he should in South Asian and postcolonial studies curricula. Teltumbde has shown in much of his work that upper caste bureaucrats, intellectuals, statesmen, police, investigators, educators, businesspeople, and even communists, more often than not foil and disorganize organized movements and actions against casteist-capitalist-structural violence.[55] More recently, even low caste groups classified as “other backward castes” have been very successful at disorganizing radical structural challenges to state-capital accumulation projects often because of the way they are enlisted as beneficiaries of both reservations and development projects.[56] The disparities and inequities experienced by other backward castes and Dalits should not be conflated either by policy makers or scholars. Both occupy different structural positions historically and in the present. Conflating the inequities experienced by both necessarily leads to sloppy solutions in which OBC upliftment hides further Dalit descent down a social and economic ladder.

Because of the assumption that capitalism began in the West and spread outwards through empire, an assumption even Cedric Robinson made in Black Marxism, scholarly accounts of decolonization and internationalism tend to celebrate national liberation projects of the mid-twentieth century as exemplary of formal severance from western powers. But this is a mistake. Conceptions of “Asia” as an ahistorical geographic container or caste as timeless status could easily morph into the broader category “global south,” a category so broad that it often limits rather than enlivens the internationalist imagination. In the “global south” problems can too easily be conceived of as problems of “backwardness” or “underdevelopment” due to colonization and a belated modernization. Even positive accounts of a “peripheral” capitalism can serve to undermine working class aspirations in the global south, implying that they must wait before their time for freedom has come. But this is a mistake. It is the distinction between peoples rather than distinction between places that gives capital its power, everywhere.Only through international working class-based solidarity, a solidarity that must traverse formal and informal labor, wage and day labor, domestic and industrial labor, and free and unfree labor, can internationalism truly overcome the power of racialized capital everywhere.

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[1] The author would like to thank the following scholars for their reading and deep engagement with many drafts of this piece: Charisse Burden-Stelly, Natalie Etoke, Navyug Gill, Aparna Gopalan, Mishal Khan, Andy Liu, Malini Ranganathan, Anupama Rao, Nate Roberts, Dwaipayan Sen, and most especially Rupa Viswanath.

[2]Natrajan and Greenough 2009.

[3] Several works have explored these resonances. See Visweswaran 2010; Loomba 2017.

[4] Gidla 2017; More 2020.

[5] Appadurai 2020.

[6] Mosse 2020.

 

[8]Ramnarayan Rawat’s study on Chamars, stigmatized now as caste-based leather workers, shows they were once agricultural workers, hence a once exalted people fallen through the transformations of Hindu dominated, colonial capitalism. Rawat 2011.

[9] Kumar 1965.

[10] Tilly 1998.

[11] Rao 2009, p. 81-82.

[12] The scholarship on caste that argues these things is rather voluminous but exemplary are Dirks 2001; Bayly 1999; Ahmad 1978.

[13] As has been found even in construction work of temples and motels in the United States: “Laborers From India Are Suing New Jersey Hindu Temple For Worker Abuse.” NPR, June 2, 2021: https://www.npr.org/2021/06/02/1002604394/laborers-from-india-are-suing-new-jersey-hindu-temple-for-worker-abuse; Annie Correal, “Hindu Sect Accused of Using Forced Labor at More Temples Across U.S.”New York Times, Nov. 10, 2021.

[14] See Khan in Leroy and Jenkins 2021.

[15] For a discussion of the distinction between formal and real subsumption, see “Appendix: Results of the Immediate Process of Production” in Marx 2004. For discussions of Marx’s understanding of slavery and industry see Johnson 2004.

[16] Robinson 2020, “Introduction.”

[17] Robinson 2020, Chapter 1.

[18] Robinson 2020, Chapter 2.

[19] Cox 1964, cited in Robinson 2020, “Preface to the 2000 edition.”

[20] Robinson 2020, Chapter 9.

[21]https://www.inversejournal.com/2019/12/25/marx-and-feminism-by-silvia-federici/

Federici 2004; Federici 2018; Federici 2021.

[22] Fanon 1963.

[23] Robinson discussed figures of unemployment, cycles of unemployment, cand even a criticism of Hobsbawm.

[24] Not only had Marx missed how de-industrial numerous forms of production and laborers were in England, but as Walter Johnson has shown, even in the choice of example in the discussion on commodity fetishism, “Marx's substitution of (British) flax [linen] for (American) cotton as the emblematic raw material of English capitalism enabled him to tell what in essence was a story of the commodity form artificially hedged in by British national boundaries.” Johnson, “The Pedestal and the Veil,” 301-2.

[25] Sherlock 1998, p. 69. I would like to thank Nate Roberts for directing me to this article.

[26]Sherlock 1999, p. 70–2.

[27]Dubois 2007, p. 694.

[28] Robinson 2020, “Introduction.”

[29]Pirenne 1956.

[30] Peter James Hudson shows how, “Racial capitalism has a lineage that predates Cedric Robinson” in “Racial Capitalism and the Dark Proletariat,” http://bostonreview.net/forum/remake-world-slavery-racial-capitalism-and-justice/peter-james-hudson-racial-capitalism-and

[31] Wallerstein 1976; Wood 1999.

[32] For instance, see Washbrook 1990.

[33]Chakrabarty 2016. I would like to thank Dwaipayan Sen for pointing me to this article.

[34]Liu 2019.

[35] This literature is large but includes Chaudhuri 1978; Pearson and Das Gupta 1987; Subrahmanyam and Bayly 1988; Subrahmanyam 2001. For a long review essay of three recent works situating them in the historiography of Indian Ocean history see Chhabria 2019.

[36] Ludden 2005.

[37] Parthasarathi 2011.

[38] Wallerstein 1986. Wallerstein has modified his views and acknowledged a pre-European exchange network of which India was a part in some of his other writings.

[39] Perlin 1983, 34.

[40] Gunder Frank 1998.

[41] Banaji 1977.

[42] Banaji 2020.

[43] “Jairus Banaji: Towards a New Marxist Historiography” Interviewed by Félix Boggio Éwanjée-Épée and Frédéric Monferrand, HistoricalMaterialism.https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/interviews/jairus-banaji-towards-…

[44] See my and Andy Liu’s interview with Jairus Banaji here: https://www.borderlines-cssaame.org/posts/2021/1/18/where-is-the-workin…

[45] This is a paraphrasing of Johnson 2004, p. 306.

[46] Robinson 2020, Chapter 9.

[47] Dohra 2009.

[48] Some works do make this start, see for example Guha 2013.

[49] Ranganathan 2021.

[50] Thompson 2011.

[51] Johnson 2016; Yamahatta-Taylor and Reed 2019.

[52] Teltumbde 2018.

[53] More  2021.

[54] Gidla 2017.

[55] Teltumbde 2018.

Teltumbde 2016; Teltumbde 2010.

[56] Teltumbde 2010. Teltumbde 2018.

Racism and Capitalism

A Contingent or Necessary Relationship

Charlie Post

Anti-racist debate today remains polarized between “class reductionist” (any attempt to address racial disparities reinforces capitalist class relations) and “liberal identity” (disparities in racial representation can be resolved without questioning class inequality) politics. Both positions share a common perspective—racial oppression and class exploitation are the products of distinctive social dynamics whose relationship is historically contingent. This essay is an initial step toward astructurally necessary relationship between capitalism and racial oppression. The essay draws upon on Anwar Shaikh and Howard Botwinick’s elaboration of Marx’s political economy; and Ellen Wood’s analysis of the specificity of capitalism imperialism.

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

The uprising sparked by the police murder of George Floyd in May 2020 has again placed the question of race at the center of politics.[1] While the right steadfastly denies the existence of racism and advocates greater repression against those protesting police violence, the left—both liberal and socialist—is scrambling to come to grips with the rebellion. For the liberals, the problem is simply a “lack of diversity”—the police, the middle classes, corporate America, and the political establishment do not “reflect” the population as a whole. The liberals hope to derail these struggles as they did those of the 1960s and 1970s, by promoting a new middle class of color without addressing the growing poverty and insecurity of working people of color. As Asad Haider[2] has argued, the neo-liberals have transformed “identity politics” from an attack on racism, sexism, and capitalism into a demand to diversify the political and economic elite without tampering with capitalist class relations.

The US socialist left is also attempting to catch up with events. The main organization of the U.S. left, the Democratic Socialist of America (DSA) was caught back-footed by these new struggles and has found it difficult to move from the routines of Democratic Party electoral politics to organizing an ongoing movement against racism and capitalism.[3] Some in DSA have failed to embrace the most radical demands of the uprising—to defund, disarm, and disband the police—and instead argue for continued campaigning around “universal” demands to raise wages and the funding of public services—including the police.[4]

Both the liberal “identitarian” and class reductionist positions, despite their divergent political trajectories, share a common conceptual starting point—they both view the relationship of racial oppression and capitalist exploitation as contingent rather thannecessary. This can be seen in radical and Marxian approaches to the relationship between racism and capitalism. While resting on very different theories of the origins and dynamics of capitalism, both Cedric Robinson’s[5] highly influential theorization of “racial capitalism,” and Ellen Meiksins Wood’s[6] assertion of the possibility of a “non-racial” capitalism view the relationship capitalist exploitation and racial oppression as historically contingent.

Robinson’s begins from the problematic ‘commercialization model,’ where capitalism emerges out of the revival of European trade and is consolidated in Europe’s imperial expansion and the creation of the early modern Atlantic economy.[7] Racism, according to Robinson, already existed in Europe as early as classical antiquity, making racial oppression’s relationship with capitalism contingent on capitalism’s alleged dependence on European expansion in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. Robinson’s assertion of a “long duree” of European racism is based on a fundamental confusion between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of differentiating human beings.[8]Black Marxism leaves open the possibility that if capitalism had emerged outside of “racialized” European feudalism, racism would not be a feature of capitalism.

Ellen Meiksins Wood, one of the most perceptive theorists of the origins and expansion of capitalism, also explicitly rejects any necessary relationship between capitalism and racial oppression:

At the very least, class equality means something different and requires different conditions from sexual or racial equality. In particular, the abolition of class inequality would by definition mean the end of capitalism. But is the same necessarily true about the abolition of sexual or racial inequality? Sexual and racial equality… are not in principle incompatible with capitalism…although class exploitation is constitutive of capitalism as sexual or racial inequalities are not, capitalism subjects all social relations to its requirements. It can co-opt and reinforce inequalities and oppressions that it did not create and adapt them to the interests of class exploitation.[9]

Wood confuses the theoretical and historical preconditions of capitalist social property relations with the results—the unintended consequences of the reproduction of these social property relations.[10] Wood argues, correctly, that racial oppression is not a necessary precondition for the establishment of capitalist social-property relations. The necessary preconditions of capitalist production are the emergence of producers and non-producers who are compelled to reproduce themselves through market competition—through the operation of the law of value. Historically, racism was the result, not the cause, of the global expansion of English capitalism in the 17th century. While not a precondition of capitalism, there are strong theoretical reasons to argue that racial oppression is anecessary consequence of the expansion and reproduction of capitalist social relations.

Similar methodological and theoretical problems haunt other attempts, influenced by notions of intersectionality, to analyze the relationship between capitalism and racial oppression. The roots of intersectionality can be found in the “dual systems” theories of gender oppression that emerged in the late 1970s. Many socialist-feminists had concluded that Marxism was a “gender blind” theory capable of grasping the dynamics of class exploitation, but possessing few insights into the dynamics of an independent “sex/gender” system of patriarchal oppression that coexisted with capitalism.[11] In the last twenty years, theories of intersectionality have expanded the notion of multiple systems to race, sexual preference, gender identity, and differential ability. While the earliest version of intersectionality saw distinct systems of class, gender, racial and other forms of oppression shaping social identities and practices, later versions have attempted a more integrative perspective. Patricia Hill Collins[12] collates oppressions in “matrices” and attempts to explore the interrelationships between different vectors of oppression. Ashley Bohrer’s[13] work is the most rigorous attempt to date to reconcile Marxism and intersectionality, arguing that capital’s social domination is based on both exploitation and oppression.

All of the variants of intersectionality suffer from a number of analytic problems. The earliest versions suffer from the same issues as dual-systems theory identified by Lise Vogel in the early 1970s—a failure to consistently specify the dynamics of patriarchy and its relationship to capitalism.[14] Holly Lewis, in her path-breaking analysis of gender and sexuality, argues that intersectionality “assumes that each system of oppression is a vector with a nebulous origin intersecting with the individual subject... Disconnected from material life, oppression seems it as if it “were born of ill will and bad ideas.”[15] Not only are the origins and trajectory of each separate “street” of oppression unspecified, but as Tithi Bhattacharya argues intersectionality fails to specify “the logic of their intersection.”[16] The later and more sophisticated versions of the theory avoid the “atomistic”[17] methods of the earlier versions, but work from an idealized understanding of capitalist accumulation and competition.[18] Specifically, the latter incarnations of intersectionality assert that Marxist theorizations of accumulation and competition posit the homogenization of both capitalists and workers, and are thus incapable of explaining gendered and racialized divisions amongst them.

This misunderstanding of the dynamics of the reproduction of capitalist social relations is evident in the work of David Roediger and Elizabeth Esch.[19] They have produced a rich description of how both capitalists and wage workers deploy race—the myth of intrinsic and unchangeable differences amongst humans—to defend and advance their social positions in capitalist societies. They provide a detailed map of both shifting “racial boundaries” within the working class across time; and the persistence of racialization throughout the history of US capitalism. However, racism remains an independent vector of oppression that operates externally to, but in afunctional relationship to capitalist accumulation and competition. Roediger and Esch argue, as does Boeher and others, that the operation of the law of valuehomogenizes labor--- equalizing wages, conditions of work and the like:[20] For them, racism exists because it is functional for capital—as a mechanism to ideologically and politically divide an increasingly homogeneous working class. As do other intersectional theorists, Roediger and Esch deploy a simplistic understanding of capitalist accumulation and competition that leaves them unable to explain how the structure of capitalism both compels andenables[21] capitalists to ideologically and politically differentiate workers whose conditions of life and work are ostensibly becominghomogeneous.[22]

Lise Vogel’s seminal, but long ignored, attempt to construct a unitary theory of gender oppression provides a model for transcending the dilemmas of contingent theories of racial oppression and capitalism. Vogel situates women’s oppressionwithin the real dynamics of capitalist accumulation, which requires the continuous reproduction of capitalism’s “special commodity,” labor-power. There are three aspects to the social reproduction of labor-power: the capacity to work must be reproduced daily (workers must be fed, clothed, etc. to appear at work each day), those who cannot work (the young, the old and the disabled) must be cared for, and the working class must be reproduced inter-generationally. While capitalism has found various ways to organize the daily reproduction of labor-power and the care of non-workers—work-camps, single-sex dormitories, immigration, old-age homes, orphanages, etc.—thegenerational reproduction of labor-power requires both thesocial andbiological reproduction of human beings. All class societies socially organize the biological capacities (childbearing and nursing) that create women’s “differential role in the reproduction of labor-power.” Capitalism takes hold of and transforms the main site of the daily and intergenerational reproduction of labor-power, the family/household, creating “a severe spatial, temporal, and institutional separation between domestic labor and the capitalist production process.”[23] Women’s primary responsibility for the privatized, “domestic” aspects of social reproduction is the matrix for the production of gender oppression.

What follows is an attempt to sketch a unitary or necessity theory of capitalism and racial oppression. We begin with a rigorous understanding of both the necessary dynamics of capitalist reproductionand the radical discontinuity between non-capitalist and capitalist forms of social production. Contrary to most radical and “Marxian” accounts of capitalist accumulation and competition, we will argue they do nothomogenize capitalists and workers. Instead, accumulation and competition necessarily produce heterogeneity of profit rates, labor-processes and wage rates. The dynamics of the capitalist mode of production—market-competition and the continuous development of the productivity of labor through labor-saving technological innovation—cannot explain the emergence and expansion of this form of social labor. The continuing process of “primitive accumulation”—thecreation of capitalist social property relations—requires political-legal coercion and, in many circumstances, does not immediately produce specifically capitalist social relations of production.[24] These social and historical processes create the matrix for the production and reproduction of race—the notion that humanity is divided into distinct groups withunchangeable characteristics that make one groupinherently superior and other groupsinherently inferior—as the “mental road map of lived experience” of both exploiters and exploited under capitalism.

This analysis owes a profound debt to three Marxian thinkers in the Black Radical tradition, whose attempts to grapple with the relationship of capitalism and racial oppression prefigure what I argue here. W.E.B. DuBois is best known for his notion that white working class and popular racism is rooted in a “public and psychological wage” that gives them political rights and social deference. While he used this term only once in his magisterial Black Reconstruction, in most of his other work he roots racist ideology and practices inlabor-market competition. [25] In his analysis of the 1919 St. Louis “race riot”—a white working-class pogrom against newly arrived Black workers—DuBois argued:

If the white workingmen of East St. Louis felt sure that Negro workers would not and could not take the bread and cake from their mouths, their race hatred would never have been translated into murder. If the black workingmen of the South could earn a decent living under decent circumstances at home, they would not be compelled to underbid their white fellows.[26]

Oliver Cromwell Cox’s Race, Class and Caste[27] made the first systematic attempt to analyze the necessary relationship between capitalist exploitation and racial oppression. Cox, despite sharing Robinson’s commercialization model of the origins of capitalism, clearly distinguished between pre-capitalist forms of differentiating humans, in particularcaste, and the distinctively capitalist form,racism.[28] Ruth Wilson Gilmore[29] deploys an analysis of the reserve army of labor since the 1970s to reveal the actual social basis for the expansion of racialized incarceration in the United States. Her insights into the capitalist management of growing “relative surplus populations” informs our analysis of the necessary relationship between capitalist accumulation and racial oppression.

Accumulation, Competition, “Primitive Accumulation”

Contrary to most interpretations of capitalism and its origins, including many ostensibly Marxist accounts, capitalist reproduction through competition and accumulation and the process by which capitalism emerges are not elements of the “material” economic “base” which in turn determines the “social superstructure” of culture and politics.[30] Contrary to notions that trans-historical processes—market competition, technological innovation, and plunder—produce and structure capitalism, capitalist accumulation and competition and “primitive accumulation” are social and historical processes.[31] Put simply, specific social property relations—relations amongst human beings (class relations) and between humans and nature (labor processes)—shape the social dynamics of any form of social production and co-constitute the political and cultural relations, including specific forms of oppression, of these forms of production.

Under capitalism, both producers and non-producers must reproduce themselves through market competition. On the one hand, the capitalists’ continued possession of the means of production requires compelling workers to produce at or below the socially average necessary labor-time—they must “sell to survive.” On the other hand, the dispossession of workers from non-market forms of subsistence makes them dependent on wage labor for survival, and easily hired and fired by capital. These social property relations, as we will argue in detail below, do not lead to economic equilibrium or the homogenization of profits rates, labor-processes, or wage rates. Instead, they give rise to the uniquely capitalist dynamics of accumulation and real competition through the uneven and combined mechanization of production—processes that necessarily produce heterogeneous social classes. “Primitive accumulation” is not a process of spreading markets, technological innovation running up against the “obstacle” of “outdated” social relations or simple geographic expansion, plunder and looting of the non-capitalist world. Instead, primitive accumulation—the transformation of means of production into capital and of direct producers into wage labor—is the unintended consequence of the struggle between non-capitalist exploiters and exploited attempting to reproduce themselves as non-capitalist classes. In sum, the emergence and development of the capitalist “economy” arehistorical and social processes of the creation and reproduction of distinctive social class relations.

Nor are politics and ideology “social superstructures” separate and apart from the “material base.” Instead, these ostensibly “superstructural” elements part of:

…a continuous structure of social relations and forms with varying degrees of distance from the immediate process of production and appropriation, beginning with those relations and forms that constitute the system of production itself. The connections between ‘base’ and superstructure’ can then be traced without great conceptual leaps because they do not represent two essentially different and discontinuous orders of reality.”[32]

From this perspective, ideology is not a free-floating set of cultural ideals or discourses separate and apart from the social relations that constitute social production. Nor is it mere propaganda “imposed” on a passive population through the media, schools and the like; or the equivalent of “doctrine,” a coherent and stable set of beliefs about the world. Instead, ideologies are the “mental road map of lived experience”– the “vocabulary of day-to-day action and experience” shaped by social property relations.[33] These mental road maps change as the lived experience of social relations change through practice and conflict. Put another way, ideological notions and practices, including racial oppression, are “co-constituted” by the reproduction of specific social relations of production and form part of the “internal relations” of different modes of production.[34]

Most Marxists and non-Marxists attribute to Marx a theory of value, accumulation, and competition that homogenizes capital and labor. This reflects neither Marx’s mature theory inCapital nor the actual history of capitalism. Instead, the reproduction of capitalism does nothomogenize but constantlydifferentiates capitalists and workers.[35]  The operation the law of value—where the exchange-value of different commodities are expressed in the amount of socially average abstract labor time required to produce them—does not depend upon thehomogenization of labor. Rather, it is capitalist competition and accumulation that allows the products of fundamentallydifferentconcrete human labor-processes to exchange asequivalents byabstracting from those concrete differences.[36]

The notions that accumulation and competition homogenize conditions of production confuse Marx’s account ofreal competition with neo-classical economics’idealized vision of competition. “Perfect competition,” where numerous firms are passive “price-takers” and any firm’s market advantage is temporary at best, produces uniform profit rates and wages. This vision of competition makes the existing economic order appear efficient and just.Real capitalist competition has little to do with the dream world of neo-classical economics. Real competition is fought through what Marx called the “heavy artillery of fixed capital”—constant technological innovation, taking the form of the increasing mechanization of production—for market share won at the expense of other producers. According to Shaikh,[37]real competition, antagonistic by nature and turbulent by nature… is as different from so-called perfect competition as war is from ballet.”

Real competition and accumulation through increasing the mechanization of production creates heterogeneity among capitalists and workers. The process of the division of tasks and their mechanization in one branch of production leads to a portion of the workforce being made redundant for capital. This constant replenishment thereserve army of labor, the mass of unemployed and underemployed, not only regulates wages within the boundaries of profitability, but creates the possibility ofheterogeneous labor-processes, profit-rates, and wages between branches of industry. While the increasingly capital-intensive industries enjoy higher profits and the possibility of higher wages, the constant replenishing of the reserve army allows the constant reproduction oflabor-intensive industries with lower profits and lower wages. In other words, “sweated labor” under capitalism is not some atavistic hangover of earlier forms of production, but the necessary consequence of the continued, but necessarily uneven and combined mechanization of production.[38]

The constant generation of the reserve army, with workers experiencing different levels of precarity and desperation, produce workers who have little choice but to accept the worst jobs across the economy. In the presence of the reserve army, the mobility of capital and labor sets limits to, but cannot eliminate, overall wage differentiation. Low wage sectors can avoid raising wages by tapping into pools of desperate workers. Low-wage industries often draw from specific labor-reserves—specific layers of unemployed and underemployed workers whose labor-power is reproduced under distinctive social conditions—in order to maintain their profitability.[39] Migrant workers are a contemporary example of such a distinct reserve army of labor. The physical separation of inter-generational reproduction in the global South and day-to-day reproduction in the global North, allows capitalists in low wage industries to pay wages below the costs of reproduction of labor-power in the global North.[40] “Undocumented” immigrants’ lack of the most minimal political rights enjoyed by “citizens” intensifies the precarious conditions of the social reproduction of this segment of the reserve army of labor.

Competition within and between industries also necessarily differentiates labor-processes, profits and wage rates. In the competitive “war of all against all,” firms with older investments in fixed capital have difficulty reducing unit costs and raising profit margins and rates. However, they cannot abandon these investments immediately in favor of new and more efficient methods. Capitalist investment in buildings, machinery, and the like create barriers to immediately adopting new techniques orexiting a branch of production. Capitals with older and less efficient fixed capital, thenon-regulating capitals, haveno choice but to remain in business until their investments are amortized. They compete with “state of the art” capitals, theregulating capitals, by paying below average wages, and intensifying work through speed-up, sub-division of tasks, and other means of increasing absolute surplus-value extraction.[41]

Contrary to contemporary usage, “primitive accumulation” is not simply a process of the accumulation of wealth through plunder, slavery, and colonialism.[42] Marx explicitly rejected this notion in Capital, arguing that it reduces the process of primitive accumulation to a morality tale in which “the frugal elite” accumulate wealth through means fair and foul, while “the lazy rascals” are left with no choice but to labor for their betters.[43] Means of production and subsistence become capital only when means of production are transformed into a commodity whose possession requires successful market competition. It is only on the basis of new social relations of production that the wealth appropriated through the colonization and plunder is accumulated as productive capital rather than transformed into pre-capitalist forms of surplus extraction.[44]

Primitive accumulation necessarily requires non-market compulsion.[45] All non-capitalist forms of production are based on the direct producers’ effective possession of means of production or subsistence, and the non-producers use of non-market coercion to appropriate surpluses from the direct producers. Prior to capitalism, the reproduction of both the exploiters and exploited was not predicated on successful market competition through specialization, technical innovation and accumulation, but instead on these classes’ political organization. As a result, neither the growth of markets nor the development of labor-productivity could displace non-capitalist social relations and replace them with those of capitalism. Instead, the deployment of legal and political force was necessary to force producers to become market dependent (the imposition of capitalist ground rent, public land systems, etc.) and to compel the expropriated to sell their labor-power (enforcing the closure of access to common lands through state violence, taxations, forced labor and various forms of servitude, etc.) Both the original process in England in the sixteenth century, and the uneven and combined geographic expansion of capitalism globally in the five centuries afterwards was “written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”[46]

Capitalism and Racist Ideology and Practices

Why do the creation and reproduction of capitalist class relations necessarily lead to racialization—the division of humanity into distinct groups withunchangeable characteristics that make one group inherently superior and others inherently inferior? Accumulation and competition give rise to a contradictory lived experience for both capitalists and workers. Capitalism is the first form of social labor in human history where exploitation takes place through whatappears to be theexchange of equivalents in the labor-market.[47] Rather than relying on personal domination or other forms of extra-economic coercion, capitalists and workers confront each other on the labor-market as owners of distinctive commodities—capitalists own the means of production, workers their labor-power. Capitalists purchase the workers’ capacity to work generally at its value—the historically constituted social conditions of the reproduction of labor-power. As capitalistconsume labor-power—put workers to work in labor-processes under the command of capital—workers are compelled to produce valuein excess of the value of their wages.

The buying and selling of labor-power gives rise to a very specific vocabulary of lived experience that spontaneously disguises exploitation and produces the notion of theequality of all human beings. InValue, Price, and Profit,[48]  Marx argued that under slavery all labor appears unpaid, and under serfdom the division between paid and unpaid labor is clearly visible in the division of crops and labor. By contrast, under capitalism “even the unpaid labor seems to bepaid labor” because “the nature of the whole transaction is completely masked by theintervention of a contract…” InCapital, Marx identified how this produces a distinctive ideology, “the sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labor-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham.”[49]

However, once we leave the idealized world of commodity exchange, we enter the real world of capitalist production, accumulation, and competition, which necessarily producessubstantial inequalities—between capital and labor, within the working class and between societies in the capitalist world economy. In pre-capitalist societies, human inequality wasassumed to be part of the “order of things;” inscribed in relations of personal dependence and extra-economic coercion. By contrast, the actuality of inequality must beexplained under capitalism in a way that iscompatible with the notion that human beingsshould be free and equal. This requires are-naturalization of difference—the division of humanity into groups withunchangeable characteristics making some inherently superior, others inferior. Only if some people are viewed as and treated as less than “fully human” can either capitalists or groups of competing workers make sense of a society where all appear to be equal, but there is real inequality between and within classes.

A similarly contradictory lived experience marks the process of the geographic expansion of capitalism.[50] On the one hand, capitalist imperialism presents itself as “universalizing” the “benefits of civilization” -- the “fair and equal exchange” of the market and the blessing of capitalist “improvement,” the development of the productivity of labor through technical innovation and accumulation. Unfortunately for capital, the subordination of non-capitalist producers to market compulsion cannot be achieved on the basis of “fair and equal exchange” or “out-producing backward producers,” because both non-capitalist exploiters and exploited have effective possession of means of production and subsistence. As a result, race becomes central to the “mental road map of lived experience” that explains and justifies the violent expropriation of non-capitalist producers and the establishment of capitalist social property relations.[51]

Racial and gender differentiation are the most common ways both capitalists and workers navigate the contradictory lived experience of capitalist development. Gender differences are ideologically reduced to biology—gender is equated with sexual differentiation-- which purportedly explains women’sinherent inferiority to me. While race has no biological existence, the process of racialization socially constructs differences that are purported to be permanent and unchangeable.[52] Racialization naturalizes differences in physical appearances, religion, language, and the like.[53] Racist ideology, with its notion of inherent andunchangeable relations of inequality provides a potent mental road map for both capitalists and workers of the contradictory lived experience of the creation and reproduction of capitalist social property relations.

The History of Racism

If racism is a central “vocabulary of the lived experience” of the creation and reproduction of capitalism, then it must have a distinct history. The notion that race and racism existtrans-historically, at least since European antiquity is at the heart of Cedric Robinson’sBlack Marxism.[54] Other scholars[55] have rooted Ancient ‘racism’ in the belief that differences between “civilized” and “barbaric” groups were rooted in environmental factors that became inheritable. However, even proponents of a Greco-Roman racism admit that the inheritance of acquired characteristics were not seen asconstant and stable”[56] from one generation to another. Put another way, a new physical environment could easily produce new social and behavioral characteristics—making themfluid and flexible. In addition, those claiming the existence of racialization in classical antiquity have not demonstrated that certain groups wereexcluded from political life if they paid rent, taxes, or tribute to their rulers. In fact, there is considerable evidence of Africans, in particular, being integrated into the Greek and Roman states as soldiers and public officials.[57]

Before capitalism, humanity was differentiated by religion (“heathens and believers”) and kinship-community (“strangers and neighbors/kin”). Both tended to be highly flexible and changeable through conversion, adoption, and the like. In almost all non-capitalist forms of social labor, class exploitation was indistinguishable from political-legal unfreedom, making inequality appear “natural.” Pre-capitalist imperialism did not generally disrupt the direct producers’ effective possession of means of production and subsistence, but transferred lordship or politically regulated trade monopolies from one group of non-capitalist exploiters to another.[58] Thus, the fluid character of “othering” provided an adequate understanding of the lived experience of these social and historical processes. Under capitalism, race is a form of human differentiation where distinguishing characteristics become unchangeable. According to Go,[59] “it is not that capitalism was built on prior racial differences; rather, capitalism served to racialize the preexisting ethnic division of labor, turning religious, cultural, or linguistic differences into ‘racial’ ones to legitimate its new exploitative strictures… racialization… was a part of modern capitalism, not its precursor.”

There is evidence that an early form of “proto-racism” emerged in one region of pre-capitalist Europe.[60] In late fourteenth and early fifteenth century Castile and Aragon, the conquering Christian monarchs forcibly expelled the previous Muslim rulers and those Jewish bankers and merchants who failed to convert to Christianity. By the mid-fifteenth century, as competition for venal offices in the new Absolutist monarchies intensified, Christians began to exclude Muslims and Jews who had converted to Christianity (conversos or “New Christians”) from the ranks of the nobility and key public offices. The claim was that these converts lacked “purity of blood” (limpieza de sange), and detailed genealogical records demonstrating that families had been Christians for several generations became a prerequisite for social advancement. With the unification of Spanish absolutism in 1492, the expulsion of Jews and Muslims who refused to convert, and the exclusion ofconversos became generalized.[61] Despite its emergence in late feudal Iberia, the generalization of race did not occur across European Absolutism, where the continued reality of non-market coercion made human inequality continue to appear to benatural.

Racial oppression in its modern form was crystallized two centuries later during the English capitalist colonization of Virginia.[62] When legal unfreedom is the typical status of the laboring classes, as it was in most pre-capitalist societies including Virginia before the late seventeenth century, inequality wasassumed. It was only when all other forms of bonded labor, in particular indentured servitude, were abolished in early eighteenth-century Virginia, that the enslavement of people of African descent needed to beexplained andjustified. The notion of race was systematized to justify the unfreedom of Africans alone in a society wherelegal freedom and equality were becoming the norm. According to Fields:

By the Age of Revolution, English society and its American offspring [shared-CP] … the assumption that the individual is the proprietor of his own person… [This notion—CP] had advanced sufficiently to make bondage a condition for calling for justification and to narrow the basis on which such a justification might rest. Slavery by then could be neither taken for granted nor derived from self-evident general principles. Pro-slavery and antislavery publicists… unconsciously collaborated in locating that basis of the slaves’ presumed incapacity from freedom, an incapacity that crystallized into a racial one and all of its subsequent pseudo-biological trappings.” [63]

While plantation slavery in Virginia was a non-capitalist form of production,[64] it emerged as part of the first process of capitalist colonization.[65] The break through to capitalist agriculture in England in the sixteenth century gave rise to a mass consumer market among prosperous capitalist tenant farmers. Merchants operating outside the declining system of royal monopolies sought to supply this market, initiating plantation production of sugar and tobacco in the English Caribbean and southern North American mainland. While the new merchants were unable to establish capitalist social relations in their colonies, the colonies were extensions of the first capitalist society—the first society where juridical-legal freedom and equality was becoming the norm.

Forms and Variations of Racism

Race and racism did not disappear with the abolition of New World slavery, but instead becomes generalized across the capitalist world. The specific terms of racist ideology, whatspecific characteristics made some groups superior and others inferior, and the forms of racial oppression varied according to thespecific historical forms capitalist social relations and their geographic expansion took. Unfortunately, many critical social scientists have attempted to grasp these variations through the notion of “racial formations.”[66] These typologies often take on a ‘life of their own,” leading to attempts to assign distinctive dynamics to each idealized “racial formation” and a loss of the historical specificity of each set of racist ideologies and practices. Instead, we need to proceed from the abstract understanding of the necessity of racial oppression to capitalist reproduction and expansion, and then move to the concrete, historical specificity of racial oppression in specific, historically constituted capitalist societies.

For example, in the aftermath of the abolition of US plantation slavery, the forms of racism changed because “there is, after all, a profound difference in social meaning between a planter who experiences black people as ungrateful, untrustworthy, and half-witted slaves and a planter who experiences black people as undisciplined, irregular and refractory employees.”[67] Through the history of capitalist imperialism, the racialization of indigenous populations varied according to whether these people were forcibly expelled to make room for “white” settlers (US Native Americans, Australian “Aborigines,” Palestinians, etc.) or were compelled, under varying degrees of legal coercion, to labor for wages for their conquerors (South Africa, part of colonial India, most of Latin America since the early twentieth century, etc.) In the former case, the indigenous populations are seen as inherently incapable of “improving” land in a capitalist manner and must be expropriated and expelled to make room for “civilized” farmers and workers. In the latter case, the indigenous people are seen as having inherently different requirements for social reproduction and commitment to “steady work.”

Under specifically capitalist accumulation and competition, the differentiation of capital and labor spontaneously generates the notion that different groups of workers have unchangeable characteristics, making some inherently more or less “reliable” workers.Both capitalists and workers, especially when working class organizations like unions are weak, utilize race as a way of ordering the access to employment. The constant subdivision and mechanization of tasks characteristic of capitalism, creates a mass of workers in both the active and reserve armies of labor who can perform almost any specific job.[68] Workers and capitalists invent fictional racial “characteristics” to determine who are the most “reliable” and “efficient” workers for different tasks.[69]   At the center of this process of constructing a racial “roadmap of lived experience” is the notion that different “races” have inherently different costs of social reproduction and capacities to produce different quanta of surplus value (inherently different levels of skill, intelligence, motivation, and productivity).

English capitalists in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century viewed the Irish, who were being rapidly expropriated by English landlords, as ignorant and crude peasants whose costs of reproduction and capacity for “steady” and skilled work was less than those of English workers. The Irish were deemed suitable only for “pick and shovel” work on the docks, canal and railroad construction, and the most deskilled positions in manufacturing.[70] In the US, capitalists developed an elaborate racial hierarchy of costs of reproduction and work capacities for the Irish in the early nineteenth century and the varied southern and eastern European immigrants in the late nineteenth and twentieth century.[71] As Blacks are expelled from southern agriculture before and during World War I, their purported lower costs of social reproduction and lesser capacities for “disciplined labor’ justified their assignment to the least desirable, lowest skill and most poorly paid work in industry. The racialization of the labor-market is evident in the global South as well, as British and later Arab capitalists assigned different costs of reproduction and laboring capacities to different groups of migrant workers in the Gulf ports.[72]

The process of the racialization of the labor market and reserve armies does not proceed simply “from above”—through the agency of capitalists—but “from below” – through the activity of workers when collective action and organization against capital does not appear viable. Working class racism is rooted in the contradictory position of workers under capitalism: “workers are not only collective producers with a common interest in taking collective control over social production. They are alsoindividual sellers of labor power in conflict with each other over jobs, promotions, etc.”[73] As competing sellers of labor power, workers are open to the appeal of politics that pit them against other workers—especially workers in a weaker social position. For example, Skilled artisanal workers in the early nineteenth century US attempt to socially construct themselves as “white” to protect themselves from the pressures of the reserve army of labor and the threat of being easily replaced as capital deskilled their work. Fears of impoverization and deskilling fueled antebellum northern white skilled workers projection “onto Black workers what they still desired in terms of the imagined absence of alienation, even as they bridled at being treated as slaves or ‘white n*ggers.’”[74] By the mid-nineteenth century, competition between for unskilled work in northern cities led to racist pogroms by Irish workers against African Americans, culminating in the bloody “draft riots” in New York and other cities during the Civil War.[75] As the mass migration of African-Americans to the northern cities began before World War I, competition among workers exploded in the “race riots” of 1919, and again in the wave of “hate strikes” during World War II.[76] In the past four decades, the support of a minority of older, white workers for right-wing politicians, beginning with Reagan and culminating in Trump, reflect a similar dynamic[77]. Satnam Virdee[78] traces similar racialized competition stimulating working class racism in Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Multi-racial working-class unity will not be produced spontaneously-- it will require the rebuilding a culture and organization of solidarity among workers.[79] Clearly, struggles for universal, class wide demands—higher wages, greater job security, health care (“Medicare for All”) and pensions not tied to employment, etc.—reduce competition among workers and are a necessary, but not sufficient conditions for building a multi-racial workers’ movement. The mainstream of the industrial union movement of the 1930s and 1940s made “color-blind” appears to workers, allowing racial divisions to deepen and contributing to the failure to organize the southern US.[80]Race-specific demands like defunding and disarming the police, ending housing and residential segregation, plant and industry-wide seniority,[81] affirmative action in hiring and promotion, full citizenship rights for all immigrants upon arrival, an end to racial harassment and discrimination on the job, and the like will be essential to building multiracial working class solidarity. The experience of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the Negro Labor Congress, the Negro American Labor Council, and Black and Latino caucuses in unions in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrate that a multiracial workers’ movement also requires self-organization by workers of color within the broader labor movement. Finally, non-work place movements against racism, like the uprising of 2020, have radicalized workers and promoted multiracial unity. Put simply,effective class organization and politics—forging working class unity among a racially heterogeneous class—must includeanti-racism.

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[1] The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers, the editors of Historical Materialism, Tithi Bhattacharya, Howard Botwinick, Robert Brenner, David Camfield, Sue Ferguson, Todd Gordon, Kate Doyle-Griffiths, Asad Haider, Paul Heideman, Aaron Jaffe, David McNally, Kim Moody, Richard Seymour, and Lise Vogel, for their comments on earlier versions of this essay. I want to acknowledge, as well, the participants in my “Capitalism, Race and Class” seminar at the CUNY Graduate Center in the Fall of 2016 and Spring of 2020, and in the Graduate Center Political Economy Workshop in November 2018 where many of these ideas were discussed. A special thanks as well to Satnam Virdee, with whom I have debated these issues in other venues. This essay is dedicated to the memory of James A. Geschwender (1933-2020), who taught me how to think about race and class when I was his graduate student at Binghamton.

[2] 2018.

[3]Activist Roundtable, 2020

[4] Chibber 2020 and Guastella 2020.

[5] 1983.

[6] 1995, Chapter 9.

[7] Wallerstein 1974. For a thorough theoretical and historical critique of this approach, see Brenner 1977 and Wood 2002.

[8] Go 2020, pp. 3-4 makes a similar point.

[9] 1995 p. 259.

[10] Arruzza 2015 and 2015.

[11] Hartman 1979

[12] 2000.

[13] 2019.

[14] 2013, Chapter 2.

[15] 2016, pp. 273-274.

[16] 2017, p 17. 

[17] McNally 2017.

[18] Jaffe 2020, Chapter 2020.

[19] 2012.

[20] Roediger and Esch’s understanding of value theory, accumulation, and competition are drawn from Lebowitz 2006.

[21] The notion that structures both compel and enable agents to act in determinant ways is drawn from Callinicos 2006.

[22] Julian Go’s attempt to resolve the tensions in Robinson’s account of racial capitalism suffers from a similar problem. Go deploys David Harvey’s (2014) distinction between “Marx’s theory of capital and histheory of capitalism.” The theory of “capital” in theGrundrisse andCapital works at level of abstraction that cannot account for “categories of race, gender, or ethnicity… because they are too concrete.” (Go 2020, p. 5) By contrast, Marx’s theory of “capitalism” refers to attempts to deploy his theory of “capital” to explain concrete historical developments, including racial oppression. However, Go argues that the relationship of capitalism and racism remain historical and contingent, because it is not possible “to deduce, from the categories of Marx’s theory [of Capital—CP], the necessity of racism or racial differentiations in society.” Harvey’s distinction between a “theory of capital” and a “theory of capitalism” confuses scientific abstraction with the construction of ideal types, which makes a rigorous relationship between theory and history impossible. See Post 2021 for a more detailed exposition of these issues in another context.

[23] Vogel 2013, pp. 151,159.

[24] Legally coerced wage labor continues to be reproduced through capitalist accumulation and competition, in particular in branches of social production where capital relies on highly skilled labor or must pay wages often below the cost of social reproduction to remain competitive and profitable. See Post 2016.

[25] DuBois 1920, Chapter IV. See Melchor 2019 for a discussion of DuBois’ belief that labor-market competition made interracial labor unionism impossible in the US prior to World War II.

[26] 1920, pp. 66-67.

[27] 1948.

[28] Drawing on the work of Cox, Raju (2021) makes a powerful critique of recent attempts to equate caste and racial oppression. Charissee Burden-Stelly (2020) defends Cox’s rejection of the equation of race and caste against Isabel Wilkerson (2020).

[29] 2007, pp. 70-78. Bhattacharyya’s (2018, p. 5) analysis of racial capitalism, despite its reliance on notions of intersectionality, also highlight the way in which capitalist accumulation produces “edge populations” of the unemployed and underemployed globally, whose “racialization… arises retrospectively as a result of marginalization from structures of production and/or the formal labor market… the fiction of race springs up, conveniently and almost spontaneously, to give rationale to the exigencies of capital.”

[30] This version of Marxism, which is rooted in the “systematization” of Marxism by the Second International, continues to shape the approach of both “productive forces” Marxists like G.A. Cohen (1980) and “structural” Marxist of the Althusserian school. This approach mars Hall’s (1980) provocative, but ultimately disappointing attempt to theorize racism.

[31] See Wood 1995, Part I and LaFrance 2021, pp. 85-92.

[32] Wood 1995, pp.25-26.

[33] Our approach to ideology is indebted to the work of Fields, 1990, pp. 110-113.

[34] McNally 2015.

[35] Shaikh 2016, Botwinick 2018

[36] A similar point, derived from Shaikh’s work, is made in Chibber 2013 pp. 133-137, 145-147.

[37] 2016, p. 14.

[38] Botwinick 2018, Chapter 3.

[39] Friedman 1984.

[40] The original formulation of the physical separation of inter-generational and day-to-day reproduction of labor power as the basis of migratory labor system was in Buroway 1976. For a recent deployment of this argument in social reproduction theory see Ferguson and McNally 2014.

[41]This argument should not be confused with ‘dual economy’ theories that posit a “core” with permanently higher profits and wages than the “peripheral” regions of the economy. See Botwinick 2018, Chapters 5-7 for a detailed argument on how the “turbulent regulation” of profit rates, profit margins and wage rates through real capitalist competition prevent any branch of production or individual capital from permanently retaining its “core” position

[42] For a thorough review and critique of the recent literature on primitive accumulation see Roberts 2017.

[43] Marx 1976, p. 873.

[44] Blackburn 1997, Chapter XII details how the profits from Absolutist France’s slave colonies flowed into the purchase of feudal estates and venal office, while only the profits from capitalist England’s’ slave colonies were accumulated as productive capital.

[45] Brenner 1977 and Wood 2002.

[46] Marx 1976, p. 875.

[47] Marx 1976, Chapter 6.

[48] 1910 pp. 83-86.

[49] 1976 p. 280.

[50] This is account of specifically capitalist imperialism is based on Wood 2003, Chapters 4-6.

[51] Jessica Evans (2018), working from a similar understanding of capitalist imperialism, analyzes how the Canadian transition to capitalist agriculture in the mid-nineteenth century led to the racialization of the indigenous people as a group “incapable” of “improving” landed property. Bonnett 1998 traces how European imperialist expansion transformed non-European forms of differentiating people, racializing non-Europeans as non-white and inherently inferior. Other works, which do not share our understanding of capitalist imperialism have produced insightful descriptions of the ways in which capitalist colonization has led to the racialization of non-Europeans in a variety of frameworks. See Bhandar 2018, Bhattacharrya 2018, Lentin 2020, Wolfe 2016.

[52] Such “permanent and unchangeable” characteristics are often viewed as biological. However, in the post-World War II era racial differences became “inherited and unchangeable” cultural characteristics. While liberal discourses of “assimilation” and “diversity” often call on the racially oppressed to adapt the cultural characteristics of “whites” (“pull yourself up by your own bootstraps”), the structural obstacles to the majority of those constituted as “non-white” to become “respectable” leads to liberal despair about “cultures of poverty.” See Steinberg 1989, Party Two Introduction and Chapter 4 for a discussion of ‘culture’ in racist discourses in the second half of the Twentieth Century.

[53] Virdee 2014 provides an account of “non-color coded” racism in Britain. Roediger 2005 brilliantly charts the shifting boundaries of race among European immigrant workers in the 20th century US.

[54] 1983.

[55] Isaac 2004.

[56] Isaac 2009 p. 42.

[57] Snowden 1983, Chapter 4.

[58] Wood 2003, Chapters 2-3.

[59] 2020 pp. 3-4

[60] I want to thank David Camfield bringing this to my attention.

[61] Herring Tore’s, et al, 2012, and Nirenberg 2009.

[62] Morgan 1975, Fields 1990, Virdee 2018 pp. 11-15. Many Marxists embrace Theodore Allen’s (1995 and 1997) claims in his that racism emerges simultaneously in Colonial Virginia and during the English colonization of Ireland. However, as David Camfield has pointed out in comments on an earlier version of this essay, the oppression of Irish Catholics was not racial—if they converted to Protestantism, they would enjoy the same rights as other Irish Protestants.

[63] Fields 1982 pp. 161-162.

[64] Post 2012, Chapter 3.

[65] Wood 2003, Chapters 4-5; Brenner 1993, Part One.

[66] Omi and Winant 2015.

[67]Fields 1990 pp. 154-155.

[68] Braverman 1974. Unfortunately, most readers of Braverman’s masterpiece tend to equate deskilling with the homogenization of labor. Braverman himself was quite clear that the tendency to deskill work constantlydifferentiates work.

[69] I am deeply indebted to Kim Moody for much of the following.

[70] Virdee 2015, pp. 26-27, 34-37; Virdee 2018, pp. 15-18

[71] Roediger and Esch 2012, Roediger 2005.

[72] Khalili 2020, p. 185.

[73] Brenner and Brenner 1981, p. 31.

[74] Roediger 2019, p. 68.

[75] Ignatiev 1995, Bernstein 2010.

[76] Wolfinger 2009.

[77] Post 2017.

[78] 2014

[79] Chibber 2017.

[80] Goldfield 2020.

[81] Nelson 2001, Chapters 5-7, demonstrates how the CIO’s acceptance of departmental seniority set the stage for the reproduction of racial divisions among steel workers and other organized industrial workers in the post-war period.

Beyond the Binary of Race and Class

A Marxist Humanist Perspective

Peter Hudis

The emergence of a new generation of antiracist activists and theorists seeking to advance an anticapitalist agenda creates a new vantage point of reexamining how racism relates to the logic of capital. This essay explores sources in the work of Marx, twentieth century Marxists, and Frantz Fanon that can provide direction for overcoming the binary of class and race.

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

To grasp the Black Dimension is to learn a new language, the language of thought, Black thought. For many, this new language will be difficult because they are hard of hearing. Hard of hearing because they are not used to this type of thought, a language which is both a struggle for freedom and the thought of freedom.

                                                                                  – Raya Dunayevskaya[1]

Marxism’s Contradictory Legacy on Race and Class

Few issues in radical theory are more contentious than the relation of race and class. It remains a largely unsettled one: some claim that prioritising issues of race diverts from building an anti-capitalist alternative, some contend it is inconceivable for such an alternative to arise without doing so, and others adopt positions that do not neatly fall into either view. But given the adage that history does not pose problems that are incapable of being solved, it is worth recalling that Marxists are not exactly new-comers to this debate.

This includes the work of Hubert Harrison, who challenged early twentieth century socialists to prioritise the fight against racism while encouraging the Garvey movement to embrace the class struggle; W.E.B. Du Bois, whose magisterial Black Reconstruction was deeply impacted by his engagement with Marx; Oliver Cromwell Cox, who held that ‘racial exploitation and race prejudice developed among Europeans with the rise of capitalism’[2] in the trans-Atlantic slave trade; and C.L.R. James, who argued for the independent validity of Black freedom struggles while upholding the perspective of proletarian revolution.

Nonetheless, efforts to overcome the binary of race and class have a fraught history.[3] While the U.S. Communist Party did important work in fighting racism, its slavish subservience to Moscow led it to oppose the Harlem and Detroit rebellions of 1943 on the grounds that ‘Negro rights should be considered secondary’ to the war effort. Nor was this an isolated case: the Stalinist denigration of anyone and anything that got in the way of the defence of the USSR led many Blacks to leave the communist movement, from Richard Wright and Harold Cruse to Aimé Césaire and George Padmore. True, some went in the other direction, like Claudia Jones and later Du Bois. But the Stalinists were not the only ones to be put to the test when it came to race: James faced intense opposition within the Trotskyist U.S. Workers’ Party because of its position that ‘Race consciousness is a reactionary doctrine…the general class oppression to which Negroes are subjected is identical with the exploitation of the white workers’.[4]

In the decades that followed, controversies over race and class engulfed virtually every tendency in the Western Left (for better or worse). The Civil Rights, Black Power, Feminist and LGBTQ movements inspired a series of important works on the relation of race, class and gender by such figures as Huey Newton, Angela Davis, and Ruth Wilson Gilmore, the development of whiteness studies by Theodore Allen, Noel Ignatiev, and Alexander Saxton, and writings by Cornell West, Manning Marble, Robin D. K. Kelly, and many others.

The consensus among most Marxists prior to the 1980s was that anti-Black racism arose with the birth of capitalism in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This view has the virtue of countering ahistorical or biological explanations that ignore the economic and political formations responsible for the social construction of race and racism. But it hardly settles the question as to what explains the persistence of anti-Black racismafter the abolition of slavery. Du Bois addressed this in pointing to job competition between white and Black workers as a factor in fostering white racism. But despite recent claims to the contrary, Du Bois was reluctant to commit to monocausal explanations of racism; he was even unconvinced that the ‘psychological’ wage gained by white workers at the expense of Blacks could explain the depth of race hatred that drove many of them to commit lynching and mass murder.[5]

The publication of Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism in 1983 marked a kind of watershed: his invocation of an often-neglected Black radical tradition and his discussion of the difficulty many Marxists face in incorporating an anti-racist agenda into a political tradition that prioritises class led many (including Robinson himself) to turn away from Marxism, even as others were inspired to turn anew to figures in the Black Marxist tradition that he discusses. Robinson’s argument that white racism precedes the birth of capitalism by many centuries helps explain this ambiguous legacy:[6] if racism and capitalism are not concomitants, why presume that the abolition of the latter will ever lead to the annulment of the former?

The outstanding decolonial theorist Sylvia Wynter addressed this as follows:

Both before and during the post-World War II global anticolonial and antiapartheid uprising […] Marx’s then prophetic-poetic emancipatory project had been, for so long, the only ostensibly ecumenically human emancipatory project around […] The result was that manyof us had thought that what first had to be transformed, was, above all, our present free-market/free-trade mode of capitalist economic production exploitation system into a new socialist mode of production. The idea was that once this was done, everything else would follow [… including] our still ongoing, status-ordered hierarchically structured, world-systemic order of domination/subordination. This change was to automatically follow. It didn’t of course.[7]

Wynter makes an important point. There have been many efforts to create ‘a new socialist mode of production’ by transforming or abolishing the ‘free market’, but it would be hard to argue that they put an end to racial discrimination. Neither the Social Democratic welfare states, which sought to restrain the free market, nor ‘revolutionary’ regimes in the USSR, China or Cuba which got rid of it, can claim to have abrogated discrimination based on race and gender. The history of the past 100 years indicates that there is no assurance that targeting the ills of a market economy based on private ownership of the means of production translates into overcoming racialised ways of seeing and relating to others – especially since those who imbibe the norms of a racist society often includes progressive whites.

It can be argued that neither the Social Democratic nor Stalinist regimes created ‘a new socialist mode of production’ – and if they had, the changes that Wynter refers to would have ‘automatically followed’. But that begs the question – what must be done to create ‘a new socialist mode of production’ if restricting or abolishing ‘our present free-market/free-trade mode’ doesn’t suffice? This question is rarely asked: despite the growth of interest in socialist ideas in recent years, it is still generally taken for granted that ‘socialism’ equals public ownership of property and planned production and/or an enhanced welfare state that ‘fairly’ redistributes surplus value. Achieving this would surely be an advance worth fighting for, but it would not require uprooting the capitalist mode of production. Why then assume that racism would be seriously undermined on the basis of so narrow a vision of socialism?

Wynter’s comment raises the question: do the new means of production create the new humanity, or does the new humanity create the new means of production? If it is the latter, can a new humanity emerge without making the struggle against racism an absolute priority? And if so, how can antiracist perspectives be integrated into a rejuvenated Marxism that targets not merely capitalism’s inequitable forms of distribution but the logic of capital itself?

These questions are by no means alien to today’s social movements: they are called forth by them. This is evident from the massive protests against police abuse and for Black lives following the murder of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, which brought over 20 million into the streets in the U.S. and hundreds of thousands in Latin America, Africa, and Europe. What was remarkable was not just the size but theform of the protests. Inspired (and often organised) by Blacks, Latinx, and Native Americans, they weremultiracial and provided a forum for a host of voices – women speaking out against discrimination, immigrants opposing deportation, frontline workers deploring the lack of protection from COVID-19, transgendered activists opposing sexual violence, youth deploying lack of adequate education, etc. Most of all, it reshaped political discourse in the U.S. by bringing long-suppressed demands for police and prison abolition to the forefront of public discussion and debate.

What has played a huge in these developments has been mutual aid, which many assert is crucial in helping to prefigure human relations that point beyond the horizon of capitalism. One activist reports,

While the term ‘mutual aid’ is now used by many leftists as shorthand for (re)distributive activities, there is value in critically thinking through the term. Mutual aid can certainly address communities’ survival needs, but it should serve another purpose, i.e., to undermine the reification of transactional human relations under capitalism. As the desire for capital returns subsumes all aspects of our lives, the very institutions of care which this system relies upon begin to decay. This presents an opportunity for new forms of care-taking institutions to emerge, including those not based in patriarchal social relations.[8]

Another participant in mutual aid work states,

A common slogan amongst community organisers now is ‘mutual aid is solidarity not charity’. Non-profits and the state do not engage in mutual aid because mutual aid is necessarily about working outside the state and is anticapitalist […] Thus, mutual aid, abolition of police and militarism, abolition of capitalism, and decolonisation go hand in hand.[9]

Advocates of defunding police and prison abolition clearly have a tough road ahead, as witnessed by the pushback against such demands not only from the far-Right and neoliberals but also some sections of the radical Left.[10] Nevertheless, it is clear that those involved in these campaigns make no secret of their hostility to capitalism or that they identify as workers. Yet it is not the general class struggle that motivates them as much as capitalism’s thoroughly racialised nature. Mariama Kaba writes,

As a society, we have been so indoctrinated with the idea that we solve problems by policing and caging people that many cannot imagine anything other than prisons and the police as solutions to violence and harm. People like me who want to abolish prisons and police, however, have a vision of a different society, built on cooperation instead of individualism, on mutual aid instead of self-preservation. What would the country look like if it had billions of extra dollars to spend on housing, food and education for all? This change in society wouldn’t happen immediately, but the protests show that many people are ready to embrace a different vision of safety and justice.[11]

These voices pose a challenge to develop a rejuvenated Marxism that targets not merely capitalism’s forms of distribution but the logic of capital itself. But what might that involve?

Rethinking Marxism in Light of Racial Capitalism

An issue that is repeatedly raised in today’s anti-racist struggles is the notion that people of color have been written out of the social contract that grounds modern society. The expression ‘The Social Contract is Broken!’ has appeared in innumerable posters and graffiti and voiced in street protests and public assemblies. As Kimberly Jones stated in response to criticism of the riots that accompanied some of antiracist protests,

When they say, ‘Why do you burn down your own neighborhood?’, we say it’s not ours! We don’t own anything! There’s a social contact that we all have, that if you steal or if I steal, then the person who is the authority comes in and they fix the situation, but the person who is ‘fixing’ the situation is killing us. So, the social contract is broken! You broke the contract when you killed us in the streets, you broke the contract when for over 400 years we played your game, and built your wealth. They broke the contract.[12]

Such views were was hardly new; the conception that racism exposes the pretentions of the liberal social contract gores back to the work of Charles Mills and others.[13] It is worth re-examining such critiques in light of the challenges they pose to contemporary Marxist theory.

Contractual relations are integral to capitalism – especially wage labour. It takes the form of appearance of a contract.Mutual recognition takes place insofar as each party agrees to formally acknowledge the claims of the other.Such recognition is limited and superficial, since capitalists extend recognition to workers only insofar as they augment profit, while workers extend recognition to capitalists only insofar as they continue to employ them. But the seeminglycontractual nature of wage labour is dispelled when we leave the market and enter the ‘hidden abode’ of production, wherethe despotic plan of capital reigns supreme.

What defines this despotic plan is the domination of ‘dead labour’ over ‘living labour’.  It is personified in the capitalist lording over the worker. But the capitalist is no more a self-acting agent than the worker, since he must bring commodities to market that are produced in accordance with the average amount of time in which it is necessary to do so. If the productive output fails to adhere to this time differential, he will fail to match the rate of profit of his competitors and risk being forced out of business. The despotic plan of capital, whichappears as the domination of the capitalist over the worker, turns out to be governed by animpersonal force,abstract universal labor time.

What grounds and makes possible the ‘free market’ is therefore despotism in which individuals are subjected to a time-determination over which they have no control. Simply altering the terms of the contract (as by obtaining higher wages or a modification of working conditions), while surely beneficial, does not by itself point toward an exit from capitalism. The annulment of ‘market anarchy’ leads to anew society only if freely-associated relations are established in and outside the workplace in which ‘time becomes the space for human development’.[14] To be sure, the law of value is enforced by the personifications of capital – but they need not be private owners of labour power; state functionaries can perform the task as well. Marx’s critique of class society goes further than targeting property forms and exchange relations because his critique of alienated labour goes further than the economic structure of society. It targets itshuman relations.

To be sure, the Communist Manifesto states, ‘the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property’.[15] Abolishing bourgeois property right is the immediate object of critique since it is the precondition for a free association of the producers. However, an abolition of private property that leaves alienated labour intact brings forth not a new mode of production but a different variant of capitalism. Marx attacked the ‘crude and unthinking communists’ of his day because their ‘community is only a community oflabour, and equality ofwages paid out by communal capital – by thecommunity as the universal capitalist’.[16] This identification of the community as the ‘universal’ or ‘abstract capitalist’,[17]following the elimination of individual capitalists is a remarkable anticipation of twentieth-century Social Democracy and Stalinism, as well as of non-statist cooperatives that fail tothoroughly transform alienated labour. Marx contends, ‘The relationship of the worker to labour creates the relation of it to the capitalist (or whatever one chooses to call the master of labour).Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, ofalienated labour, of the external relation of the workers to nature and to himself’.[18]

What holds for property is true of the ‘free’ market. Marx opposed the modern market economy because the condition of its possibility is a peculiar form of social labour.Concrete products of labour can be universally exchanged only if they contain a commensurate substance that is itself not concrete. This is not supplied by ‘labour,’ but by a specific kind of labour –abstract labour. Each moment of laboring involves performingconcrete, differentiated tasks, but in capitalism labor has adual character, since value is generated by physiological activity that assumes anabstract form in conforming to socially necessary labor time. The labor time that counts as socially necessary constantly shifts in response to contingencies, such as technological innovations that enable more to be made in less time. This is the basis of thedictatorship of capital, which defines even the most ‘democratic’ of capitalisms. As Marx put it, ‘The various proportions in which different kinds of labour are reduced to simple labour as their unit of measurement is established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers’.[19]

It may seem that this has nothing to do with race. It may even appear that Marx’s theory of value contravenes any notion that race or racism is integral to the logic of capital, since the latter effaces difference and contingency in favor of abstraction and homogenisation. For example, while David Roediger takes issue with the claim of David Harvey and others that ‘race sits outside of the logic of capital’, he contends that Marx’s Capital falls short of ‘placing racial and national division within as well as outside’ its logic.[20] This does not mean that Roediger (and others who make similar criticisms) denies that Marx had important things to say about the connection between racism and capitalism. Like earlier twentieth-century Marxists, he highlights the importance of the section on ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ at the end of Capital, in which Marx calls ‘the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of Black skins’ one of the ‘chief moments of primitive accumulation’ of capital.[21] However, it is one thing to make the empirical claim (hardly controversial among most Marxists[22]) that the historical reflections found in the final section ofCapital ties the birth of capitalism to the racism that defined the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and quite another to demonstrate that the delineation of the  value-theoretic categories in its earlier parts account for racial difference. The standard narrative – ranging from postcolonial theorists to Marxist capital-logic and value-form theorists – is that Marx’s presentation of the law of value inCapital completely abstracts from such concrete issues as race or gender.[23] Such claims cannot be dismissed out of hand; after all, the opening chapters of Volume One of Capital are written at a high level of abstraction. Yet if such claims are left unchallenged, it is hard to see how a new generation of antiracist activists and theorists will feel impelled to discover the wealth of insights found for today in Marx’s critique of political economy.

However, if instead of remaining at the phenomenal level of property forms and market relations Capital is approached in terms of its delineation of the time-determination that grounds capitalism, the relation between racism and the logic of capital appears in a different light. Central to this is chapter 10 of Volume One ofCapital on ‘The Working Day.’ Here we find Marx’s famous declaration, ‘Labour in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin.’[24] The statement has been heralded by many Marxists as a sign of Marx’s sensitivity to anti-Black racism while being downplayed by critics of Marxism as a rhetorical flourish that is undermined by his privileging the industrial proletariat as the ‘universal’ class that leads everyone else to liberation. What tends to be overlooked by many on either side of the debate is that the chapter on the Working Day was not composed until 1866, shortly before the publication of Volume One; no version of it appears in the earlier drafts of Capital.[25] This indicates that the impact of the U.S. Civil War, climaxed by Blacks fleeing the plantations in what Du Bois called nothing less than a ‘mass general strike’,[26] finally led Marx to devote a chapter of his greatest theoretical work to the question ‘when does my working day begin and when does it end?’

In documenting that Marx restructured Capital on the basis of the impact of the events during in the U.S. during the Civil War, Dunayevskaya noted,

It sounds fantastic to say that until 1866 Marx had not worked out the seventy pages on the Working Day […] That Ricardo didn’t concern himself with the working day is understandable because he evaded the whole problem of the origin of surplus value. That the socialists, from the utopians through Proudhon and Lassalle, were not weighted down by this problem is explained easily enough since they were too busy with their plans to ever study the real workers’ movement. But for Marx, who had never once taken his eyes off the proletarian movement, not to have a section on the Working Day in his major theoretical work seems incomprehensible.[27]

Marx himself argued that ‘so long as the determination of value by working time is itself left “undetermined”, as it is with Ricardo, it does not make people shaky. But as soon as it is brought exactly into connection with the working day and its variations, a very unpleasant new light dawns upon them’.[28] Marx explicitly states in chapter 10 that the freedom struggles of former Black slaves is such a new stage in the fight for freedom that it inspired white workers to take up the fight for an eight-hour workday, as witnessed by the formation of the General Congress of Labour in August 1866 in Baltimore. It wasn’t the struggles of the industrial proletariat that paved the way for the emancipation of Black slaves; on the contrary, it was the self-activity of former Black slaves that breathed new life into a previously dormant class struggle.[29]

This had Marx’s ear, and it led him to incorporate issues of race and racism into his critique of capital on a level that is not found in his earlier work.[30] He calls attention to,

Time for education, for intellectual development, for the fulfillment of social functions, for social intercourse, for the free play of the vital forces of his body and his mind […] in its blind and measureless drive [capital] usurps the time for growth, development and healthy maintenance of the body…. Capital asks no questions about the length of life of labor power. What interests it is purely and simply the maximum of labor power that it can set into motion in a working day. It attains this objective by shortening the life of labor power, in the same way as a greedy farmer snatches more produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility’.[31]

A page later he writes,

It is accordingly a maxim of slave management, in slave-importing countries, that the most effective economy is that which takes out of the human chattel in the shortest space of time the utmost exertion it is capable of putting forth. It is in then tropical culture, where annual profits often equal the whole capital of plantations, that Negro life is most recklessly sacrificed. It is the agriculture of the West Indies, which has been for centuries prolific of fabulous wealth, that has engulfed millions of the African race.[32]

Marx here poses race-based slavery in the Americas as internal to the dynamics of capital accumulation, which hinges on extracting the greatest amount of surplus value in the fewest hours of time. And he is indeed referring to surplusvalue – not simply a surplusproduct of use-values, since he invokes ‘annual profits’ based on ‘the capital of plantations.’ Moreover, Marx infers that the American system of race-based slavey is not an archaic hangover of a precapitalist past that impedes the development of a ‘higher’ and ‘more efficient’ mode of production, since he calls it ‘the most effective economy’ when it comes to maximising profits. If this is often overlooked, it is because it is easy to conflate Marx’s discussion of precapitalist slave modes of production – in which labour power is not commodified and production is aimed at augmenting use-values instead of exchange value – with the form assumed by slavery in the Americas, which was integral to the accumulation of capital based on a global division of labor.

This conflation defines an otherwise engaging essay by Walter Johnson, in which he asks, ‘What does Marx say about capitalism and slavery? – there can only be on answer: slavery in Marx is not properly speaking, “capitalist”’.[33] Johnson invokes as his authority the outdated and much criticised work of Eugene and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, who tended to conflate race-based slavery in the Americas with generic slave modes of production.[34] Yet in the 1863-64 draft of Capital – by no accident penned in the midst of the U.S. Civil War – Marx writes,

In the second type of colonies – plantations – where commercial speculations figure from the start and production is intended for the world market, the capitalist mode of production exists, although only in a formal sense, since the slavery of Negroes precludes free wage-labour, which is the basis of capitalist production. But the business in which slaves are used is conducted by capitalists. The method of production which they introduce has not arisen out of slavery but is grafted on to it. In this case the same person is capitalist and landowner. And the elemental existence of the land confronting capital and labour does not offer any resistance to capital investment, hence none to the competition between capitals.’[35]

Johnson rightly asks, ‘If slavery was not capitalist how do we explain its commercial character’.[36] Clearly, if American slavery was not capitalist we could not account for its commercial character. But Marx never denied that capitalism existed prior to industrial capitalism, even though the latter was the focus of his critique.[37] The ‘excrescence of money changers and cotton factors in southern cities who yearly handled millions and millions of pounds of foreign exchange’ and ‘the thriving slave markets at the centre of their cities where prices tracked those that were being paid for cotton thousands of miles away’,[38] which Johnson says demonstrates the commercial character of U.S. slavery, did not signify for Marx (unlike Fox-Genovese) that U.S. slavery was exogenous to capitalism. To be sure, there is no capital without wage labour, and no wage labour without capital; a society exclusively defined by slave labour is not and cannot be capitalist. However, nothing prevents slave labour, especially in its most racialised forms, from augmenting capital in a society whose ‘general creative basis’[39] is wage labour. Roman slavery could neither create nor augment capital because the conditions of generalised wage labour did not exist. American slavery could and did augment capital since it operated in the context of a capitalist world market in which wage labour generally prevailed as its ‘creative basis’.[40] The same goes for racialised forms of violent social control that followed the end of chattel slavery.

Curiously, neither critics of Marxism such as Johnson, nor Marxists like Roediger – both of which have done vital work in recording and analysing the pivotal role played by racial classification and differentiation in the development of U.S. society – single out that Marx restructured Capital on the basis of Black freedom struggles during the Civil War which informed the writing of the chapter on the Working Day. Could this result from not considering the chapter as part of the essence of Marx’s analysis of capital? But if so, why not? Why consider Marx’s effort to theorise from the standpoint of the lived experience of the worker who lacks ‘time for education, for intellectual development, for the fulfillment of social functions, for social intercourse, for the free play of the vital forces of his body and his mind’ to be less important than his more ‘abstract’ discussion of the relative and equivalent forms of value, the relation surplus value and profit, and the difference between absolute and differential ground rent? If Marxism is a theory of liberation – and what is it if it is not – thenCapital’s most outstanding characteristic is that Marx analyses the most abstract forms of domination without taking his fingers off of the pulse of human relations.[41]

The Czech Marxist Humanist Karel Kosik spoke to this when he stated that Marxism is not merely a theory of class struggle but a ‘philosophy of everyday life, a philosophy ofordinary relationships among people […] It not only analyses the movements of large historical entities, such as classes and nations, but also provides answers to the individual’s questions – about the meaning of life, and the contents and prospects of his efforts’.[42] And what is more meaningful to human life than whether or not we have control of our time? Kosik writes, ‘Man knows his mortality only because he organises time, on the basis of labor as objective doing and as the process of forming socio-human reality. Without this objective doing in which man organises time into a future, a present, and a past, man could not know his totality’.[43] Kosik held that achieving the socialisation of the means of production requires developing new human capacities attained in the struggle against dehumanisation. Du Bois and others in the Black radical tradition were attentive to such a notion in singling out the political and philosophical significance of the ‘simple’ act of tens of thousands of Black slaves walking off the plantations in the 1860s.

Yet the question remains – can the defining concepts of Marx’s theory of value, especially the ever-increasing domination of concrete labor by abstract labor, account for social differentiations that are integral to racial oppression? Roediger doubts that it can, based on Lisa Lowe’s view that, ‘In the U.S., capital has maximised its profits not through rendering labor ‘abstract’ but precisely through the social productions of difference […] marked by race, nation, geographical regions, and gender.’[44] Roediger concludes from this (as does Michael Lebowitz) that ‘divisions among the working class, specifically racism and sexism, do not appear as part of the essence of capital in Marx’s Capital’.[45] But this appears to rest on a misunderstanding of the concept of abstract labor. What ‘makes labor abstract’ is adhering to socially necessary time: labor becomes ‘homogenous’ insofar as it conforms to a universal time determination, as represented by the ticking of the factory clock. And it is precisely this which accentuates differences between workers: some adhere to the average, others do not; the latter are sooner or later dispensed with and/or deprived of the benefits that others possess, since in capital’s view any hour of labor performed in excess of the social average (which is communicated to the agents of social production through the laws of competition) creates no value. There are many reasons why some enterprises conform to the dictates of socially necessary labor time better than others: it could be the quantity and quality of labor-saving devices, the skill or education of the workers, the level of social cohesion among workers that enables them to resist overwork and speed-up, etc. Although an array of contingencies determines whether or not enterprises follow the law of value, they are compelled to follow this singular law.

Race and gender play a critical role in this. If making use of socially-inscribed differences can pump out greater output in less relative units of time, so much the better from capital’s standpoint. The utilisation and reproduction of difference poses no barrier to the homogenising power of abstract labor, so long as they meet the requirements of value production. It is one reason that the majority of factory workers in the world today are young women – gender discrimination tends to lower wage rates while expending the bodies and lives of young women boosts profit rates. It is also why capital sees to it that Blacks are the last hired and first fired – racial discrimination acts as a disciplinary agent in forcing greater output from the most marginalised while enabling many white workers to feel relatively privileged even as they come under increasing pressure from capital’s time constraints. Capital relies no less on the reproduction of national and ethnic difference – as in employing immigrant workers speaking over a dozen different languages in a single enterprise (as in many meatpacking plants in the U.S.) in order to make it harder for them to come together to fight for better conditions. There is nothing in Marx’s concept of abstract labor that suggests that all concrete laboring activities become the same or that social differentiations become washed away. On the contrary, abstract labor in Marx’s theory as well as in life is productive of difference. In this sense, Roediger is correct in writing, ‘we have too often forgotten [John R.] Common’s suggestion that the hurrying and pushing could be chronically infected by playing races against each other.’[46] We need only add that this ‘hurrying and pushing’ is part and parcel of the disciplinary power of socially necessary labor time, which serves as the inner core of Marx’s theory of value and surplus value.

Claims that Marx’s concept of abstract labor fails to account for racial differentiation may be due, in part, to a passage in the Communist Manifesto that states with the progressive development of capitalism ‘national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing […] the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still further’.[47] This naïve modernist optimism was clearly unjustified, as Marx himself came to realise in subsequent years as he paid greater attention to the persistence of national antagonisms, both in Europe and the Americas.[48] Yet his discussion of this issue in the Manifesto has nothing to do with the concept of abstract labor, which he did not even begin to formulate until a decade later.

To be sure, the chapter on the Working Day has a limited scope – it comes under the discussion of absolute surplus value. Hence, the struggles for a shorter working day involve ‘demand[ing] the value of my commodity;[49] they do not in and of themselves lead to the abolition of commodity production. But since bringing ‘the productive process under their common control by their associated reason’ depends upon workers having the time for ‘intellectual development [and] sociable intercourse’, for Marx struggles over the working day are on a much higher level than ‘the pompous catalogue of the ‘inalienable rights of man’.[50]

This is not to suggest that Marx’s delineation of the logic of capital does our work for us: he only occasionally makes explicit the relation of race and gender to capital accumulation and never developed a specifically Marxian theory of racialisation. Doing so is a task that falls to our generation. Hence, the critical issue is not what Marx said at a certain point of time as much as whether the concepts found in his critique of the capitalist mode of production can help make sense of the realities of our time – if, that is, we take the trouble of thinking them out to their logical conclusion. The task is hardly facilitated by thea priori assumption that concepts like abstract labor and socially necessary labor time efface difference and contingency.[51]

In critiquing the dehumanisation involved in being subjected to an abstract time determination, Marx’s critique of political economy takes issue with the form of social praxis which defines modern life. This is what enables his body of thought, when ‘stretched’ to deal with the realities of our time, to address the dialectical relation between race and class. As Sekyi-Otu argues,

Marx’s call for the transcendence of alienation would therefore not call for the liberation of humanity from time […] as Herbert Marcuse once envisioned, but the liberationof time, ‘time set free’, is the only goal consistent with Marx’s social ontology […] Would Fanon question the prominence here assigned to time in the poetics of human existence? Quite likely not’.[52]

Indeed! As Fanon himself put it, ‘every human problem must be considered from the standpoint of time’.[53]

Race, Class and Recognition Today

The work of Frantz Fanon continues to be a beacon because of the depth of his grasp of the psychological as well as economic-political impact of racism and colonialism.[54] This is evident from his discussion of the ‘zone of non-being’ that grounds his critical encounter with Hegel’s dialectic of self-consciousness in Black Skin, White Masks. It has much to say to efforts to pose an alternative to the racist social contract that defines much of modern life.

Elsewhere I have detailed Fanon’s critique of Hegel’s so-called ‘master/slave’ dialectic in Black Skin, White Masks.[55] ‘So-called’, since strictly speaking there is no ‘master/slave’ dialectic in Hegel. The German terms are Herrschaft andKnechtschaft, which translate as Lordship and Bondage; this is how it is rendered in most English translations of thePhenomenology of Spirit (the German term for slave,Sklave, appears nowhere in the book).[56] It became known as ‘Master’ and ‘Slave’ due to the French translation by Jean Hyppolite, which rendered Herr andKnecht[57] as ‘maître’ and ‘esclave’. Alexandre Kojève, a major influence in post-war French thought, historicised this ‘master/slave’ dialectic and claimed it as the central theme of Hegel’sPhenomenology as a whole. His interpretation has been widely challenged,[58] since for Hegel ‘Lordship and Bondage’ refers to a particular stage of self-consciousness in which one side gains superiority over the other in a battle for recognition. It does not refer to a stage of actual history, let alone the slavery of his time. This is no scholastic matter: if Hegel is referring to actual masters and slaves, the fact he never mentionsBlack slavery would suggest that his racist writing of Africans out of history in hisPhilosophy of History[59] defines his delineation of the stages of consciousness in the Phenomenology. Achille Mbembe reads Hegel along these lines:

Hegel’s reasoning proceeds as follows: my life is particularity; my particularity is totality; my totality is consciousness; and my consciousness is life. Self-consciousness, the knowing of itself, self-identity: all this is raised up to the status of ‘native realm of truth’. Difference has no being, or, if it has, then only as the reverse of everything that I am, as error, folly – in short, the ‘objective negative’. All that counts is the motionless tautology of ‘I am I’.[60]

The ‘my’ here obviously refers to the standpoint of whites. But this hardly does justice to Hegel’s text. Dialectical movement in Hegel proceeds through difference, not at its expense; identity for Hegel is the identity of identity and non-identity. The notion that ‘my consciousness is the totality of consciousness’ is refuted from the initial chapter on sense-certainty, which shows that apprehension of particulars depends upon universal categories that are not reducible to the individual. And ‘the motionless tautology of ‘I am I’ is not Hegel’s position but rather Fichte’s, which is critiqued throughout thePhenomenology.

There is no question of Hegel’s racism and Eurocentrism: his banishing of Africa from history expresses a racist mindset that places Europe at the apex of human development.[61] But it is not his delineation of the stages of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit that explains his racism, but rather his uncritical acceptance of racist stereotypes which prevents him from positing Black experience and reason as part of its dialectical movement.[62]

Fanon did not read German, so he accessed the Phenomenology through the lens provided by Hyppolite and Kojève. But unlike Kojève, he did not try to apply the ‘master/slave’ dialectic to contemporary realities. On the contrary, he denied any such application.[63] This is because Hegel asserts that the bondsman obtains a ‘mind of his own’ in the struggle for recognition. In contrast, Fanon holds that in the real world of racial capitalism no such recognition is granted to people of color. As a result, the Black slave ‘is less independent than the Hegelian slave… Here the slave turns toward the master and abandons the object’.[64]

Fanon’s critique of Hegel’s ‘master/slave’ dialectic did not lead him to reject Hegel tout court. At several junctures hedefends Hegel against Jean-Paul Sartre, who called the anti-racist struggle a ‘minor term’ that must eventually give way to the ‘universal’ class struggle. Fanon writes, ‘For once this friend, this born Hegelian, had forgotten that consciousness needs to lose itself in the might of the absolute, the only condition for attaining self-consciousness’.[65] Despite Fanon’s critique of Hegel, he affirms Hegel’s dialectical conception that ‘negativity draws its value from a virtually substantial absoluity’.[66] Much like Marx, Fanon attacks Hegel’s failure to affirm the subjective forces that can uproot alienation while adhering to Hegel’s notion that freedom is attained through a dialectic of negativity.

When Hegel is read through the eyes of Fanon, an often-overlooked aspect of Hegel comes to light – namely, no sooner does Hegel say the bondsman gains ‘a mind of his own’ than he says this constitutes ‘only stubbornness’ since it has not overcome the gap between its subjectivity and an unfree objective world.[67]Misrecognition, not recognition, is the outcome of the dialectic of self-consciousness. Genuine recognition onlybegins to be reached much later in thePhenomenology, in the section ‘Spirit Certain of Itself’.

Fanon did not comment further on the Phenomenology, so it is unclear how familiar he was with the rest of the book. But his work after the publication ofBlack Skin, White Masks has some fascinating parallels with later parts of thePhenomenology. In ‘Spirit Certain of itself’, Hegel goes beyond an encounter between two individual self-consciousnesses by posing recognition in terms of apolitical community based on asocial contract. Through the latter, the universal becomes united with individual existence. In entering into contract, I ‘externalise’ myself in relation to others, and thereby ‘establish’ myself as an objective being.

Hegel proceeds to show that what binds the individual to the political community is confession. Catherine Malabou writes, “Confession, according to Hegel, is nothing private, secluded from the political sphere. On the contrary, it is a political achievement. Confession is the postcontractual expression of the will.”[68] Although I accept the social contract, the general will confronts me as an external imposition. This produces a sense of unease which is part of the alienation that defines modern life. Malabou adds, “In modern society…the individual does not recognise itself in the community that it is nevertheless supposed to have wanted. She isnonrecognisedby her own recognition; she is outside herself, in an alien spirit. The individual is ‘alienated from itself.’”[69] Confession is way to resolve this contradiction. Confessing to a transgression of the social contract and asking forgiveness for doing so reconciles the individual to the spiritual community. Recognition now seems possible.[70] However, what happens if you are not considered part of the social contract to begin with? If that is the case, you do not exist, strictly speaking, as a social being: you are a non-person, who inhabits a ‘zone of nonbeing’.

Hegel’s discussion may seem to have little to do with Fanon – and even less with the relation between race and class. Nevertheless, in TheWretched of the Earth, Fanon writes,

The question of truth must also be taken into consideration. For the people, only fellow nationals are ever owed the truth. No absolute truth, no discourse on the transparency of the soul can erode this position. In answer to the lie of the colonial situation, the colonised responds with a lie. Behavior toward fellow nationalists is open and honest, but strained and indecipherable toward the colonists. Truth is what hastens the dislocation of the colonial regime.[71]

The lie of the colonial situation is the claim to treat the colonised as human by ‘including them in civilisation’, even though the colonised knows they are not treated that way at all. Yet no confession or guilt is expressed on the part of the colonised: they respond to the lie of the colonist with one of their own. In a psychiatric paper that has recently become available, ‘Conducts of Confession in North Africa’, Fanon explores why victims of colonialism often refuse to confess to crimes they are guilty of. The reason, he says, is that confession depends on a contractual relation – which is absent in a colonial context. He writes, “I confess as a man and am sincere. I also confess as a citizen and I validate the social contract.”[72] Confession depends upon prior recognition: “There can be no reintegration if here has been no integration.”[73] In remaining silent and refusing to confess, it seems that the colonised submits to authority, but they are actually expressing resistance to a society that leaves them out of the social contract.[74]

Those who seek to gain recognition by refraining from such resistance fall victim to an inferiority complex – expressed in the colonised trying to ‘become white’. But since this proves ultimately futile, the only way out is to tarry with the negativity inherent in racial discrimination by reaching for what Fanon called a ‘new Humanism’.[75] Since victims of racism have weaker ties to juridical relations, they can go beyond calls for a fairer distribution of the products of labour by questioning the dehumanised character of life itself. Working-class Blacksexperience dehumanisation in its starkest form and therefore have less of a stake in its continuance.[76] In this spirit, Fanon addressed himself to the ‘wretched of the earth’ who truly have nothing to lose but their chains.

This does not mean that he overlooked class.[77] He states in another psychiatric paper,

Labour was conceived as forced labor in the colonies, and even if there is no whipping, the colonial situation itself is a whipping: what the colonised does nothing is normal, since labor, for him, leads to nothing. Labour must be recovered as the humanisation of man. Man, when he throws himself into work, fecundates nature, but he fecundates himself also.[78]

Fanon’s treatment of these issues speaks directly to contemporary realities. Today the relentless pressure of socially necessary labour time is reducing the proportion of living to dead labour as never before through labor-saving devices. This does not make the working class superfluous, since expanded reproduction depends not just on the production but also therealisation of surplus value. A host of new occupations open up to ensure the latter (information technology, multiple forms of service work, etc.). At the same time, whole arenas of the economy (such as teachers and government workers) are becoming increasingly proletarianised.

While claims that capitalism will ‘abolish’ labour have long been specious, capital will continue to displace workers. What are its ultimate consequences? Surely not the ‘annulment’ of the law of value, which is driving the process. Surely not the collapse of capitalism due to over-investment in technology. Dead labour cannot serve as the emancipatory alternative; only live human beings can uproot a system based on abstract forms of domination. But what forces might they be, and do they have the potential to overcome capital’s march to self-destruction?

This is addressed in one of Fanon’s last psychiatric writings, which explores the difference between the relaxed attitude toward time on the part of North Africans versus the objectified notion of time that prevails in Western societies:

Being a good worker means you have had no trouble with the time clock. The workers’ relations with the apparatus are strict, timed. For the worker, to be on time means being at peace with the time clock. The moral notion of guilt is introduced here. The time clock prevents and limits the endemic guilt of the worker. For the boss, the time clock is indispensable. As the time clock is continually present, it introduces a number of specific conducts into the worker. It represents the overall apparatus that employs the worker. Before the time clock, the worker had the possibility to apologise; from now on, the worker is constantly rejected in the solitude with the impossibility of persuading the employer about his good faith.[79]

The worker felt guilt, and ‘apologised’ – she confessed – for not keeping pace with the clock. Guilt arises from broken contract – from a debt that remains to be paid. As a wage labourer, the worker is part of the social contract, but it still confronts her as an ‘alien spirit’. She tries to transcend this alienation by confessing to not keeping pace with the clock. But what sets the pace of the clock? Not the boss. Not even the company. The clock is set according to the dictates ofvalue production – the drive to conform to the socially necessary labour time that it takes to produce a commodity on the world market. No matter who you are, worker or capitalist, the law of value confronts you as a person apart, as an ‘alien spirit’.

As a result, the effort to achieve reconciliation with the political community breaks down – as does the quest for recognition in the earlier section on self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This is because capitalism is governed by an abstract form of domination, abstract universal labour time, which can hear no apology. There can be no recognition between an individual and an impersonal time determination that employs them. The moreabstract becomes capital’s dominance, as all aspects of work and everyday life are compelled to conform to socially necessary labour time, the harder it is to achieve even the pretense of formal recognition. In a word, the logic of capital ultimately undermines its contractual form of appearance.

We are living in an era defined by this phenomenon. It has serious consequences for class politics and identity politics. No longer can workers obtain even the pretense of recognition on the basis of their job, career, or place of employment, which constantly shifts as labour becomes less secure and more precarious. At the same time, today’s concentration and centralisation of capital tends to produce not a compact and unified working class but a highly differentiated and variegated one employed (or underemployed) in multiple arenas. Atomisation and isolation become ever more ingrained, producing a deep sense of loss and anxiety in the body politic.

However, many who experience these increasingly precarious conditions but are not invested in blaming other oppressed people for their distress tend to become energised by anti-racist struggles. As recognition based on class relations is undermined, it is only to be expected that it will be sought in other sources – such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, etc. As capitalism deprives recognition to those who once received it on a minimal level, some become moved to identify with those to whom recognition has long been denied onany level.[80] This is reflected in the large numbers of white youth who were galvanised for the first time into political activism by the Black Lives Matters protests of the past several years. Battles over race, gender, and sexuality increasingly serve as the catalyst for bringing a differentiated and dispersed working class onto the streets. We may be witnessing something like this today, with the emergence of new kinds of multiracial working-class struggles.

In sum, while the proletariat remains the universal class, insofar as no other class is capable of resolving the contradictions of civil society, it is not the universalsubject. There are multiple forces of revolution, and which one plays the decisive role at any point depends on an array of conditions that cannot known in advance. What we do know is that around the world today it is not the general class struggle but the specificity of battles around gender, race and sexuality in the class struggle that are increasingly at the leading edge of mass resistance.

Overcoming the binary of race and class depends on developing a critique of capitalism that focuses on resistance to the dehumanisation that defines modern society.[81] Marxism is a revolutionary humanism or it is nothing. The point is not to argue over whose oppression is more or less important than another’s, but to hear how each force contains within itself the capacity to reach for a new society freed from a lifeworld in which human relations take on the form of relations between things. As Louis Lavelle wrote long ago,Philosophy and life only have a serious character on the condition that the Absolute is not before me and outside of me as an inescapable goal, but on the contrary is in me and that in that I trace my furrow’.[82]

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[1] Dunayevskaya 1985, p. 49.

[2] Cox 1970, p. 322.

[3] See Dawson 2013 for a valuable discussion of these developments.

[4] See McKinney 1945, document no. 296. The Workers Party rejected James’ views on race and class: his ‘Resolution on the Negro Question’ was later adopted by the Socialist Workers Party, though James and his colleagues in the Johnson-Forest Tendency left the SWP after a bitter dispute several years later. For a discussion by a Black worker who participated in these debates, see Denby 1989, pp. 172-4.

[5] Goodwin 2022, p. 55 draws from Black Reconstruction the conclusion that ‘capitalists’ competition for labour and workers’ competition for jobs are the root cause of conflicts thatseem to be driven by racism’ (my emphasis). But as Du Bois makes clear, these conflictsare driven by racism; at issue is what explains the racism. Simply asserting that white workers falsely believe that people of color are responsible for their problems in finding gainful employment begs the question as towhy they don’t blame the system instead.

[6] The problem with Robinson’s claim is that substantiating it requires singing out the specific social formations of European feudalism that necessitated the birth of white racism. Robinson makes no attempt to do so inBlack Marxism, and his later turn to Foucault and discourse theory became a way to avoid doing so. See Robinson 1983, pp. 9-37.

[7] Wynter 2015, pp. 40-1.

[8] Kitonga 2022.

[9] Adamson 2020.

[10] See Frost 2021.

[11] Kaba 2020.

[12] Jones 2020.

[13] See Mills 1999 and Pateman and Mills 2007.

[14] Marx 1985a, p. 142.

[15] Marx 1976a, p. 498.

[16] Marx 1975, p. 205.

[17] Marx 1975, p. 280.

[18] Marx 1975, p. 279.

[19] Marx 1976c, p. 135.

[20] Roediger 2017, p. 121.

[21] Marx 1976c, p. 915.

[22] At least it used to be uncontroversial: see Issar, Brown, and McMahon 2021 for the rather bizarre claim that the origins of ‘whiteness’ and ‘the primitive accumulation of capital’ is to be found in the Europe of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. ‘Whiteness must be consolidated in medieval Europe’, they claim, in ‘the mercantile’s imaginary description/fantasy of the Mongol Empire’ (pp. 350-1). Why they do not consider the Mongols as part of this consolidation is left unexplained – even though they engaged in systematic genocide that slaughtered at least five percent of the world’s population at the time. Nor is it explained how ‘whiteness’ could exist as a social category centuries before the social construction of ‘blackness’ – or how the accumulation of capital could occur in agrarian societies that lacked capital, whose producers were not separated from the land, and which extracted the surplus product in the form of use-values instead of exchange value. Such is what is what happens when concepts are turned into mere words to justify the problematical claims (of Cedric Robinson and others) that white racism preceded capitalism.

[23] According to many capital-logic theorists, from Backhaus to Postone, the delineation of the theory of value in Capital excludes class, which is supposedly exogenous to it. It is therefore ironic that some who criticise ‘identity politics’ from a class reductionist perspective draw upon Postone’s ‘reinterpretation’ of Marx’s value-theoretic categories. For more on this, see Hudis 2013, pp. 9-36.

[24] Marx 1976c, p. 414.

[25] See Marx 1987a, p. 224: ‘I therefore elaborated the section on the “Working Day” from the historical point of view, which was not part of my original plan’.

[26] See Du Bois, pp. 81-117.

[27] Dunayevskaya 2000, p. 88.

[28] Marx 1987b, p. 514.

[29] Six months after drafting the chapter on ‘The Working Day’, Marx wrote, ‘The limitation of the working day is needed to restore the health and physical energies of the working class […] as well as to secure them the possibility of intellectual development, sociable intercourse, social and political action’ (Marx 1985b, p. 187). Since surmounting the logic of capital entails workers ‘bringing the productive process under their common control by their associated reason’, a shorter working day that allows for greater ‘intellectual development [and] sociable intercourse’ is indispensable. The phrase ‘under their common control by their associated reason’ is in the 1863-64 draft of what later became Volume 3 of Capital, but was left out of version edited by Engels as well as the 1976 translation by David Fernbach. See Jeong 2019.

[30] I am not only referring to the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (which is silent on these issues) but also theContribution to the Critique of Political Economy of 1859, which had virtually nothing to say about race-based slavery.

[31] Marx 1967c, pp. 375-6.

[32] Marx 1976c, p. 377.

[33] Johnson 2004, p. 303.

[34] See Genovese 1974.

[35] Marx 1971, pp. 302-3.

[36] Johnson 2004, p. 303. Although Johnson errs in his estimation of Marx, his work makes a valuable contribution in highlighting the links between U.S. slavery and capitalism. See especially Johnson 2013, p. 199: ‘‘Under the dominion of cotton, reproduction (childbearing, motherhood, fatherhood) was labor (care given, love spent) in the service of capital: the conversion of living humanity into dead labor.’

[37] For more on this, see Banaji 2020, pp. 8-28.

[38] Johnson 2004, p. 303.

[39] Marx 1973, p. 278.

[40] The same could be said of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, whose drive for rapid industrialisation was termed by its architects ‘primitive socialist accumulation’. The state-capitalist character of this form of ‘primitive accumulation’ was not contradicted by the widespread use of slave labour in the Gulag, since wage labour served as the ‘general creative basis’ of the USSR.

[41] See Marx 1976c, p. 343: ‘I therefore demand a working day of normal length, and I demand it, without any appeal to your heart […] the thing you represent when you come face to face with me has no heart in its breast. What seems to throb there is my own heartbeat’.

[42] See Kosík, 2019, p. 47. I wish to thank Jan Mervart for bringing this text to my attention.

[43] Kosik 1976, p. 123.

[44] Quoted in Roediger 2017, p. 119.

[45] Roediger 2017, p. 122.

[46] Roediger, p. 155.

[47] Marx 1976a, p. 503.

[48] For more on this, see Anderson and 2010, which discusses his changing views concerning Ireland, and Norman Smith 2022, which discusses Marx’s notes on racism among white workers in California who supported the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.

[49] Marx 1976c, p. 343.

[50] Marx 1976c, p. 416.

[51] Singh (2016, p. 34) wrongly claims that Marx’s category of abstract labor necessitates ‘indifference to any prior social condition, status, or standing’ while failing to mention the one thing it is ‘indifferent’ to – time that is not governed bysocially necessary labor time.

[52] Sekyi-Out 1996, p. 75-6.

[53] Fanon 2008, p. xvi.

[54] See Salem 2017: ‘Fanon’s analysis goes even deeper because of his focus on both the material and subjective – culture, identity and the psychology of colonialism are as important as economic and political structures – and in fact cannot be easily separated from them’.

[55] See Hudis 2015.

[56] Baille, Miller, and Inwood all give it as ‘Lordship and Bondage’, while Pinkard renders it as ‘Mastery and Servitude’.

[57] Literally, one who kneels; the English term ‘knight’ derives from it.

[58] See especially Williams 1997, pp. 366-71, Bernasconi 2020, Van Haute 2020, and Tembo 2020.

[59] There is hardly a single white-racist stereotype that Hegel fails to regurgitate in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History (lecture notes published after his death, in 1837): ‘The Negro exists in a wild and untamed state’, they ‘lack moral faith’ and ‘regard tyranny as no wrong’, ‘cannibalism is looked upon [by them] as quite customary’, they ‘manifest a lack of self-control’ and are incapable of forming a ‘political constitution’, etc. See Hegel 1967, pp. 93-7.

[60] Mbembe 2001, p. 192. For an excellent critique of Mbembe’s misreading, see Tembo 2020.

[61] For critiques of Hegel on this score, see Gilroy 1993, pp. 75ff and Gordon 2015, pp. 114-7.

[62] For an illustration of how reading Hegel’s Phenomenology from the vantage point of hisPhilosophyof Historyidstory Historycan be profoundly misleading, see Ogungbure 2018.

[63] See Hogan 2018, p. 27.

[64] Fanon 2008, p. 19

[65] Fanon 2008, p. 112.

[66] Fanon 2008, p. 113.

[67] See Hegel 2018, p. 118: ‘Stubbornness is the freedom that hitches itself to a singular individuality standing within the bounds of servitude’.

[68] Malabou 2011, p. 21.

[69] Malabou 2011, p. 24.

[70] Hegel shows that the effort to achieve mutual recognition in ‘Spirit Certain of Itself’ likewise fails, since the contradictions of civil society ultimately thwart its realisation. The dialectic of negativity, not ‘synthesis’, pervades all stages of the Phenomenology. In this sense, Hegel’s critique of liberal contract theory goes much further than Charles Mills, who held, ‘Some of the master’s tools, like racism, are intrinsically oppressive and morally tainted, but others, like contractarianism and liberalism, are not problematic in themselves but only contingently racialised, and are flexible enough to be adopted to different and progressive usages’ (Mills 2016, p. 74).

[71] Fanon 2004, p. 19.

[72] Fanon 2018b, p. 415.

[73] Fanon 2018a, p. 412.

[74] See Gibson and Beneduce 2017 for a discussion of Fanon’s psychiatric writings on confession and the social contract. They do not connect it to Hegel’s discussion of these issues in the Phenomenology.

[75] Fanon 2004, p. 178.

[76] Fanon 2008, pp. 198-9 underlines this in noting that for the Black professional ‘alienation is almost intellectual in nature’, whereas ‘for the Antillean working on the sugarcane plantations in Le Robert, to fight is the only solution’.

[77] This is also reflected in the lectures Fanon gave at University of Tunis in 1959 on conditions of workers in colonised societies and the effect of production methods on workers’ mental health. See Gibson and Beneduce, 2017, p. 169.

[78]Fanon 2018c, p. 530.

[79] Fanon 2018c, p. 522.

[80] This is also reflected in the increased support for transgender rights expressed by today’s movements against police abuse and for Black lives.

[81] See Caitlin Rosenthal’s response to Walter Johnson’s criticism of the language of ‘dehumanisation’: ‘To speak of dehumanisation can be a way of acknowledging what is lost in the language of capital […] Humanisation and dehumanisation characterise processes of representation, and they can be used to explore the ways the language of capital pushes toward the commodification, securitisation, instrumentalisation, and alienation of everything – even lives, if our laws allow it to do so’ (Rosenthal 2018).

[82] Lavelle 1946, p. 49.

Reexamining Race and Capitalism in the Marxist Tradition

Ashok Kumar, Robert Knox

This introduction cannot encapsulate the diversity and breadth of Marxist writing about race and racism. Yet it does attempt, at the very least, to give an idea of the seriousness with which Marxists have historically taken these issues. Far from just an ‘epiphenomenon’, many in the Marxist tradition have sought to significantly extend historical materialist theory in order to specifically understand race and racism. In some ways, however, the mature neoliberal period saw something of a retreat from these positions: with greater emphasis placed on the category of race as one simply opposed to Marxist analysis.The articles in this special issue need to be understood against this wider context. Eschewing overly binary discussions about the ‘competition’ between ‘race’ and ‘class’, they instead represent more specific interventions – on both the theoretical and historical level – into these questions. Whilst the contributions are of course varied, we can understand them as responding directly to many of the questions we post in this introduction. These interventions are multifaceted and intertwined. And yet, despite their interconnectedness, it was necessary to place these interventions into themes, to provide some structure and coherence to the discussion. Some themes were more bounded than others, but even those that were more narrowly defined were often overlapping and interconnected. It was a delicate balancing act that required careful consideration. Given the sheer size of this special issue, it will be covered over two physical issues. The first will contain the articles under the theme of Race and Capital and Colony, while the second issue will look the areas of Ideology, Chains, and Labour.

This piece is being made available as a preprint edition of the Race and Capital special issue of Historical Materialism. The final published version of this text will be made available on the Brill website in the coming months, we ask that citations refer to the Brill edition.

Issue 32(2&3): Race and Capital

It is now a truth almost universally acknowledged that the 2008 financial crisis – and the various permutations of austerity which followed – set the scene for the re-emergence of the concept of capitalism in the popular, political and academic scenes. That crisis revealed (once again) the unstable and chaotic nature of capitalist social relations, and the austerity which followed starkly highlighted capitalism’s polarised class relations.

However, it was not simply class relations that were polarised in this context. For many, the uneven and unequal responses to capitalist crisis were also expressed inracialised terms. The sub-prime mortgage crisis, was of course, deeply linked to racist housing provision in the US,[1] and the consequences of austerity were unevenly distributed along racialised lines.[2] This was true both domestically, but even more specifically internationally, with racialised peripheral states bearing a heavy burden of the crisis.[3] The recent response to the Covid-19 pandemic has further highlighted this.[4] At the same time, at least partially as a response to the unrest unleashed by the crisis, racialised state violence in the domestic scene, became much more prominent.

It is perhaps for this reason, that – alongside a social democratic resurgence – the politics of the period since 2008, and especially since 2014, have also been expressed in racialised terms. On the left, several political movements – Black Lives Matter, Rhodes Must Fall etc. – invoked anti-racism as one of their guiding political principles. On the other hand, forces of the right mobilised racism: both in terms of attacks on racialised populations and in reactionary defenses of ‘whiteness’. In the English-speaking world this was most obviously the case with the Trump Presidency and the right-wing elements of the Brexit project.

This historical moment is also characterised by a notable presence of racially marginalised groups in positions of power. From Barack Obama to Rishi Sunak, the rise in representation means that racial and class structures are now managed and policed by previously subordinated groups. This shift may lead to increased resources for historically disadvantaged communities, but also muddles lines, dulls conflicts, and creates incentives for the most privileged members of each racial group to maintain racial hierarchies and categories.

These political-economic events have of course been reflected intellectually. As was noted in a 2017 special issue of this journal, much of the intellectual production associated these moments took the form of ‘identity politics’.[5] Here the phenomenon of race was understood as the expression of individual or group identities. These positions, of course, built on a longer tradition of thinking about race and empire – drawn often from poststructural and postcolonial theory – in which race was seen as primarily rooted in psychic and cultural relations.

As such, in these modes of thinking, ‘the historical specificity of racism and sexism’s emergence through and alongside a capitalist mode of production is mystified’, with issues of race and racism seen as separate from issues of capitalism and class.[6] Such positions, of course, fundamentally implicate the Marxist tradition: if race is a central political category, and one which cannot be explained in relation to social relations, then Marxism cannot claim to have a significant purchase on understanding and explaining the social totality. In some instances, this was a response to a sense that Marxist approaches often neglected issues of race and racism, relegating them to mere epiphenomena of capitalism, secondary contradictions, or as simply tools to divide the working class.

Racial Capitalism?

However, things were not ultimately as straightforward as this divide might suggest. Whilst there are many thinkers and traditions which insist on rigidly dividing questions of class and capitalism from those of race and racism, there are also those who have sought to understand their connections. This was particularly important in the context of the past 15 years, where the outcome of a capitalist crisis was widely understood as being racialised.  

In this respect, rather than a simple separation of ‘race’ (as an ‘identity’) and capitalism, over the past eight years or so we havealso seen particularly fraught debates about the relationship between the two. From debates on capitalism’s relationship to slavery,[7] to debates over imperialism and the ‘decolonial’,[8] and debates over prison abolition[9] we have seen a real resurgence in work attempting to think through the ways in which capitalism is involved in processes of racialisation.

Emblematic of this new orientation has been the explosion of interest in Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism and his attendant concepts of ‘racial capitalism’ and the ‘black radical tradition’.[10] In that book, Robinson argued that practices of racial differentiation (‘racialism’) had emerged in Europe with ‘the integration of the Germanic migrants with older European peoples’.[11] In this context a ‘racial theory of order’ had emerged an ‘[e]nduring principle’ in European feudalism, such that the effects of racialism ‘were bound to appear in the social expression of every strata of every European society’.[12] Accordingly, capitalism, as a creation of Europe, emerged steeped in these categories, and reproduced them as it expanded outwards.

In Robinson, then, we find two distinct arguments about the relationship between capitalism and racism, both of which have been controversial for Marxists. The first is that racism – as a systemic organisational phenomenon – is understood to significantly precede capitalism. This is linked to a wider question about what the of source of racial animus. The second is that the connection that Robinson draws between capitalism in particular and racism is ultimately a contingent one – based on the historical phenomenon of racialism in Europe – as opposed to anything based on capitalism’s logic.

The risk here, of course, is that Robinson overemphasises the centrality of race in society, be it capitalist or pre-capitalist. In not offering an account of the specificity of the historical specificity of race and racialisation, Robinson risks reducing all social relations to a racialised hierarchy. At the same time, the risk is that race appears as atimeless and transhistorical phenomenon, and, as such, a perennial or quasi-naturalised feature of human existence.

It is for this this reason that the subtitle of Robinson’s book is so important. Whilst the book is ostensibly about ‘Black Marxism’, Robinson’s argument is precisely that the Marxism of the figures he surveys (W.E.B. DuBois, C.L.R. James and Richard Wright) did not offer sufficient resources to deal with the ‘race question’. As such, these figures had to turn to a ‘Black Radical Tradition’ for those answers which ‘began to emerge and overtake Marxism’[13] in their analyses. In this way, Robinson in fact diminishes the significance of a the Black Marxist tradition. In the process, Robinson at times appears to rely – as Robin D.G. Kelley tentatively suggests in his introduction[14] – upon an overly homogenous notion of African culture and experience as the basis for the commonality of approach characteristic of the ‘Black Radical Tradition’.

Of course, Robinson’s particular analysis here is not shared by everyone who uses the term ‘racial capitalism’ (and indeed the concept has a much longer and more explicitly Marxist history).[15] For many, the term operates as a kind of signifier to denote a general relationship between capitalism and racism. That being said, Robinson’s formulations have been influential, with many insisting that whilst capitalism and racism have some kind of connection, it is not one that the Marxist tradition has been able to successfully capture.

The impetus for this symposium is to contest this assumption. The symposium seeks to build on Historical Materialism’s prior work on race and racism,[16] as well of that in the wider Marxist tradition. It represents an attempt to take questions of race and racialisation seriously whilst, at the same time, situating them firmly within their material context. This introduction will now proceed to offer a few thoughts on the history and characterisation of Marxist work on race and racism – both intellectually and politically – before introducing the contributions to the symposium.

Marx and Engels on Race and Racism

Although Marx and Engels were not centrally concerned with issues of race and racism, it is a myth to imagine that these issues played no role in their analysis. Beyond their personal opinions of race and racism,[17] Marx and Engels both invoked questions of racism in important ways. Perhaps the most obvious and prominent here were in their discussions of primitive and accumulation and colonialism. Famously, Marx described the birth of capitalist production in racialised terms, noting:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize tile dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation.[18]

Here, then, Marx recognised that the geographically uneven birth of capitalism was – in part – mediated through ‘race’, this was an insight which was to prove crucial in later Marxist invocations. At the same time, Marx was at pains to insist that there was nothing ‘natural’ about the connection between race and slavery. In Wage Labour and Capital Marx famously posed the question ‘What is a Negro slave?’, in response he answered that a ‘A man of the black race. The one explanation is worthy of the other. A Negro is a Negro. Only under certain conditions does he become a slave’.[19] On the one hand, then, Marx pointed out that slavery was not an inherent characteristic of black people. On the other, Marx did treat it as self-evident that there was a ‘black race’.

Crucially, Marx insisted that race could serve as a device to divide the revolutionary working class movement. Thus, in the context of the US Civil War – in which also Marx supported the anti-slavery forces unreservedly – Marx was to argue that the US labour movement had been ‘paralysed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the republic’. This was because, Marx argued, ‘Labour in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin’.[20] This, of course, echoes Marx’s state position on Ireland[21], where he argued that ‘[t]he ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life’ in a manner ‘the same as that of the “poor whites” to the Negroes in the former slave states’.[22] For Marx this ‘antagonism is the secret of theimpotence of the English working class’, and remedying it would be the ‘first condition of their own social emancipation’.[23]

In this way, Marx essentially bequeathed three points to later Marxists thinking about race. The first was that race and racism were deeply connected to capitalism’s spread internationally. The second was that racism was bound up with internal competition within the working class, and served to – both as a conscious project of the ruling class and directly via the labour movement – undermine the basis for a revolutionary movement. The third was that Marx did not assign race or racism an independent causational force, it was clear that Marx did not think people were enslaved, exploited or dispossessed because of their racialisation, but rather owing to definite social conditions.

The latter also points us to a significant limit of Marx’s reflections, whilst Marx’s analysis did not ascribe any particular causational power to race, he nonetheless took for granted the existence of racial categories. As such, ‘race’ as a category was not subjected to the same historical and material analysis that both Marx and Engels would deploy in relation to other phenomena, it was this task that later thinkers in the Marxist tradition sought to undertake.

The Third International and the Turn East

Marx’s attention to the colonial dimensions of race became particularly important in the context of the Russian Revolution. As is well-known, Lenin – borrowing much of his analysis from Bukharin,[24] Hobson[25] and Hilferding[26] – argued that the question of imperialism had become central to capitalism, thus bringing with it the question of race and racism.

The discussion here was twofold.  Bukharin and Lenin argued that mature monopoly capitalism had led to a situation in which a handful of advanced capitalist countries – in order to stave of capitalist crises – had been forced to export capital to less advanced and pre-capitalist societies.[27] In order to protect this export, and so guarantee profit rates, these advanced capitalist countries transformed and dominated these societies. However, profit here was not repatriated in those countries, rather surplus value flowed back to the metropole. This situation was justified and framed in racial and civilisational terms.

Alongside this, Lenin and Bukharin sought to explain why the traditional social democratic parties had been unwilling to oppose their own imperialism. Here, they turned to Marx’s ideas about the role of race and competition in dividing the working class, as well as Engels’ reflections on the possibility of a section of the working class becoming – through the provision of higher wages – an ‘aristocracy of labour’. In the context of imperialism, they argued, this had become a reality since:

All the relative “prosperity” of the European-American industry was conditioned by nothing but the fact that a safety valve was opened in the form of colonial policy. In this way the exploitation of “third persons” (pre-capitalist producers) and colonial labour led to a rise in the wages of European and American workers.[28]

For Lenin, the possibility of super-profits enabled capitalists to pay a section of the working class wages that are much higher than they might otherwise achieve and so ‘bribe their own workers, to create something like an alliance ... between the workers of the given nation and their capitalistsagainst the other countries’.[29] In this way, to ‘a certain degree the workers of the oppressor nations are partners oftheir own bourgeoisie in the plundering ... of the oppressed nations’. These workers occupy ‘aprivileged position in many spheres of political life’ and ‘[i]deologically ... are taught ... disdain and contempt for the workers of the oppressed nations’.[30] As such, racism represented the ideological articulation of the material relationship of imperialism.

Of course, the labour aristocracy thesis has not been without criticism,[31] but it certainly set the scene for the politics of the Third International. In the wake of the Russian Revolution, and the defeat of the revolutionary movements in Europe, the Communist movement turned East,[32] incorporating anti-imperialism and self-determination directly into the political programmes of the Communist International. Thus at the Second Congress of the Communist International, the task was set ‘to bring into being a close alliance of all national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia’.[33] Crucially, in this context the ‘Negro Question’ was explicitly linked to the colonial question.[34] This theme was further developed at the Fourth Congress, which resolved to ‘support every form of the Black movement that either undermines or weakens capitalism’ and committed itself to ‘struggle for the equality of the white and Black races, and for equal wages and equal political and social rights’.  This was matched by a political commitment to:

[U]tilise all the means available to it to compel the trade unions to take Black workers into their rights, or, where this right already exists in form, to make special efforts to recruit Blacks into the trade unions. If this proves to be impossible, the Communist International will organise Blacks in their own trade unions and make special use of the united front tactic in order to force the general unions to admit them.[35]

Third Worldism and the Civil Rights Movements

These commitments to anti-imperialism and anti-racism – on both a theoretical and practical level – became crucially important to the development of Marxist accounts of race and racism for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, in a practical sense, they built immediate solidarity between the European Communist movement, non-Europeans, and racialised people living in Europe. The Congresses saw representatives from the colonies and others directly participate in these debates. Secondly, the intellectual resources provided by Marxist theory proved crucial in negotiating and conceptualising the anti-imperialist and anti-racist struggles.

The net effect of these two issues was that Marxist thought played a significant role in the period from the 1930s up to the 1980s in anti-imperialist, anti-racist and radical civil rights movement. Communist Parties and Marxist organisations played a leading role in anti-colonial and national liberations movements,[36] as well as serving as key players in the struggles against racism, particularly in the US.[37] Some of these movements were affiliated with the ‘official’ Communism of the USSR or Peoples Republic of China, but many were more heterodox formations, and all these movements produced intellectuals and theorists not beholden to any party line.

Of course, this was by no means a seamless phenomenon. The anti-colonialism of the official Communist movement sometimes stood at odds with its broader political lines, particular in the periods of ‘socialism in one country’ and ‘peaceful co-existence’. This led to situations in which particular anti-colonial struggles were deprioritized in favour of various ‘national’ priorities, most notable here was the French Communist Party’s lukewarm position on the Algerian Revolution.[38]

Accordingly, it was not the case that non-European, anti-colonial Marxists simply ‘received’ a Marxism which they then unthinkingly applied. Rather, they used Marxist categories to understand the conditions in which they existed. Here, the analysis of racism was not simply an added extra to an analysis of capitalism, but rather had to be understood as in some sense central to it. As Frantz Fanon memorably put it:

The originality of the colonial context is that economic reality, inequality, and the immense difference of ways of life never come to mask the human realities. When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence, you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich.

As such, Fanon went on, ‘Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem’.[39] Some have interpreted this ‘slight stretching’ as a wholesale repudiation of the Marxist tradition (indeed, in some sense this is Robinson’s thesis). But it more accurate to say that figures in the Third Worldist and anti-racist movements in this context sought to deepen the Marxist tradition through theorising the conditions in which race and racism comes to play a structuring role in a given social formation.

Attempting to grapple with the numerous figures in this period is beyond the scope of this introduction, but we can pick out some key themes that emerged =. One crucial element shared by almost all the approaches was the insight that race was not a ‘natural’ phenomenon to which racism was a response. Instead, in the words of Eric Williams, in his discussion on slavery, ‘[s]lavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery’. Indeed, for Williams slavery was ‘basically an economic phenomenon’ which had been given a ‘racial twist’.[40]

In this way, these Marxists were committed to an account of racialisation. The question was how to situate these processes of racialisation within their material contexts, and to chart out the relationship these processes had with capitalist social relations. In this way, these figures departed from Marx himself in refusing to assume that ‘race’ was unproblematic category. At the same time, by charting racism’s place in capitalist social relations, they were deepened Marx’s own project of charting a social totality.

For the radical anti-imperialist movement, race and racism were deeply intertwined with the uneven nature of the capitalist world market, and its attendant division of labour. As Fanon[41] wrote, a ‘country that lives, draws its substance from the exploitation of other people, makes those peoples inferior’.[42] In this way racism is part of a totality characterised by ‘the shameless exploitation of one group of men by another which has reached a higher stage of technical development’.[43] In this way, racism was understood as intrinsically connected with rise, consolidation and spread of capitalist social relations. As Walter Rodney noted, ‘no people can enslave another for centuries without coming out with a notion of superiority, and when the color and other physical traits of those peoples were quite different it was inevitable that the prejudice should take a racist form’.[44] In this way, ‘the white racism which came to pervade the world was an integral part of the capitalist mode of production’.[45]

In this way, racism was coterminous with the international division of labour in capitalism. At the same time, racism was used both to divide the European working class from the from the non-European masses – which, following the labour aristocracy thesis, had a material basis – and, vitally, to sow division amongst the oppressed and exploited in the less advanced capitalist states[46]. Both of these facts taken together meant that racism was both a product of capitalist social relations and a central element in their maintenance and reproduction.

These positions also found purchase in more ‘domestic’ anti-racisms (the division here is, of course, artificial). In the 1960s and 1970s many black radicals – especially those associated with Black Panther Party – theorised the situation of racialised peoples within the US as analogous to colonialism, with black populations essentially forming an ‘internal semi-colony’.[47] In this respect, they built on the Black Belt thesis, advanced by both the Comintern and elements of the CPUSA, in which blacks in the South were understood as an incipient nation with a right to self-determination.[48] Perhaps the height of this was Huey Newton’s theory of ‘revolutionary intercommunalism’, which he devised as a solution to the problem of imperialism and racism. For Newton, the oppression of Black Americans was not simply ‘racism’ but rather was rooted in a global economic system of imperialism. This imperialism was not simply based on nations, but rather ‘communities’, for Newton, a community was ‘small unit with a comprehensive collection of institutions that serve to exist a small group of people’.[49] Imperialism was characterized by a situation in which a small circle ‘administers and profits from the empire of the United States’ as against other oppressed communities. In this context, a revolutionary intercommunalism would unite those communities oppressed and exploited through empire, creating creating a society based on equality, mutual aid, in which everyone’s basic needs were met, this would be achieved through the collective ownership of resources and the abolition of private property[50].

Particularly important in the US context were those theories which sought to understand the particular formation of ‘whiteness’, and how this ‘whiteness’ interlocked with the US working class. Perhaps most famously W.E.B. DuBois characterised the racism of the white working class in the US post-Bellum South as a ‘public and psychological wage’.[51] Here, DuBois argued, although white labourers received a low wage they received other compensations such a deference and courtesy, also had access to a number of public benefits such as the best schooling, access to public areas and an influence in terms of electoral politics.[52] By contrast, black workers were subject to ‘[m]ob violence and lynching’ which in certain contexts served as ‘entertainment’ for ‘vicious whites’.[53] As such, Du Bois argued:

One can see for these reasons why labor organizers and labor agitators made such small headway in the South. They were, for the most part, appealing to laborers who would rather have low wages upon which they could eke out an existence than see colored labor with a decent wage. White labor saw in every advance of Negroes a threat to their racial prerogatives, so that in many districts Negroes were afraid to build decent homes or dress well, or own carriages, bicycles or automobiles, because of possible retaliation on the part of the whites.[54]

Du Bois’ emphasis on the construction of whiteness through the provision of ‘privilege’ has been a significant influence on theories of race and racism. ‘White privilege’ is, of course, a concept that has been invoked in many non-Marxist accounts to explain racism.[55] Yet beyond this, Du Bois’ account here has been directly important for those Marxists in the US who sought to explain the relative quiescence of the US labour movement – both in general and in relation to anti-racist struggles. Particularly, important in this respect were the theoretical positions that emerged from figures associated with the New Communist Movement – especially the Sojourner Truth Organisation – including Theodore W. Allen, Noah Ignatiev and – later Elizabeth Esch and David Roediger.[56]

Following on from Du Bois, these figures – whilst of course articulating a myriad of different positions – all located the construction of ‘whiteness’ in the provision of a series of ‘privileges’. The crucial moment here was understood to be in the 17th century, where racial divisions were seen to have hardened. Particularly, important in the American context was the experience of the Virginia plantations. Here – particularly following Bacon’s Rebellion[57] - there was a potential for an alliance between ‘white’ indentured labourers and black slaves, fighting together against their common white masters. In response to this, the plantation ruling class intensified the racialisation of slavery, and emphasised the relative ‘privilege’ of those ‘white’ labourers. In this way, ‘whiteness’ serves as mechanism of social control, by separating out the white workers from black slaves, as David Roediger put it:

Thus the very idea of formal equality among industrious free white citizens emerged in and after the American Revolution from creating, measuring, and imagining their social distance from African American slaves and from Indians whose alleged laziness rationalized their dispossession and exploitation.[58]

Unlike contemporary uses of ‘privilege’, Ignatiev’s concept was embedded in a social structure not on individual identity. While Ignatiev’s analysis was that some groups secured advantages in the short term, but that these privileges were ultimately harmful not only to the oppressed but those who seemingly benefited from it. While contemporary uses of privilege are overly individualistic and is not sufficiently attuned to structural factors and the role of race in sowing social divisions that also disadvantage the ‘privileged’[59].

Crucially, they argue, this survived the ending of the formal, juridical subordination of chattel slavery, with the ‘production of difference’ outside of formal juridical categories, remaining crucial in the management of labour.

Race, Ideology, Neoliberalism

The collapse of the anti-colonial and radical civil rights movements in the late 1970s and 1980s very much reconfigured the relationship between Marxism and anti-racist – in both intellectual and political terms. In this period, in which the forces of the organised left fought, and eventually lost, a sustained battle with the emergent neoliberal right, many began to cast doubt on the ability of the Marxist tradition to grapple with questions of race and racism (indeed in this context, it is perhaps no accident that Black Marxism was published in 1983). In particular, with the seeming fragmentation of the bastions of organised labour, and the rise of the various ‘new social movements’ (particularly around race, gender and sexuality), many argued that Marxism, with its purportedly narrow focus on class, could not account for these social antagonisms.

Such arguments were, in many respects, associated with the ‘post-‘ theories of the 1980s – poststructuralism, postcolonialism and Post-Marxism – as well as the solidification of what was to become ‘identity politics’. Crucially, these developments did not simply occur ‘outside’ of the Marxist tradition, instead, they were an intrinsic part of the Marxist attempts to relate to the ‘new social movements’. In this respect, Marxist accounts of hegemony and ideology became crucial.

Perhaps the most significant work here was that of Stuart Hall. In Policing the Crisis Hall –– along withChas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts -- argued that race is ‘a critical structure of the social order of contemporary capitalism’.[60] Here, race helps to ‘reproduce labour’ in an ‘internally divided form’, and thus create sections of the working class which might be subject to greater forms of exploitation and to forestall ‘the unity of the [working] class as a whole’.[61] In this way, race served as one of a number of structures that ‘reproduce the class relations of the whole society in a specific form on an extended scale’,[62] with the role of racism to reproduce the ‘working class in a racially stratified and internally antagonistic form’.[63]

At the same time, however, Hall insisted that race did not simply serve as an objective form here, but rather, also as the subjective mode through which individuals experience their class position, accordingly, as famously put inPolicing the Crisis, race was:

the principal modality in which the black members of that class 'live,' experience, make sense of and thus come to a consciousness of their structured subordination. It is through the modality of race that blacks comprehend, handle and then begin to resist the exploitation which is an objective feature of their class situation. Race is therefore not only an element of the 'structures'; it is a key element in the class struggle - and thus in thecultures — of black labour. It is through the counter-ideology of race, colour and ethnicity that the black working class becomes conscious of the contradictions of its objective situation and organises to 'fight it through'.[64]

These formulations were part of Hall’s larger, Althusserian-influenced perspective on Marxism and race. For Hall, ultimately, capitalist social formations had to be understood as specific complex ‘articulations’ of different modes of production, as well as different instances of the social totality. In this way, it is necessary to start with ‘historically specific racisms, beginning with an assumption of difference, of specificity rather than of a unitary transhistorical universal “structure”. Accordingly:

One must start, then, from the concrete historical “work” which racism accomplishes under specific historical conditions—as a set of economic, political and ideological practices, of a distinctive kind, concretely articulated with other practices in a social formation. These practices ascribe the positioning of different social groups in relation to one another with respect to the elementary structures of society; they fix and ascribe those positionings in ongoing social practices; they legitimate the positions so ascribed.[65]

Consequently, for Hall, there could be no broader theory about the race and capitalism, with racism not being necessary to the functioning of all capitalisms, with mission of materialist analysis to demonstrate how particular racisms are articulated with particular social formations. Although Hall’s position did not develop into a full-blown post-Marxist one, he was – of course – a central figure in Marxism Today and the broader Eurocommunist wing of the CPGB. Here he was criticised politically by other figures on the Marxist, anti-racist left, particularly important in this respects was Ambalavaner Sivanandan,[66] whose own work carefully foregrounded the centrality of the class and state as determinant elements in producing a racialised capitalist society.[67]

 

Marxist Theory Today

The above discussion, cannot, of course, encapsulate the diversity and breadth of Marxist writing about race and racism. Yet it does, at the very least, give an idea of the seriousness with which Marxists have historically taken these issues. Far from just an ‘epiphenomenon’, many in the Marxist tradition have sought to significantly extend historical materialist theory in order to specifically understand race and racism. In some ways, however, the mature neoliberal period saw something of a retreat from these positions: with greater emphasis placed on the category of race as one simply opposed to Marxist analysis.

Indeed, this has been the character of many contemporary debates on the issue. With many contemporary Marxists contesting the idea that race and racism have any independent explanatory power or standing.[68] At the same time, however, a number of Marxist works respond to the older traditions described above, and seek to advance their arguments in a contemporary sense. These debates, drawing on the history of Marxist thinking about race and racism, have arguably been structured around the following issues:

  • The relationship between ‘race’ and ‘class’. This encompasses both the question of what status each have in capitalism, and – perhaps more productively – the role that practices of race and racialisation play in class-formation.[69]
  • The degree to which racism can be understood as having a necessary connection with capitalist social relations, that is to say whether or not racism might be said to be inherent in the logic of capital, or whether it is a contingent historical outgrowth. This touches on the question of whether racism exists prior to, and alongside, the capitalist mode of production.[70]
  • Despite ideologies eschewing universal theorisations of race (poststructuralism) or that the universal theory is fixed in its hierarchy (afropessimism), that race is both socially constructed but also carries patterns across the world be they exploited as migrant labour or dispossessed for land.

In this way, of course, the contemporary debate attempts to respond to the broader question of the relationship between processes of capitalist accumulation and those of racialisation.

Special issue

The articles in this special issue need to be understood against this wider context. Eschewing overly binary discussions about the ‘competition’ between ‘race’ and ‘class’, they instead represent more specific interventions – on both the theoretical and historical level – into these questions. Whilst the contributions are of course varied, we can understand them as responding directly to many of the questions outlined above. These interventions are multifaceted and intertwined. And yet, despite their interconnectedness, it was necessary to place these interventions into themes, to provide some structure and coherence to the discussion. Some themes were more bounded than others, but even those that were more narrowly defined were often overlapping and interconnected. It was a delicate balancing act that required careful consideration. Given the sheer size of this special issue, it will be covered over two physical issues. The first will contain the articles under the theme of Race and Capital and Colony, while the second issue will look the areas of Ideology, Chains, and Labour.

We start our discussion on Race and Capital with two pieces by Satnam Virdee and Charlie Post that get to the historical roots of the relationship between race and capitalism. Virdee traces the origins of racism to the dissolution of absolute states in Western Europe from the 15th to 17th centuries, while Post sees racial subordination as rooted in capitalist social property relations. Peter Hudis then evaluates whether Marxist theorists can explain the persistence of racism and the emergence of subjective agency against it, using the mass protests against police abuse that swept across the US and other countries as a critical test. Finally, Sheetal Chhabria examines the South Asian caste system in the context of Robinson’s “racial capitalism” to answer the questions of whether there is a global history of racial capitalism.

This takes us to our next section, Colony. Here we continue within South Asia with Tania Bhattacharyya’s research into the Sidi community in Bombay, which comprises freed people of African descent rescued from slaving boats in the Indian Ocean in the 19th century. While colonial liberation foregrounded ideas of race, Sidis have rejected such categories. Through an exploration of the colonial archives, Bhattacharyya critiques colonial racecraft, a form of race-making intended to incorporate displace former enslaved people from East Africa into colonial Bombay’s burgeoning steamship industry as stokes, fireman and trimmers. Yet, Sidis, in the tradition of Fanon, attempted to move beyond racial categories proscribed to them. Meanwhile, Jack Davies takes us to the Australian settler-colony to critique ‘settler colonial studies’ for its universalizing the Australian settler-colonial experience. Indeed, the limitations of Settler Colonial Studies goes beyond its use of Australia as paradigmic, to Davis it remains overly reliant on an expansive notion of primitive accumulation by David Harvey and built on a single inadequate reading of Rosa Luxemburg. Ultimately, Davis argues that such an interpretation is to the detriment to our understanding of race in this contemporary phase of capitalism. Finally, Gabi Kirk continues this critique of settler colonial studies while looking at the case of Palestine. To Kirk the question of ‘indigeneity’ remains underexamined. Through the Palestine example, Kirk shows how the valorization and privatization of indigeneity narrows notions of the biological-cultural, offering challenges to Palestinian struggles in the context of the larger debate of racial capitalism.

The second issue begins with Ideology. Adam Hanieh and Rafeef Ziadah’s argue that borders are a mystification, an ideological misrepresentation of social reality, that emerged from the nature of capitalism as a society based upon generalized commodity production. Using value-form theory, they examine migration as a process of mystification and class formation and how borders shape and circumscribe the various fractions of labour as demarcated, contained, and brought into relations with one another. While Matthew Dimick takes a closer look at race and reification through Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism. In doing so, he explores why race is naturalized through a wide-reaching exploration of domination, exploitation and ideology. Finally, Lukas Egger sets forth a value-form theoretical approach to racism. Building upon and against the work of Peter Schmitt-Egner, to make sense of how capitalism is bound up with racism through the past and into the present.

As the pages of history turned and the chains of slavery tightened around the world, the questions of emancipation loomed large. We begin with the next theme of Chains and the question of enslavement. Naturally, we begin with the question of whether Marx Defended Black Slavery? Gregory Slack corrects the misinterpretation of a single passage concerning black slavery from an 1853 letter from Marx to Engels. This quote makes it seem as though Marx’s support for emancipation was conditional on the level of ‘civilization’ attained by black slaves. This has led to even rightwing publications to make the case the ‘Karl Marx Was a Total Racist.” The falsity of these interpretations is confronted by situating Marx’s comments within its historical context, language and understood within his corpus of writings and actions. Scott Timcke then Revisits the Plantation Society by drawing on the analysis of the oft-neglected New World Group of the West Indies. The group’s economic analysis exposes the inherent logic of plantation societies, and the historical dynamics found in the Caribbean. In tandem with Timcke’s examination, Ajmal Waqif takes a closer look at the revolutionary writings of Robert Wedderburn, which delve into the Haitian Revolution, maroon warfare, and propose a Spencean communist program. Waqif uses these proposals to offer a rebuttal to the ideas generated from postcolonial theory and afro-pessimism, as he mines through archives to provide historically-grounded argument for universal emancipation in the political present.

Finally, the last section of Labour begins with Nicholas De Genova’s exploration of the history of human labour, spanning from the enslavement to our contemporary moment. De Genova weaves a radical racial theory of labour, grounded in the labour theory of value, that challenges dominant ideas surrounding the position of migrant labour under global capitalism. Jane Komori tackles the issue of the ‘labour problem’ that plagued Canada’s sugar beet sector. She argues that the challenge of recruiting and retaining field workers resulted in a form of racialization, as the industry turned to groups such as interned Japanese Canadians, indigenous peoples removed from northern reserves from the 1950s-1980s, and seasonal Mexican and Caribbean migrant workers to fill the labour gap. Despite the sector’s increasing automation, Komori concludes that the industry still relies heavily on a racialized and captive pool of inexhaustible labour. Her analysis sheds light on the deeply embedded structures of oppression and exploitation that have shaped the labour landscape in Canada and beyond.  We end with Alfie Hancox, who offers an exploration of how Britain’s Black Power movement challenged the political outlook of the anti-fascist left, specifically the high-profile Anti-Nazi League, in 1960s and 1970s. While the established labour movement interpreted the National Front as an aberrant threat to Britain’s social democracy, Black political groups foregrounded the systemic racial violence of the British state. In a prescient move, they prefigured Stuart Hall’s analysis of “authoritarian populism”, making powerful connections between fascism and state policies, both at the border and abroad. In so doing, they foregrounded the centrality of racism to capitalism, and its ‘normal’ mode of operation.

Taken together, these contributions offer a powerful and sobering critique of how race was both integrated and was born out of the plantations system, borders, the colony, and work, while proposing concrete ways towards a society free of racism and capitalism.

Read the Back Issue 26(2): Identity Politics

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Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich 1972, Imperialism and World Economy, London: Merlin Press.

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Deleixhe, Martin. 2019, “Marx, the Irish Immigrant-Workers, and the English Labour Movement” Historical Materialism. 29(2): 222-247.

DiAngelo, R., 2022. White Fragility (Adapted for Young Adults): Why Understanding Racism Can Be So Hard for White People (Adapted for Young Adults). Beacon Press.

Du Bois, W. E. B. 1999, Black Reconstruction in America 1860-1880, New York, NY: Free Press.

Dymski, Gary. 2009. "Racial exclusion and the political economy of the subprime crisis." Historical materialism 17, no. 2: 149-179.

Fanon, Frantz 1963, The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press.

——— 1988, ‘Racism and culture’, in Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays, New York: Grove Press: 29–44.

Fields, Karen E. and Barbara J. Fields 2014, Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life, Reprint edition., London: Verso.

Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts. 1978. Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state and law and order. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Harman, Chris 2010. Zombie capitalism: Global crisis and the relevance of Marx. Haymarket Books.

Hiferding, R., 2019. Finance capital: A study in the latest phase of capitalist development. Routledge.

Hobson, J.A., 2018. Imperialism: a study. Routledge.

Hudis, Peter. 2018. “Racism and the Logic of Capital: A Fanonion Reconsideration” Historical Materialism. 26(2): 199-220.

Ignatiev, Noel. 2003 “Whiteness and Class Struggle” Historical Materialism. 11(4): 227-235

Johnson, Cedric 2016, ‘Between Revolution and the Racial Ghetto: Harold Cruse and Harry Haywood Debate Class Struggle and the “Negro Question”, 1962–8’, Historical Materialism 24, 2: 165–203.

Kalyvas, S.N. and Balcells, L., 2010. Did Marxism make a difference? Marxist rebellions and national liberation movements. Marxist Rebellions and National Liberation Movements.

Kelley, R.D.G., 1987. Hammer n'hoe: black radicalism and the Communist Party in Alabama, 1929-1941. University of California, Los Angeles.

Kelly, Brian 2004, ‘Materialism and the Persistence of Race in the Jim Crow South’, Historical Materialism 12:2: 3-19.

Kelly Brian 2019, ‘Slave Self-Activity and the Bourgeois Revolution in the United States: Jubilee and the Boundaries of Black Freedom’, Historical Materialism 27:3: 31-76.

Kipfer, Stefan A. and Ayyaz Mallick 2022, ‘‘Stretch’ and ‘Translate’: Gramscian Lineages, Fanonist Convergences in the (Post)Colony’, Historical Materialism 30:4: 137-173.

Knox, Robert and Ntina Tzouvala 2021, ‘Looking Eastwards: The Bolshevik Theory of 

Imperialism and International Law’, in Revolutions in International Law: The Legacies of 1917, edited by Anna Saunders, Anne Orford, Kathryn Greenman, and NtinaTzouvala, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 27–55.

Knox, Robert and David Whyte 2023, ‘Vaccinating capitalism: racialised value in the COVID-19 economy’, Mortality.

Kumar, A., Elliott-Cooper, A., Iyer, S. and Gebrial, D., 2018. An introduction to the special issue on identity politics. Historical Materialism,26(2), pp.3-20.

Le Blanc, Paul 2003, ‘The Absence of Socialism in the United States: Contextualising Kautsky's 'American Worker'’, Historical  Materialism 11:4: 124-170.

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——— 1964, ‘A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism’, in V.I. Lenin, 

Collected Works, edited by M.S. Levin, Moscow: Progress Publishers: 28–76.

Levenson, Zachary and Marcel Paret 2022, ‘The Three Dialectics of Racial Capitalism: From South Africa to the U.S. and Back Again’, Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 1–19.

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Opratko, Benjamin 2017, ‘Islamophobia: The Bigger Picture’, Historical Materialism 25, 1: 63–89.

Patnaik, U. and Patnaik, P., 2021. Capital and imperialism: Theory, history, and the present. Monthly Review Press.

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Post, Charlie, 2010. Exploring working-class consciousness: A critique of the theory of the ‘Labour-Aristocracy’. Historical Materialism,18(4), pp.3-38.

Pulido, Laura. 2006. Black, Brown, Yellow and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Reed, Adolph L. and Merlin Chowkwanyun 2012, ‘Race, class, crisis: The discourse of racial disparity and its analytical discontents’, Socialist Register 48: 149–75.

Riddell, John. 2014 Towards the United Front: Proceedings of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, 1922. Haymarket Books

Robinson, Cedric J., 2000. Black Marxism, revised and updated third edition: The making of the black radical tradition. UNC press Books.

Rodney, Walter 1982, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press.

Roediger, David 2017, Class, Race and Marxism, London ; New York: Verso.

Roediger, David and Elizabeth Esch 2009, ‘One Symptom of Originality: Race and the Management of Labour in the History of the United States’, Historical Materialism 17, 4: 3–43.

Roediger, David R and Elizabeth D Esch 2012, The Production of Difference: Race and the Management of Labor in U.S. History, Oxford University Press.

Roediger, David R. How race survived US history: From settlement and slavery to the eclipse of post-racialism. Verso Books, 2019.

Saad-Filho, A. and Ayers, A.J., 2020. 'A ticking time-bomb': The global south in the time of coronavirus. The Journal of Australian Political Economy, (85), pp.84-93.

Shelby, T., 2022. The Idea of Prison Abolition. In The Idea of Prison Abolition. Princeton University Press.

Sivanandan, Ambalavaner. "All that melts into air is solid: the hokum of New Times." Race & Class 31.3 (1990): 1-30.

Williams, Eric, 1914. Capitalism and slavery. UNC Press Books.

Wood, P.W., 2022. 1620: A Critical Response to the 1619 project. Encounter Books.

Van Ree, E., 2019. Marx and Engels’s theory of history: making sense of the race factor. Journal of Political Ideologies,24(1), pp.54-73.

Vasquez, Delia. 2018 “Intercommunalism: The late theorizations of Huey P. Newton. Viewpoint Magazine

Virdee, Satnam 2014, Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider, Bloomsbury Publishing.

Virdee, Satnam 2019, ‘Racialized capitalism: An account of its contested origins and consolidation’, The Sociological Review 67, 1: 3–27

Wall, Irwin M 1977, ‘The French Communists and the Algerian War’, Journal of Contemporary History 12, 3: 521–43.

Wood, Ellen Meiksins 1995, Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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[1] Taylor 2019.

[2] Dymski 2009

[3] Harman 2010

[4] Saad-Filho and Ayers 2020; Knox and Whyte 2023.

[5] Kumar et al. 2018.

[6] ibid., p. 10.

[7] Wood 2022

[8]See Patnaik and Patnaik 2021 for new imperialism debates. SeeNdlovu-Gatsheni and Ndlovu 2021 for decolonial and Marxism debates

[9] Shelby 2022

[10] Robinson 2020

[11] Robinson 2020, p. 84

[12] Robsinson 2020, p. 28

[13] Robinson 2000, p. xxxi.

[14] ibid., p. xx.

[15] See Bhattacharyya 2018. For an in-depth account see Levenson and Paret 2022.

[16] See e.g. Balthaser 2021; Kelly 2004; Le Blanc 2003; Camfield 2016; Johnson 2016; Kelly 2019; Opratko 2017; Kipfer and Mallick 2022.

[17] Van Ree 2019

[18] Marx 1990, p. 915.

[19] Marx 1933, p. 28

[20] Marx 1990, p. 414.

[21] For more on Irish immigrant-workers and Marx see Deleixhe 2019

[22]Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 43, Letters 1868–70 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2010): 471–76.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Bukharin 1972

[25] Hobson 2018

[26] Hilferding 2019

[27] Lenin 1964

[28] Bukharin 1972, p. 165.

[29] Lenin 1964, p. 114.

[30] Lenin 1964, p. 56.

[31] Many a critique in the pages of this journal over the question. See Maguire (2021) and Post (2010)

[32] Knox and Tzouvala 2021.

[33] Degras (ed.) 1956, p. 121.

[34] Zumoff 2014

[35] Riddell 2014, p. 951

[36] Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) found that the most effective liberation struggles were once that adopting a Marxist ideology

[37] Kelley (1987) documenting the communist party’s Alabama Sharecroppers’ Union is but one example of Marxists commitment to interracial organising efforts. See also Omi and Winant (2014) and Pulido (2006).

[38] Wall 1977.

[39] Fanon 1963, p. 40.

[40] Williams 2021, p. 7

[41] For a Fanonion reconsideration of racism and the logic of capitalism see Hudis 2018.

[42] Fanon 1988, pp. 40–41.

[43] ibid., pp. 37–38.

[44] Rodney 1982, p. 88.

[45] ibid.

[46] Balibar’s (1991) uses nation as a middle term in the relationship between race and capitalism to argue that nations are used to legitimize and reinforce hierarchies that exist within capitalist societies.

[47] Pinderhughes 2011

[48] Kelley 1987

[49] Newton 2018.

[50] Vasquez 2018

[51] Du Bois 1999, p. 626.

[52] ibid.

[53] ibid.

[54] ibid.

[55] There are innumerable books that individualise either directly or indirectly utilising the ideas of ‘privilege’. Such books can found at any airport kiosk the best-selling of which is Robin DiAngelo’s 2022 book White Fragility.

[56] Roediger and Esch 2009; Roediger and Esch 2012.

[57] Allen 1973

[58] Roediger 2019, p. xv

[59] Ignatiev 2003

[60] Hall et al 1978 (p. 345)

[61] Hall et al 1978 (p. 346)

[62] Hall et al 1978 (p. 346)

[63] Hall et al 1978 (p. 346)

[64] Hall et al 1978 (p. 347)

[65] Hall et al 1978 (p. 338)

[66] Sivanandan 1990

[67] Sivanandan 1976.

[68] See, e.g. Fields and Fields 2014; Wood 1995, pp. 264–84.

[69] See e.g. Kelley 1987; Reed and Chowkwanyun 2012; Roediger 2017; Virdee 2014.

[70] See e.g. Virdee 2019.

 

Racism and the Logic of Capitalism

A Fanonion Reconsideration
Peter Hudis

ISSUE 26(2): IDENTITY POLITICS

The emergence of a new generation of anti-racist activists and thinkers battling police abuse, the prison-industrial complex and entrenched racism in the US, alongside the crisis over immigration and growth of right-wing populism in Europe and elsewhere, makes this a crucial moment to develop theoretical perspectives that conceptualise race and racism as integral to capitalism while going beyond identity politics that treat such issues primarily in cultural and discursive terms. The last several decades have produced a slew of important studies by Marxists of the logic of capital as well as numerous explorations by postcolonial theorists of the narratives that structure racial and ethnic discrimination. Far too often, however, these two currents have assumed different or even opposed trajectories, making it all the harder to transcend one-sided class-reductionist analyses and equally one-sided affirmations of identity that bypass or ignore class. In light of the new reality produced by the deepening crisis of neoliberalism and the looming disintegration of the political order that has defined global capitalism since the end of the Cold War, the time has come to revisit theoretical approaches that can help delineate the integrality of race, class and capitalism.

Few thinkers are more important in this regard than Frantz Fanon, widely considered one of the most creative thinkers on race, racism and national consciousness of the twentieth century. Fanon’s effort to ‘slightly stretch’ (as he put it) ‘the Marxian analysis … when it comes to addressing the colonial issue’[1] represented an important attempt to work out the dialectic of race and class through a coherent theoretical framework that does not dissolve one into the other. This may help explain the resurgence of interest in his work that is now underway. At least five new books on Fanon have appeared in English over the past two years[2] – in addition to a new 600-page collection in French of his previously-unpublished or unavailable writings on psychiatry, politics and literature.[3] Although Fanon has remained a commanding presence for decades, the extent of this veritable renaissance of interest in his thought is striking. It is no less reflected in the many times his words have appeared on posters, flyers and social media over the past year by those protesting police abuse, the criminal-injustice system, and racism on and off college campuses.[4]

These ongoing rediscoveries of Fanon’s work mark a radical departure from the tenor of debates among postcolonial theorists over the past several decades – when the prevailing issue seemed to be whether or not he was a ‘premature poststructuralist’.[5] If one were to limit oneself to such academic discussions, one might come away thinking that the validity of Fanon’s body of work rests on the extent to which he succeeded in deconstructing the unity of the colonial subject in the name of alterity and difference.[6] Yet these approaches – some of which went so far as to sanction even the discussion of capitalism or its unitary logic as representing a capitulation to epistemic imperialism – could not be further from what drives the renewal of interest in Fanon’s legacy today.[7]

What makes Fanon’s work especially cogent is that contemporary capitalism is manifesting some of the most egregious expressions of racial animosity that we have seen in decades. One need only note the attacks on immigrants of colour in the US and Europe, the revival of right-wing populism, and most of all, the ascendancy of Donald Trump to the US presidency. This raises the question of why there is such a resurgence of racial animus atthis point in time. At least part of the answer is the work of groups like Black Lives Matter, Black Youth Project 100 and many others, which, in engaging politics from a ‘black-feminist-queer lens’, has put the spotlight on issues of race in as creative a manner as the Occupy movement did for economic inequality.[8] In reaction, a section of bourgeois society has decided to drop the mask of civility and openly reassert the prerogatives of white male domination. ‘Whitelash’ is in the driver’s seat – and not only in the US. This should come as no surprise, since the forces of the old always rear their heads when a new challenge to their dominance begins to emerge.

Not unconnected to this is the growth of reactionary challenges to neoliberalism. This calls for a serious reorganisation of thought, since many have focused so much attention on critiquing neoliberalism that they have had rather little to say about the logic of capital as a whole. It is often overlooked that neoliberalism is but one strategy employed by capitalism at a particular point in time – as was Keynesianism at an earlier point. And just as Keynesianism was jettisoned when it no longer served its purpose, the same may be true of neoliberalism today. What brought down the Keynesian project was the crisis in profitability faced by global capital in the 1970s. Capitalists responded by embracing the neoliberal stratagem as a means to restore profitability. This made perfect sense from their point of view, since it is profitability – not effective demand – that in the final analysis determines the course of the development of capitalist society.[9] Profit-rates did go up from the early 1980s to 2000 as the forces of global competition, free trade, and privatisation were unleashed, but most of these gains were in real estate and finance – whereas manufacturing profitability remained at historically low levels. And since much of the profit from real estate and financialisation has not been invested in the real economy, there has been a decline in recent decades in the rate of growth in the productivity of labour.[10] This at least partly explains the anaemic rate of growth in today’s world economy, which is causing so much distress – not only among those most negatively impacted by it, but also to sections of the ruling class that increasingly recognise that the neoliberal ‘miracle’ has proven to be something of a mirage.

In many respects, this established the ground for Trump. His electoral victory (pyrrhic as it may well turn out to be) is a sign that a significant section of the Right has found a way to speak to disaffected segments of the working class by draping criticism of neoliberalism in racist and misogynist terms – while ensuring that capitalism goes unquestioned. Hence, opposition to such tendencies must begin and end with a firm and uncompromising rejection of any programme, tendency or initiative that in any way, shape or form is part of, or dovetails – no matter how indirectly – with racist and/or anti-immigrant sentiment. Any other approach will make it harder to distinguish a genuine critique of class inequality, free trade, and globalisation from reactionary ones.

For this reason, holding to the critique of neoliberalism as the crux of anti-capitalist opposition no longer makes much sense. Needed instead is an explicit attack on the inner core of capitalism – its logic of accumulation and alienation that is inextricably tied to augmenting value as an end in itself. And racism has long been integral to capital’s drive for self-expansion.

Capitalism first emerged as a world system through the anti-black racism generated by the transatlantic slave trade, and it has depended on racism to ensure its perpetration and reproduction ever since.[11] Marx argued,

Slavery is an economic category like any other … Needless to say we are dealing only with direct slavery, with Negro slavery in Surinam, in Brazil, in the Southern States of North America. Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that gave the colonies their value; it is the colonies that created world trade, and it is world trade that is the precondition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance.[12]

Marx was clearly cognisant of the peculiar role played by race in American slavery – and he was no less aware of how integral race-based slavery was to capitalism’s origins and development as a world system. But does this mean that racism is integral to the logic of capital? Might racism be a mere exogenous factor that is only built into specific moments of capitalism’s contingent history? To be sure, it is possible to conceive of the possibility that capitalism could have emerged and developed as a world system without its utilising race and racism. But historical materialism does not concern itself with what could have occurred, but with whatdid occur andcontinues to occur. According to Marx, without race-based slavery ‘you have no modern industry’ and no ‘world trade’ – and no modern capitalism. Hence, thelogic of capital is in many respects inseparable from itshistorical development. I am referring not only to the factors that led to the formation of the world market but to the role played by race and racism in impeding proletarian class consciousness, which has functioned as an essential component in enabling capital accumulation to be actualised. Marx was keenly aware of this, as seen in his writings on the US Civil War and the impact of anti-Irish prejudice upon the English workers’ movement.[13] He took the trouble to address these issues in Capital itself, which famously declared ‘labour in a white skin cannot emancipate itself where it is branded in a black skin.’[14]

Racism is not and never has been an epiphenomenal characteristic of capitalism. It is integral to its very development. The time is therefore long past for holding onto such notions as ‘there is no race question outside the class question’[15] or ‘the race issue, while important, is secondary to class’. Since capitalism was shaped, from its inception, by racial factors, it is not possible to effectively oppose it without making the struggle against racism a priority. And for this very reason, the present situation also makes it increasingly anachronistic to hold onto forms of identity politics that elide issues of class and a critique of capital. The effort to elevate ethnic identity and solidarity at the expense of a direct confrontation with capitalism is inherently self-defeating, since the latter is responsible for the perpetration of racism and the marginalisation of peoples of colour in the first place. Since race and racism help create, reproduce and reinforce an array of hierarchies that are rooted in class domination, subjective affirmations of identity that are divorced from directly challenging capital will inevitably lose their critical edge and impact over the course of time.

Class struggle and anti-racist struggle have a common aim – at least from a Fanonian perspective. It is to overcome the alienation and dehumanisation that define modern society by creating new human relations – termed by Fanon a ‘new humanism’.[16] But the path to that lofty goal is not one of rushing to the absolute like a shot out of the pistol. It can be reached only through ‘the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative’.[17] Re-engaging Fanon on this level can speak to us in new ways.

 

II.

Fanon repeatedly emphasises that anti-Black racism is not natural but is rooted in theeconomic imperatives ofcapitalism – beginning with the transatlantic slave trade and extending to the neo-colonialism of today. As he writes inBlack Skin, White Masks, ‘First, economic. Then, internalization or rather epidermalization of his inferiority.’[18] At the same time, he held that racism cannot be combatted on economic or class-terms alone, since racialised ways of ‘seeing’ and being take on a life of their own and drastically impact the psychic, inner-life of the individual. Both the black and the white subject are impacted and shaped by class domination, but they experience it in radically different ways. Any effort to ignore or downplay these crucial differences for the sake of a fictive ‘unity’ that abstracts from them is bound to fall on deaf ears when it comes to a significant portion of the dispossessed. On these grounds, Fanon insisted that both sides – the economic and the cultural/psychic – have to be foughtin tandem. As he put it, ‘The black man must wage the struggle on two levels: whereas historically these levels are mutually dependent, any unilateral liberation is flawed, and the worst mistake would be to believe their mutual dependence automatic … An answer must be found on the objective as well as the subjective level.’[19]

For Fanon, what makes racism especially deadly is that it denies recognition of the dignity and humanity of the colonised subject. As a result, the latter experiences a ‘zone of nonbeing’ – a negation of their very humanity. He calls this ‘an extraordinary sterile and arid region, an incline stripped bare of every essential form from which a genuine new departure can emerge.’[20] It is a zone of depravity that renders implausible any ‘ontology of Blackness’. The black is not seen as human precisely bybeing seen’ – not once, but repeatedly –as black. The colonial mind does not ‘see’ what it thinks it sees; it fixes its gaze not on the actual person but on a reified image that obscures them. For the coloniser, the black is indeednothing.However, this zone of non-being in no way succeeds in erasing the humanity of the oppressed. The denial of the subject’s subjectivity can never be completely consummated. This is because, as Fanon never ceases to remind us, ‘Man is a “yes” resonating from cosmic harmonies.’[21]

On this issue, there are striking parallels between Fanon’s works and Marx’s – even if it is rarely acknowledged. In the first essay in which he proclaimed the proletariat as the revolutionary class, Marx defined it as ‘the class in Civil Society that is notof Civil Society’.[22] The proletariat lives in civil society, but unlike the bourgeoisie its substantiality is notconfirmed in it. Since workers are robbed of any organic connection to the means of production in their being reduced to a mere seller of labour-power, they find themselves alienated from thesubstance of civil society. This is because what matters to capital is not the subjectivity of the living labourers but rather their ability to augment wealth in abstract, monetary terms. There is only one ‘self-sufficient end’ in capitalism – and that is the augmentation of (abstract) value at the expense of the labourer. Insofar as the worker’s subjectivity becomes completely subsumed by the dictates of value production, theworker inhabits a zone of negativity. He isdehumanised is insofar as his ‘activity [is] not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self.’[23]Self-estrangement is therefore integral to the domination of capital. This makes for a living hell, but it is also what makes the proletariat potentially revolutionary, since ithas nothing to lose but its chains. But what does it have togain? The answer iscommunism, defined by Marx as ‘thepositive transcendence ofhuman self-estrangement … the complete return of man to himself as asocial (i.e., human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development.’ Since capitalismdehumanises the labourer, the alternative to capitalism is nothing less than anew humanism: ‘This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism.’[24]

This is a far cry from any classless, abstract humanism, since for Marx only the proletariat ‘has the consistency, the severity, the courage or the ruthlessness that could mark it out as the negative representative of society.’ It alone possesses ‘the genius that inspires material might to political violence, or that revolutionary audacity which flings at the adversary the defiant words: “I am nothing and I should be everything.”’[25]

But how could everything arise fromnothing? It is only possible if it is not labour that takes the form of a commodity but rather thecapacity for labour – labour-power. As Luca Basso puts it, ‘the capitalist buys something that only exists as a possibility, which is, however, inseparable from the living personality of theArbeiter.’[26] If labour were the commodity, the worker’s subjectivity would be completely absorbed by the value-form and any internal resistance to it would be implausible. Marx’s entire critique of value production – rooted in the contradiction between concrete and abstract labour – proceeds from recognition of the irreducible tension between the subject and the continuous effort to subsume its subjectivity by abstract forms of domination. Here is where the so-called ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’ converge in Marx’s work.

There is more than an echo of this in Fanon’s declaration in Black Skin, White Masks that, ‘Genuine disalienation will have been achieved only when things, in the most materialist sense, have resumed their rightful place.’[27] But Fanon also points to a key difference between racial and class oppression, in that the former cuts deeper than the traditional class struggle insofar as people of colour are denied even a modicum of recognition when structures of domination are over-determined by racial considerations.

Fanon’s insights on this issue are most profoundly posed in his discussion of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic in Black Skin, White Masks. Hegel maintains that the master wants to be recognised by the slave, for without it he is unable to obtain a sense of self-certainty and selfhood. Hegel acknowledges, of course, that what the master mainly wants from the slave iswork. Yet the master still aspires to be recognised by his subordinates, since he, like all human beings, wants to obtain a substantive sense of self – and that is something that can only be provided by the gaze of the other. So what happens when the master/slave dialectic is structured along racial lines – something that Hegel does not consider? Fanon argues that the situation becomes radically altered. The master is no longer interested in being recognised by the slave, just as the slave is no longer interested in recognising him.This is because when the master is white he does not see the black as even potentially human.[28] Like all masters, he wants work from his slave; but when race enters the picture, that is all he wants – he denies the slave even the most primordial degree of recognition.

To be sure, matters are hardly pristine when race does not inform the class relation. The capitalist ‘cares’ about the worker only to the extent that she provides work – and if the latter can be attained without her, the capitalist will gladly lay her off and employ a machine. However, the capitalist knows that a worker, like any human being, cannot be worked to the point of extinction – otherwise there is no source of profit. And as much as the worker detests the capitalist, she knows that she may well be out of a job if the capitalist is unable to earn any profit. The two antagonists recognise each other’s existence, even as they battle against each another. But when class relations are structured along racial lines even the most basic level of recognition is blocked, since when the other is seen as black it is not ‘seen’ at all.

Since consciousness of self and identity-formation depend on recognition by the other, its absence produces an existential crisis. In Hegel’s text, the slave obtains ‘a mind of his own’;[29] but when the slave is black the lack of recognition blocks the formation of an independent self-consciousness. The general class struggle does not lead immediately to consciousness of self when the slave is black. Instead, the slave aspires for ‘values secreted by the masters’.[30] Denied recognition, but hungering for it all the same, the slave tries to mimic the white. She has an inferiority complex. But her efforts are futile, since no recognition will be forthcoming so long as the class relation is configured along racial lines. This is a veritable hell, since her veryconsciousness is dependent on the will of the master. We have reached a level of reification of consciousness that would startle even Lukács. There seems to be no way out if the master totally dominates the verymind of the oppressed. So what is to be done? The black slave must turn away from the master andface her own kind. She makes use of the socially constructed attributes of race to forge bonds of solidarity with others like her.Only then does the master’s dominance begin to be seriously challenged. Through social solidarity born from taking pride in the very attributes that are denigrated by existing society, she gains ‘a mind of one’s own’.

However, as Hegel notes at the conclusion of the master/slave dialectic, the slave’s independent self-consciousness does not overcome the diremption between subjective and objective. The achievement of subjective self-certainty brings to view the enormity of an objective world that it has not yet mastered. Hegel says that unless the subject confronts objectivity and overcomes this diremption, ‘a mind of one’s own’ turns out to be ‘little more than a piece of cleverness’.[31] Fanon’s argument in Black Skin, White Masks follows a similar trajectory. Fanon views Negritude – at least initially – as the pathway by which the black subject affirms pride in themselves as part of reclaiming their dignity. However, Fanon is wary of aspects of Negritude inBlack Skin, White Masks, since it tends to essentialise the racial characteristics forged by colonial domination. This is evident in Senghor’s statement that ‘emotion is Negro as reason is Greek’[32] – which, as Lewis Gordon has shown, is actually a phrase from Gobineau![33] Negritude runs the risk of becoming so enamoured of its independent consciousness that it turns away from confronting the social realities of the objective world. Identity-formation is a vital moment of the dialectic that cannot be subsumed or skipped over, but it also carries within itself the possibility of becoming fixated on its subjective self-certainty.

The struggle against racism is therefore not reducible to the class struggle; nor is it a mere ancillary or ally of it. The class relation is fundamentally reconfigured once it presents itself through the ‘mask’ of race. Like any good Hegelian, Fanon points to the positive in the negative of this two-fold alienation in which class and racial oppression overlap. Thrown into a ‘zone of non-being’, yet retaining their basic humanity, the colonised are compelled to ask what does it mean to be human in the very course of the struggle. To be sure, they do so by taking pride in the racial attributes created by a racist society. But since it is society, and not nature or ‘being’ that creates these attributes, the subject can cast them off once it obtains the recognition it is striving for. However, this result is by no means predetermined. There is always a risk that the subject will treat socially constructed attributes as ontological verities. Fixation is a serious risk. It is easy to get trapped in the particular, but there is no way to the universal without it.

The nuances of this position are addressed in a striking manner in Fanon’s critique of Sartre’s view of Negritude. Although Sartre praised Negritude in Black Orpheus, he referred to it as a ‘weak stage’ of the dialectic that must give way to the ‘concrete’ and ‘universal’ fight of the proletariat. Fanon is extremely dismayed by Sartre’s position, stating, ‘The generation of young Black poets has just been dealt a fatal blow.’[34] Fanon rejects the claim that racial pride is a mere way station on the road to confronting the ‘real’ issue – proletarian revolution. He credits Sartre for ‘recalling the negative side’ of the Black predicament, ‘but he forgot that this negativity draws its value from a virtually substantial absoluity’.[35] As against Sartre’s effort to relativise the moment of black consciousness, Fanon contends, ‘this born Hegelian, had forgotten that consciousness needs to get lost in the night of the absolute.’[36] Claims to liberation cannot find their voice if they are treated as arbitrary; they must present themselves in absolute terms (‘I am nothing and I should be everything!’). But since the black subject inhabits a ‘zone of non-being’, its absolute is imbued withnegativity. Hence, consciousness of selfin this context contains the potential to reach out beyond itself, toward universal human emancipation.

It is not just that negativity is the font from which the individual is impelled toward the positive. It is that upon being subjected to absolute denial and lack of recognition, the individual finds it necessary to draw upon the substantial reservoir of hidden meaning that it possess as a human subject. ‘That which has been shattered is rebuilt and constructed by the intuitive lianas of my hands.’[37]

Sartre’s problem was not in viewing Negritude as a particular, but in rushing too fast to get past it. By the time he writes The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon is long past it as well. But he does not leap there like a shot out of a pistol. Heendures the labour of the negative – by dwelling on the specific ways in which the colonised subject can make its subjectivity known in a world that has become totally indifferent to it. Fanon never takes his eyes off the creation of the positive from out of the negative, of absolute positivity from out of absolute negation, of a new humanism from out of total dehumanisation. As Alice Cherki has noted, he was an incurable humanist.[38]

Given the aborted and unfinished revolutions of his time and since, Fanon’s insistence on neither getting stuck in the particular – that is, pride in one’s race and ethnicity (the mark of identity politics) – nor skipping over it in the name of affirming an abstract, colour-blind advocacy of ‘proletarian revolution’, takes on new significance. Hubert Harrison’s conception (voiced in the 1920s) that struggles of African-Americans against racism represent the ‘touchstone’ of American society[39] – later re-cast in Raya Dunayevskaya’s Marxist-Humanist conception of Black masses as the vanguard of US freedom struggles[40] – reflects a similar understanding of the relation of race and class to that which we find within Fanon’s lifelong effort to grasp their dialectical interconnection.

In some respects, the debate between Fanon and Sartre is being replayed today, as seen in the impatience of some on the left who urge anti-racist activists to ‘get to the real issue’ – as if that were the state of the economy. This is not to deny that the economy is of central importance. But so is the psychic impact of racism and discrimination upon the inner-life of the individual. It is only by approaching those struggling for freedom from the particular nexus-point that defines their lived experience as potentially revolutionary subjects that we can work out the difficult question of how to surmount the matrix of contradictions that define modern capitalism. Just as there is no road to the universal that gets stuck in the particular, there is no reaching-it that rushes over the particular.

 

III.

The fullest expression of these insights is found in The Wretched of the Earth, whose focus is the actual dialectics of revolution – the struggle for national culture and independence against colonialism. One of its central themes is the ‘Manichean divide’ that defines the colonial experience. So great is this divide between coloniser and colonised that Fanon speaks of them as if they were two ‘species’. It would appear that the racial divide is decisive, replacing class dominance as the deciding factor. For some commentators, Fanon’s discussion of the Manichean divide indicates that he has rejected or supplanted the Marxian view of class.[41] However, the appearance is deceptive. First, Fanon is not endorsing this divide; he is describing it. Second, he does not pose this divide as stable or impermeable. As the revolutionary struggle progresses, he shows, it begins to fall apart. He writes,

The people then realize that national independence brings to light multiple realities that in some cases are divergent and conflicting … it leads the people to replace an overall undifferentiated nationalism with social and economic consciousness. The people who in the early days of the struggle had adopted the primitive Manicheanism of the colonizer – Black versus White, Arab versus Infidel – realize en route that some blacks can be whiter than the whites … The species is splitting up before their very eyes … Some members of the colonialist population prove to be closer, infinitely closer, to the nationalist struggle than certain native sons. The racial and racist dimension is transcended on both sides.[42]

We see here how the struggle for national liberation unites the people and breaks apart the racial dichotomies that define colonialism, thereby pointing the way to the death of race and racialism as socially defining features.

Clearly, Fanon does not set aside class relations in his critique of colonialism. James Yaki Sayles, a New Afrikan political prisoner who spent 33 years in a maximum-security prison and wrote what I consider to be one of the most profound studies of The Wretched of the Earth, put it this way: ‘The existence of Manichean thinking doesn’t make economic relationships secondary to “racial” ones – it does exactly what it’s supposed to do: It masks and mystifies the economic relationships … but doesn’t undermine their primacy.’[43] He adds, ‘When Fanon talks about the “species” breaking up before our eyes … he’s talking about the breakup of “races” themselves – the “races” which were constructed as part of the construction of world capitalism, and which must first be deconstructed along with the deconstruction of capitalism.’[44]

Does this mean that Fanon adopts Sartre’s position in Black Orpheus that class is primary and race a ‘minor term’ by the time of writingTheWretched of the Earth?[45] That may seem to be the case, since racial identity is not its guiding or central theme; it is instead the struggle for national liberation and the need to transcend its confines. Yet this is precisely what undermines any claim that he has changed the position outlined inBlack Skin, White Masks. In it Fanon also connects racism to class relations by pointing to the economic factors that drive its social construction. And in that work he also poses the deconstruction of race as the essential precondition of a new humanism. As he so poignantly put it, ‘Because it is a systematic negation of the other person, and a furious determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question constantly: “In reality, who am I?”’[46]

Most important, Fanon held that while race is a product of class relations, which serves as their mask, it is not a secondary factor. While racereflects class formations, the reflection is not a one-way mirror image. The reflection is taken up in consciousness and performs a sort of doubling bymirroring its origin at the same time asreshaping it. Determinations of reflection are not passive butactively reconstructive. And since racial determinations are often not superstructural but integral to the logic of capital accumulation, efforts by people of colour to challenge them can serve as the catalyst for targeting and challenging class relations.

Whereas racial identity is the major focus in Black Skin, White Masks, national identity takes centre stage inThe Wretched of the Earth. But thestructure of Fanon’s argument remains very much the same. In both works, the path to the universal – a world of mutual recognitions – proceedsthrough the particular struggles of those battling racial, ethnic or national discrimination. This separates Fanon’snew humanism from an abstract humanism that skips over the lived experience of actual subjects of revolt.

As Fanon sees it, this humanism can emerge only if the colonial revolutions transcend the bourgeois phase of development. He writes, ‘The theoretical question, which has been posed for the last 50 years when addressing the history of the underdeveloped countries, i.e., whether the bourgeois phase can be effectively skipped, must be resolved through revolutionary action and not through reasoning.’[47] Fanon is directly referring to the debates in the Second International prior to World War I and the congresses of the Third International in the early 1920s as to whether revolutions in technologically underdeveloped societies must endure the vicissitudes of a prolonged stage of capitalism. Building on the work of previous Marxists,[48] he emphatically rejects the two-stage theory of revolution, arguing, ‘In the underdeveloped countries a bourgeois phase is out of the question. A police dictatorship or a caste of profiteers may very well be the case but a bourgeois society is doomed to failure.’[49] This advocacy of permanent revolution was a very radical position. It was not put forth by any of the political tendencies leading the African revolutions, Algeria included. Even Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré refrained from such wholesome condemnations of the national bourgeoisie. Fanon was nevertheless insistent on this point in prophetically arguing that if they did not ‘skip’ the phase of bourgeois nationalism, the African revolutions would revert to intra-state conflict, tribalism and religious fundamentalism.

How, then, did he envision bypassing the capitalist stage? Central to this was his view of the peasantry. The peasants tend to be neglected by the national bourgeoisie, which is based in the cities. They constitute the majority of the populace, vastly outnumbering the working class and petty-bourgeoisie. Although they are not included in the agenda of the nationalist parties, they turn out to be the most revolutionary. Fanon insists, ‘But it is obvious that in the colonial countries only the peasantry is revolutionary.’[50] This is surely an exaggeration, which does not take into account the pivotal role of the Nigerian labour movement in the struggle for national independence, let alone the situation in countries like South Africa (where the labour movement later proved instrumental in forcing the elimination of apartheid). Although Fanon is painting with all-too-broad a brush, his view of the peasantry is not without merit. He argued that since most of the newly independent states in Africa had not undergone industrialisation on a large scale, the working class could not present itself as a cohesive and compact force. It has not been socialised by the concentration and centralisation of capital. The working class is dispersed, divided and relatively weak. The peasantry, on the other hand, is socialised and relatively strong precisely because it has been largely untouched by capitalist development. Their communal traditions and social formations remain intact. They think and act like a cohesive group. Theylive the Manichaean divide that separates them from the coloniser. Hence, the message of the revolution ‘always finds a response among them’.[51] They are therefore unlikely to put their guns away and enable the bourgeoisie to lord over them.

This issue of permanent revolution is also the context for understanding Fanon’s view of revolutionary violence. He did not subscribe (contra Arendt and others) to any ‘metaphysics of violence’. His advocacy of violence washistorically specific. He argued that a people armed would not only be better equipped to evict the colonialists; most importantly, it is needed to help push the revolution beyond the boundaries set by the national bourgeoisie after the achievement of independence. It is no accident that one of the first demands of the leaders of the newly independent states was for the masses to give up their arms – the presence of which could impede their embrace of neocolonialism. Fanon also emphasised the need for adecentralised as against a centralised political and economic apparatus that could succeed in directly drawing the masses into running the affairs of society – including the most downtrodden among them, like the peasantry. He warned against adopting the model of statist Five-Year Plans and advocated support for cooperatives and other autonomous ventures. No less significantly, he argued strenuously against a single-party state on the grounds that, ‘The single party is the modern form of the bourgeois dictatorship – stripped of mask, makeup, and scruples, cynical in every respect.’[52] He conceived of parties in terms of ‘an organism through which the people exercise their authority and express their will’ and not as a hierarchical, stratified force standing above them. Most importantly, he emphasised the critical role of consciousness and revolutionary education in providing the most indispensable condition of socialist transformation – overcoming the depersonalisation of the colonised subject. He wrote,

It is commonly thought with criminal flippancy that to politicize the masses means from time to time haranguing them with a major political speech … But political education means opening up the mind, awakening the mind, and introducing it to the world. It is, as Césaire said, ‘To invent the souls of men.’[53]

Needless to say, Fanon’s strictures were not followed by the leaders of the national independence struggles, who found a comfortable place for themselves within the framework of the bourgeois phase of development – even when (indeed especially when!) they anointed their rule as some form of ‘socialism’. But were there  the material conditions present at that time which could have enabled the African revolutions to bypass the bourgeois phase? I am not referring solely to conditions of economic backwardness or underdevelopment, since these would not be decisive barriers if the newly independent nations were in the position to receive aid and support from the workers of the technologically developed world. Marx, after all, held at the end of his life that economically backward Russia could bypass a capitalist stage of development if a revolution centred on the peasantry linked up with proletarian revolutions in the West.[54] Yet in the context of the African revolutions of the 1950s and ’60s, such aid could not be expected – in large measure because forces like the French Communist and Socialist parties disgracefully supported French imperialism’s war against the Algerian Revolution (something that major left-intellectuals inside and outside the French CP at the time, such as Althusser and Foucault, never managed to find time to condemn).

This problem consumed Fanon’s attention in the final years of his life, and marks one of the most controversial aspects of his legacy. In the face of the failure of the established French leftist parties to support Algeria’s struggle for independence (with which he became openly identified by 1955), he issued a series of sharp critiques of the working class for failing to fulfil its historic mission. He writes,

The generalized and sometimes truly bloody enthusiasm that has marked the participation of French workers and peasants in the war against the Algerian people has shaken to its foundations the myth of an effective opposition between the people and the government … The war in Algeria is being waged conscientiously by all Frenchmen and the few criticisms expressed up to the present time by a few individuals mention only certain methods which ‘are precipitating the loss of Algeria.’[55]

In a colonial country, it used to be said, there is a community of interests between the colonized people and the working class of the colonialist country. The history of the wars of liberation waged by the colonized peoples is the history of the non-verification of this thesis.[56]

These statements are often taken as proof that Fanon dismissed the revolutionary potential of the working class tout court. However, only a year later Fanon stated in another piece forEl Moudjahid, ‘the dialectical strengthening that occurs between the movement of liberation of the colonized peoples and the emancipatory struggle of the exploited working class of the imperialist countries is sometimes neglected, and indeed forgotten.’[57] Might he have had himself in mind? He now considerably revises his earlier position, as he speaks of ‘the internal relation … that unites the oppressed peoples to the exploited masses of the colonialist countries’.[58] And as The Wretched of the Earth (written a few years later) clearly shows, he did not close the door to the possibility that the working classmight fulfil its historic mission even while criticising it for not yet having done so:

The colossal task, which consists of reintroducing man into the world, man in his totality, will be achieved with the crucial help of the European masses who would do well to confess that they have rallied behind the position of our common masters on colonial issues. In order to do this, the European masses must first of all decide to wake up, put on their thinking caps and stop playing the irresponsible game of Sleeping Beauty.[59]

Nevertheless, the hoped-for aid from the workers of the industrially-developed West never arrived – notwithstanding the heroic efforts of numerous individuals in France and elsewhere who spoke out in favour of the independence of the African colonies. In lieu of any significant support from the industrially-developed West, how were the African Revolutions going to obtain the resources needed to sustain genuine independence, let alone move further towards the creation of a socialist society?

Fanon responded by turning his energies to Africa as a whole. This is reflected in his decision to become a roving ambassador for Algeria’s FLN, travelling to over a dozen countries pushing for an ‘African Legion’ to come to the aid of the Algerian struggle and revolutions elsewhere on the continent. It is also reflected in his effort to create a ‘southern front’ of the Algerian struggle by procuring a route for the shipment of arms and other materiel from Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Niger. Concerned that the French might strike a rotten compromise with the FLN to keep it within its neocolonial orbit, he was trying to radicalise both the Algerian and sub-Saharan struggles by cementing closer relations between them.

It may be true, as Adam Shatz has recently argued, that Fanon’s efforts were rather quixotic, since ‘the southern Sahara had never been an important combat zone for the FLN, and there was little trust between the Algerians and the desert tribes.’[60] However, this should not cause us to lose sight of his broader effort to convey the militancy of the Algerian struggle ‘to the four corners of Africa’ as part of rejecting any compromise with capitalism. As Fanon put it, the task is ‘To turn the absurd and the impossible inside out and hurl a continent against the last ramparts of colonial power.’[61] This was no mere rhetorical declaration, since he spent the last several years of his life working incessantly to coordinate activity between the various revolutionary movements in Africa. He forthrightly stated, ‘For nearly three years I have been trying to bring the misty idea of African unity out of the subjectivist bog of the majority of its supporters. African Unity is a principle on the basis of which it is proposed to achieve the United States of Africa without passing through the middle-class chauvinistic phase…’ In case there is any doubt about the provenance of this embrace of permanent revolution, he states on the same page: ‘We must once again come back to the Marxist formula. The triumphant middle classes are the most impetuous, the most enterprising, the most annexationist in the world.’[62]

For Fanon ‘it is no longer possible to advance by regions … [Africa] must advance in totality.’ The key to that, he held, was Congo – since ‘a unified Congo having at its head a militant anticolonialist [Patrice Lumumba] constituted a real danger for South Africa’.[63] For if South Africa, the most industrially-developed country in Africa, was brought into the orbit of revolution, the material conditions might be at hand to push the continent as a whole beyond the confines of capitalist development.

Despite their verbal commitment to Pan-Africanism, virtually all the leaders of the newly independent states – including the most radical among them – were more interested in gaining acceptance and aid from the major world powers than in promoting pan-African unity. Close as he was in many respects to Nkrumah, Fanon was embittered at Ghana’s failure to provide material aid to Lumumba in the Congo, and he grew increasingly embittered at the failure of the African Legion to get off the ground. It became clear that for the new leaders of independent Africa, the way forward was to ally with one or another pole of global capital – either the imperialist West or the so-called ‘communist’ East. Fanon was opposed to this approach.

It [is] commonly thought that the time has come for the world, and particularly for the Third World, to choose between the capitalist system and the socialist system. The underdeveloped countries … must, however, refuse to get involved in such rivalry. The Third World must not be content to define itself in relation to values that preceded it. On the contrary, the underdeveloped countries must endeavor to focus on their very own values as well as methods and style specific to them. The basic issue with which we are faced is not the unequivocal choice between socialism and capitalism such as they have been defined by men from different continents and different periods of time.[64]

Fanon was clearly not satisfied with existing ‘socialist’ societies ‘as they have been defined’. He was aware of their deficiencies. But this does not mean that he conducted a thorough analysis of them or acknowledged their class basis and thoroughly oppressive character. This is unfortunate, since it has led some followers of Fanon to whitewash their crimes, which has only fed into the general discrediting of the Left for supporting regimes which were as exploitative of their working class as imperialist ones. No less importantly, the lack of a thoroughgoing critique of ‘Soviet-type’ societies on Fanon’s part rendered his effort to conceive of the transcendence of the bourgeois phase somewhat abstract and even quixotic, since it was left unclear how technologically underdeveloped societies might skip the bourgeois phase if they could not depend on the beneficence of the purportedly ‘socialist’ regimes.

Fanon cannot be blamed for his rather inconclusive discussion of how to surmount the bourgeois phase of development in The Wretched of the Earth, since he was only beginning to explore the issue of permanent revolution and he passed from the scene only days after the book came off the press. However, we who today face the task of developing an alternative toall forms of capitalism – whether the ‘free market’ capitalism of the West or its state-capitalist variants – do not have that excuse. Fanon’s work may not provide the answer to the question, but it does provide resources that (in conjunction with the work of many others) can aid our effort to do so.

Today’s realities are of course far different than those that defined Fanon’s life and times – on an assortment of levels. But they also provide new possibilities for coming to grips with the problems he was addressing, especially at the end of his life. Fanon departed from the scene declaring, ‘Let us leave this Europe which never stops talking of man yet murders him at every one of its street corners, at every corner of the world.’[65] These words are hardly rendered obsolete by the fact that today many from the global South are trying to find their way into Europe, as is seen from the response of the European powers to an influx of refugees which is transforming the continent. It may turn out that the growing presence of the global Southinside the global North provides a material basis for thinking out new pathways to the transcendence of neocolonialism and class society, just as the racist resurgence that has accompanied it gives new urgency to working out the dialectical relation of race, class and gender anew. Fanon’s work will live on so long as these problems continue to concern us.

BACK TO ISSUE 26(2): IDENTITY POLITICS

References

Anderson, Kevin B. 2010, Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Basso, Luca 2015, Marx and the Common: From ‘Capital’ to the Late Writings,Historical Materialism Book Series, Leiden: Brill.

Bhabha, Homi K. 1999, ‘Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche, and the Colonial Condition’, in Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing Dialogue, edited by Nigel Gibson, New York: Humanity Books.

Bird-Pollan, Stefan 2015, Hegel, Freud and Fanon: The Dialectic of Emancipation, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Cherki, Alice 2006, Frantz Fanon: A Portrait, translated by Nadia Benabid, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Coulthard, Glenn Sean 2014, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Cox, Oliver Cromwell 1948, Race, Caste and Class: A Study in Social Dynamics, New York: Doubleday.

Debs, Eugene V. 1903, ‘The Negro in the Class Struggle’, International Socialist Review, 4, 5: 257–60.

Dunayevskaya, Raya 2003, Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre, and from Marx to Mao, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Fanon, Frantz 1967, Toward the African Revolution, translated by Haakon Chevalier, New York: Grove Press

Fanon, Frantz 2004, The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Richard Philcox, New York: Grove Press.

Fanon, Frantz 2008, Black Skin, White Masks, translated by Richard Philcox, New York: Grove Press.

Fanon, Frantz 2016, Écrits sur l’aliénation et la liberté, edited by Jean Khalfa and Robert J.C. Young, Paris: La Découverte.

Gordon, Lewis R. 2015,What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought, New York: Fordham University Press.

Harrison, Hubert 2001, ‘The Negro and Socialism: 1 – The Negro Problem Stated’, in A Hubert Harrison Reader, edited by Jeffrey P. Perry, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 1977, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Books.

Hudis, Peter 2012, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism,Historical Materialism Book Series, Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Hudis, Peter 2015, Frantz Fanon, Philosopher of the Barricades, London: Pluto Press.

JanMohamed, Abdul 1986, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in Colonial Literature’, in ‘Race’, Writing, and Difference, edited by Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Kwame Anthony Appiah, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lee, Christopher J. 2015, Frantz Fanon: Toward a Revolutionary Humanism, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Marx, Karl 1975a, ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction’, in Marx–Engels Collected Works, Volume 3, New York: International Publishers.

Marx, Karl 1975b, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, inMarx–Engels Collected Works, Volume 3, New York: International Publishers.

Marx, Karl 1976, ThePoverty of Philosophy, inMarx–Engels Collected Works, Volume 6, New York: International Publishers.

Marx, Karl 1977, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume One, translated by Ben Fowkes, New York: Penguin.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels 1983, ‘Preface to Russian Edition of the Communist Manifesto’, in Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and ‘The Peripheries of Capitalism’, edited by Teodor Shanin, New York: Monthly Review Books.

Parry, Benita 1987, ‘Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse’, Oxford Literary Review, 9, 1: 27–58.

Roberts, Michael 2016, The Long Depression: How It Happened, Why It Happened, and What Happens Next, Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Shatz, Adam 2017, ‘Where Life Is Seized’, London Review of Books, 39, 2: 19–27, available at: <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n02/adam-shatz/where-life-is-seized&gt;.

Wyrick, Deborah 1998, Fanon for Beginners, New York: Writers and Readers Publishing.

Yaki Sayles, James 2010, Meditations on Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, Chicago: Spear and Shield Publications.

Zeilig, Leo 2016, Frantz Fanon: The Militant Philosopher of Third World Revolution, London: I.B. Tauris & Co.

 

 


[1] Fanon 2004, p. 5.

[2] See Gordon 2015, Lee 2015, Bird-Pollan 2015, Hudis 2015, Zeilig 2016. See also Coulthard 2014.

[3] See Fanon 2016.

[4] For specific expressions of this, see Hudis 2015, p. 1.

[5] See Parry 1987, p. 33.

[6] See especially JanMohamed 1986 and Bhabha 1999.

[7] Of course, vital appropriations of Fanon’s work occurred in recent decades that were outside the purview of most postcolonial theorists – as by South African youth during and after the Soweto Uprising in 1978. The impetus for this came from the Black Consciousness Movement and not the ANC – which adhered (as it still does) to the two-stage theory of revolution, which calls for a prolonged stage of national capitalist development while pushing a socialist transformation off to the distant horizon.

[8] For a fuller discussion of these developments, see Taylor 2016.

[9] For more on this, see Hudis 2012, pp. 169–82.

[10] For a substantiation of these claims, see Roberts 2016.

[11] For a pathbreaking study that put forward this thesis, see Cox 1948.

[12] Marx 1976, p. 167.

[13] See Anderson 2010, pp. 79–153.

[14] Marx 1977, p. 414.

[15] See Debs 1903 for a classic formulation of this position.

[16] Fanon 2008, p. xi.

[17] Hegel 1977, p. 10.

[18] Fanon 2008, p. xv.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Fanon 2008, p. xii.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Marx 1975a, p. 186.

[23] Marx 1975b, p. 274.

[24] Marx 1975b, p. 296.

[25] Marx 1975a, p. 185.

[26] Basso 2015, p. 4.

[27] Fanon 2008, p. xiv.

[28] It is therefore no accident that one of the most commonly circulated posters during the US Civil Rights Movement was the simple – albeit enormously profound – statement, ‘I am a Man.’ Curiously, thousands of virtually the same posters resurfaced, in a new form, during the street protests against police abuse in Chicago, New York, and other cities in 2015 and 2016 – although many of them also read, ‘I am a Woman.’

[29] Hegel 1977, p. 119.

[30] Fanon 2008, p. 195.

[31] See Hegel 1977, p. 119: ‘Having a “mind of one’s own” is self-will, a freedom which is still enmeshed in servitude.’

[32] Fanon 2008, p. 106.

[33] Gordon 2015, p. 54.

[34] Fanon 2008, p. 112.

[35] Fanon 2008, pp. 112–13.

[36] Fanon 2008, p. 112.

[37] Fanon 2008, p. 117.

[38] Cherki 2006, p. 64.

[39] See Harrison 2001, p. 54.

[40] See Dunayevskaya 2003, pp. 267–73.

[41] See Wyrick 1998, p. 132: ‘In fact, Fanon believes that colonialism causes the Marxist model of base and superstructure to collapse altogether because economic relationships are secondary to racial ones. That is, the Manichean thinking on which colonialism depends blots out other distinctions, hierarchies, logical patterns.’

[42] Fanon 2004, pp. 93–5.

[43] Yaki Sayles 2010, p. 304.

[44] Yaki Sayles 2010, p. 181.

[45] Shatz thinks that Fanon had already reached this position by the end of Black Skin, White Masks (Shatz 2017, p. 20). However, Fanon’s emphasis on ‘reaching out for the universal’ and creating ‘a new human world’ is better seen as a concretisation of his insistence (in critiquing Sartre) that black consciousness is the mediating term in the movement from the individual to the universal.

[46] Fanon 2004, p. 182.

[47] Fanon 2004, p. 119.

[48] Alice Cherki, who knew Fanon very well, reports that the transcripts of the proceedings of the first four Congresses of the Third International, which debated this issue, held ‘a great fascination for Fanon’. See Cherki 2006, p. 93.

[49] Fanon 2004, p. 118.

[50] Fanon 2004, p. 23.

[51] Fanon 2004, p. 69.

[52] Fanon 2004, p. 111.

[53] Fanon 2004, p. 138.

[54] See Marx and Engels 1983, p. 139.

[55] Fanon 1967, p. 65.

[56] Fanon 1967, p. 74.

[57] Fanon 1967, p. 144.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Fanon 2004, p. 62.

[60] Shatz 2017, p. 26.

[61] Fanon 1967, pp. 180–1.

[62] Fanon 1967, p. 187.

[63] Fanon 1967, p. 192.

[64] Fanon 2004, p. 55.

[65] Fanon 2004, p. 235.

Marxist Interventions into Contemporary Debates

Ashok Kumar, Dalia Gebrial, Adam Elliott-Cooper, Shruti Iyer

For journal subscription and purchasing details, please go here. The special issue 26(2) is currently being printed, and will be available in July 2018. Individual copies will be available to purchase directly from Central Brooks (sasha@centralbooks.com).

ISSUE 26(2): IDENTITY POLITICS

2017 was, in many ways, the year debates around identity politics came to a head. No longer exclusively the stuff of intra-Leftist mudslinging, the contrived opposition between ‘class politics’ and ‘identity politics’ resurfaced in mainstream political and media parlance. After having spectacularly misjudged two of the West’s most significant political shocks of the decade – Brexit and the election of Donald Trump – talking heads were quick to blame the rise of the far-right on the crushing hegemony of ‘political correctness’. This discursive framework purportedly side-lined the so-called ‘white working class’ in its desperate, emasculating attempts to appeal to women, people of colour and other marginalised communities.

Despite the categorically bourgeois interests behind the UK ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’ campaigns, and the fact that, for example, lower-income Americans were less likely to vote for Trump than the upper classes,[1] both moments were prematurely framed as cries of revenge from white, working-class men: a category defined by class as well as race, and yet dispossessed not by capitalism but by a multiracial metropolitan elite preoccupied with showing superficial tolerance towards minority identities. White nationalist and former Chief Strategist in Trump’s White House, Steve Bannon, neatly summarised this framework – and its efficacy for his project of the so-called ‘alt-right’:

"The Democrats – the longer they talk about identity politics, I got ’em. … I want them to talk about racism every day. If the left is focused on race and identity, and we go with economic nationalism, we can crush the Democrats."[2]

Indeed, the set-up here becomes untenable for any serious, comprehensive Left project. The struggles of raced, gendered, sexual marginalities are situated in opposition to economic dispossession – which in turn, is experienced exclusively by white people, specifically white men, who curiously are not themselves implicated in a politics of identity-formation. In a further stretch of the imagination, the root of this economic dispossession is not located in the structural conditions of capital, but in the unjust squandering of resources on the less deserving – on migrants, people of colour and queer people. As such, resistance to this economic dispossession lies not in the dismantling of capitalism, but in the intensification of its racial and gendered violence: more incarceration, more detention and more jingoistic grandstanding. The implicit logic here is that the greater the dispossession of the racial and gendered Other, the higher the pile of scraps under the table of the capitalist class. Such a strategy effectively destroys all grounds for mass, anti-capitalist solidarity and resistance.

The original impetus for this Special Issue, which seeks to explicitly intervene in this contradictory discursive context, came in late 2015 – before the aforementioned political upheavals. It came in response to the Left’s ongoing internalisation of these terms, and the cycle of self-defeat it was leading to. Indeed, just as all identity categories are spatially and temporally contingent – socially constructed, yet naturalised – so too is this current bifurcation between ‘class politics’ and ‘identity politics’. This opposition is itself a constructed, naturalised, and – crucially – effective innovation of the Right’s many incarnations. It was clear to us that the Left’s failure to articulate a compelling, rigorous history of identity-formation and, by extension, identity-oppression as rooted in capitalist dynamics left a dangerous explanatory vacuum. Furthermore, it created an organisational culture of individualised, positionality politics that precluded the possibility of broad-based co-operation – a necessity in the fight against capital in its contemporary form. If only the personal can be political, then solidarity ceases to be desirable – let alone achievable.

Tackling this mystification of the politics of identity-formation, the politics of capital and their mutual constitution, is an urgent site of intervention for Marxists today. As many of the contributions to this Special Issue show, there has been a fundamental ideological concession in the discourse regarding the role and nature of identity: of what we are talking about when we talk about identity. Chapters by Chi Chi Shi and Annie Olaloku in particular elegantly demonstrate how the Left has abrogated the notion of identity as being materially rooted, and contingent on historical and geographical context. In its place, we see the hegemonic acceptance of an inherently reactionary alternative: one which perceives race, gender and sexuality as dearly-held, self-fashioning and self-justifying essences. Such a concession has not only reinforced the class/identity binary, but led to a stifled political imagination in which identity-based politics can only be conceptualised within a liberal-capitalist logic. The acceptance and valorisation of one’s identity as the both the start and end-point of politics leaves us with diversification within contemporary power structures as the only conceivable goal. Identity-based organising spaces have become an end in themselves, rather than being seen as part of the labour of building meaningful, constructive solidarity between oppressed groups. In turn, exploring one’s personal identity is no longer the beginning of a deeper, theoretical exploration of oppression and resistance strategies, but the political project tout court.

A form of identity politics that has always strained resistance-movements – one that conceals its roots in historical power-dynamics behind a fog of contradiction and homogenisation – has therefore emerged as dominant. This Special Issue aims to unpack this phenomenon, and begin to carve out alternative understandings of identity and its relationship to political economy. Specifically, the aim is to do this in a way that can effectively rise to the challenges of the contemporary world. It asks: how can we begin to understand identities such as race as not just – to extend Stuart Hall’s formulation – a ‘modality’ in which class, and therefore capitalism, is ‘lived’, but also one through which its power is continually made and remade? Most importantly, how can we use such theoretical formulations as the guiding principle of our organisational strategies?

Identity Politics and Neoliberalism

Marxists have long made a case for the analytical connection between the rise of a particular kind of dematerialised identity-politics and neoliberal hegemony. It is within this academic trajectory that this intervention sits.

The story goes as such: in the West, the late 1960s and ’70s saw the demise of a dominant form of capitalist production (‘Fordism’) – associated with high levels of employment, rising wages and increased welfare spending – all of which fed into a culture of mass consumption. The Fordist years are widely understood as a concordat between capital and labour, where the latter was allowed a minor share in the former’s gains. Neoliberal measures championed by Reagan and Thatcher, however, brought this ‘virtuous spiral’ to an end, and a new kind of political organising grew. Surin identifies two popular positions concerning the rise of this new politics – one is that spreading prosperity under Fordism rendered a class-based politics less indispensable for working people, allowing new forms of collectivity to emerge (the civil-rights movement, and feminist, peace, ecology, and gay-liberation movements).[3] The second prefers to see the growth of identity politics alongside neoliberalism as a quintessentially post-World War II American phenomenon, whereby a new multiculturalism emerged that was linked to the implementation of structural adjustment and Western-led humanitarian interventions. This operated as part of the US’s need to assert itself within a context of newly-emerging independent states in Africa and Asia, along with the internationalisation of the world economy.[4] In both interpretations, the identitarian conjuncture of the 1970s is situated as distinct from any iteration that may have prefigured it; it is a historical break in which the predominant political articulations dethroned a more conventional idea of class-based politics. This reading sees identity politics as emerging from a historical moment that opposes the development of a mass anti-capitalist politics, and, being symptomatic of this failure, cannot possibly generate resistance to it.

Many of these assumptions are reflected in the debate between Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, where the two competing goods are those of ‘recognition’ and ‘redistribution’. Recognition is the demand by oppressed groups that their distinctiveness be recognised, and the predominance of this vocabulary is occurring alongside the ‘decline in claims for egalitarian redistribution’ of material resources and goods.[5] The demand for recognition is seen as the only viable demand that can be made, in a world where a credible ‘feasible socialism’ does not seem possible, and there remain doubts about the viability of the erstwhile Keynesian social-democratic order.[6] Fraser identifies two problems with a politics of recognition – the first being that it displaces struggles for redistribution by remaining silent on economic inequality, and secondly that it reifies group identities in a manner that freezes them and offers no possibility of overcoming them. In this way, ‘cultural proponents of identity politics simply reverse the claims of an earlier form of vulgar Marxist economism: they allow the politics of recognition to displace the politics of redistribution’.[7]Fraser sees recognition as offering a valuable path for liberation, in that it can map-out a way to overcome the institutional misrecognition of oppressed groups (the status model), (i.e. racial profiling, homophobia, the stigma attached to single mothers, etc.) without valorising the specificity of the group itself (the identity model). In confronting institutionalised discrimination, politics centred around recognition offer the possibility of seeing economic inequalities as barriers to full citizenship and participation in social life, tying the oppression of identity groups into questions around the distribution of and access to resources.

In this sense, identity politics is positioned in a variety of Marxist frameworks as ineffectual; as a politics founded on difference, it is inherently incapable of building the broad-based movement needed to destabilise capitalism. These arguments rely on seeing identity politics as not just historically linked to the neoliberal moment, but a manifestation of a neoliberal logic itself. Under the thesis that neoliberalism is not simply an economic moment, or set of economic policies, but a logic unto itself – turning ‘all conduct into economic conduct’[8] – identity politics has been understood as a configuration of this neoliberal rationality. Where neoliberalism economises previously non-economic spheres and practices, the human being now becomes human capital, and ‘is both a member of a firm, and itself a firm’.[9] Indeed, according to Feher, the primary distinction between the neoliberal subject and the subjects that preceded her is that homo economicus is now concerned with enhancing its portfolio value in all domains of life.

So how might identity politics figure into this idea of neoliberal rationality? For one, as the Foucauldian narrative goes, the hallmark of neoliberal reason is competition, the market’s root principle. Political collectivities formed around insular, demarcated (albeit frequently-changing) identities might therefore be conceived as groups competing for representative primacy and limited resources. As Adolph Reed[10] and Walter Benn Michaels[11] put it, on this model of identitarian liberation, capitalist society is faultless for as long as, within the 1% that controls 90% of all resources, there is a proportional representation of women, racial minorities, and LGBT people. Touré Reed’s interpretation identifies discourses which lead to groups like Black Lives Matter presenting racism in policing and prisons as somehow separate from capitalism.[12] While he chooses a media interview from a BLM activist, rather than the material the movement itself produces (which is quite explicit about the links between capitalism and prisons), his critique speaks to a wider trend in categorising prisons as a ‘race’ problem, and universal healthcare and free education as offering a class-reductionist approach to social injustice. Much of this critique, articulated by both Adolph Reed and Touré Reed, is linked to their frustration with anti-racism overlooking the ways in which the Bernie Sanders campaign disrupts neoliberal hegemony. While groups like BLM are dissatisfied with Sanders’s position on policing and prisons, their aforementioned critics consider the commitments to healthcare, education and other social-democratic policies as a fundamentally positive contribution to struggles for social, economic and racial justice. This conception of identity politics also opens it up to critique on the lines of strategy – whereby collectives organised around the principle of difference will be reduced to trying to win concessions under capitalism for the groups that they represent. Therefore, since political affiliations organised around differential identity brackets cannot confront capital or class, it ought to be dispensed with.

Brown identifies this sort of despair as part of a neoliberal logic, that market institutions are unassailable and that there is no prospect of change.[13] Rather, these critics see identity politics as itself a manifestation of class politics: the class politics of a‘professional-managerial class’ which does not seek to dismantle class structures – considering this either impossible, or perhaps even undesirable – but seeks instead to ensure the representation of minorities among the capitalist class. Replacing an analysis that situates capitalism at its heart, the root of systemic injustice in popular discourse is then increasingly relegated to the ahistorical and individualising domain of ‘intolerance’ and ‘prejudice’. It is then no surprise that the rise of this mode of political organisation and, most crucially, political imagination, happens through and alongside the dismantling of unions and of the possibility of envisioning an alternative to a world thoroughly marketised.

This is not to reject all forms of identity-based movements as unfortunate mistakes – or worse, ‘false consciousness’. Indeed, even these critics admit to there being a utility to identity politics when leveraged against the state for legal remedies – but the contestation is that this strategic, or operational, essentialism must be only that – it cannot contribute to a political vision of liberation, or even one that sees anti-racism and women’s liberation as part of a programme for social justice. In part the claim is that ascriptive identities (like race, gender, or sexual orientation) shift from being understood as, to extend Stuart Hall’s formulation, modalities through which class is ‘lived’ and experienced,[14] to attributes of individuals that attach to them. It becomes part of their ‘portfolio’, categorising individuals on the basis of what they are rather than what they do. In this sense, identity operates as a commodity, whereby the historical specificity of racism and sexism’s emergence through and alongside a capitalist mode of production is mystified.

The emergence of identity politics is therefore also embedded in the liberal-democratic state, and the ability to mobilise around gaining concessions or formal rights from it. These are, in the liberal-democratic framework, intended to translate into material and symbolic equality. The precondition for this collectivisation, however, is the claim that the collective group is oppressed and has been injured in some way. Brown cautions that this approach politicises identity by re-entrenching its own pain, and its continued success is contingent on not overcoming this pain; in other words, the collective identification is premised on a past exclusion rather than the capacity to imagine future liberation.[15] Nair goes further, saying that the ideal subject of neoliberalism is a subject of trauma, and that the corollary, in movements, is a culture of confessing one’s individual trauma, necessitating a certain personal experience and fulfilling a demand for authenticity that is seen to stifle organising rather than creating the conditions for solidarity and effective resistance.[16]

The question remains, however: given their predominance in the contemporary moment, can identitarian movements be a viable part of anti-capitalist political formations? What character would they take, if so? Can identity collectives be predicated on their own eventual destruction, or do they necessarily solidify the formations they seek redress for? It remains unclear whether they offer no meaningful interim reparation, or that the moment of their emergence necessarily precludes these movements from taking on an anti-capitalist character. Of course, a politics of identity that is simply an extension of liberal democracy, and only conceives of itself in those terms, ought to be dismissed outright as having any revolutionary prospect (and, it must be added, they have no pretensions of having any). And as Surin points out, there have been a number of historical struggles that confronted economic dispossession in a way that has centred gender- and race-analysis as core modes through which such dispossession has been made possible (such as the Zapatista movement in the Chiapas, or the Wages for Housework movement). Perhaps it remains most useful not to see identity movements as having supplanted class-based organising, but as a development that is itself structured by a continuing class conflict, regenerated by the financial crisis of 2008 and continued through the political crises of 2016. But if identity movements are to have anti-capitalist energy, the abolition of class and identity distinctions will have to be part of their vision for the future, the society that they struggle for.

The Identity Politics of Whiteness

The critique of identity politics in recent years has been shouted loudest by the Right. Reducing a range of struggles which decentre the West, or overtly problematise whiteness, to matters of ‘identity’ is used to dismiss critiques of European imperialism and its legacies. Yet, it is the identity politics mobilised by the Right which has seen Empire recaptured in the minds of Europe’s citizens most effectively. Take the UK referendum to remain or leave the European Union, as a case-in-point: we witnessed the evocation of Britishness, and by extension whiteness, as an identity, mobilised through a range of signifiers and symbols.

While Britain’s political establishment was somewhat divided on the issue, those in the Leave camp seized the moment, in an unmasking of their tacit racism which was shocking to some. When Barack Obama made a presidential visit to Britain, urging it to remain in the European Union, Boris Johnson, future Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, remarked that Obama holds Britain in contempt due to his Kenyan roots. Combining an acknowledgement of imperial crimes with the ongoing nostalgia for Empire itself was perhaps only shocking as far as it was directed at the head of the old Empire’s most successful legacy. Yet it is Brexit which provided the antidote to both Britain’s post-imperial melancholia and the political correctness (now apparently thrusted upon Britain from a European, rather than a darker outsider) which dampens its proud legacies. The popularity of this white identitarianism was not missed by the press, hoisting the far-right politician Nigel Farage to public stardom. Even the often-liberal Channel 4 News invited Farage into the studio to discuss Empire, as the living survivors of Britain’s gulags in 1950s Kenya forced their old colonial masters to publicly acknowledge their crimes. Neither lawyer nor historian, Nigel Farage’s sole purpose was to posit an identitarian position, reassuring viewers that ‘white British’ was an identity of which to be proud, and importantly, an identity under attack. Flip-flopping between post-colonial immigration threats and those from Continental Europe was, and remains, a seamless transition. Farage’s UKIP demonstrated this with their flagship advertising campaign, which identified the apparent failings of EU migration policy with an image of darker-skinned migrants who have come from beyond Europe’s borders, falsely implying that it is EU membership which leads to migrants from beyond Europe entering the UK.

But, of course, herein lies the power of identity politics – even the most basic level of consistency can be explained away, with Leave voters citing a range of xeno-racist explanations from their position. From the threat of ‘radical Islam’ or the job-seeking Europeans, to the ominous slogan ‘Take Back Control’, with clear echoes to the equally nostalgic ‘Make America Great Again’ being sung across the Atlantic. Interestingly, both Brexit and Trump were interpreted by many on the liberal-Left as being part of a working-class (read: white working-class) revolt. The conceit that the xeno-racist bigotry of Brexit/Trump is the preserve of the (white) working class is not particularly new to the common sense of the liberal establishment. But the platforms afforded to the extreme-Right by the liberal press, as citizens in both the US and Europe went to the ballot box, points towards an encouragement of such a (white) uprising (in times of working-class dissent, the liberal media affirmed a dangerous historical precedent that it is the Right which has the knowledge and the answers). While the complementary relationship between liberalism and white racism has long been documented,[17] it is within this political moment that far-right and fascist forces, emerging from Europe and North America’s capitalist class, were presented as something quite different. Studies following the election of Trump and the British referendum on Europe clearly indicate that working-class people, racialised as white, were not the primary demographic driving these reactionary electoral outcomes.[18] A complex mesh of educational attainment, property-ownership, public/private-sector work, age and, of course, race, appear to be stronger determinants as to the position taken in these battles over identity.

Further-cementing of the white politics of identity became apparent with Prime Minister Theresa May’s post-Brexit international tour. Visiting Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States, the Conservative government enthusiastically championed more migration between these historically aligned white-settler colonies. No longer a colonial favourite, South Africa was left off the list of former colonies with which Britain wished to maintain such close ties. And while Modi’s India has been widely praised by Britain’s political class, his proposal for skilled migrants to be afforded more-open access to a post-Brexit Britain was swiftly rejected. Consistent with the rhetoric around international migration, the greatest indicator of how the identity politics of whiteness remains wrapped up in establishment politics is perhaps its foreign policy. While some commentators speculated that Trump’s election could lead to isolationism on the part of America, US aggression in Syria and towards North Korea suggests otherwise. As Sai Englert points out in his analysis of identification with Israel and the Trump campaign in this special feature, even the rampant antisemitism of these white nationalisms has done little to deter white identities globally, which continue to mark the international fault-lines which facilitate the settler-colonial project taking place in what was formerly Palestine. Indeed, the violence of white nationalisms which have emerged across Anglo-America since the Trump–Brexit alliance began to take hold may well be reproduced on the international scale. This should perhaps come as little surprise, for a movement which relies so heavily on a whitened version of an imperial past.

Identity Politics and the International

Beyond the Anglo-American context within which the editors of this special feature are situated, identity politics has also been mobilised across the post-colonial world. Two key examples are the principal regional powers in Southern Africa and South Asia: South Africa and India. In India, the identity politics of Hindu nationalism has gone further in strengthening neo-colonial capitalism and repressing the darker masses. While the BJP espouses a nationalism that, it often argues, is anti-colonial, in its harking-back to a pre-colonial Hindu culture it has in fact re-entrenched neoliberalism. Constructing an identity politics, it has imposed a school curriculum promoting Sanskrit, but also the literature of the Hindu-nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh organisation and a patriotic ‘Defence Studies’ used to legitimise BJP reforms. Like the far-Right in Europe and North America, the BJP has blamed the inequalities of neoliberal capitalism on liberal elites which favour national minorities, such as Muslims.[19] Thus, neoliberalism continues to shape the political economy of the subcontinent, with its reproduction cemented, and resistance to it repressed, through a populist party defined by identity.

In South Africa, on which Richard Pithouse writes, identity politics is continually mobilised to promote a black capitalism which has left the vast majority of black South Africans as impoverished as they were during apartheid. The ANC’s shift towards a neo-colonial capitalism has been masked with a rhetoric championing a black capitalism. The rhetoric of the latter is demonstrated through BEE, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003, the promotion of economic transformation to ‘enable meaningful participation of black people in the economy’ (Section 2(a)). It has, however, only reached a thin layer of South Africa’s black population,[20] particularly those with close links to the ANC government.[21] For example, the ANC-aligned owners of the wine industry have used BEE to avoid land redistribution and improvements in worker conditions.[22] Moreover, a BEE deal involving state forests in Komatiland had to be cancelled after the recipient, Mcebisi Mlonzi, was accused of paying R55,000 to Andile Nkuhlu, chief-director of the Department of Public Enterprises, before the deal was sealed.[23]

Frantz Fanon grappled with the pitfalls of the post-colonial state, as the black bourgeoisie serviced the former colonial masters, manifested in the enduring presence of white monopoly-capital in South Africa. As Paul Gilroy puts it, anti-racism prescribes us the pious ritual in which we always agree that ‘race’ is invented but are then required to defer to its embeddedness in the world and to accept that the demand for justice nevertheless requires us to enter the political arenas that it helps to mark out.[24]

Yet, in attempting to overcome such a contradiction, he affirms that identity should be the basis for our politics, not our politics in-itself. Thus, it is being racialised as black, and all that it brings, that provides the basis for the radical anti-racist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist politics of social movements in South Africa, and many other post-colonial contexts. Navigating this strategic deployment of identity is urgent in both the under and over-developed worlds. But rather than making clear divisions between them, this Special Issue instead focuses on the genealogies of identities, their relationship with the state and the extent to which they can help or hindersolidarities.

 

This Special Issue is organised into three sections: genealogies, the state, and solidarity.

Genealogies

We begin with Marie Moran’s ‘Identity and Identity Politics: A Cultural-Materialist History’. Moran analyses the relationship between economic transformation and political struggle by following the changing meaning and application of the word ‘identity’ throughout the twentieth century. Moran argues that the emergence of the central role of identity in social and political practice is an outgrowth of particular social forces and pressures. In this context, prior to the 1950s identity was discussed only by a small group of philosophers and in a fundamentally different way to how it has emerged in popular culture since the 1950s. Identity politics in its more contemporary form arose in the second half of the twentieth century as a direct response to the inequalities of the postwar consumer boom. In short, through the changing articulation of ‘identity’ and its move, over time, from the political periphery to its core, ‘identity’ in its current expression is both specific to advanced capitalism and a historical novelty.

In March 2016, at the height of her campaign for the White House, Hillary Clinton effusively tweeted about the ‘complex, intersectional set of challenges’ faced by the United States. Whether it was Clinton herself or a high-priced social media strategist behind the tweet is neither here nor there; what is clear is that intersectionality is now part of popular parlance and hegemonic discourse. In ‘Intersectionality and Marxism: A Critical Historiography’, Ashley Bohrer situates the emergence and proliferation of intersectionality against and within a Marxist-Feminist framework. These debates have rested on the antagonism between Marxism, which tends to cast gender and race as secondary or epiphenomenal to class, and intersectionality, in which class remains underdeveloped or absent altogether. Ultimately, Bohrer locates capitalism as the source of modern class, gender, sexuality, and race-based systems of oppression but does not position class as the primary or privileged axis of oppression. As such, an intersectional Marxism is necessary to both understand capitalist exploitation and oppression and mobilise to overthrow it.

Hannah Proctor’s ‘History from Within: Identity and Interiority’ is best read as a critique of the critiques of identity politics. It aims to break with some of the conditional reflexes in debates over identity politics, in particular the assumption that considerations of subjective experience somehow invariably reify liberal individualism. In this kaleidoscopic approach, Proctor delves into twentieth-century psychological texts that preceded the ‘age of identity politics’, drawing on seemingly disparate experiences to draw out the distinction between identification, recognition, integration and subjectivity. Proctor argues against Fraser and others that individual psychology is indeed interwoven with identity – and thus social relations – suggesting that cognitive capacities correspond to externally-manifest social attributes and material conditions. Finally, Proctor critiques a normative impulse in Fanon via Moten, explaining this latter’s politics of non-identity, non-recognition and non-‘framing’ (as against identity politics through a demand for recognition). Ultimately, Proctor helps complicate the contemporary formations of identity by exploring the political importance of interiority. In doing so she breaks with the linear understanding of the relationship between the social and the psychological – asking how the social informs the psychic and how the psychic informs the social.

In ‘Afro-pessimism and the (Un)Logic of Anti-Blackness’ Annie Olaloku examines the formation and limitations of ‘anti-Blackness’ as a theory and a practice. Olaloku understands ‘Anti-Blackness’ in its Afro-pessimistic formulation. In this dominant variant, the basis for ‘anti-blackness’ is a uniform, transhistorical and universal racial hierarchy, and static categories with white people at the top and black people at the bottom. In this social order, proximity to whiteness determines one’s place on the ladder. Consequently, the charge of ‘anti-blackness’ is mobilised against non-black people of colour. The theory and its practice, Olaloku argues, emerged due to number of factors including the collapse of diverse political traditions represented in the black-liberation struggles of the 1960s and the separation between domestic (anti-racist) and international (anti-imperialist) resistance. Through historical analysis, Olaloku wrenches back the Black Panther Party and Franz Fanon from the pessimists, reclaiming them for revolutionaries. She uses Huey P. Newton’s concept of intercommunalism, with its conception of race as historically contingent and its aim to abolish race altogether, as a rejoinder to theories of Afro-pessimism. Ultimately, Olaloku intervenes in contemporary debates through a critique of the growing Afro-pessimism literature, in an attempt to revive the idea of racial solidarity and the possibility of revolutionary politics.

The State

In ‘Feminism Against Crime Control’ Koshka Duff addresses the tension between the struggle against sexual violence and seeking justice through the criminalising state. How can the power of the state – perhaps the biggest single perpetrator of sexual violence – be wielded against perpetrators of sexual violence? Are we condemned to be either rape apologists or state apologists? To answer this, Duff disrupts these entrenched battle-lines by exploring the work of Catharine MacKinnon – known as the most important theorist and advocate of ‘Governance Feminism’. Duff, in a similar vein to Chi Chi Shi’s paper, situates these debates within the current of ‘identity thinking’, whereby a critique of the carceral state can reproduce its logic– which relies on a clear victim/perpetrator binary – outside the state, leading Duff to highlight the need for a more complicated engagement with a multifaceted and contradictory state.

In ‘The State, Zionism and the Nazi Genocide’, Sai Englert interrogates the relationship between Jewish identity, Zionism and official Holocaust memory, as shaped by contemporary identity-politics discourse. Englert describes two distinct but overlapping formations of Jewish identity, one shaped by and for the needs of the settler-colonial state and another constructed through political contestation. Englert argues that despite the rationale of preventing antisemitism, state-led antisemitism has resulted in the Jewish community’s identification with Israel and Zionism and a whitewashed reading of the Nazi genocide that obscures the role of Western states and capital.

Richard Pithouse’s ‘Forging New Political Identities in the Shanty Towns of Durban, South Africa’ sets up two conflicting paths to political power in South Africa – accumulation via the state (authoritarian nationalism organised around forms of clientelism) and accumulation via the market (racial capitalism). However, notwithstanding this conflict between elites, the mandarins of the state and the proprietors of capital found common ground against popular movements. To support this claim, Pithouse takes us through a political history of post-apartheid South Africa and the discursive disjuncture between the articulation of ‘identity politics’ by political elites and the exercise of popular politics by counter-elites or ‘ordinary citizens’. The result has been a deepening fissure between party politics and popular politics, and between established trade-unions and social movements.

Solidarity 

Peter Hudis’s ‘Racism and the Logic of Capital’ speaks to Fanon’s understanding of the production of race-class, and race taking on a life of its own. Rather than abandoning class analysis, Fanon expands it into a more relational understanding of society and change. The thesis that racism is ‘at the inner core of the dialectic of capital accumulation’ rests on two lines of argument: that capitalism emerged on the basis of the Atlantic slave-trade, and that the ensuing racism has had a unique impact on its victims by reaching down into a psychic level deeper than anything found in the relation between capital and labour. If the slave-trade is proof that racism is at the inner-core of capital, then the key question remains: can there be capitalism without racism, or was racism built into modern capitalism through certain historical events? Is racism truly essential to the operations of capital (on a par with the extraction of surplus-value), or rather is it a matter of contingent history? Alongside interrogating Fanon’s understanding of these questions, Hudis delves into Fanon’s critiques of the fixed and essentialising tendency of Negritude. Critically, Hudis’s article is an implicit argument against Afro-pessimist misreadings of Fanon and its relation to Marxism, and should be read as a companion to Annie Olaloku’s paper.

Lucy Freedman’s ‘A “Beautiful Half Hour of Being a Mere Woman”: The Feminist Subject and Temporary Solidarity’ observes the role of gender identity in addressing the contentious and seemingly-intractable debate over womanhood. Drawing on the poetry of Loy and experiences of gender-based activist groups, Freedman describes a world in which solidarity and identity have become antagonistic. Borrowing the concept of ‘soft abolitionism’, Freedman argues for a deeper analysis of temporality to find an alternative to the binarity of identity and identity-abolition. Freedman explores the relationship between class formation and gender-oppressed people, asking: when do women and others oppressed by gender move from being a mere collection of individuals sharing a common experience, toward a collective acting with shared interests to challenge and even abolish these categories? Freedman argues that a more malleable and temporary gender-identification could enable solidarity among women and gender-queer people. To Freedman, temporary gender-identification provides an answer to an impasse arising from long-standing contradictions in feminist politics – the tension involved in a choice between reifying gender or an undermining of its own basis for connecting subjects.

In recent years, debates over the political relevance of cultural appropriation have often served as a heated dividing-line between radicals and radical-liberals. In ‘Cultural Formation and Appropriation in the Era of Merchant Capitalism’, William Crane situates this question within the transition-to-capitalism literature to identify a place and time when the discourse of cultural appropriation went wrong. Crane historicises the emergence of cultural signifiers, taking the spice and textile trade of the Dutch United East India Company (VOC) and the slaves and sailors recruited by the VOC as early examples of cultural formation as a process of the appropriation of human labour. In this context, Crane argues, cultural appropriation is more appropriately understood as the cosmopolitanism of capital and labour.

Chi Chi Shi’s paper, ‘Defining My Own Oppression: Neoliberalism and the Demands of Victimhood’, addresses a central paradox of the form of identity politics that has grown out of neoliberalism, positing the question: ‘why do we look for recognition from the very institutions we reject as oppressive?’ To Shi, contemporary activist-circles maintain a contradictory position in their praxis. While ‘identity politics’ itself is derided, in practice identity, with its emphasis on experiential accounts of oppression, has become a barometer of legitimacy. ‘The collective’ conceived through intentional construction, as a product of agency and with a final aim towards dismantling the oppressions themselves, is now congealed through experiences of trauma produced by the structures of domination. From this, Shi unpacks how frameworks of ‘intersectionality’ – once introduced as a rejoinder to identity politics – have come to function as its new iteration. Here, differential identities are continually multiplied, flattened-out and naturalised in the name of representation and recognition – a process that sacrifices analytical depth for an unavailing form of breadth. The result of this political culture, organised ostensibly in opposition to these systems of oppression, is to make these social relations more durable.

At its core, the aim of this Special Issue is to intervene in what are make-or-break questions for the Left today. Specifically, we hope to provoke further interrogative but comradely conversation that works towards breaking down the wedge between vulgar economism and vulgar culturalism. We call for an intellectual and organisational embracing of the complexity of identity as it figures in contemporary conditions; being a core organising-principle of capitalism as it functions today, a paradigm that Leftist struggle can be organised through and around – and yet all with a recognition of the necessity of historicising, and ultimately abolishing, these categories along with capitalism itself.

Critically, this work is not new. Looking back at the legacies of our strongest points in history – from the Black Panthers, to Fanon, to radical queer interrogations of gender – we stand in a long tradition of reconciling the material and the symbolic as inextricable components of oppression today. We invite scholars and activists to review this history, and re-orient its questions to the present day. In particular, we invite people to engage with areas that we did not cover – particularly around the pressing issues of Islamophobia, sexuality and debates around digital technology and subjectivity.

Finally, this volume would not have been possible without the (often thankless) labour of dozens of scholars who served as blind peer-reviewers – we extend gratitude for their work.

BACK TO ISSUE 26(2): IDENTITY POLITICS

References

Benn Michaels, Walter 2008, ‘Against Diversity’, New Left Review, II, 52: 33–6, available at:<

Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2017, ‘Brexit, Trump, and “Methodological Whiteness”: On the Misrecognition of Race and Class’, The British Journal of Sociology, 68, S1: 214–32.

Bond, Patrick 2004, ‘The ANC’s “Left Turn” & South African Sub-imperialism’, Review of African Political Economy, 31, 102: 599–616.

Brown, Wendy 2015, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, New York: Zone Books.

Césaire, Aimé 2000, Discourse on Colonialism, translated by Joan Pinkham, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Du Toit, Andries, Sandra Kruger and Stefano Ponte 2008, ‘Deracializing Exploitation? “Black Economic Empowerment” in the South African Wine Industry’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 8, 1: 6–32.

Egan, Timothy 2017, ‘What if Steve Bannon Is Right?’, New York Times, 25 August, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/opinion/bannon-trump-polls-republica…;.

Fraser, Nancy 2000, ‘Rethinking Recognition’, New Left Review, II, 3: 107–18, available at: <https://newleftreview.org/II/3/nancy-fraser-rethinking-recognition&gt;.

Gilroy, Paul 1998, ‘Race Ends Here’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21, 5: 838–47.

Gould, Sky and Rebecca Harrington 2016, ‘7 Charts Show Who Propelled Trump to Victory’, Business Insider, 11 November, available at: <http://uk.businessinsider.com/exit-polls-who-voted-for-trump-clinton-20…;.

Gumede, William Mervin 2005, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC, Cape Town: Zebra Books.

Hall, Stuart and Paul du Gay (eds.) 1996, Questions of Cultural Identity, London: SAGE Publications.

Kinnucan, Michael 2014, ‘An Interview with Yasmin Nair, Part Two: The Ideal Neoliberal Subject Is the Subject of Trauma’, Hypocrite Reader, August, available at: <http://hypocritereader.com/43/yasmin-nair-two>.

Nattrass, Nicoli and Jeremy Seekings 2001, ‘“Two Nations?” Race and Economic Inequality in South Africa Today’, Daedalus, 130, 1: 45–70.

Reed Jr., Adolph 2016, ‘How Racial Disparity Does Not Help Make Sense of Patterns of Police Violence’, nonsite.org, 16 September, available at: <http://nonsite.org/editorial/how-racial-disparity-does-not-help-make-sense-of-patterns-of-police-violence>.

Reed, Touré F. 2015, ‘Why Liberals Separate Race from Class’, Jacobin, 22 August, available at: <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/bernie-sanders-black-lives-matter-ci…;.

Surin, Kenneth 2009, Freedom Not Yet: Liberation and the Next World Order, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Vanaik, Achin 2001, ‘The New Indian Right’, New Left Review, II, 9: 43–67, available at: <https://newleftreview.org/II/9/achin-vanaik-the-new-indian-right&gt;.

 

 

 


[1] Gould and Harrington 2016.

[2] Steve Bannon, quoted in Egan 2017.

[3] Surin 2009, p. 141.

[4] Surin 2009, pp. 142–6.

[5] Fraser 2000.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Brown 2015, p.10.

[9] Brown 2015, p. 34.

[10] Reed 2016.

[11] Benn Michaels 2008.

[12]Reed 2015.

[13] Brown 2015.

[14] Hall and du Gay (eds.) 1996, p. 51.

[15] Brown 2015.

[16] Kinnucan 2014.

[17] Césaire 2000.

[18] Bhambra 2018.

[19] Vanaik 2001, p. 55.

[20] Nattras and Seekings 2001, p. 66.

[21] Bond 2004.

[22] See Du Toit, Kruger and Ponte 2008.

[23] Gumede 2005, p. 296.

[24] Gilroy 1998, p. 842.